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Safe	  disposal	  of	  radioactive	  waste	  and	  spent	  nuclear	  fuel	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  major	  challenge	  for	  present	  
and	  following	  generations	  irrespective	  of	  the	  current	  and	  future	  scenarios	  for	  the	  use	  of	  nuclear	  power	  in	  
different	  countries.	  	  
	  
International	   efforts	   are	   underway	   towards	   the	   implementation	   of	   repositories	   notably	   for	   highly	  
radioactive	  waste:	  58	  countries	  signed	  the	  Joint	  Convention	  of	  September	  1997	  on	  the	  Safety	  of	  Spent	  Fuel	  
Management	   and	   on	   the	   Safety	   of	   Radioactive	  Waste	  Management,	   committing	   themselves	   “to	   take	   the	  
appropriate	  steps	   to	  aim	  to	  avoid	   imposing	  undue	  burdens	  on	   future	  generations”.	   In	   July	  2011,	   the	  EU	  
published	  their	  Council	  directive	  2011/70/Euratom	  forcing	  EU	  member	  states	  to	  establish	  programs	  and	  
schedules	   for	   the	   safe	   disposal	   of	   radioactive	   waste.	   The	   European	   technology	   platform	   IGD-­‐TP	  
(Implementing	  Geological	  Disposal	  of	  Radioactive	  Waste	  Technology	  Platform)	  clearly	  expresses	  its	  vision	  
“that	  by	  2025	   the	   first	  geological	  disposal	   facilities	   for	  spent	   fuel,	  high	   level	  waste,	  and	  other	   long-­‐lived	  
radioactive	   waste	   will	   be	   operating	   safely	   in	   Europe”.	   While	   some	   geological	   disposal	   programs	   in	  
countries	   such	   as	   Finland,	   Sweden,	   France	   and	   Switzerland	   are	  quite	   advanced,	   other	   states	  decided	   to	  
reconsider	   and	   re-­‐start	   their	   projects	   (e.g.	   UK,	   USA	   and	   Germany).	   Yet,	   the	   development	   of	   a	   widely	  
accepted	  concept	  for	  repository	  development	  which	  combines	  all	  relevant	  sociotechnical	  criteria	  within	  a	  
stepwise	  implementation	  approach	  remains	  a	  challenge	  for	  interdisciplinary	  research.	  	  
	  
Considering	  the	  time	  scales	  of	  many	  decades	  required	  to	  implement	  a	  repository	  from	  conceptualization	  
via	   initiating	   the	   site	   selection	  process	   to	   repository	  closure,	   it	   is	  obvious	   that	   science	  and	   technologies	  
related	  to	  nuclear	  waste	  disposal	  have	  to	  be	  developed	  further.	  	  
	  
The	   international	   conference	   “Key	   topics	   in	   deep	   geological	   disposal”	   did	   set	   a	   focus	   on	   the	   following	  
topics:	  	  
	  
1. Repository	  concepts	  in	  different	  host	  rocks	  and	  safety	  analyses	  	  
2. A.	  Governance	  und	  public	  involvement	  
B.	  Sociotechnical	  challenges	  and	  interdisciplinarity	  
3. Safety	  aspects	  of	  repository	  operation	  
4. Construction	  of	  technical	  barriers	  
5. Scientific	  aspects	  of	  the	  nuclear	  waste	  disposal	  safety	  case	  
6. Siting	  Strategies	  
	  
The	  conference	  provided	  an	  adequate	  forum	  for	  fruitful	  scientific	  exchange	  and	  a	  valuable	  instrument	  for	  
further	   improving	   multilateral	   co-­‐operation	   for	   mutual	   benefit.	   The	   program	   consisted	   of	   invited	   and	  
contributed	  presentations.	  	  
	  
This	   conference	   report	   is	   a	   compilation	   of	   extended	   abstracts	   and	   also	   short	   abstracts.	   It	   will	   give	   an	  
overview	  of	  the	  conference	  contents.	  
	  
We	  would	   like	   to	   thank	   all	   speakers,	   authors	   of	   posters	   and	   participants	  who	   have	   contributed	   to	   the	  
success	  of	  this	  conference.	  
	   	  






The	  German	  association	  for	  repository	  research	  (DAEF)	  represents	  leading	  research	  organizations	  active	  
in	  radioactive	  waste	  disposal	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SESSION	  1	  REPOSITORY	  CONCEPTS	  IN	  DIFFERENT	  HOST	  ROCKS	  
	  
Cigéo	  Project:	  The	  French	  Deep	  Geological	  Repository	  Project	  in	  
Clay	  Host	  Rock	  
	  
JEAN-­‐MICHEL	  HOORELBEKE1,	  ODILE	  OZANAM2	  
1Andra,	   National	   Radioactive	   Waste	   Management	   Agency,	   1-­‐7	   rue	   Jean-­‐Monnet,	   92298	   Châtenay-­‐Malabry,	  
France,	   jean-­‐michel.hoorelbeke@andra.fr;	   2Andra,	  National	   Radioactive	  Waste	  Management	  Agency,	   1-­‐7	   rue	  
Jean-­‐Monnet,	  92298	  Châtenay-­‐Malabry,	  France,	  odile.ozanam@andra.fr	  
	  
The	  French	   classification	  of	  waste	   is	  defined	  by	   the	  National	  management	  plan	  of	   radioactive	  materials	  
and	  waste	   updated	   every	   three	   years.	   High	   level	  waste	   (HLW)	   and	   intermediate	   level	   long-­‐lived	  waste	  
(ILW)	   are	   planned	   to	   be	   disposed	   of	   in	   a	   deep	   geological	   repository	   subject	   to	   authorization	   (Cigéo	  
Project).	   By	   law	   deep	   geological	   disposal	   is	   dedicated	   to	   end	   waste	   that	   cannot	   be	   disposed	   of	   at	   the	  
surface	  or	  at	  low	  depth	  with	  regard	  to	  safety.	  
	  
HLW	  consists	  in	  vitrified	  fission	  products	  and	  minor	  actinides	  from	  spent	  fuel	  reprocessing.	  Intermediate	  
level	  long-­‐lived	  waste	  arises	  mainly	  from	  spent	  fuel	  reprocessing	  and	  from	  the	  maintenance	  and	  operation	  
of	   reprocessing	  plants.	  The	  volume	  of	  existing	  waste	  was	  40,000m3	  of	   ILW	  and	  2,700	  m3	  of	  HLW	  at	   the	  
end	  of	  2010.	  The	  total	  prospective	  volume	  used	  for	  the	  repository	  design	  is	  estimated	  at	  70,000m3	  of	  ILW	  
and	  10,000m3	  of	  HLW.	  	  
	  
	  
Fig.	  1.	  Overall	  view	  of	  the	  disposal	  facility	  
In	  2011,	  the	  results	  of	  20	  years	  of	  R&D	  made	  it	  possible	  to	  issue	  detailed	  project	  technical	  requirements.	  
On	  this	  basis	  Andra	  launched	  the	  industrial	  design	  of	  the	  future	  facilities	  of	  Cigéo	  Project.	  A	  public	  debate	  




was	  held	  on	   the	  project	  during	   the	  year	  2013.	  To	   take	   into	  account	   the	   recommendations	  of	   the	  public	  
debate,	   some	   modifications	   have	   been	   proposed	   for	   the	   future	   development	   of	   the	   project:	   the	  
preparation	  of	  the	  license	  application	  will	  follow	  a	  phased	  evaluation	  process	  between	  2015	  and	  2017	  and	  
a	  pilot	  industrial	  phase	  is	  introduced	  from	  2025	  to	  verify	  in	  real	  conditions	  at	  least	  the	  operational	  safety,	  
the	  retrievability	  and	  the	  monitoring,	  first	  without	  real	  waste	  and	  then	  with	  real	  waste	  up	  to	  around	  2035.	  
A	  law	  defining	  the	  reversibility	  conditions	  should	  also	  be	  voted	  by	  the	  Parliament	  before	  Andra	  provides	  
the	  license	  application.	  	  
	  
If	   licensed	   the	   disposal	   facility	  will	   be	   implemented	   at	   a	   depth	   of	   500	  m,	   in	   the	   Callovo-­‐Oxfordian	   clay	  
layer	   (argillites)	   which	   has	   been	   investigated	   in	   the	   Meuse/Haute	   Marne	   Underground	   research	  
laboratory	  (URL).	  The	  underground	  facility	  will	  be	  located	  in	  a	  30	  km2	  defined	  area	  close	  to	  the	  URL.	  This	  
facility	  is	  planned	  to	  be	  constructed	  progressively	  along	  with	  waste	  delivery,	  over	  a	  period	  of	  about	  one	  
century.	  	  
	  
It	  will	  include	  dedicated	  disposal	  zones	  for	  IL	  waste	  and	  HL	  waste.	  Access	  to	  the	  underground	  facility	  will	  
be	  provided	  by	  vertical	  shafts	  (ventilation,	  mucking…)	  and	  an	  incline	  ramp	  for	  waste	  transfer.	  Two	  service	  
areas	   are	  planned	  on	   the	   surface:	   one	  of	   them	   located	  at	   the	   entrance	  of	   the	   ramp	  will	   be	  dedicated	   to	  
receiving,	  control	  and	  preparation	  of	  waste	  packages;	  the	  other,	  located	  vertically	  above	  the	  underground	  
facility,	  will	  support	  construction.	  
	  
Disposal	   cells	   for	   IL	  waste	   consist	   of	   horizontal	   tunnels	  with	   a	   500	  m	   length.	   The	   cross	   section	   of	   the	  
disposal	   tunnels	  makes	   it	  possible	   to	  stack	  waste	  disposal	  packages.	  Waste	  handling	  will	  be	  carried	  out	  
remotely	  because	  of	  the	  dose	  rate	  within	  the	  disposal	  tunnels.	  	  
	  
	  
Fig	  2.	  Disposal	  cells	  for	  ILW(left)	  and	  HLW	  (right)	  
	  
The	   depth	   of	   the	   disposal	   facility,	   the	   absence	   of	   exceptional	   natural	   resources	   and	   the	   favourable	  
geodynamic	  context	  provide	  for	  the	  isolation	  of	  waste	  during	  very	  long	  periods	  of	  time.	  	  
	  
The	  long-­‐term	  containment	  is	  essentially	  based	  on	  the	  favourable	  properties	  of	  the	  host	  clay	  layer.	  It	  has	  
been	  studied	  at	  the	  scale	  of	  a	  million	  years.	  Post	  closure	  safety	  functions	  are:	  (i)	  oppose	  groundwater	  flow;	  
(ii)	  limit	  the	  release	  of	  radionuclides	  and	  immobilize	  them	  within	  repository;	  (iii)	  delay	  and	  mitigate	  the	  
migration	   of	   radionuclides.	   The	   main	   geological	   properties	   governing	   these	   safety	   functions	   are:	  
geodynamic	   stability,	   geological	   continuity	   and	   thickness	   of	   the	   clay	   layer;	   low	   permeability	   and	  




retardation	   capability	   of	   the	   argillite;	   low	   hydraulic	   gradients	   in	   the	   considered	   area,	   etc.	   A	   number	   of	  
experiments	  were	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  URL	  to	  assess	  these	  properties	  at	  pertinent	  scales.	  The	  design	  of	  the	  
underground	  facility	  aims	  at	  the	  preservation	  of	  these	  favourable	  properties	  in	  particular	  with	  regard	  to	  
mechanical	   and	   chemical	   impacts.	   Underground	   experiments	   have	   being	   carried	   out	   specifically	   to	  
investigate	  the	  potential	  interactions	  between	  repository	  and	  host	  rock.	  
	  
The	  underground	  architecture	  of	  the	  repository	  contributes	  to	  its	  long	  term	  performance	  and	  robustness	  
(implementation	  of	  disposal	  drifts	  in	  the	  middle	  part	  of	  the	  clay	  layer,	  location	  of	  access	  shafts	  and	  ramps,	  
configuration	  of	  disposal	  zones,	  etc.).	  	  
	  
After	  operation,	  disposal	  cells,	  access	  drifts	  and	  shafts	  will	  be	  sealed	  and	  backfilled	  to	   fulfil	  post	  closure	  
safety	   functions.	   Significant	  work	   has	   been	   done	   to	   develop	   and	   demonstrate	   the	   capability	   to	   seal	   the	  
repository.	  
	  
Safety	   studies	   have	   included	   a	   number	   of	   iterations	   since	   the	   first	   French	   waste	   law	   in	   1991	   to	  
progressively	  optimize	  the	  conceptual	  design	  with	  regard	  to	  safety.	  The	  safety	  case	  provided	  by	  Andra	  in	  
2005	  showed	  the	  scientific	  feasibility	  and	  the	  long	  term	  safety	  of	  a	  deep	  disposal	  facility	  in	  the	  clay	  layer	  
investigated	  in	  the	  URL.	  	  
	  
Along	   with	   safety,	   reversibility	   of	   deep	   geological	   disposal	   is	   a	   requirement	   of	   the	   2006	   waste	   law.	  
Provisions	   are	   included	   in	   the	   design	   to	   enhance	   the	   retrievability	   of	   disposed	   waste	   packages.	   The	  
implementation,	   the	   operation	   and	   the	   closure	   of	   the	   disposal	   facility	   are	   conceived	   as	   a	   stepwise	   and	  
progressive	  process.	   Intermediate	  milestones	  will	   be	   identified	  until	   final	   closure	   to	   adapt	   as	  necessary	  
the	  conduct	  of	  operation	  and	  closure.	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Abstract:	   A	  methodological	   approach	   for	   long-­‐term	   safety	   analyses	   was	   applied	   in	   preparing	   the	   project	  
”Preliminary	   Safety	   Analysis	   of	   the	   Gorleben	   Site“	   based	   on	   the	   German	   requirements	   for	   final	   disposal	   of	  
heat	  generating	  radioactive	  waste.	  The	  approach	  included	  the	  description	  of	  the	  geological	  site	  and	  its	  future	  
evolution	   coupled	   with	   a	   range	   of	   possible	   waste	   emplacement	   scenarios	   using	   site	   specific	   repository	  
designs.	  The	  repository	  designs	  were	  developed	  to	  provide	  operational	  safety,	  long-­‐term	  safety	  and	  retrieval	  /	  
recovering	   of	   the	   waste	   to	   comply	   with	   the	   German	   requirements	   (BMU	   2010).	   A	   safety	   concept	   for	  
accomplishment	  of	   the	  radiological	   safety	  and	   its	  assessment	  was	  developed.	  Analysis	  of	   the	   integrity,	   fluid	  
flows	   and	   radiological	   consequences	   were	   done	   and	   the	   performance	   of	   the	   system	   was	   assessed.	   If	   the	  
present	  assumptions	  are	  confirmed	  by	  future	  research	  and	  development,	  the	  designed	  repository	  system	  for	  
drift	  disposal	  was	  assessed	  to	  be	  robust.	  Further	  optimization	  of	  the	  present	  drift	  disposal	  design	  is	  possible	  in	  
relation	   to	   gaseous	   radionuclide	   species	   and	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   technology	   of	   retrieval	   for	   the	   of	   borehole	  
disposal	  design.	  This	  site	  specific	  safety	  analysis	  identified	  important	  tasks	  for	  research	  and	  development.	  The	  
methodology	  and	  safety	  concept	  can	  be	  applied	   to	  other	   salt	   rock	   sites	  and	  can	  be	   transferred	  partially	   to	  
clay	  sites.	  	  
	  
	  
1	  Introduction	  	  
	  
The	   Gorleben	   salt	   dome	   has	   been	   discussed	   as	   a	   possible	   site	   for	   a	   repository	   for	   heat-­‐generating	  
radioactive	  waste	  in	  Germany	  since	  the	  1970s.	  A	  consortium	  consisting	  of	  nine	  German	  organizations	  lead	  
by	  GRS	  was	  contracted	  by	  the	  Federal	  Ministry	  of	  Environment,	  Nature	  Conservation	  and	  Reactor	  Safety	  
to	  perform	  a	  Preliminary	  Safety	  Analysis	  of	   the	  Gorleben	   site.	  The	  objective	  of	   the	  project	   “Preliminary	  
Safety	  Analysis	  of	  the	  Gorleben	  Site	  (VSG)”	  was	  to	  assess	  if	  repository	  designs	  at	  the	  Gorleben	  site	  or	  other	  
salt	  rock	  sites	  with	  a	  comparable	  geology	  could	  comply	  with	  the	  safety	  requirements	  governing	  the	  final	  
disposal	   of	   heat-­‐generating	   radioactive	   waste	   in	   Germany,	   implemented	   by	   the	   federal	   ministry	   of	  
environment,	   natural	   conservation	   and	   nuclear	   safety	   (BMU)	   in	   2010	   (BMU,	   2010)	   based	   on	   currently	  
available	   knowledge	   (Fischer-­‐Appelt	   et	   al.,	   2013),	   (Bracke	   et	   al.,	   2013).	   In	   addition	   an	   assessment	  was	  
made	   of	  whether	   the	  methodological	   approach	   could	   be	   used	   for	   a	   future	   site	   selection	   procedure	   and	  
which	  technological	  and	  conceptual	  considerations	  could	  be	  transferred	  to	  other	  geological	  situations.	  	  
	  
The	  objective	   included	  the	  compilation	  and	  review	  of	  the	  available	  exploration	  data	  of	  the	  Gorleben	  site	  
and	  on	  disposal	   in	   salt	   rock,	   drafting	  of	   repository	  designs	   and	   the	   identification	  of	   the	  need	   for	   future	  














2	  Project	  Structure	  
	  
The	  VSG	  was	  composed	  of	  four	  main	  working	  sections	  (Fig.	  1):	  
	  
	  
Fig.	  1.	  VSG	  project	  structure	  
	  
1. Basis:	  This	  topic	   included	  the	  geological	  description	  of	  the	  site	  and	  its	   future	  evolution	  over	  the	  
next	   one	   million	   years	   as	   stipulated	   in	   the	   safety	   requirements	   (BMU,	   2010);	   further,	   a	  
description	  of	  the	  inventory	  of	  the	  waste	  that	  could	  be	  emplaced	  in	  a	  repository	  at	  the	  Gorleben	  
site	   arising	   from	   the	   current	   situation	   in	   Germany,	   with	   its	   phase-­‐out	   of	   nuclear	   energy	   (June	  
2011),	  and,	  finally,	  generation	  of	  a	  concept	  to	  accomplish	  radiological	  safety	  and	  to	  demonstrate	  
its	  compliance	  to	  the	  BMU	  safety	  requirements.	  
2. Designs:	  Repository	  designs:	  Based	  on	  these	  fundamentals,	  repository	  designs	  were	  developed	  to	  
provide	  operational	  safety,	  long-­‐term	  safety	  and	  the	  ability	  of	  retrieval	  /	  recovering	  of	  the	  waste.	  
Two	  emplacement	  variants	  (emplacement	  of	  spent	  fuels	  in	  drifts	  or	  in	  boreholes)	  and	  three	  main	  
types	   of	   canisters	   (POLLUX©,	   CASTOR©,	   BSK3R)	   and	   one	   optional	   variant	   for	   additional	  
emplacement	  for	  non-­‐heat-­‐generating	  waste	  were	  considered.	  
3. System	   analysis:	   The	   long-­‐term	   safety	   analysis	   of	   the	   repository	   system	   was	   based	   on	   these	  
designs.	  The	  main	  features,	  events	  and	  processes	  of	  the	  repository	  were	  compiled	  and	  described.	  
These	  were	  used	  to	  derive	  scenarios	  and	  to	  assess	  the	  probability	  of	  the	  possible	  evolutions	  of	  the	  
system.	   The	   integrity	   of	   the	   geological	   barrier	   (containment	   providing	   rock	   zone)	   was	  
investigated	  by	  geomechanical	   analyses	   for	  one	  million	  years	   considering	   external	   and	   internal	  
events	   and	   processes	   such	   as	   erosion,	   glaciation,	   decay	   heat	   or	   gas	   generation.	   Similarly,	   the	  
performance	  of	  shaft	  and	  drift	  seals	  was	  analyzed.	  The	  radiological	  consequences	  were	  calculated	  
by	  numerical	  models	  for	  the	  transport	  of	  the	  liquid	  and	  gas	  phase	  (two	  phase	  transport).	  




4. Synthesis:	  The	   compliance	  of	   the	   repository	   system	  and	   the	   concept	   to	   accomplish	   radiological	  
safety	  with	   the	   safety	   requirements	  were	  assessed	  within	   the	  project	   synthesis	   report.	  Existing	  
uncertainties	   (e.g.	   due	   to	   the	   incomplete	   geological	   exploration	   of	   the	   Gorleben	   site)	   and	  
additional	  R&D	  needs	  were	  systematically	   identified	  and	  compiled	  (Fischer-­‐Appelt	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  
The	  methodological	  approach	  was	  discussed	  for	  its	  suitability	  to	  compare	  repository	  sites	  and	  its	  





3.1.	  Evolution	  prognosis	  
	  
Based	   on	   the	   geoscientific	   site	   data	   a	   prognosis	   of	   the	   future	   evolution	   of	   the	   site	   was	   performed	  
(Mrugalla,	  2011).	  Geological	  and	  climatic	  features,	  events	  and	  processes	  were	  considered.	  Future	  tectonic	  
activity,	  diapirism,	  subrosion,	  hydrology	  and	  climate	  were	  described	  and	  grouped	  into	  probable	  and	  less	  




The	   heat	   generating	   radioactive	   waste	   will	   be	   composed	   mainly	   of	   spent	   fuel	   elements	   from	   power	  
reactors,	   reprocessed	  waste	   and	   irradiated	   fuel	   elements	   from	   research	   and	   prototype	   reactors.	   As	   an	  
option	  negligible	  heat	  generating	  waste	  was	  also	  considered	  to	  be	  disposed	  to	  assess	  the	  feasibility	  of	  the	  
joint	  disposal	   in	  a	  separate	  area	  of	  the	  repository.	  A	  hypothetical	  amount	  and	  composition	  of	  this	  waste	  
was	   assumed.	   It	   included	   depleted	   uranium	   tails	   from	   enrichment	   (about	   35,000	  m3),	   graphite	   (about	  
1,000	  m3)	  and	  mixed	  waste	  (about	  15,000	  m3)	  (Peiffer	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  
	  
3.3	  Safety	  Concept	  
	  
In	  response	  to	  the	  German	  safety	  requirements	  (Bundesministerium	  für	  Umwelt,	  2010)	  the	  safety	  concept	  
for	  the	  project	  VSG	  was	  based	  on	  the	  following	  principles	  (Mönig	  et	  al.,	  2012):	  	  
	  
• The	  radioactive	  waste	  must	  be	  contained	  in	  a	  containment	  providing	  rock	  zone	  (CPRZ),	  i.e.	  part	  of	  
the	  host-­‐rock	  enclosing	  the	  repository	  together	  with	  geotechnical	  barriers,	  
• The	  containment	  shall	  be	  effective	  immediately	  after	  closure,	  
• The	  containment	  must	  be	  provided	  by	  the	  repository	  system	  permanently	  and	  maintenance-­‐free,	  
• The	  intrusion	  of	  brine	  to	  the	  waste	  forms	  shall	  be	  prevented	  or	  limited.	  
	  
3.4	  Repository	  and	  Barrier	  design	  
	  
The	   repository	   designs	   for	   the	   Gorleben	   site	   have	   been	   developed	   for	   three	   emplacement	   variants	  
(Bollingerfehr	  et	  al.,	  2012)	  with	  respect	  of	  operational	  safety	  (Peiffer	  and	  McStocker,	  2012).	  Measures	  to	  
mitigate	   the	   impact	   of	   accidential	   and	   considering	   human	   intrusion	   were	   investigated	   and	   evaluated	  
(Beuth	   et	   al.,	   2012a)	   according	   to	   the	   German	   Safety	   Requirements.	   The	   proposed	   measures	   did	   not	  
significantly	  change	  the	  repository	  design.	  
	  




• Variant	  A:	  As	  an	  option	  –	  emplacement	  of	  non-­‐heat-­‐generating	  radioactive	  waste	  in	  a	  separate	  
area	  of	  the	  repository.	  This	  variant	  was	  combined	  with	  the	  following	  variants	  for	  spent	  fuel	  and	  
high	  level	  waste	  (Fig.	  2).	  	  
• Variant	  B:	  Emplacement	  of	  heat-­‐generating	  radioactive	  waste	  (spent	  fuel	  and	  vitrified	  waste)	  in	  
self-­‐shielding	  waste	  containers	  (POLLUX©	  casks)	  in	  horizontal	  drifts	  (Fig.	  2).	  As	  an	  alternative,	  the	  
emplacement	  of	  heat-­‐generating	  radioactive	  waste	  in	  transport	  and	  storage	  casks	  (CASTOR©)	  in	  
short	  horizontal	  boreholes	  was	  considered	  although	  this	  required	  changes	  to	  the	  design	  of	  shafts	  
and	  underground	  transportation	  systems.	  
• Variant	  C:	  Emplacement	  of	  heat-­‐generating	  radioactive	  waste	  in	  multi-­‐purpose	  conical	  overpacks	  
in	  deep	  vertical	  boreholes.	  
	  
	  
Fig.	  2.	  Repository	  design	  for	  emplacement	  of	  heat-­‐generating	  radioactive	  waste	  (spent	  fuel	  and	  vitrified	  waste)	  in	  self-­‐
shielding	  waste	  containers	  and	  non-­‐heat-­‐generating	  waste	  in	  horizontal	  drifts	  
	  
The	   disposal	   was	   planned	   to	   allow	   retrieval	   during	   the	   operational	   phase.	   The	   technical	   solutions	   for	  
retrieval	  of	  overpacks	  in	  variant	  C	  were	  projected	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  A	  steel	  tubing	  (liner)	  of	  300	  m	  length	  
was	  proposed	  for	  disposal	  of	  the	  conical	  overpacks	  in	  boreholes.	  The	  void	  space	  in	  the	  liners	  was	  planned	  
to	   be	   filled	   with	   dry	   quartz	   sand.	   The	   conical	   shape	   of	   the	   overpacks	   for	   spent	   fuel	   and	   flasks	   were	  
designed	  to	  facilitate	  retrieval	  using	  vibration.	  	  
	  
Barriers	  are	  provided	  by	  geology	  and	  geotechnical	  measures.	  The	  main	  natural	  barrier	  is	  the	  geology	  i.e.	  
the	  Hauptsalz	  of	  the	  Staßfurt	  series	  (z2)	  which	  shall	  enclose	  the	  repository.	  The	  minimum	  thickness	  was	  
set	   to	  50	  m	  as	  planning	   criteria	   for	   the	   containment	  providing	   rock	  zone.	  This	   safety	  distance	   from	   the	  
repository	  to	  rocks	  other	  than	  z2	  as	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  the	  repository	  design	  shall	  include	  uncertainties	  on	  
the	  detection	  of	  geological	  layers,	  of	  cracks	  and	  fissures	  and	  on	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  EDZ	  (excavated	  disturbed	  
zone)	  to	  ensure	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  geological	  barrier	  in	  the	  containment	  providing	  rock	  zone	  (Mönig	  et	  al.,	  
2012).	  
	  




Geotechnical	  measures	  shall	  provide	  long-­‐	  and	  short-­‐term	  barriers.	  The	  long-­‐term	  barrier	  is	  the	  salt	  grit	  
backfill.	  Its	  initial	  high	  porosity	  and	  permeability	  is	  reduced	  continuously	  by	  compaction	  which	  is	  caused	  
by	  salt	  creep.	  This	  is	  a	  time	  dependent	  process	  and	  transforms	  the	  features	  of	  the	  salt	  girt	  to	  the	  features	  
of	  undisturbed	  rock	  salt	  within	  a	  few	  thousand	  years.	  This	  is	  the	  required	  minimum	  life-­‐time	  of	  the	  short-­‐
term	  barriers.	  
	  
The	  short-­‐term	  barriers	  are	  containers,	  drift	  and	  shaft	  seals.	  The	  main	  material	  for	  drift	  seals	  uses	  is	  sorel	  
concrete.	  The	  shaft	  seals	  are	  composed	  of	  bentonite,	  salt	  concrete	  and	  sorel	  concrete.	  The	  failure	  of	  a	  drift	  
or	   shaft	   seal	   is	   regarded	   as	   a	   less	   probable	   scenario	   within	   its	   technical	   lifetime.	   In	   addition	   the	  
infrastructural	  area	   located	  between	  shafts	  and	  drift	   seals	  was	  planned	   to	  be	   filled	  by	  non-­‐compactable	  
crystalline	   rock	   gravel,	   providing	   a	   large	  pore	   space	   storage	   for	   any	   solution	   seeping	   through	   the	   shaft	  
seals	  into	  the	  repository.	  
	  
3.5	  System	  Analysis	  
	  
A	  novel	  scenario	  development	  methodology	  was	  adopted	  in	  the	  project	  VSG	  (Beuth	  et	  al.,	  2012b).	  Based	  
on	  an	  updated	  FEP	  database	  with	   interdependencies,	  (Wolf	  et	  al.,	  2012b),	  which	  provides	  one	  reference	  
scenario	  for	  each	  repository	  design	  (horizontal	  drift	  /	  borehole	  emplacement)	  and	  a	  number	  of	  alternative	  
scenarios.	  The	  scenarios	  comprehensively	  cover	  the	  range	  of	  possible	  repository	  system	  evolutions.	  The	  
methodology	   allows	   the	   assignment	   of	   probability	   classes	   to	   the	   scenarios	   based	   on	   the	   regulatory	  
framework	   (BMU,	   2010).	   The	   individual	   scenarios	   are	   described	   by	   features,	   events,	   and	   processes	   (in	  
short:	   FEP)	   that	   determine	   the	   future	   evolution	   of	   the	   final	   repository	   system.	   FEP	   may	   initiate	   or	  
influence	   other	   FEP,	   be	   influenced	   by	   or	   resulting	   from	   other	   FEP	   (Wolf	   et	   al.,	   2012a,	   b).	   These	  
interdependencies	  were	   used	   to	   derive	   scenarios	   systematically.	   The	   reference	   scenarios	  were	   derived	  
from	   probable	   FEP	   and	   basic	   assumptions.	   The	   alternative	   scenarios	  were	   generated	   from	   violation	   of	  
assumptions,	  from	  less	  probable	  FEP	  and	  from	  probable	  FEP	  with	  less	  probable	  parameter	  values.	  	  
	  
Based	   on	   these	   scenarios	   an	   analysis	   of	   geomechanical	   and	   geotechnical	   integrity	   was	   performed	  
(Kock	  et	  al.,	  2012),	  (Müller-­‐Hoeppe	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  
	  
The	  dilatancy	  criterion	  and	  the	  fluid	  pressure	  criterion	  are	  the	  main	  criteria	  to	  assess	  the	  geomechanical	  
integrity	   of	   the	   rock	   salt	   barrier.	   The	   integrity	   of	   the	   salt	   barrier	   is	   only	   ensured	   if	   both	   criteria	   are	  
satisfied	  in	  a	  sufficiently	  large	  zone	  (i.e.	  CPRZ)	  around	  the	  repository.	  In	  this	  case,	  linked	  flow	  paths	  from	  
the	   water-­‐bearing	   horizons	   in	   the	   overburden	   down	   to	   the	   emplacement	   zone,	   as	   well	   as	   release	   of	  
hazardous	   substances	   from	   the	   repository	   itself	   (e.g.	   due	   to	   generation	   of	   a	   gas	   pressure)	   can	   then	   be	  
excluded	  from	  a	  geomechanical	  point	  of	  view.	  The	  mechanical	  and	  thermo-­‐mechanical	  simulations	  carried	  
out	  using	  a	  range	  of	  codes	  and	  material	  laws	  produced	  the	  following	  results	  and	  conclusions:	  	  
	  
• The	  emplacement	  of	  heat-­‐generating	  waste	  heats	  up	  the	  salt	  dome	  over	  a	   large	  volume,	  but	   the	  
thermally-­‐induced	  stresses	  and	  deformations	  do	  not	  generate	  any	  continuous	  migration	  paths.	  	  
• The	  highest	  thermo-­‐mechanical	  stresses	  affecting	  the	  salt	  barrier	  occur	  within	  the	  first	  hundred	  
years	  after	  sealing	  the	  geologic	  repository.	  Any	  loss	  of	  integrity	  of	  the	  barrier	  becomes	  much	  less	  
likely	  in	  the	  subsequent	  time	  period.	  Mechanical	  damage	  caused	  by	  exceeding	  the	  dilatancy	  limit	  
was	   restricted	   to	   the	   rock	   zones	   directly	   adjacent	   to	   the	   underground	   cavities	   within	   a	   few	  
decimeters	  up	  to	  3	  meters	  (EDZ)	  and	  rock	  zones	  at	  the	  distant	  top	  of	  the	  salt	  dome.	  These	  rock	  
zones	  at	   the	  salt	   top	  are	  of	  no	   importance	  with	  respect	   to	   the	   integrity	  of	   the	  salt	  barrier	  some	  




hundred	  meters	  below	  the	  salt	  dome	  top	  which	  constitutes	  the	  containment	  providing	  rock	  zone	  
around	  the	  emplacement	  fields.	  	  
• The	  thermo-­‐mechanical	  stresses	  calculated	  for	  the	  borehole	  emplacement	  design	  are	  higher	  than	  
those	  calculated	  for	  the	  drift	  emplacement	  concept	  because	  the	  heat	  is	  released	  in	  a	  smaller	  and	  
differently	  shaped	  volume.	  
• The	   integrity	  of	   the	  geotechnical	  barriers	  (drift	  and	  shaft	  seals)	   for	   their	  designed	   life-­‐time	  was	  
demonstrated	  by	  numerical	  calculations	  concerning	  geological,	  thermal	  and	  geochemical	  impacts	  
during	   their	   lifetime	   and	   by	   providing	   redundant	   and	   varying	   types	   of	   sealing	   systems	   in	  
combination.	  
	  
For	  the	  radiological	  consequence	  analysis	  (Larue	  et	  al.,	  2013)	  the	  radionuclide	  transport	  was	  modelled	  
using	   a	   2-­‐phase	   fluid	   flow	   analysis	   with	   TOUGH2	   (Pruess	   et	   al.,	   1999),	   and	   one	   phase	   analysis	   with	  
MARNIE	  (Martens	  et	  al.,	  2002).	  The	  design	  of	  the	  repository	  for	  the	  drift	  disposal	  was	  transferred	  into	  a	  
network	  for	  TOUGH2	  and	  for	  MARNIE.	  	  
	  
Even	  a	   failure	  of	   the	  drift	  seals	  did	  not	  result	   in	  advective	   flow	  of	  brine	  within	  or	   into	  the	  emplacement	  
fields.	  The	   infrastructure	   area	  backfilled	  with	  non-­‐compactable	   crushed	   rock	   (approx.	   100,000	  m³	  pore	  
space)	  prevents	  an	  increase	  of	  hydraulic	  pressure	  at	  the	  drift	  seals	  for	  approx.	  at	  least	  several	  1,000	  years	  
(„buffer	   storage	   effect“),	   which	   guarantees,	   that	   there	   is	   time	   enough	   for	   the	   salt	   grit	   compaction	   to	  
establish	  similar	  features	  as	  in	  the	  undisturbed	  salt	  rock.	  	  
	  
Using	   MARNIE	   no	   radionuclide	   transport	   by	   advection	   was	   detected	   in	   the	   liquid	   phase	   beyond	   the	  
containment	  providing	   rock	   zone	   (CPRZ).	  As	   a	   consequence	  any	   radionuclides	   in	   the	   liquid	  phase	  were	  




Fig.	  3.	  Activity	  release	  at	  eastern	  drift	  seal	  (reference	  case	  PV-­‐R3)	  
	  




The	  radionuclide	  transport	  and	  release	  via	  the	  gas	  phase	  from	  the	  CPRZ	  is	  relevant	  up	  to	  some	  hundred	  
years	  after	  closure	  in	  2-­‐phase	  fluid	  flow	  model	  calculations	  with	  TOUGH2.	  The	  compaction	  of	  salt	  grit	  and	  
metal	   corrosion	   with	   gas	   generation	   are	   the	   driving	   forces	   on	   the	   transport	   and	   release	   of	   gaseous	  
radionuclides	  (e.g.	  C-­‐14	  as	  methane	  from	  structural	  parts)	  through	  a	  drift	  seal.	  No	  C-­‐14	  was	  released	  via	  





The	   safety	   concept	   and	   the	   methodology	   of	   the	   VSG	   were	   compatible	   with	   the	   German	   safety	  
requirements.	  The	  generated	  designs	  of	  the	  repository	  systems	  were	  feasible	  and	  complied	  with	  the	  safety	  
requirements.	  Nevertheless	   some	  assumptions	  were	  necessary	  which	   refer	   to	   the	   incomplete	  geological	  
exploration,	   the	   reliability	   of	   construction	   and	   some	   inherent	   uncertainties.	   If	   these	   assumptions	   are	  
confirmed	  by	  the	  results	  of	  future	  R&D	  work,	  the	  designed	  repository	  system	  will	  be	  robust.	  
	  
Options	   exist	   to	   optimize	   the	   repository	   design.	   A	   repository	   layout	   such	   as	   placing	   the	   structural	  
components	  farther	  away	  from	  the	  drift	  seals	  would	  probably	  result	  in	  a	  lower	  C-­‐14	  flow	  through	  the	  drift	  
seals.	   Furthermore,	   implementing	   a	   void	   volume	   as	   a	   sink	   (e.g.	   an	   infrastructure	   area	   backfilled	   with	  
gravel)	   might	   hinder	   a	   gas	   flow	   through	   the	   shaft	   seals.	   The	   use	   of	   gas	   tight	   casks	   for	   the	   structural	  
components	   (like	   POLLUX©	   canisters)	   will	   ensure	   retention	   of	   volatile	   radionuclides	   until	   long-­‐term	  
confinement	  is	  provided	  by	  the	  compacted	  salt	  grit.	  
	  
Further	  conclusions	  are:	  
	  
• The	  preliminary	  safety	  analysis	  for	  the	  Gorleben	  site	  identified	  important	  tasks	  for	  research	  and	  
development	   (Thomauske	   et	   al.	   2013).	   This	   would	   have	   not	   been	   possible	   by	   a	   generic	   safety	  
analysis.	  Similar	  safety	  analyses	  should	  be	  repeated	  in	  time	  intervals.	  
• The	  methodology,	   the	   safety	   concept	   and	  proof	  of	   compliance	   can	  be	  applied	   to	  other	   salt	   rock	  
sites.	  
• The	   methodology	   can	   be	   applied	   to	   clay	   stone	   as	   host	   rock	   but	   the	   application	   of	   the	   safety	  
concept	  and	  proof	  of	  compliance	  is	  specific	  for	  salt	  rock	  and	  is	  probably	  transferable	  to	  clay	  stone.	  
• The	   possible	   release	   of	   gaseous	   radionuclides,	   two	   phase-­‐flow	   processes	   and	   modelling	   of	  
radiation	  exposure	  require	  further	  research	  and	  development.	  
• The	   mobilization	   of	   other	   pollutants	   and	   the	   heating	   of	   groundwater	   should	   be	   studied	   and	  
requirements	  should	  be	  specified	  in	  more	  detail.	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SKB,	   Swedish	  Nuclear	  Fuel	   and	  Waste	  Management	  Company	   is	   tasked	  with	  managing	  Swedish	  nuclear	  
and	  radioactive	  waste.	  Crystalline	  rock	  is	  the	  obvious	  alternative	  for	  deep	  geological	  disposal	  in	  Sweden.	  
SKB	  is,	  since	  1988,	  operating	  a	  near	  surface	  repository	  for	  short-­‐lived	  low	  and	  intermediate-­‐level	  waste,	  
SFR.	  The	  waste	  in	  SFR	  comprises	  operational	  and	  decommissioning	  waste	  from	  nuclear	  plants,	  industrial	  
waste,	   research-­‐related	   waste	   and	   medical	   waste.	   Spent	   nuclear	   fuel	   is	   currently	   stored	   in	   an	   interim	  
facility	  while	  waiting	  for	  a	   license	  to	  construct	  a	  deep	  geological	  repository.	  The	  Swedish	   long-­‐lived	   low	  
and	   intermediate-­‐level	   waste	   consists	   mainly	   of	   BWR	   control	   rods,	   reactor	   internals	   and	   legacy	   waste	  
from	  early	   research	   in	   the	   Swedish	  nuclear	  programs.	  The	   current	  plan	   is	   to	  dispose	  of	   this	  waste	   in	   a	  
separate	  deep	  geological	  repository,	  SFL,	  sometimes	  after	  2045.	  
	  
Understanding	   of	   the	   rock	   properties	   is	   the	   basis	   for	   the	   design	   of	   the	   repository	   concepts.	   Swedish	  
crystalline	   rock	   is	   mechanical	   stable	   and	   suitable	   for	   underground	   constructions.	   The	   Spent	   Fuel	  
Repository	  is	  planned	  at	  approximately	  500	  meters	  depth	  in	  the	  rock	  at	  the	  Forsmark	  site.	  The	  host	  rock	  
will	  keep	  the	  spent	  fuel	  isolated	  from	  human	  and	  near-­‐surface	  environment.	  The	  rock	  will	  also	  provide	  the	  
stable	   chemical	   and	   hydraulic	   conditions	   that	   make	   it	   possible	   to	   select	   suitable	   technical	   barriers	   to	  
support	  the	  containment	  provided	  by	  the	  rock.	  A	  very	  long	  lasting	  canister	  is	  necessary	  to	  avoid	  release	  
and	  transport	  of	  radionuclides	  through	  water	  conducting	  fractures	  in	  the	  rock.	  A	  canister	  designed	  for	  the	  
Swedish	  rock,	  consists	  of	  a	  tight,	  5	  cm	  thick	  corrosion	  barrier	  of	  copper	  and	  a	  load-­‐bearing	  insert	  of	  cast	  
iron.	  To	  restrict	  the	  water	  flow	  around	  the	  canister	  and	  by	  that	  prevent	  fast	  corrosion,	  a	  bentonite	  buffer	  
will	   surround	   the	   canister.	   Secondary,	   the	   bentonite	   buffer	  will	   retard	   a	   potential	   release	   by	   its	   strong	  
sorption	  of	  radionuclides.	  
	  
The	  SFR	  repository	  is	  situated	  in	  Forsmark	  beneath	  the	  sea	  floor,	  covered	  by	  about	  60	  meters	  of	  rock.	  The	  
meaning	  of	  the	  rock	  for	  the	  safety	  of	  SFR	  is	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  mechanical	  stable	  environment	  and	  to	  keep	  the	  
waste	   away	   from	   human	   and	   near-­‐surface	   environment.	   The	   long-­‐term	   safety	   in	   SFR	   is	   based	   on	   slow	  
release	   of	   radionuclides.	   By	   creating	   an	   appropriate	   chemical	   environment	   in	   the	   repository,	  
radionuclides	  can	  be	  retarded	  in	  the	  repository.	  A	  great	  quantity	  of	  cement	  will	  keep	  a	  high	  pH	  during	  long	  
time	   periods.	   A	   high	   pH	   will	   prevent	   corrosion	   and	   also	   make	   the	   environment	   less	   vulnerable	   to	  
microbial	  activity.	  The	  cement	  and	  concrete	  constructions	  will	  also	  function	  as	  flow	  barriers.	  
	  	  
Long-­‐lived	  low	  and	  intermediate-­‐level	  waste	  is	  not	  suitable	  for	  final	  disposal	  of	  in	  SFR.	  The	  waste	  requires	  
a	  repository	  designed	  for	  longer	  time	  periods.	  Therefore,	  SKB	  is	  planning	  for	  the	  SFL	  repository.	  The	  basic	  
principal	  will	  be	  the	  same	  as	  for	  SFR	  with	  slow	  release	  of	  the	  radionuclides.	  It	   is	  also	  necessary	  to	  place	  
such	   a	   repository	   deeper	   down	   in	   the	   bedrock	   in	   order	   to	   increase	   the	   length	   of	   the	   flow	   paths	   and	  
enhance	  the	  retardation	  of	  the	  released	  radionuclides.	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Abstract:	  The	  paper	  summarizes	  the	  results	  and	  findings	  of	  the	  study	  "Impacts	  of	  Safety	  Requirement	  
Retrievability	  on	  existing	  Repository	  Designs	  and	  Requirements	  for	  new	  Repository	  Concepts"	  prepared	  
by	   DBE	   TECHNOLOGY	   GmbH	   (Bollingerfehr	   et	   al.,	   2014).	   The	   study	   establishes	   a	   basis	   for	   further	  
developing	   existing	   and	   designing	   new	   repository	   concepts	   that	   take	   into	   account	   the	   German	   safety	  
requirements.	   Conceptual	   adaptations	   for	   application	   of	   retrievability	   in	   existing	   repository	   concepts	  
are	   presented	   and	   additional	   challenges	   for	   future	   R&D	   activities	   are	   pointed	   out.	   The	   paper	   starts	  
with	  a	  review	  of	  the	  "Safety	  Requirements	  Governing	  the	  Final	  Disposal	  of	  Heat-­‐Generating	  Radioactive	  
Waste"	  (BMU,	  2010)	  and	  presents	  a	  conceptual	  idea	  of	  how	  retrievability	  could	  be	  realized	  in	  Germany	  





From	   the	   very	   beginning	   in	   the	   1980s,	   generic	   repository	   concepts	   for	   the	   disposal	   of	   heat-­‐generating	  
waste	   and	   spent	   fuel	   in	   salt	   formations	   have	   been	   developed	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   safety	   requirements.	   A	  
continuous	   improvement	   process	   led	   to	   a	   reference	   concept.	   Full-­‐scale	   transport	   and	   emplacement	  
technologies	   have	   been	   tested	   successfully	   in	   surface	   test	   facilities,	   again	   in	   compliance	   with	   safety	  
requirements.	  
	  
In	   2010,	   the	   German	   Federal	   Ministry	   for	   the	   Environment,	   Nature	   Conservation	   and	   Nuclear	   Safety	  
(BMU)	  issued	  the	  new	  “Safety	  Requirements	  Governing	  the	  Final	  Disposal	  of	  Heat-­‐Generating	  Radioactive	  
Waste”.	   Among	   others,	   the	   safety	   requirements	   focus	   on	   retrievability	   and	   make	   it	   a	   strict	   licensing	  
requirement.	  According	   to	   the	  safety	  requirements,	   retrievability	   is	   considered	  as	   the	  planned	   technical	  
option	   to	   remove	   emplaced	   radioactive	   waste	   containers	   from	   the	   repository	   during	   the	   operational	  
period.	   In	   order	   to	  meet	   these	   requirements,	   it	   must	   be	   analyzed	   if	   adaptations	   to	   existing	   repository	  
concepts	  are	  necessary.	  These	  adaptations	  and	  modifications	  could	  include,	  for	  example,	  an	  optimization	  
of	   the	   spacing	  between	  waste	   containers	  and	  drifts,	   the	   installation	  of	   adequate	  drift	  or	  borehole	   lining	  
systems	  where	  necessary,	  adaptions	  to	  the	  ventilation	  system,	  the	  implementation	  of	  cooling	  systems,	  and	  
monitoring	  and	  radiological	  protection	  measures	  during	  the	  retrieval	  process.	  
	  
	  
2	  Definition	  of	  Retrievability	  
	  
2.1	  Definitions	  according	  to	  German	  regulations	  
	  
Until	  2010,	  retrievability	  was	  not	  a	  requirement	  for	  repositories	  in	  Germany	  and,	  therefore,	  all	  repository	  
concepts	  developed	  until	  then	  do	  not	  include	  retrievability	  measures.	  Today,	  according	  to	  the	  new	  safety	  
requirements	  retrievability	  is	  stipulated	  as	  a	  design	  criterion	  for	  a	  repository	  for	  HLW	  and	  spent	  fuel.	  	  




	  "Retrievability	  is	  the	  planned	  technical	  option	  for	  removing	  emplaced	  radioactive	  waste	  containers	  from	  the	  
repository	  mine"	  (BMU,	  2010).	  Retrievability	  of	  waste	  containers	  has	  to	  be	  given	  during	  the	  "…	  operating	  
phase	  up	  until	  sealing	  of	  the	  shafts	  or	  ramps…"	  (BMU,	  2010).	  	  
	  
Reversible	   planning	   and	   regular	   review	   of	   decisions	   allow	   high	   flexibility	   during	   design,	   construction,	  
operation	   and	   closure	   of	   the	   repository.	   Retrievability	   is	   a	   special	   case	   of	   the	   general	   philosophy	   of	  
reversibility.	  The	  realization	  of	  retrievability	  is	  called	  retrieval.	  "Retrieval	  is	  the	  actual	  action	  removing	  the	  
waste	  packages	  from	  the	  repository	  during	  the	  operation	  period"	  (NEA	  2011).	  
	  
In	   addition	   to	   the	   retrievability	   of	  waste	   containers,	   the	  German	   safety	   requirements	   also	  use	   the	   term	  
"Bergung"	   (recovery	   or	   recovering).	   Recovery	   is	   defined	   as	   "…retrieval	  of	  radioactive	  waste	   from	  a	   final	  
repository	  as	  an	  emergency	  measure"	  (BMU,	  2010).	  The	  time,	  reasons,	  and	  the	  conditions	  for	  recovery	  can	  
vary	  within	  a	  very	  wide	  range.	  Therefore,	  recovery	  is	  requirement	  that	  is	  limited	  to	  the	  waste	  containers,	  
"…handleability	   of	   the	  waste	   containers	  must	   be	   guaranteed	   for	   a	   period	   of	   500	   years	   in	   case	   of	   recovery	  
from	  the	  decommissioned	  and	  sealed	  final	  repository"	  (BMU	  2010).	  
	  
The	  new	  safety	  requirements	  determine	  retrievability	  as	  a	  requirement	  for	  licensing.	  In	  order	  to	  comply	  
with	  Atomic	  Energy	  Act,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  demonstrate	  compliance	  with	  the	  safety	  requirements	  and	  that	  
the	  repository	  is	  technically	  feasible.	  
	  
2.2	  Comparison	  with	  international	  definitions	  
	  
In	   order	   to	   illustrate	   the	   differences	   between	   the	   terms	   and	   also	   for	   better	   comparison	   with	   the	  
understanding	  in	  other	  countries,	  the	  definitions	  given	  above	  are	  summarized	  on	  the	  retrievability	  scale	  
developed	  by	  NEA,	  see	  Figure	  1.	  The	  sketch	  was	  developed	  during	  the	  "Reversibility	  and	  Retrievability"	  
project,	   which	   was	   finished	   in	   December	   2011.	   The	   sketch	   divides	   the	   repository	   lifetime	   into	   six	  
characteristic	  stages	  (NEA,	  2011).
	  
	  
Fig.	  1.	  Retrievability	  and	  Recovery	  as	  defined	  in	  German	  safety	  requiremnts	  in	  context	  of	  "R-­‐scale",	  modifided,	  based	  
on	  (NEA,	  2011)	  




The	  German	  safety	  requirements	  stipulate	  that	  retrievability	  must	  be	  given	  during	  stages	  two	  to	   four	  of	  
the	   R-­‐scale.	   These	   stages	   correspond	   to	   the	   operational	   period	   of	   the	   repository	   and	   take	   place	  
simultaneously.	  According	  to	  the	  definitions	  already	  given,	  retrievability	  ends	  at	  stage	  four,	  after	  closure.	  
During	  a	  defined	  period	  after	  closure	  (represented	  by	  stage	  five),	  removing	  the	  waste	  containers	  requires	  
the	  construction	  of	  a	  new	  mine.	  This	  corresponds	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  recovery.	  Recovery	  ends	  500	  years	  after	  
closure.	  For	  stage	  6	  (the	  distant	  future	  evolution),	  no	  retrievability	  requirements	  exist	  in	  legislation.	  	  
	  
2.3	  Strategies	  and	  measures	  for	  the	  retrieval	  of	  waste	  
	  
Transferring	  retrievability	  into	  the	  R-­‐scale	  clarifies	  that	  retrieval	  must	  be	  possible	  during	  different	  stages	  
that	   are	   characterized	   by	   different	   passive	   and	   active	   safety	   levels.	   In	   general,	   the	   efforts	   for	   retrieval	  
increase	   during	   the	   different	   stages.	   The	   safety	   requirements	   give	   more	   details	   on	   how	   to	   realize	  
retrievability:	  
	  
"The	   number	   of	   open	   emplacement	   zones	   should	   be	   kept	   to	   a	   minimum.	   These	   should	   be	  
promptly	  loaded,	  then	  backfilled	  and	  reliably	  sealed	  from	  the	  mine	  building"	  (BMU,	  2010).	  
	  
According	  to	  Figure	  1,	   the	   immediate	  closure	  of	   the	  emplacement	  drifts	  and	  emplacement	   fields	  creates	  
the	  highest	  possible	  passive	  safety	  level	  during	  the	  operational	  period.	  Backfilling	  allows	  the	  development	  
of	   the	   repository	   as	   planned	   and	   additional	   impacts	   on	   the	   emplacement	   area	   caused	   by	   human	  
interaction	   are	   minimized.	   In	   case	   of	   retrieval,	   the	   repository	   will	   be	   affected	   again.	   In	   this	   case,	   the	  
emplacement	  fields	  or	  drifts	  will	  be	  re-­‐excavated	  and	  the	  waste	  containers	  will	  be	  exposed.	  This	  so	  called	  
"re-­‐mining"	   strategy	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   good	   approach	   for	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   retrievability	   option,	  
especially	   in	  salt	   formations.	  The	  good	  mining	  conditions	  of	   the	  rock	  and	  the	  safety	   function	  of	   the	  host	  
rock	  comply	  with	  this	  strategy.	  The	  main	  sealing	   function	  of	  a	  repository	   in	  salt	   is	  provided	  by	  the	  host	  
rock	   itself.	   Convergence	   of	   the	   rock	   salt	   and	   compaction	   of	   the	   backfill	   close	   the	   drifts	   over	   time.	  
Eventually,	  the	  backfill	  will	  have	  properties	  that	  are	  comparable	  with	  those	  of	  the	  host	  rock.	  If	  backfilling	  
and	   compaction	   starts	   directly	   after	   emplacement,	   the	   process	   will	   also	   finish	   earlier	   and	   the	   sealing	  
function	  of	  the	  rock	  and	  backfill	  will	  be	  achieved	  at	  an	  earlier	  time.	  
	  
The	  implementation	  of	  the	  re-­‐mining	  strategy	  for	  retrievability	  into	  existing	  repository	  concepts	  affects	  all	  
stages	  of	  the	  repository	  lifetime.	  This	  includes	  the	  implementation	  of	  measures	  to	  provide	  retrievability	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  handling	  of	  the	  retrieved	  waste	  containers.	  With	  ongoing	  planning	  the	  repository	  design	  and	  
the	   retrievability	   concept	   will	   become	   more	   detailed.	   Measures	   for	   and	   adaptations	   to	   the	   repository	  
concepts	  that	  could	  improve	  retrievability	  and	  ease	  retrieval	  are:	  
	  
• Increased	  distances	  between	  drifts	  to	  improve	  mechanical	  stability	  or	  thermal	  load	  
• Reduced	  thermal	  load	  of	  the	  waste	  containers	  
• Consideration	  of	  retrieval	  in	  mine	  layout	  at	  repository	  design	  stage	  
• Removal	  of	  internals	  before	  backfilling	  
• Use	  of	  minable	  materials	  for	  lining	  systems,	  backfilling	  and	  sealing	  systems	  
• Supply	  of	  an	  adequate	  ventilation	  and	  cooling	  system	  during	  retrieval	  
• Automation	  of	  technical	  processes	  where	  possible	  or	  use	  of	  remote	  controlled	  systems	  
• Refinement	  of	  emplacement	  equipment	  for	  retrieval	  
• Provision	  of	  adequate	  measures	  for	  operational	  safety	  and	  radiological	  protection	  
• Provision	  of	  systems	  to	  handle	  contaminated	  materials	  and	  retrieved	  waste	  containers	  
	  




Finally,	   the	   feasibility	   of	   the	   important	   technical	   processes	   of	   retrieval	   has	   to	   be	   demonstrated,	   as	   it	  
already	   has	   been	   done	   for	   the	   emplacement	   technology.	   The	   demonstration	   of	   technical	   feasibility	   is	   a	  
requirement	  for	  the	  licensing	  of	  all	  repository	  concepts.	  
	  
	  
3	  Retrievability	  concepts	  for	  drift	  disposal	  in	  salt	  formations	  
	  
The	   drift	   disposal	   concept	   comprises	   the	   emplacement	   of	   heat-­‐generating	   radioactive	  waste	   and	   spent	  
fuel	   in	  standardized	  POLLUX®	  casks.	  The	  casks	  have	  a	  cylindrical	  shape,	  with	  a	  diameter	  of	  1.5	  m	  and	  a	  
length	  of	  5.5	  m.	  The	  mine	  layout	  is	  characterized	  by	  two	  access	  drifts,	  which	  are	  connected	  by	  cross-­‐cuts.	  
The	   cross-­‐cuts	   open	   to	   the	   emplacements	   fields.	   Parallel	   blind-­‐ending	   drifts	   (the	   emplacements	   drifts)	  
branch	   from	   the	   cross-­‐cuts	   into	   the	   emplacement	   fields.	   The	   POLLUX®	   casks	   are	   emplaced	   on	   the	   drift	  
floor	  at	  regular	  distances,	  depending	  on	  their	  thermal	  output.	  The	  dimensions	  of	  the	  emplacement	  device	  
define	   the	  minimum	  cross	   section	  of	  17	  m²	   for	   the	  emplacement	  drifts.	  Directly	  after	  emplacement,	   the	  
remaining	   space	   inside	   the	  drift	  will	   be	   backfilled	  with	   crushed	   rock	   salt.	   The	   emplacement	   equipment	  
was	  successfully	   tested	  by	  DBE	   in	   the	  mid-­‐nineties.	  The	  surface	  demonstration	   tests	  show	  the	   technical	  
feasibility	  of	  the	  emplacement	  concepts.	  In	  addition,	  subsurface	  experiments	  in	  a	  salt	  mine	  demonstrated	  
the	  backfilling	  of	  the	  remaining	  drift	  cross-­‐section	  using	  the	  slinger	  backfilling	  method.	  Within	  the	  scope	  
of	   the	  "Preliminary	  safety	  analysis	   for	   the	  Gorleben	  site"	   (acronym	  VSG,	   (GRS,	  2012)),	   the	  drift	  disposal	  
concept	  was	  adapted	   to	   the	   local	  conditions	  at	   the	  Gorleben	  salt	  dome.	  This	  was	  also	   the	   first	   time	   that	  
retrievability	  was	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  the	  concept.	  
	  
One	   option	   to	   retrieve	   POLLUX®	   casks	   is	   the	   use	   of	   the	   re-­‐mining	   strategy.	   Retrieval	   includes	   the	  
emplacement	   and	   backfilling	   as	   described	   above.	   This	   concept	   guarantees	   the	   highest	   possible	   passive	  
safety.	   In	   case	  of	   retrieval,	   the	  normal	  development	  of	   the	   repository	  differs.	  The	   retrievability	   concept	  
includes	   the	   re-­‐excavation	   of	   the	   backfilled	   galleries.	   The	   decision	   for	   retrieval	   has	   to	   be	  made	   before	  
closure	  of	  the	  shafts	  at	  the	  latest.	  In	  this	  case,	  all	  drifts	  including	  the	  access	  drifts	  and	  the	  cross-­‐cuts	  have	  
to	  be	  excavated.	  The	  new	  retrieval	  drifts	  are	  excavated	  in	  three	  steps,	  see	  Figure	  2.	  First,	  two	  small	  drifts	  
are	   excavated	   at	   both	   sides	   of	   the	   waste	   containers.	   They	   connect	   the	   nearest	   cross-­‐cuts	   and	   allow	  
continuous	  ventilation	  and	  cooling.	  Afterwards,	  the	  remaining	  pillar	  between	  the	  two	  drifts	  is	  removed	  by	  
road	  headers	  and	  modified	  mining	  equipment.	  The	  final	  retrieval	  drift	  provides	  a	  sufficient	  cross	  section	  
to	  pick	  up	  the	  POLLUX®	  casks	  with	  a	  modified	  emplacement	  device.	  It	  is	  necessary	  to	  adapt	  the	  supporting	  
frame	   that	   lifts	   and	   carries	   the	   POLLUX®	   cask	   and	   change	   the	   rail-­‐bound	   system	   for	   retrieval.	   The	  
modified	  emplacement	  device	  transfers	  the	  POLLUX®	  cask	  to	  a	  transport	  cart.	  The	  transport	  back	  to	  the	  
surface	  will	  be	  realized	  in	  reverse	  order	  to	  the	  emplacement.	  
	  
	  
Fig.	  2.	  Left:	  First,	  section	  of	  excavation	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  POLLUX	  cask,	  Right:	  Final	  retrieval	  drift	  and	  contour	  of	  old	  
emplacement	  gallery	  
	  




The	  retrievability	  option	  was	  also	  implemented	  in	  the	  borehole	  disposal	  concept	  for	  salt	  formations	  by	  re-­‐
excavation	  of	  old	  drifts	  and	  retrieving	  the	  modified	  waste	  canisters	  from	  the	  lined	  boreholes.	  
	  
	  
4	  Retrievability	  concepts	  for	  repository	  concepts	  in	  clay	  stone	  formations	  
	  
In	  addition	  to	  more	  than	  250	  salt	  domes	  and	  bedded	  salt	  formations,	  large	  clay	  stone	  formations	  exist	  in	  
Germany.	   In	   the	  past,	   generic	   repository	  concepts	   for	   clay	  stone	   formations	   in	  Germany	  were	  designed.	  
These	   concepts	   are	   characterized	  by	   the	   adaptation	   of	   known	   emplacement	   systems	   (e.g.	   borehole	   and	  
drift	   emplacement)	   to	   the	   conditions	   in	   clay	   formations.	   The	   designs	   comply	   with	   the	   safety	   criteria.	  
Compared	   with	   repository	   concepts	   in	   salt	   formations,	   the	   level	   of	   detail	   is	   lower	   and	   the	   knowledge	  
about	  the	  host	  rock	  is	  less	  comprehensive.	  
	  
Implementing	  retrievability	  in	  a	  repository	  in	  clay	  formations	  follows	  a	  different	  approach	  than	  in	  salt.	  As	  
mine	  operation	  in	  salt	  formations	  do	  not	  require	  any	  technical	  support,	  the	  use	  of	  a	  regular	  lining	  system	  
in	   clay	   formations	   is	   generally	   necessary.	   This	   requires	   additional	   investigation	   with	   respect	   to	   the	  
impacts	  on	  retrievability.	  The	  repository	  concept	  has	  to	  include	  technical	  solutions	  for	  the	  existing	  conflict	  
between	  the	  need	  of	  a	  lining	  system	  during	  operation,	  retrievability,	  and	  long-­‐term	  safety	  of	  the	  host	  rock.	  
This	   conflict	   affects	   the	   retrieval	   strategy	   as	  well	   as	   the	  design	  of	   the	   liner	   and	   the	  backfilling.	   Existing	  
repository	   concepts	  have	   to	  be	   adapted	   to	   the	  new	   safety	   requirements	  with	   special	   focus	  on	   technical	  
solutions	  for	  the	  conflict	  to	  be	  addressed.	  
	  
	  
5	  Summary	  and	  forecast	  
	  
German	   repository	   concepts	   have	   been	   developed	   since	   the	   early	   1980s	   taking	   into	   account	   the	   safety	  
requirements.	  From	  the	  generic	  concepts,	  reference	  concepts	  for	  the	  drift	  disposal	  of	  POLLUX®	  casks	  and	  
the	  deep	  vertical	  borehole	  disposal	  of	  canisters	  were	  established	  and	  adapted	  to	  the	  local	  conditions	  of	  a	  
possible	   location.	   In	   view	   of	   a	   future	   licensing	   process,	   the	   emplacement	   technologies	   and	   methods	  
needed	   have	   already	   been	   tested	   successfully.	   With	   the	   revision	   of	   the	   safety	   requirements,	   different	  
aspects	   regarding	   repository	   design,	   including	   the	   requirement	   of	   retrievability,	   have	   to	   be	   considered	  
additionally.	  The	  VSG	  took	  into	  account	  a	  retrievability	  concept	  for	  the	  very	  first	  time.	  
	  
DBE	  TECHNOLOGY	  GmbH	  continued	  the	  technical	  implementation	  of	  retrievability	  into	  existing	  reference	  
concepts	   for	   salt	   formations	   and	   prepared	   technical	   strategies	   for	   the	   realization	   in	   new	   repository	  
concepts	  and	  other	  host	  rocks	  within	  a	  first	  study.	  The	  new	  R&D	  project,	  called	  "ERNESTA",	  has	  the	  aim	  to	  
broaden	  the	  knowledge	  on	  how	  to	  guarantee	  retrievability,	  wants	  to	  address	  the	  technical	  challenges	  and	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In	  Switzerland,	  the	  site	  selection	  process	  according	  to	  the	  "Sectoral	  Plan	  for	  Deep	  Geological	  Repositories"	  
(BFE	  2008)	  is	  underway	  since	  2008.	  This	  process	  takes	  place	  in	  three	  stages.	  In	  stage	  1	  geological	  siting	  
regions	  (six	  for	  the	  L/ILW	  repository	  and	  three	  for	  the	  HLW	  repository)	  have	  been	  identified,	   in	  stage	  2	  
sites	  for	  the	  surface	  facilities	  have	  been	  identified	  for	  all	  siting	  regions	  in	  close	  co-­‐operation	  with	  the	  sting	  
regions	  and	  a	  narrowing	  down	  of	  the	  number	  of	  siting	  regions	  based	  on	  geological	  criteria	  will	  take	  place.	  
In	  stage	  3	  the	  sites	  for	  a	  general	  license	  application	  are	  selected	  and	  the	  general	  license	  applications	  will	  
be	  submitted	  which	  eventually	  will	  lead	  to	  the	  siting	  decision	  for	  both	  repository	  types.	  
	  
In	   the	  Swiss	   site	   selection	  process,	   safety	  has	   the	  highest	  priority.	  Many	   factors	  affect	   safety	  and	   thus	  a	  
whole	   range	   of	   safety-­‐related	   issues	   are	   considered	   in	   the	   identification	   and	   screening	   of	   siting	  
possibilities.	  Besides	  dose	  calculations	  a	  range	  of	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  issues	  are	  considered.	  Dose	  
calculations	   are	   performed	   in	   all	   three	   stages	   of	   the	   site	   selection	   process.	   In	   stage	   1	   generic	   safety	  
calculations	  were	  made	  to	  develop	  criteria	  to	  be	  used	  for	  the	  identification	  of	  potential	  siting	  regions.	  In	  
stage	  2,	  dose	   calculations	  are	  made	   for	   comparing	   the	  different	   siting	   regions	  according	   to	  a	  procedure	  
prescribed	  in	  detail	  by	  the	  regulator.	  Combined	  with	  qualitative	  evaluations	  this	  will	  lead	  to	  a	  narrowing	  
down	  of	  the	  number	  of	  siting	  regions	  to	  at	  least	  two	  siting	  regions	  for	  each	  repository	  type.	  In	  stage	  3	  full	  
safety	  cases	  will	  be	  prepared	  as	  part	  of	  the	  documentation	  for	  the	  general	  license	  applications.	  
	  
Besides	   the	   dose	   calculations,	   many	   other	   issues	   related	   to	   safety	   are	   analyzed	   in	   a	   quantitative	   and	  
qualitative	  manner.	   These	   consider	   the	   13	   criteria	   defined	   in	   the	   Sectoral	   Plan	   and	   the	   corresponding	  
indicators.	  The	  features	  analyzed	  cover	  the	  following	  broad	  themes:	  efficiency	  of	  geological	  barrier	  (host	  
rock	   and	   confining	   units);	   long-­‐term	   stability	   (erosion,	   differential	   movements,	   etc.);	   reliability	   of	  
geological	   information	   (explorability;	   predictability);	   technical	   feasibility	   (sufficient	   space	   for	   allocating	  
the	   disposal	   rooms;	   depth	   of	   repository;	   rock	   strength,	   etc.).	   For	   some	   of	   these	   issues,	   rather	   detailed	  
quantitative	  analyses	  are	  made	  (e.g.	  for	  erosion).	  
	  
Besides	   long-­‐term	  safety,	  also	  operational	  safety	   is	  considered.	  This	   is	  done	  to	  ensure	  that	  suitable	  sites	  
are	  chosen	  for	  the	  surface	  infrastructure	  (waste	  acceptance	  facilities,	  entrance	  to	  access	  to	  underground).	  
The	  main	  emphasis	  is	  on	  external	  events	  (e.g.	  very	  severe	  flooding)	  that	  need	  to	  be	  avoided.	  	  
	  
The	   involvement	   of	   society	   in	   the	   site	   selection	   process	   is	   also	   very	   important.	   This	   requires	   that	   the	  
scientific	   information	  needed	   (and	  wanted)	  by	   society	   is	  delivered	   in	  a	   format	  understandable	   to	   them.	  
This	   helps	   society	   develop	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   question	   "why	   here	   and	   not	   there"	   in	   the	   siting	  
decision;	  something	  that	  is	  considered	  essential	  to	  get	  the	  necessary	  support	  for	  the	  siting	  decision.	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Hydrocarbons	  in	  the	  Hauptsalz	  Formation	  of	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  Content,	  Distribution	  and	  Origin	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In	  the	  frame	  of	  the	  geological	  exploration	  of	  the	  Gorleben	  salt	  dome	  (November	  2010	  to	  November	  2012)	  
concentrations	   and	   compositions	   of	   hydrocarbons	   occuring	   in	   the	  main	   rock	   salt	   (Hauptsalz,	   Stassfurt	  
series,	  z2)	  have	  been	  investigated.	  These	  exploration	  works	  followed	  former	  investigations	  of	  Gerling	  et	  al.	  
(2002)	  and	  Bornemann	  et	  al.	  (2008).	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  get	   fresh,	  unaltered	  and	  representative	  samples	  beyond	  the	  EDZ	  (excavation	  damaged	  zone)	  
for	  mineralogical	  and	  geochemical	  analyses,	  about	  45	  boreholes	  have	  been	  drilled	  at	  the	  840	  m	  level	  of	  the	  
Gorleben	   exploration	  mine.	   These	   boreholes	   have	   been	   arranged	   in	   equal	   distances	   (depending	   on	   the	  
mine	  structure)	  alongside	  crosscut	  1	  west	  (each	  6	  m	  long)	  and	  crosscut	  1	  east	  (each	  9	  m	  long).	  In	  addition	  
20	  packer	  boreholes	  (10	  packer	  boreholes	  per	  crosscut)	  for	  pressure	  build-­‐up	  recording	  and	  hydrocarbon	  
sampling	  have	  also	  been	  established.	  
	  
Immediately	  after	  drilling,	  core	  samples	  from	  the	  Hauptsalz	  for	  organic	  geochemical	  analyses	  have	  been	  
retrieved	   and	   were	   dissolved	   in	   deionised	   and	   degased	   water.	   The	   results	   of	   analyses	   of	   about	   210	  
samples	  scattered	  over	  all	  45	  boreholes	  reveal	  a	   total	  background	  concentration	  of	  hydrocarbons	  (C1	   to	  
C40)	   of	   0,24	   mg/kg.	   70	   samples	   have	   concentrations	   between	   1	   mg/kg	   and	   50	   mg/kg	   (average	   2,66	  
mg/kg)	  with	  5	  outliers	  up	  to	  442	  mg/kg	   in	  crosscut	  1	  west	  (Hammer	  et	  al.	  2012,	  2013).	  The	  drill	  cores	  
have	   been	   investigated	   and	   documented	   by	   using	   ultraviolet	   light	   (l	   =	   254	   nm)	   in	   respect	   of	   visible	  
indications	   of	   the	   existence	   of	   fluorescing	   aromatic	   hydrocarbons.	   Analyses	   revealed	   a	   high	   level	   of	  
heterogeneous	  hydrocarbon	  distribution	   in	   the	   shape	  of	   isolated,	   irregular	   streaks,	   clusters,	   clouds	   and	  
occasionally	  layers	  mainly	  located	  in	  recrystallized	  zones	  of	  the	  Hauptsalz.	  
	  
Thin	   sections	   and	   thick	   sections	   showed	   that	   hydrocarbons	   in	   z2HS1	   (Knäuelsalz)	   and	   z2HS2	  
(Streifensalz)	   samples	   are	   either	   located	   as	  black	   to	  brownish	  dendritical	   fluid	   inclusions	   alongside	   the	  
grain	   boundaries	   of	   halite	   crystals,	   on	   the	   surfaces	   and	   knuckles	   or	   inside	   of	   micro	   capillary	   tubes	   of	  
anhydrite	   crystals	   and	   anhydrite	   clusters,	   in	   newly	   formed	   micro	   cracks	   due	   to	   drilling	   respectively	  
preparational	  works	  or	  rarely	  in	  micro-­‐porous	  parts	  of	  the	  Hauptsalz.	  
	  
In	   order	   to	   get	   additional	   information	   about	   the	   origin	   of	   hydrocarbons	   detected	   in	   the	   Gorleben	  
Hauptsalz	   organic	   geochemical	   analyses	   of	   potential	   source	   rocks	   in	   the	   vicinity	   like	   the	   Stassfurt	  
Carbonate	  (z2SK)	  have	  been	  provided.	  These	  analyses	  revealed	  that	  the	  level	  of	  maturity	  of	  hydrocarbons	  
in	  the	  Gorleben	  Hauptsalz	  correspond	  to	  0,8	  to	  1,2%	  vitrinite-­‐reflection-­‐equivalent	  for	  the	  oil,	  similar	  to	  
the	  organic-­‐petrographical	  data	  of	  Stassfurt	  Carbonate	  and	  Copper	  schist	  in	  the	  periphery	  of	  the	  Gorleben	  
salt	   dome	   (Gerling	   et	   al.	   2002;	   Senglaub	   2001;	   Cramer	   2005).	   The	   analyses	   of	   biomarkers	   (esp.	  
triterpenoid	  biomarkers)	  detected	  in	  the	  hydrocarbon	  mixtures	  from	  the	  Hauptsalz	  point	  to	  the	  Stassfurt	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Abstract:	  Though	  physicochemical	  processes	   related	   to	   the	  behavior	  of	   spent	  nuclear	   fuel	   (SNF)	   in	  a	  deep	  
geological	   repository	   are	   of	   complex	   nature,	   knowledge	   on	   underlying	   mechanisms	   has	   considerably	  
advanced	   over	   the	   last	   years.	   Several	   key	   issues	   for	   the	   long-­‐term	   safety	   assessment	   of	   SNF	   disposal	   are	  
related	  to	  the	  interaction	  of	  water	  with	  the	  waste	  form.	  Upon	  contact	  with	  water,	  the	  alteration	  of	  SNF	  and	  
the	  consecutive	  release	  of	   radionuclides	   involve	   the	  combination	  of	  many	  different	  processes,	  which	  can	  be	  
grouped	  into	  two	  stages:	  (i)	  A	  fast	  /	  instant	  release	  of	  a	  fraction	  of	  radionuclides	  and	  (ii)	  a	  much	  slower	  and	  
long-­‐lasting	  radionuclide	  release	  that	  results	  from	  the	  alteration	  and	  dissolution	  of	  the	  UO2	  fuel	  matrix.	  The	  
so-­‐called	  Instant	  Release	  Fraction	  (IRF)	  comprises	  fission	  products	  which	  are	  segregated	  during	  irradiation	  
to	  the	  pellet	  /	  cladding	  gap,	  fractures	  in	  the	  pellet	  and	  grain	  boundaries	  as	  well	  as	  activation	  products	  within	  
the	  cladding.	  According	  to	  a	  review	  of	  Kienzler	  et	  al.	   (2013)	   the	   IRF	  depends	  mainly	  on	   linear	  heat	  rating,	  
burn-­‐up	  and	  other	  in-­‐reactor	  fuel	  operating	  parameters.	  As	  a	  major	  result	  of	  recent	  studies,	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  
alteration	  of	  the	  UO2	  fuel	  matrix	  is	  significantly	  inhibited	  under	  the	  strongly	  reducing	  conditions	  induced	  by	  
container	   corrosion	   and	   consecutive	   hydrogen	   production.	   It	   is	   assumed,	   radiolysis	   driven	   oxidative	   fuel	  
matrix	   dissolution	   appears	   to	   be	   less	   relevant	   for	   most	   repository	   concepts.	   Still,	   open	   questions	   remain	  
related	  to	  the	  exact	  mechanism	  of	  the	  protective	  hydrogen	  effect	  on	  SNF	  matrix	  corrosion	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  
potentially	  interfering	  naturally	  occurring	  groundwater	  trace	  components.	  
	  
	  
1	  Introduction	  	  
	  
Presently,	   final	   disposal	   of	   spent	   nuclear	   fuels,	   SNF,	   in	   deep	   bedrock	   repositories	   is	   considered	   as	   the	  
preferred	  option	  for	  the	  management	  of	  nuclear	  fuels	   irradiated	  in	   light	  water	  reactors	  (LWR).	   Isolating	  
this	   kind	   of	   high	   level	   waste	   products	   from	   the	   biosphere	   in	   a	   geologically	   stable	   environment	   over	  
periods	  of	  several	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  years	  offers	  maximum	  safety,	  which	  cannot	  be	  guaranteed	  at	  
present	  by	  other	  concepts.	  The	  development	  of	  multi-­‐barrier	  systems	   for	  SNF	  disposal	   is	  being	  pursued	  
internationally.	  These	  systems	  will	  consist	  of	  several	   independent	  barriers	  which	  prevent	  effectively	  the	  
release	  of	  radionuclides	  from	  the	  waste	  products	  into	  the	  geosphere	  and	  their	  subsequent	  migration	  into	  
the	   biosphere.	   Though,	   geological	   or	   geo-­‐technical	   barrier	   system	   may	   prevent	   to	   some	   extent	  
groundwater	  contacting	  the	  fuel,	   intrusion	  of	  solutions	  into	  disposal	  rooms	  has	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  
within	   the	   long-­‐term	   safety	   case	   of	   a	   SNF	   repository.	   The	   fate	   of	   spent	   nuclear	   fuel	   and	   the	   associated	  
release	  of	  radionuclides	  depend	  on	  SNF	  corrosion	  kinetics	  as	  well	  as	  on	  thermodynamics.	  Corrosion	  of	  the	  
fuel	   and	   radionuclide	   behaviour	   are	   influenced	   by	   a	   variety	   of	   factors	   such	   as	   radionuclide	   inventory,	  
defining	  temporal	  variable	  α−,β− and	  γ−radiation	  fields,	  pH,	  redox	  potential,	  availability	  of	  solids	  acting	  as	  
sorbents,	  complexing	  groundwater	  constituents	  and	  temperature.	  	  	  	  
	  
In	   the	  past	  decade	   considerable	   research	  effort	  has	  been	  expended	   to	  quantify	   the	   radionuclide	   release	  
from	  corroding	  spent	  LWR	  fuels	  under	  repository	  conditions.	  This	  communication	  highlights	  main	  issues	  








2	  Characteristic	  properties	  of	  LWR	  UO2	  fuels	  and	  distribution	  of	  radionuclides	  
in	  spent	  nuclear	  fuel	  
	  
Most	  commercial	  LWR	  fuels	  have	  an	  initial	  enrichment	  of	  3	  to	  5	  wt.%	  U-­‐235.	  So-­‐called	  mixed-­‐oxide	  fuel,	  
MOX,	   contains	  5	   to	  10%	  Pu-­‐239	  mixed	  with	  uranium.	  Fuel	  assemblies	  are	   rods	  composed	  of	   cylindrical	  
pellets	  made	  of	   polycrystalline	  UO2(s),	  which	   are	   stacked	   in	   tubes	   of	   gas-­‐tight	   zirconium	  alloy	   cladding	  
materials,	  i.e.	  Zircaloy.	  During	  nuclear	  reactor	  operation	  the	  UO2	  fuel	  undergoes	  intensive	  transformations	  
due	   to	   fission,	   consecutive	   neutron	   capture	   and	   decay	   reactions	   as	   well	   as	   temperature	   induced	  
transformations	   (e.g.	   swelling,	   diffusion,	   cracking	   and	   segregation).	   Currently,	   fuels	   irradiated	   in	   LWR	  
with	  typical	  burn-­‐ups	  (BU)	  of	  35	  to	  45	  MWd/kg	  U,	  contain	  about	  95	  wt.%	  of	  UO2.	  This	  SNF	  matrix	  consists	  
mainly	  of	  U-­‐238,	  remaining	  U-­‐235	  and	  U-­‐236	  produced	  from	  U-­‐235	  by	  neutron	  capture	  (e.g.	  Neeb,	  1997;	  
Bruno	   and	   Ewing,	   2006).	   According	   to	   Olander	   (1976)	   the	   oxygen	   potential	   of	   the	   fuel	   increases	  
significantly	  at	  burn-­‐up	  ranges	  between	  50	  and	  60	  MWd/kg	  U	  at	  temperatures	  of	  modern	  LWRs.	  Since	  the	  
average	   valence	   of	   the	   fission	   products	   is	   less	   than	   two,	   the	   oxygen	   :	   uranium	   ratio	   increases	   slightly	  
during	  irradiation,	  so	  that	  the	  stoichiometry	  of	  the	  fuel	  matrix	  is	  expressed	  as	  UO2±x.	  The	  deviation	  x	  from	  
the	  UO2.00	  stoichiometric	  composition	  varies	  within	  a	  fuel	  pellet	  or	  a	  rod	  depending	  on	  the	  local	  burn-­‐up.	  It	  
influences	   various	   physical	   properties,	   in	   particular	   those	   which	   depend	   on	   the	   atomic	   mobility	   (e.g.	  
diffusion	  coefficients),	  and	  the	  oxygen	  partial	  pressure	  or	  chemical	  behaviour	  of	  the	  fission	  products.	  The	  
chemical	  stability	  of	  fission	  products	  within	  the	  UO2	  	  matrix	  can	  be	  classified	  into	  four	  main	  groups:	  	  
	  
• Fission	  gases	  and	  other	  volatile	  fission	  products	  (Kr,	  Xe,	  Br,	  I)	  which	  occur	  as	  finely	  dispersed	  
bubbles	  within	  grains,	  at	  grain	  boundaries	  and	  in	  pores	  (Cui	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  To	  some	  extent	  they	  are	  
released	  to	  the	  open	  porosity	  of	  the	  fuel	  and	  gap	  between	  the	  periphery	  of	  the	  fuel	  pellet	  and	  the	  
surrounding	  cladding.	  	  
• Metallic	  fission	  products	  (Mo,	  Tc,	  Ru,	  Rh,	  Pd,	  Ag,	  Cd,	  In,	  Sn,	  Sb,	  Te)	  forming	  immiscible,	  micron-­‐	  to	  
nanometer-­‐sized	  precipitates.	  The	  metallic	  phases	  found	  are	  ε-­‐Ru(Mo,	  Tc,	  Rh,	  Pd)	  solid	  solutions	  
and	  are	  denoted	  as	  ε-­‐particles	  (Bramman	  et	  al.,	  1968;	  Kleykamp	  et	  al.,	  1985).	  
• Fission	  products	  forming	  oxide	  precipitates	  (Rb,	  Cs,	  Ba,	  Sr,	  Zr,	  Nb,	  Mo,	  Te).	  These	  oxides	  tend	  to	  
have	  the	  general	  composition	  AB[O3]	  and	  to	  adopt	  a	  cubic	  perovskite-­‐type	  structure	  with	  Ba,	  Sr,	  
and	  Cs	  in	  the	  A	  sites	  and	  Zr,	  Mo,	  U	  and	  lanthanides	  in	  the	  B	  sites	  (Kleykamp	  et	  al.,	  1985;	  	  He	  et	  al.,	  
2007).	  Depending	  on	  the	  oxygen	  potential,	  Mo	  may	  exist	  in	  metallic	  or	  oxidized	  state.	  
• Fission	  products	  occurring	  as	  oxides	  in	  the	  UO2	  matrix	  (Sr,	  Zr,	  Nb,	   	  Y,	  La,	  Ce,	  Pr,	  Pm	  and	  Sm).	  Zr	  
and	   lanthanides	  are	  partially	  or	  completely	  miscible	  with	  UO2	   to	   form	  solid	  solution	   (González-­‐
Robles,	  2011).	  
	  
There	  are	  continuous	  transitions	  between	  the	  four	  groups,	  which	  depend	  on	  the	  irradiation	  history	  (burn-­‐
up,	  linear	  heat	  generation	  rate	  etc.)	  and	  consequently	  on	  the	  chemical	  state	  and	  solubilities	  of	  the	  fission	  
products	  Kleykamp	  (1988).	  For	  example,	  prominent	  Sr	  and	  Zr	   isotopes	  occur	  in	  the	  dominating	  ceramic	  
precipitate	   (Ba1-­‐x-­‐ySrxCsy)(U,Pu,Ln,Zr,Mo)O3	   as	   well	   as	   solid	   solutions	   in	   the	   UO2	   matrix.	   Similarly	   to	  
lanthanides,	   transuranium	  elements	  (Pu,	  Am,	  Cm,	  Np)	  occur	   in	   the	   fuel	  matrix,	  where	   they	  substitute	  U.	  
Detailed	   descriptions	   of	   the	   radionuclide	   distribution	   in	   spent	   nuclear	   fuel	   and	   the	   radiochemical	  
properties	  are	  given	  for	  instance	  by	  Kleykamp	  (1979;	  1985;	  1988),	  Neeb	  (1979)	  and	  Carbol	  et	  al.	  (2012).	  	  




In	  their	  review,	  Bruno	  and	  Ewing	  (2006)	  argue	  that	  the	  distribution	  of	  radionuclides	  is	  not	  homogeneous	  
within	   a	   single	   pellet	   due	   to	   the	   steep	   thermal	   gradient	   within	   the	   pellet	   during	   irradiation.	   Thermal	  
excursion	   during	   reactor	   operation	   cause	   a	   coarsening	   of	   the	   grain	   size,	   extensive	  microfracturing	   and	  
migration	  of	  fission	  gases	  and	  volatile	  fission	  products	  to	  grain	  boundaries,	  fractures,	  and	  the	  gap	  region.	  
Due	   to	  a	  gradient	   in	   the	   local	  burn-­‐up	  with	  relatively	  high	  burn-­‐ups	  at	   the	  pellet	  periphery,	  porous	  and	  
fine	   grained	   microstructure	   “high	   burn-­‐up	   structures”	   are	   formed.	   These	   high	   burn-­‐up	   structures	   are	  
characterized	  by	  relatively	  high	  concentrations	  of	  239Pu	  at	   the	   fuel	  rim,	  polygonization	  of	   the	  UO2	  grains	  
resulting	  in	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  size	  of	  individual	  grains	  (González-­‐Robles,	  2011).	  
	  
In	  addition	  to	  radionuclides	  in	  the	  spent	  nuclear	  fuel	  itself,	  activation	  products	  are	  present	  in	  the	  cladding	  
and	   other	   structural	   parts	   of	   the	   fuel	   elements.	   For	   time	   intervals	   of	   interim	   storage,	   the	   radionuclide	  
inventory	  of	  these	  metallic	  parts	  of	  a	  fuel	  element	  is	  dominated	  by	  short-­‐lived	  activation	  products,	  such	  as	  
Co-­‐60,	   Ti-­‐44	   and	   Sb-­‐125.	  With	   respect	   to	   the	   long-­‐term	   safety	   of	   irradiated	   fuel	   elements,	  mainly	   C-­‐14	  
(produced	  by	  N-­‐14(n,p)	  reactions	  in	  cladding	  and	  steel	  components)	  and	  Tc-­‐99	  (produced	  by	  Mo-­‐98(n,γ)	  
reactions	  in	  steel	  components)	  are	  of	  concern.	  
	  
	  
3	  Radionuclide	  release	  from	  spent	  nuclear	  fuel	  
	  
Spent	   nuclear	   fuel	   alteration	   processes	   and	   radionuclide	   release	   processes	   depend	   both	   on	   the	  
characteristics	  of	   the	  SNF	   itself	  and	  on	  many	  spatially	  and	   temporal	  varying	  geochemical	  parameters	   in	  
the	  near	  field	  of	  the	  repository.	  Dissolution	  experiments	  simulating	  the	  contact	  of	  aqueous	  solution	  with	  
SNF	   demonstrate	   clearly	   that	   radionuclide	   release	   from	   the	   fuel	   is	   strongly	   affected	   by	   the	   spatial	  
radionuclide	  distribution	  among	  (i)	   the	  gap	  region,	   (ii)	  boundaries	  between	  UO2	  grains,	   (iii)	  UO2	  matrix	  
and	  (iv)	  in	  the	  high	  burn-­‐up	  structures	  (Katayama,	  1976;	  Johnson	  et	  al,	  1985;	  Poinssot	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Bruno	  
and	   Ewing,	   2006;	   González-­‐Robles,	   2011).	   The	   alteration	   of	   SNF	   and	   the	   consecutive	   release	   of	  
radionuclides	  involve	  the	  combination	  of	  many	  different	  processes,	  which	  can	  be	  grouped	  into	  two	  stages:	  	  
(i) Fast	  release	  of	  radionuclides	   from	  the	  gap	  and	  grain	  boundaries	  at	   the	   time	  of	  breaching	  of	   the	  
SNF	  canister.	  The	  fast	  released	  radionuclide	  fraction	  is	  generally	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  Fast	  /	  Instant	  
Release	  Fraction	  (IRF).	  Certain	  radionuclides	  are	  accumulated	  in	  channels,	  which	  are	  formed	  by	  
fission	   gases	  within	   fuel	   grains,	   or	   along	   grain	   boundaries.	   It	   is	   assumed	   that	   fast	   radionuclide	  
release	  can	  be	  facilitated	  through	  these	  fission	  gas	  networks	  and	  thereby	  contributes	  to	  the	  IRF.	  	  
(ii) A	  much	  slower,	  long-­‐term	  radionuclide	  release	  that	  results	  from	  the	  alteration	  and	  dissolution	  of	  
the	   UO2	   matrix.	   The	   reactions	   of	   the	   fuel	   matrix	   with	   water	   are	   driven	   both	   by	   radiolytic	  
processes	  and	  by	  a	  thermodynamic	  affinity	  effect.	  	  
The	  IRF	  comprises	  a	  fraction	  of	  few	  percent	  of	  Cs-­‐135	  (and	  short-­‐lived	  Cs-­‐137),	  I-­‐129	  and	  potentially	  Cl-­‐
36,	  Se-­‐79,	  Tc-­‐99	  as	  well	  as	  Pd-­‐107.	  C-­‐14	  (and	  to	   less	  extent	  Tc-­‐99)	  present	   in	   the	  Zircaloy	  cladding	  and	  
steel	  parts	  of	  the	  fuel	  elements	  are	  often	  also	  considered	  as	  contributing	  to	  the	  IRF.	  I-­‐129,	  Cl-­‐36	  and	  Se-­‐79	  
tend	  to	  form	  anionic	  species	  and	  therefore	  they	  are	  hardly	  chemically	  retained	  even	  in	  a	  deep	  geological	  
disposal	  system.	  Since	  C-­‐14	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  released	  both	  as	  dissolved	  /	  gaseous	  inorganic	  and	  organic	  
compounds,	  a	  high	  mobility	  of	  C-­‐14	  is	  considered.	  	  
Within	   the	   current	   Collaborative	   Project	   FIRST-­‐Nuclides	   (“Fast	   /	   Instant	   Release	   of	   Safety	   Relevant	  
Radionuclides	   from	   Spent	   Nuclear	   Fuel”)	   new	   experimental	   and	   theoretical	   studies	   on	   the	   IRF	   of	   high	  
burn-­‐up	   SNF	   are	   performed.	   Detailed	   descriptions	   of	   fast	   /	   instant	   release	   and	   a	   summary	   of	   results	  
obtained	   from	   more	   than	   hundred	   published	   experiments	   with	   SNF	   samples	   are	   given	   in	   the	   FIRST-­‐
Nuclides	  State-­‐of-­‐the-­‐Art	  report	  (Kienzler	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  It	  is	  shown	  that	  fast	  /	  instant	  release	  of	  I-­‐129	  is	  in	  
the	  order	  of	   fission	   gas	   release	   (FGR),	  whereas	   the	   ratio	  of	   fractional	   release	  of	   fission	   gases	   to	  Cs-­‐137	  




release	   is	   in	   the	  range	  of	  3:1.	  Generally,	   the	  FGR	   is	  measured	  by	  means	  of	  puncturing	   the	  plenum	  of	  an	  
irradiated	  fuel	  rod.	  Obviously,	  there	  is	  a	  dependence	  of	  the	  IRF	  of	  Cs-­‐137,	  Cs-­‐135,	  I-­‐129	  and	  fission	  gases	  
on	   the	   irradiation	   history	   and	   other	   in-­‐reactor	   fuel	   operating	   parameters	   of	   the	   studied	   SNF.	   New	  
experimental	  results	  of	  FIRST-­‐Nuclides	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  IRF	  of	  these	  radionuclides	  is	  higher	  for	  SNF	  
irradiated	   in	  Pressurized	  Water	  Reactors	   (PWR)	   	   compared	   to	   SNF	   irradiated	   in	  Boiling	  Water	  Reactor	  
(BWR)	  for	  similar	  burn-­‐up	  values.	  There	  is	  growing	  evidence	  that	  FGR	  (Fig.	  1)	  and	  IRF	  of	  Cs-­‐137,	  Cs-­‐135	  
and	   I-­‐129	   increase	  with	   increasing	   linear	   heat	   generation	   rate	   (LHGR)	   rather	   than	  with	   burn-­‐up	  of	   the	  
studied	  SNF.	  
	  
Fig.	  1.	  Fractional	  fission	  gas	  release	  (FGR)	  measured	  in	  plenum	  puncturing	  tests	  as	  function	  of	  	  power	  rate	  (LHGR)	  of	  BWR	  and	  PWR	  
SNF	  samples	  studied	  in	  the	  Collabrative	  Project	  FIRST-­‐Nuclides.	  
	  
The	  release	  of	  radionuclides	  bound	  to	  the	  UO2	  matrix	  depends	  on	  the	  extent	  of	  UO2(s)	  corrosion,	  which	  is	  
controlled	   by	   a	   competition	   between	   oxidizing	   radiolysis	   products	   and	   complexing	   species	   on	   one	   side	  
and	   inhibitors	   on	   the	   other	   side.	   Radiation	   induced	   UO2	   matrix	   dissolution	   can	   only	   occur	   if	   the	   non-­‐
radiolytic	   redox	   couples	   in	   the	   near	   field	   do	   not	   consume	   the	   radiolytic	   oxidants.	   Since	   high	   hydrogen	  
concentrations	   will	   be	   achieved	   in	   the	   near	   field	   of	   a	   deep	   geological	   repository,	   mainly	   caused	   by	  
anaerobic	   corrosion	   of	   the	   Fe-­‐based	   waste	   canisters,	   an	   inhibition	   of	   the	   SNF	   matrix	   dissolution	   is	  
expected.	  Leaching	  experiments	  with	  SNF	  samples	  and	  non-­‐irradiated	  UO2(s)	  samples	  as	  well	  as	  radiolysis	  
studies	   indicate	   that	  molecular	   hydrogen	   both	   impedes	   radiolytic	   decomposition	   of	   the	   studied	   simple	  
groundwater	   surrogates	   and	   considerably	   inhibits	   corrosion	   of	   the	   fuel	   matrix	   (Metz	   et	   al.,	   2012	   and	  
references	   therein).	   This	   hydrogen	   inhibition	   effect	   is	   considered	   to	   be	   related	   to	   three	   different	  
electrochemical,	  radiochemical	  and	  radiolytically	  driven	  processes:	  
	  
• Catalytic	  reactions	  at	  the	  surface	  of	  ε-­‐Ru(Mo,	  Tc,	  Rh,	  Pd)	  and	  /	  or	  other	  ε	  -­‐particles.	  
• UO2(s)	  surface	  controlled	  reduction	  of	  UO22+(aq)	  by	  H2	  in	  presence	  of	  corroding	  iron.	  
• Inhibition	  of	  the	  radiolytic	  production	  of	  oxidizing	  species	  (H2O2	  and	  OH●).	  
	  
It	  is	  widely	  assumed	  that	  radiolysis	  driven	  oxidative	  fuel	  matrix	  dissolution	  appears	  to	  be	  less	  relevant	  for	  
most	   repository	   concepts	   (e.g.	   Eriksen	   et	   al.,	   2012),	   though	   there	   is	   insufficient	   knowledge	   about	   the	  
molecular	  mechanisms	  of	  the	  protective	  hydrogen	  effect	  on	  SNF	  corrosion.	  In	  particular	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  
knowledge	  on	  the	  number	  and	  density	  of	  ε-­‐particles	  in	  SNF.	  Moreover,	  an	  international	  benchmark	  study	  
on	  modelling	  of	  SNF	  corrosion	  shows	  that	  model	  uncertainties	  are	  still	  very	  large,	  especially	  regarding	  the	  
effect	   of	   hydrogen	   as	  well	   as	   the	   respective	  parameters	   of	   the	   radiolytic	   reactions	   (Bruno	   et	   al.,	   2009).	  
Although	   the	   effect	   of	   hydrogen	   overpressure	   on	   the	   SNF	   corrosion	   behaviour	   has	   been	   studied	  
extensively	   in	   near	   neutral	   pH	   diluted	   and	   saline	   NaCl-­‐NaHCO3	   and	   NaCl	   containing	   solutions,	   the	  




hydrogen	   inhibition	   effect	   need	   to	   be	   tested	   in	   aqueous	   solutions	   which	   are	   similar	   to	   natural	  
groundwater.	  Certain	  groundwater	  constituents,	  such	  as	  bromide	  or	  sulphur,	  could	  affect	  the	  interaction	  
of	  radiolysis	  products	  with	  hydrogen	  or	  could	  poison	  ε-­‐particles.	  	  
In	  the	  long	  term,	  the	  decay	  of	  the	  SNF	  radioactivity	  will	  lead	  to	  such	  a	  low	  radiation	  dose	  that	  radiolysis	  is	  
expected	   to	  become	  unable	   to	   sustain	  oxidative	  dissolution.	   In	   the	   absence	  of	   radiolytic	  oxidants,	  U(IV)	  
solubility	  controlled	  UO2	  matrix	  dissolution	  will	  dominate	  under	  the	  reducing	  conditions	  expected	  for	  the	  
near-­‐field	  of	  a	  deep	  geological	  repository.	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   European	   Atomic	   Energy	   Community's	   Seventh	   Framework	   Programme	   (FP7/2007-­‐2011)	   under	  
grant	  agreement	  no.	  295722,	  the	  FIRST-­‐Nuclides	  project.	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The	   long-­‐term	   durability	   of	   low	   alkali	   cements	   is	   of	   interest	   where	   they	   are	   under	   consideration	   as	  
repository	   tunnel	   and	   exploration	   borehole	   seals	   and	   plugs.	   It	   is	   essential	   to	   have	   an	   appropriate	  
understanding	  of	  their	  longevity	  to	  inform	  decisions	  on	  their	  potential	  use	  in	  a	  repository	  environment.	  
	  
Archaelogical	   analogues	  of	   low	  alkali	   cement	  have	  been	   studied	   for	   some	   time.	  Thomassin	  &	  Rassineux	  
(1992),	  for	  example,	  reviewed	  some	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  Gallo-­‐Roman	  cement-­‐based	  materials	  and	  noted	  
that	  one	  of	  the	  most	  impressive	  examples	  is	  the	  1700	  year	  old	  Roman	  mortar	  used	  in	  Hadrian’s	  Wall	  (UK)	  
which	   still	   contains	   substantial	   amounts	   of	   CSH	   (calcium	   silicate	   hydrate)	   compounds.	   These	   mortars	  
were	  studied	  specifically	  with	  the	  behaviour	  of	  an	  ILW	  repository	  in	  mind	  (Jull	  &	  Lees	  1990).	  
	  
However,	  plugs	  and	  seals	  will	  generally	  be	  required	  to	  be	  durable	  for	  longer	  than	  the	  few	  thousand	  years	  
which	   can	   be	   accessed	   via	   archaeological	   analogues,	   so	   it	   is	   essential	   to	   turn	   to	   natural	   systems	   for	  
evidence	   of	   longer	   term	   durability.	   To	   date,	   there	   have	   been	   no	   reported	   studies	   on	   natural	   low	   alkali	  
cements.	   In	   principle,	   however,	   such	   cements	   should	   exist	   and	   the	   Bituminous	  Marl	   Formation,	   which	  
hosts	   the	   natural	   OPC	   cements	   in	   Jordan	   (Pitty	   &	   Alexander,	   2011),	   is	   a	   likely	   source.	   This	   Formation	  
constitutes	   a	  widespread	   terrain	  which	   stretches	   from	   Syria	   in	   the	   north,	   through	   Israel	   and	   Jordan	   to	  
Saudi	  Arabia	  in	  the	  south.	  The	  natural	  cement	  was	  formed	  by	  the	  combustion	  of	  organic	  rich	  limestones,	  a	  
process	  which	  continues	  today.	  In	  Syria	  and	  northern	  Jordan,	  for	  example,	  the	  Formation	  is	  punctured	  by	  
Late	  Oligocene	  to	  Quaternary	  volcanics	  so	  sites	  which	  include	  pozzolanic	  ash	  mixed	  with	  the	  Bituminous	  
Marl	   exist	   and,	   on	   combustion,	   should	   produce	  natural	   low	   alkali	   cements.	   A	   site	   in	   northern	   Jordan	   is	  
currently	  under	  investigation	  for	  evidence	  of	  long-­‐term	  fresh	  groundwater/low	  alkali	  cement	  interaction	  
and	  the	  preliminary	  results	  of	  the	  study	  will	  be	  reported	  here.	  	  
	  
In	   addition,	   a	   second	   site	   in	   Europe	   has	   been	   identified	   where	   natural	   low	   alkali	   cements	   exist	   in	  
combination	  with	  both	  saline	  groundwaters	  and	  brines,	  allowing	  examination	  of	  saline	  groundwater/low	  
alkali	   cement	   interaction.	   Once	   again,	   the	   preliminary	   results	   of	   the	   study	  will	   be	   reported	   here	   and	   a	  
comparison	   between	   the	   two	   sites	   will	   be	   made,	   highlighting	   the	   different	   impact	   of	   the	   differing	  
groundwaters	  on	  the	  cement.	  Although	  precise	  dates	  for	  the	  systems	  examined	  are	  not	  yet	   forthcoming,	  
this	  is	  a	  focus	  for	  future	  efforts	  at	  both	  sites,	  allowing	  more	  precise	  definition	  of	  the	  probable	  longevity	  of	  
low	  alkali	  cements	  in	  repository	  environments.	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The	  study	  of	  fractured	  porous	  media	  is	  an	  important	  and	  challenging	  problem	  in	  hydrogeology.	  One	  of	  the	  
difficulties	   is	   that	   mathematical	   models	   have	   to	   account	   for	   heterogeneity	   introduced	   by	   fractures	   in	  
hydrogeological	  media.	  Heterogeneity	  may	  strongly	  influence	  the	  physical	  processes	  taking	  place	  in	  these	  
media.	  Moreover,	  the	  thickness	  of	  the	  fractures,	  which	  is	  usually	  negligible	  in	  comparison	  with	  the	  size	  of	  
the	  whole	  domain,	  and	  the	  complicated	  geometry	  of	  fracture	  networks	  reduce	  essentially	  the	  efficiency	  of	  
numerical	  methods.	  In	  order	  to	  overcome	  these	  difficulties,	  fractures	  are	  sometimes	  considered	  as	  objects	  
of	  reduced	  dimensionality	  (surfaces	  in	  three	  dimensions),	  and	  the	  field	  equations	  are	  averaged	  along	  the	  
fracture	  width.	  
	  
Fractures	  are	  assumed	   to	  be	   thin	  regions	  of	   space	   filled	  with	  a	  porous	  material	  whose	  properties	  differ	  
from	   those	   of	   the	   porous	   medium	   enclosing	   them.	   The	   interfaces	   separating	   the	   fractures	   from	   the	  
embedding	  medium	  are	  assumed	  to	  be	  ideal.	  We	  consider	  two	  approaches:	  	  
	  
(i) the	   fractures	  have	   the	   same	  dimension,	  d,	   as	   the	   embedding	  medium	  and	  are	   said	   to	  be	  d-­‐
dimensional;	  	  
(ii) (ii)	   the	   fractures	   are	   considered	   as	   (d-­‐1)-­‐dimensional	   manifolds,	   and	   the	   equations	   of	  
density-­‐driven	  flow	  are	  found	  by	  averaging	  the	  d-­‐dimensional	  laws	  over	  the	  fracture	  width.	  	  
	  
We	   show	   that	   the	   second	  approach	   is	   a	   valid	   alternative	   to	   the	   first	   one.	   For	   this	  purpose,	  we	  perform	  
numerical	  experiments	  using	  a	  finite-­‐volume	  discretization	  for	  both	  approaches.	  The	  results	  obtained	  by	  
the	  two	  methods	  are	  in	  good	  agreement	  with	  each	  other.	  
	  
We	   derive	   a	   criterion	   for	   the	   validity	   of	   the	   simplified	   representation.	   The	   criterion	   characterizes	   the	  
transition	  of	  a	  mainly	  parallel	  flow	  to	  a	  rotational	  flow,	  which	  cannot	  be	  reasonably	  approximated	  using	  a	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Calling	  geological	  disposal	  (GD)	  a	  technical	  and	  societal	  challenge	  and	  arguing	  that	  democratic	  decision-­‐
making	  on	  GD	  requires	  public	  and	  stakeholder	  engagement	  (PSE),	  are	  statements	  that	  will	  not	  meet	  much	  
opposition.	   A	   process	   of	   ‘governance’	   consists	   of	   engaging	   stakeholder	   groups	   in	   decision	   making	  
processes	  and	  contrasts	  with	  more	  traditional,	  often	  technocratic	  forms	  of	  government.	  As	  will	  be	  argued	  
in	   other	   papers	   in	   this	   conference	   (e.g.	   Grunwald;	   Kallenbach-­‐Herbert	   et	   al.;	   Röhlig	   et	   al.)	   it	   is	   of	   fairly	  
recent	  date,	  that	  concerned	  actors	  increasingly	  recognize	  that	  PSE	  should	  relate	  to	  both	  the	  societal	  and	  
technical	   questions	   concerning	   GD.	   While	   most	   people	   would	   agree	   in	   theory,	   putting	   ‘technical	  
democracy’	  (Callon	  et	  al.	  2001)	  in	  practice,	  often	  proofs	  to	  be	  less	  obvious.	  Opening	  up	  the	  technical	  ‘black	  
box’	  remains	  a	  crucial	  challenge	  in	  discussing	  the	  implications	  of	  GD	  for	  society	  and	  for	  the	  environment.	  
	  
As	   findings	   from	   the	   InSOTEC	   project	   show,	   this	   can	   be	   explained	   because	   different	   types	   of	  
problematization	   occur,	   often	   considered	   as	   sequential,	   rather	   than	   intertwined	   (Barthe	   et	   al.	   2014).	  
Social	   problematization	   of	   GD,	   i.e.	   considering	   the	   remaining	   obstacles	   for	   implementation	   to	   be	   in	  
essence	  social	  in	  nature,	  is	  often	  associated	  with	  the	  siting	  stage,	  when	  the	  technological	  project	  meets	  its	  
social	  environment	  (ibidem).	  Formal	  participatory	  processes	  are	  often	  aimed	  mainly	  at	  dealing	  with	  socio-­‐
economic	  impacts	  and	  adapting	  life	  on	  the	  surface	  to	  the	  underground	  technology	  project,	  rather	  than	  the	  
other	  way	  around	  (Bergmans	  et	  al.	   forthcoming).	  Still	  such	   interactions	  can,	  and	  have	   indeed	  proven	  to,	  
lead	  to	  technical	  problematization,	   i.e.	  putting	   into	  question	  the	  technical	  project	  or	  certain	  aspects	  of	   it	  
(cf.	  Barthe	  et	  al.	  2014),	  by	  concerned	  stakeholders.	  As	  can	  be	  observed	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Sweden	  -­‐	  for	  GD	  of	  
spent	   fuel,	   and	   Belgium	   -­‐	   for	   surface	   disposal	   of	   low-­‐	   and	   intermediate	   level	   waste,	   this	   does	   not	  
necessarily	  have	  to	  lead	  to	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	  proposed	  project.	  .	  
	  
In	  this	  presentation	  I	  would	  like	  to	  draw	  on	  these	  two	  cases	  to	  make	  a	  related	  argument	  about	  the	  need	  to	  
consider	   long-­‐term	   governance	   processes,	   reaching	   beyond	   the	   remits	   of	   classical	   site	   selection	  
procedures.	  Rather	  than	  considering	  siting	  as	  the	  end	  point	  of	  a	  participatory	  process,	  it	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  
a	  starting	  point.	  For	  that	  purpose,	  I	  will	  make	  use	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  hosting	  to	  emphasize	  the	  relationship	  
between	   the	   repository	   and	   its	   host	   community.	   A	   relationship	   that	   demands	   a	   re-­‐figuration	   of	   the	  
geography	   and	   temporality	   of	   geological	   disposal.	   Hosting	   a	   geological	   disposal	   facility	   brings	   with	   it	  
specific	   challenges,	   involving	   both	   social	   and	   technical	   adjustments,	   as	   well	   as	   reconfigurations	   of	   the	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Stakeholder	   involvement	   and	   public	   participation	   is	   recognized	   as	   a	   necessary	   part	   of	   nuclear	   waste	  
management.	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  see	  three	  driving	  forces	  behind	  this	  development:	  	  
	  
1) a	  deliberative	  movement	  with	  its	  roots	  in	  the	  1960s	  leftish	  movement	  (a	  philosophical	  argument),	  	  
2) the	  need	  for	  public	  acceptance	  of	  proposed	  solutions	  (a	  practical	  argument),	  and	  	  
3) the	  need	  for	  awareness	  and	  clarity	  before	  crucial	  decisions	  are	  made	  (a	  practical	  and	  democratic	  
argument).	  Depending	  on	  which	  driving	  force	  dominates	  an	  initiative	  for	  public	  participation,	  the	  
initiator	  is	  likely	  to	  prefer	  certain	  public	  participation	  processes	  before	  others.	  	  
	  
The	  initiator	  has	  to	  select	  among	  a	  large	  number	  of	  processes	  already	  having	  been	  implemented	  or	  design	  
a	  new	  one	  tailored	  for	  the	  specific	  situation.	  The	  process	  choice	  is	  crucial	  for	  which	  stakeholders	  are	  able	  
to	  join	  and	  which	  goals	  can	  be	  reached.	  
	  
Much	  of	  the	  debate	  about	  public	  participation	  has	  referred	  to	  the	  “Arnstein	  ladder”	  (Arnstein,	  1969)	  or	  its	  
modernized	  versions,	   such	  as	   the	  participation	   ladder	  used	   in	   the	   IPPA	  Project	   (Richardson	  et.al.	  2011)	  
building	  on	  work	  by	  the	  Netherlands	  Environmental	  Assessment	  Agency	  (MNP,	  2008).	  The	  various	  forms	  
of	  ladders	  have	  in	  common	  an	  increasing	  level	  of	  ambition	  for	  participation	  from	  low	  to	  high.	  The	  higher	  
up	  on	  the	  ladder,	  the	  better	   it	   is	  often	  anticipated.	  However,	  with	  this	  should	  follow	  more	  responsibility	  
and	  accountability	  of	  all	  participants,	  which	  in	  practice	  is	  often	  lacking.	  There	  are	  also	  practical	  problems	  
in	   using	   the	   ladder	   to	   map	   public	   participation	   processes.	   For	   example	   the	   step	   “collaboration”	   is	  
ambiguous	   as	   it	   can	  mean	   different	   things.	   In	   the	  RISCOM	  Process,	   participants	   collaborate	   to	   improve	  
clarity	  and	  awareness	  but	  not	  for	  finding	  common	  solutions.	  Therefore,	  the	  RISCOM	  Process	  (Vojtechova,	  
2009)	  does	  not	  fit	  into	  the	  ladder	  structure.	  	  
	  
To	   avoid	   these	   and	   other	   problems	   it	   is	   suggested	   to	   use	   three	   basic	   approaches	   to	   map	   public	  
participation	   –	   consultation,	   consensus	   shaping	   processes	   and	   safe	   space.	   In	   contrast	   to	   consensus	  
shaping	  processes,	  in	  the	  safe	  space	  approach	  there	  is	  no	  intention	  to	  develop	  solutions	  together	  between	  
the	   implementer	   and	   other	   stakeholders.	   In	   comparison	   with	   the	   ladder,	   the	   basic	   approaches	   offer	  
advantages	  for	  the	  mapping	  of	  public	  participation	  processes:	  
	  
If	  you	  strive	  for	  consensus	  or	  “only”	  clarity	  and	  awareness	  is	  a	  crucial	  question	  to	  be	  answered	  before	  a	  
process	  is	  launched	  as	  it	  determines	  which	  stakeholders	  can	  join	  and	  which	  goals	  are	  feasible	  to	  reach.	  
	  
It	   is	   easier	   to	   use	   in	   assigning	   properties	   to	   a	   process,	   as	   it	   more	   straight-­‐forward	   to	   understand	   if	   a	  
process	  is	  consensus	  shaping	  or	  a	  safe	  space	  than	  where	  it	  is	  on	  the	  ladder.	  	  
	  
It	   clarifies	   better	   the	   links	   between	   the	   participation	   processes	   and	   the	   actual	   political	   and/or	   legal	  
decision-­‐making	  process.	  A	  consensus	  shaping	  process	  should	  produce	  real	  advice	  (or	  even	  decisions)	  but	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2013	   has	   been	   a	   banner	   year	   for	   Andra	   with	   widespread	   discussions	   on	   the	   question	   of	   long-­‐term	  
management	  of	  radioactive	  waste:	  a	  nationwide	  public	  discussion	  about	  the	  planned	  Cigéo	  deep	  disposal	  
facility	   has	   been	   organized	   and	   national	   discussions	   on	   the	   energy	   source	   transition	   had	   inevitably	  
brought	  up	   the	  question	  of	  what	   to	  do	  with	   future	   radioactive	  waste	   to	  be	  produced	  under	   the	  various	  
scenarios	  put	  forward.	  
	  
In	  spite	  of	  an	  open	  institutional	  framework,	  with	  numerous	  legal	  provisions	  for	  citizen	  participation,	  2013	  
showed	  that	  creation	  of	  a	  radioactive	  waste	  disposal	   facility	   is	  not,	  and	  cannot	  be,	  a	  question	  dealt	  with	  
like	  breaking	  news,	  within	   a	   given	   temporal	   or	   spatial	   perimeter.	  Any	   attempts	   to	   bring	  up	   the	   subject	  
under	  the	  spotlight	  of	  public	  scrutiny	  inevitably	  shift	  the	  discussions	  away	  from	  their	  central	  theme	  and	  
abandon	  the	  underlying	  question	  –	  what	  should	  be	  done	  with	  the	  existing	  radioactive	  waste	  and	  the	  waste	  
that	   is	  bound	  to	  be	  produced?	  –	  to	  move	  on	  to	  the	  other	  major	  question:	  "Should	  we	  stop	  using	  nuclear	  
power	  or	  not?",	  which	  takes	  us	  away	  from	  our	  responsibilities	  towards	  future	  generations.	  
	  
Daring	  to	  face	  the	  question,	  anchor	  it	   in	  citizen	  discussions,	  and	  create	  awareness	  of	  our	  duties	  towards	  
coming	  generations:	  this	  is	  the	  challenge	  that	  Andra	  had	  already	  set	  itself	  several	  years	  ago.	  Our	  position	  
is	   a	   strong	  one;	   rather	   than	   seeking	   to	  mask	   the	  problem	  of	   radioactive	  waste,	  we	  must	   face	  up	   to	   our	  
responsibilities:	  the	  waste	  is	  already	  there,	  and	  we	  have	  to	  do	  something	  with	  it.	  
	  
It	  will	  take	  time	  to	  be	  successful	  here.	  Long-­‐term	  management	  of	  radioactive	  waste	  is	  clearly	  a	  really	  long-­‐
term	  matter!	  All	  the	  experience	  in	  the	  field	  has	  shown	  that	  it	  involves	  patience	  and	  careful	  listening,	  and	  
requires	  building	  up	  a	  basis	  for	  solid	  trust	  among	  the	  potential	  neighboring	  population,	  who	  are	  the	  most	  
directly	  concerned.	  Durable	  proximity	  human	  investment	  is	  one	  of	  the	  key	  factors	  of	  success.	  For	  over	  20	  
years	  now,	  it	  has	  been	  one	  of	  the	  principles	  on	  which	  Andra	  has	  built	  its	  project	  management	  schemes.	  
	  
Nonetheless,	  the	  fresh	  light	  brought	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  matter	  by	  nationwide	  discussions	  has	  its	  merits.	  The	  
subject	   is	   now	   visible:	   the	   press,	   social	   networks,	   politicians	   and	  NGOs	   are	   going	   over	   the	  matter,	   and	  
giving	  it	  widespread	  attention.	  Unbiased	  citizens	  have	  been	  called	  on	  to	  make	  their	  comments	  and	  provide	  
guidance	  for	  the	  overall	  social	  and	  ethical	  approach	  to	  the	  subject.	  Some	  real	  links	  are	  being	  set	  up	  at	  last!	  
	  
The	  article	  will	  cover	  in	  greater	  detail	  the	  path	  followed	  by	  Andra	  over	  the	  last	  twenty	  years:	  its	  successes,	  
its	  difficulties	  and	  its	  failures,	  concentrating	  of	  course	  on	  2013,	  its	  preparation,	  which	  began	  early	  in	  2012.	  
The	  article	  will	  also	  present	  the	  Andra’s	  further	  course	  of	  action	  and	  issues	  proposals	  to	  the	  State	  in	  order	  
to	  meet	  the	  expectations	  that	  arose	  from	  the	  public	  discussion.	  
	   	  




The	  Swiss	  Approach	  to	  Finding	  Compromises	  in	  Nuclear	  Waste	  
Governance	  
	  
SOPHIE	  KUPPLER1,	  ARMIN	  GRUNWALD2	  
1Karlsruhe	   Institute	   of	   Technology,	   Institute	   for	   Technology	   Assessment	   and	   Systems	   Analysis,	  
sophie.kuppler@kit.edu,	  2Karlsruhe	  Institute	  of	  Technology,	   Institute	  for	  Technology	  Assessment	  and	  Systems	  
Analysis,	  armin.grunwald@kit.edu	  
	  
Abstract:	   In	  Switzerland,	  a	  new	  site	   selection	  procedure	   is	  being	   implemented	   since	  2008.	  This	  procedure,	  
which	  is	  laid	  down	  in	  a	  ‘sectoral	  plan’,	  shows	  strong	  elements	  of	  public	  participation	  and	  transparency	  and	  
can	  be	  considered	  a	  step	  away	  from	  the	  classical	  ‘decide-­‐announce-­‐defend’	  approach	  in	  decision-­‐making.	  This	  
procedure	   tends	   towards	   a	   more	   governance-­‐oriented	   approach	   based	   on	   ideas	   of	   ‘civility’	   of	   decision-­‐
making.	   Despite	   this	   renewal,	   the	   Swiss	   case	   clearly	   shows	   that	   any	   kind	   of	   selection	   process	   has	   to	   be	  





In	  Switzerland,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  many	  other	  countries,	  which	  are	  planning	  to	  install	  underground	  repositories	  
for	  their	  high-­‐level	  nuclear	  wastes,	  social	  conflicts	  have	  arisen	  in	  the	  process	  of	  searching	  and	  exploring	  a	  
suitable	  site.	  Those	  conflicts	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  historically	  developed.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  debate	  on	  
nuclear	  power	  production,	  the	  anti-­‐nuclear	  social	  movement	  has	  emerged.	  It	  not	  only	  demanded	  a	  phase-­‐
out	  of	  nuclear	  power	  production,	  but	  also	  participation	  in	  the	  debate	  on	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  high-­‐level	  
nuclear	   waste	   produced	   (Grunwald	   and	   Hocke	   2009,	   Grunwald	   2010:	   254-­‐257).	   Responsible	  
governmental	  actors	  reacted	  by	  taking	  up	  new	  ideas	  about	  ‘governance’	  –	  a	  term	  used	  both	  in	  the	  context	  
of	  governmental	  organizations	  and	  in	  the	  social	  scientific	  debate	  (e.g.	  European	  Commission	  2001,	  Benz	  
and	   Dose	   2010).	   Central	   parts	   of	   the	   debate	  were	   ideas	   about	   public	   participation	   in	   decision-­‐making.	  
Over	  time,	  those	  ideas	  were	  also	  picked	  up	  in	  the	  nuclear	  community.	  	  
	  
In	   Switzerland,	   a	   stale-­‐mate	   in	   decision-­‐making	   occurred	   when	   an	   application	   for	   underground	  
exploration	   for	   a	   repository	   site	   for	   low-­‐	   and	   intermediate	   level	   waste	   was	   rejected	   in	   a	   cantonal	  
referendum.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  Swiss	  parliament	  decided	  to	  abolish	  the	  cantonal	  veto	  right	  and	  instead	  install	  
an	  official	  step-­‐wise	  site	  selection	  procedure	  with	  an	  optional	  national	  referendum	  at	  the	  very	  end	  of	  the	  
selection	  process.	  	  To	  this	  end,	  they	  chose	  and	  adapted	  a	  well-­‐established	  planning	  instrument	  (“sectoral	  
plan”)	   (SFOE	   2008).	   In	   setting	   up	   this	   approach,	   the	   Swiss	   authorities	   took	   up	   ideas	   developed	   by	   the	  
German	   Committee	   for	   the	  Development	   of	   a	   Site	   Selection	   Procedure	   (AkEnd	   2002)	   and	   international	  
organisations,	   such	   as	   the	  Nuclear	   Energy	  Agency`s	   Forum	  on	   Stakeholder	   Confidence	   (e.g.	  NEA	  2003).	  
Further,	  consultations	  took	  place	  with	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  stakeholders,	  in	  which	  central	  ideas	  for	  the	  sectoral	  
plan	  were	  discussed	  before	  its	  final	  approval	  by	  the	  Swiss	  Federal	  Council	  (the	  Swiss	  national	  executive).	  
Implementation	  of	   the	   sectoral	  plan	   started	   in	  2008	  and	   is	   still	   on	   track,	   even	   though	   some	   substantial	  
changes	  needed	  to	  be	  made.	  Different	  reasons	  for	  these	  changes	  can	  be	  observed.	  They	  range	  from	  new	  
knowledge	  gained	  to	  strong	  demands	  from	  the	  public.	  
	  
In	  this	  paper,	  the	  Swiss	  approach	  to	  repository	  siting	  will	  be	  analyzed	  based	  on	  governance	  theories	  and	  
related	  ideas	  of	  public	  participation.	  
	  




2	  Swiss	  Nuclear	  Waste	  Governance	  
	  
In	  Switzerland,	  three	  categories	  of	  nuclear	  waste	  are	  differentiated:	  (a)	  high-­‐level	  waste	  (HLW);	  (b)	  alpha-­‐
toxic	  waste;	  (c)	  low-­‐	  and	  intermediate-­‐level	  waste	  (L/ILW)	  (SFOE	  2008:	  12).	  In	  total,	  a	  repository	  will	  be	  
needed	   for	   7,300	  m³	   of	   high-­‐level	  waste	   (reactor	   life-­‐time	   of	   50	   years)	   and	   for	   93,000	  m³	   of	   low-­‐	   and	  
intermediate	  level	  waste	  (Nagra	  2011).	  
	  
Before	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  sectoral	  plan,	  the	  site	  selection	  procedure	  for	  a	  repository	  site	  was	  not	  
regulated	  by	   the	   state.	  Rather,	   the	   ‘National	  Cooperative	   for	   the	  Disposal	  of	  Radioactive	  Waste’	   (Nagra)	  
was	  responsible	  for	  identifying	  a	  site	  and,	  if	  a	  site	  was	  found,	  which	  they	  deemed	  suitable,	  to	  hand	  in	  the	  
application	  for	  a	  general	  license.	  In	  2003,	  a	  new	  Nuclear	  Energy	  Act	  was	  passed	  by	  the	  Swiss	  parliament.	  It	  
went	  into	  force	  in	  2005.	  In	  this	  law,	  the	  cantonal	  veto	  right	  was	  abandoned.	  In	  the	  corresponding	  Nuclear	  
Energy	  Ordinance	   (NEO)	   from	  2004	   it	  was	   specified	   that	   a	   sectoral	   plan	   is	   to	   be	  used	   to	   formulate	   the	  
federal	   government’s	   objectives	   and	   criteria	   for	   the	   disposal	   of	   radioactive	   waste	   in	   deep	   geological	  
repositories	  in	  a	  legally	  binding	  way	  (NEO,	  Art.	  5).	  The	  sectoral	  plan	  was	  then	  conceptualized	  in	  a	  way	  that	  
it	   defines	   a	   step-­‐wise	   site	   selection	   process	   for	   geological	   repositories	   with	   strong	   elements	   of	   public	  
participation	  (Kuppler	  and	  Hocke	  2012).	  
	  
By	  formalizing	  the	  site	  selection	  procedure	  and	  handing	  over	  responsibility	  for	  its	  coordination	  from	  the	  
Nagra	  to	  the	  Swiss	  Federal	  Office	  of	  Energy	  (SFOE),	   ideas	  from	  the	  debates	  on	  “governance”	  were	  taken	  
up.	  The	  term	  “governance”	  is	  used	  in	  different	  ways,	  even	  in	  the	  scientific	  debate.	  One	  central	  idea	  is	  that	  
the	  efficiency	  of	  governmental	  action	  should	  be	  improved	  by	  involving	  non-­‐governmental	  actors	  into	  the	  
provision	  of	  services.	  Another	  related	  idea	  is	  based	  on	  the	  insight	  that	  classical	  top-­‐down	  approaches	  in	  
decision-­‐making	  have	  lost	  their	  steering	  capacity.	  Based	  on	  this	  observation,	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  governance	  
perspective	   lies	   on	   the	   organization	   of	   decision-­‐making	   processes	   and	   the	   state’s	   institutionalized	  
structures	   for	   resolving	   problems	   and	   conflicts	   (e.g.	   Chhotray	   and	   Stoker	   2009,	   Hoppe	   2010,	   Grande	  
2012).	  
	  
Particular	  attention	   is	   laid	  on	   the	   integration	  of	  stakeholders	   in	  networks	  and	  their	  coordination	  within	  
those	   networks	   (Benz	   and	   Dose	   2010,	   Haus	   2010).	   The	   latter	   is	   particularly	   difficult	   in	   technology	  
conflicts,	  such	  as	  the	  conflict	  on	  nuclear	  waste	  repository	  siting,	  as	  the	  stakeholders	  are	  often	  more	  or	  less	  
autonomous	   collective	  actors	  with	   strong	  expectations	   regarding	  public	  participation.	  The	   challenge	   for	  
the	  responsible	  governmental	  actors	  is	  to	  keep	  those	  actors	  in	  the	  site	  selection	  process	  while	  at	  the	  same	  
time	  sticking	  to	  the	  rules	  fixed	  in	  the	  sectoral	  plan.	  
	  
	  
3	  The	  Sectoral	  Plan	  
	  
In	  1995	  and	  again	   in	  2002	   the	  Nagra’s	  application	   for	  underground	  explorations	  at	   the	  Wellenberg	  site	  
was	   stopped	   by	   two	   cantonal	   referendums.	   Also	   in	   2002,	   the	   Nagra	   submitted	   a	   ‘demonstration	   of	  
disposal	   feasibility’	   to	   the	   federal	   authorities	   for	   a	   repository	   site	   for	   HLW.	   This	   was	   approved	   by	   the	  
federal	  authorities	  in	  2006.	  Having	  in	  mind	  the	  experiences	  at	  the	  Wellenberg	  site,	  the	  federal	  government	  
stated	  already	  in	  2002	  that	  an	  approval	  of	  the	   ‘demonstration	  of	  disposal	  feasibility’	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  
the	   exemplary	   site	   used	   in	   the	   demonstration	   will	   become	   the	   site	   for	   the	   final	   repository.	   Rather,	   it	  
demanded	  that	  the	  Nagra	  has	  to	  compare	  several	  sites	  regarding	  their	  suitability.	  
	  




Those	  events	  influenced	  the	  conceptualization	  of	  the	  Nuclear	  Energy	  Act	  and	  the	  decision	  to	  use	  a	  sectoral	  
plan	   for	   organizing	   the	   site	   selection	   process.	   In	   the	   Nuclear	   Energy	   Act,	   the	   cantonal	   right	   to	   hold	   a	  
referendum	  on	  planning	  activities	  related	  to	  repository	  siting	  was	  abandoned.	  Instead,	  a	  right	  to	  be	  heard	  
was	  introduced,	  but	  only	  if	  the	  siting	  process	  would	  not	  be	  unnecessarily	  obstructed	  by	  this.	  Further,	  the	  
right	  for	  an	  optional	  national	  referendum	  on	  the	  granting	  of	  the	  general	   license	  by	  the	  Swiss	  parliament	  
was	  introduced.	  	  
	  
Sectoral	  plans	  are	   the	  established	  planning	   instrument	  at	   federal	   level	   in	  Switzerland.	  They	  are	  used	   to	  
consolidate	  state	  activities	  in	  a	  certain	  field	  of	  planning.	  In	  comparison	  to	  other	  sectoral	  plans,	  the	  Sectoral	  
Plan	   for	   Deep	   Geological	   Repositories	   offers	   extended	   public	   participation.	   Public	   participation	   in	   the	  
sense	  of	  “having	  a	  say”	  is	  though	  limited	  to	  above-­‐ground	  facilities;	  in	  all	  other	  questions	  participation	  is	  
limited	  to	  consultation.	  Consultation	  takes	  place	  in	  several	  forums	  designed	  for	  this	  purpose,	  especially	  in	  
the	  so-­‐called	  regional	  conferences,	   in	  which	  representatives	  from	  the	  interested	  public	  and	  stakeholders	  
are	  members	   (Jost	   2012).	   The	   tasks	   those	   regional	   conferences	   should	   fulfil	   are	   defined	   in	   the	   sectoral	  
plan.	  Through	  this,	  the	  limits	  of	  their	  involvement	  in	  decision-­‐making	  are	  also	  indirectly	  defined.	  
	  
Already	  at	  very	  early	  stages	  of	  development	  of	  the	  sectoral	  plan,	  public	  debates	  were	  organized	  in	  order	  to	  
increase	   the	   likelihood	   that	  all	   relevant	  collective	  actors	  would	  participate	   in	   the	   implementation	  of	   the	  
final	  plan	  (Minhans	  and	  Kallenbach-­‐	  Herbert	  2012:	  7).	  Those	  consultations	   included	  information	  events,	  
but	  also	  focus	  groups	  organized	  by	  the	  SFOE.	  Furthermore,	  informal	  consultations	  were	  held	  not	  only	  with	  
industry	   representatives,	   but	   also	   with	   representatives	   from	   local	   administrations	   from	   one	   potential	  
siting	   area.	   In	   those	   consultations,	   the	   Swiss	   government	   profited	   from	   the	   strong	   Swiss	   consensus	  
democratic	  tradition.	  It	  showed	  that,	  even	  though	  time	  consuming,	  this	  approach	  was	  insofar	  a	  success	  as	  
all	  stakeholders	  agreed	  to	  take	  part	  in	  the	  new	  site	  selection	  procedure.	  A	  working	  compromise	  had	  been	  
found.	  
	  
Central	  principles	  fixated	  in	  the	  sectoral	  plan	  are	  a	  step-­‐wise	  approach	  with	  the	  possibility	  to	  fall	  back	  on	  
earlier	  steps	  if	  necessary	  at	  any	  point	  of	  time,	  the	  idea	  that	  socio-­‐economic	  criteria	  should	  play	  a	  role	  in	  
site	  selection,	  but	  that	  safety	  always	  comes	  first,	  and	  integration	  of	  the	  local	  public	  as	  well	  as	  transparency	  
regarding	  all	  information	  available	  and	  regarding	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  sectoral	  plan.	  The	  latter	  means	  that	  
roles	  were	  clearly	  distributed	  and	  criteria	  for	  moving	  from	  one	  step	  to	  the	  next	  clearly	  defined.	  It	  was	  also	  
clearly	   defined	   who	   could	   participate	   on	   what	   topic.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   room	  was	   left	   for	   adaptations,	  
which	  might	  become	  necessary	  due	  to	  new	  developments.	  
	  
One	   important	   principle	   behind	   the	   sectoral	   plan	   is	   the	   ideal	   of	   the	   “civility”	   of	   decision-­‐making.	   This	  
approach	   is	   grounded	   on	   ethical	   principles	   of	   dealing	   with	   conflicts.	   Instead	   of	   exclusively	   applying	  
majority-­‐oriented	  procedures	  to	  decision-­‐making	  situations	  discourse	  ethics	  (Habermas	  1991)	  proposes	  
to	  establish	  an	  open,	  argumentation-­‐oriented	  and	  procedural	  approach	  to	  identify	  the	  best	  solution	  among	  
all	   persons	   and	   groups	   affected.	   The	   discursive	   procedure	   of	   exchanging	   arguments	   and	   arguing	   for	  
specific	  positions	  and	  options	  must	  observe	  principles	  of	  inclusion,	  equity,	  and	  fairness.	  The	  expectation	  is	  
that	   a	   civil	   procedure	   of	   this	   kind	   could	   provide	   better	   results	   compared	   to	   traditional	   approaches	   of	  
purely	   representative	   democracy.	   However,	   there	   is	   no	   guarantee,	   and	   success	   depends	   on	   a	   large	  









4	  The	  implementation	  phase	  
	  
After	   the	   start	   of	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   sectoral	   plan	   in	   2008,	   the	   regional	   conferences	   were	  
established	  in	  line	  with	  the	  original	  schedule.	  Each	  conference	  has	  about	  100	  members	  (Jost	  2012:	  147).	  
They	   represent	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   regional	   stakeholders,	   such	   as	   citizens,	   NGOs	   and	   community	  
representatives.	  Within	  the	  regional	  conferences,	  three	  smaller	  working	  groups	  were	  established.	  One	  of	  
those	  groups	   is	  on	  safety	  aspects.	  The	  establishment	  of	   this	  group	  was	  not	  part	  of	   the	  original	  plan,	  but	  
installed	   after	   strong	   demands	   from	   the	   interested	   public	   and	   NGOs.	   By	   installing	   those	   groups,	   the	  
responsible	  authorities	  compromised	  on	  their	  idea	  that	  safety	  was	  a	  topic	  only	  the	  authorities	  had	  to	  take	  
care	  of.	  	  
	  
The	  regional	  conferences	  are	  relatively	  free	  in	  their	  self-­‐organization.	  They	  receive	  financial	  support	  from	  
the	  federal	  authorities,	  which	  allows	  them	  to	  invite	  experts	  and	  pay	  for	  studies	  as	  they	  deem	  necessary.	  
	  
Furthermore,	  a	  “Technical	  Forum	  Safety”	  (TFS)	  has	  been	  established.	  The	  TFS	  has	  the	  task	  to	  discuss	  and	  
answer	   the	   stakeholders’	   technical	   and	   scientific	   questions.	   The	   forum	   consists	   of	   experts,	   responsible	  
authorities,	  the	  Nagra,	  the	  cantons,	  as	  well	  as	  one	  representative	  from	  each	  of	  the	  siting	  regions.	  
	  
Besides	  those	  institutionalized	  forms	  of	  participation	  and	  information,	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  transparency	  has	  
been	   established	   regarding	   the	   documentation	   and	   publication	   of	   the	   progress	   in	   site	   selection.	   In	   one	  
case,	   the	   interested	  public	   and	   the	   regional	   conferences	  demanded	   for	   the	  Nagra	   to	  publish	  documents	  
explaining	  the	  background	  for	  some	  of	  their	  work.	  The	  Nagra	  followed	  this	  demand.	  
	  
Furthermore,	  information	  meetings	  and	  workshops	  were	  held	  with	  members	  of	  the	  interested	  public	  and	  
the	  regional	  conferences.	  All	  those	  activities	  were	  also	  documented	  (e.g.	  SFOE	  2009,	  AGNEB	  2013).	  
	  
Even	   in	   the	   cases,	   in	  which	   the	   stakeholders’	   rights	   are	   limited	   to	   a	   ‘right	   to	  be	  heard’	   this	   puts	   strong	  
demands	  on	  the	  responsible	  authorities	  and	  the	  Nagra	  as	   this	  means	  that	   they	  have	  the	  right	   to	  receive	  
answers	  to	  their	  questions.	  	  
	  
Despite	   these	   developments	   away	   from	   the	   classical	   decide-­‐announce-­‐defend	   approach	   towards	   a	   civil	  
conflict	  resolution,	  some	  potential	  weaknesses	  in	  the	  concept	  have	  become	  visible	  during	  implementation.	  
First,	  there	  is	  no	  clearly	  institutionalized	  way	  of	  resolving	  conflicts	  within	  the	  process	  (ESchT	  2009).	  This	  
means	  that	  e.g.	  conflicts	  arising	  among	  members	  of	  the	  regional	  conferences	  are	  resolved	  ‘ad-­‐hoc’	  by	  the	  
SFOE	  instead	  of	  having	  an	  institutionalized,	  and	  thus	  transparent,	  way	  of	  dealing	  with	  them.	  Second,	  there	  
is	  no	  institutionalized	  form	  of	  dealing	  with	  minority	  opinions.	  Two	  members	  of	  governmental	  committees	  
left	  their	   jobs	  because	  they	  were	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  their	  arguments	  were	  not	  heard.	  Third,	  the	  original	  
time-­‐table	  was	   calculated	   too	   tight.	  Over	   several	   years	   this	  was	   repeatedly	  moaned	  by	  members	   of	   the	  
regional	  conferences	  and	  at	  one	  point	   led	  to	  one	  of	   them	  enforcing	  a	   ‘stop’	   in	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  
sectoral	  plan	  until	  they	  got	  more	  time	  to	  fulfil	  a	  certain	  task.	  Only	  in	  2014,	  the	  time	  schedule	  was	  officially	  





Regarding	   the	   way	   the	   sectoral	   plan	   was	   prepared	   and	   is	   implemented,	   it	   can	   be	   concluded	   that	  
Switzerland	  has	  successfully	  integrated	  ideas	  related	  to	  governance-­‐concepts	  in	  their	  approach	  to	  conflict	  




resolution	  in	  repository	  siting.	  This	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  an	  explicit	  shift	  away	  from	  the	  decide-­‐announce-­‐
defend	  approach.	  Even	   though	  ensuring	   ‘safety’	   remains	   the	   task	  of	   the	   responsible	   authorities	   and	   the	  
Nagra,	   a	   shift	   away	   from	   a	   purely	   technocratic	   approach	   has	   taken	   place	   due	   to	   the	   high	   degree	   of	  
transparency	  and	  the	  strong	  commitment	  to	  dialogue	  with	  the	  interested	  public	  and	  stakeholders.	  	  
	  
Still,	   there	   is	   room	   for	   improvement.	   Involving	   the	   public	   in	   decision-­‐making	   requires	   changes	   in	   the	  
‘design’	   of	   decision-­‐making	   processes.	   Institutions	   need	   to	   learn	   to	   coordinate	   such	   an	   involvement	   of	  
stakeholders,	  which	  also	  means	  being	  open	   to	   their	  questions	  and	  demands.	  This	   is	  not	  an	  easy	   task	  as	  
different	   stakeholders	   have	   very	   different	   ideas	   and	   expectations	   regarding	   their	   involvement.	  
Compromises	   from	   all	   sides	   are	   necessary	   in	   order	   to	   make	   such	   arrangements	   work.	   As	   the	   arising	  
conflicts	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  sectoral	  plan	  show,	  the	  sectoral	  plan	  cannot	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  fixed	  
compromise.	  Rather,	  certain	  aspects	  have	  to	  be	  renegotiated	  ‘on	  the	  go’.	  
	  
Operationalizing	  governance	  concepts	   for	  the	  analysis	  of	  nuclear	  waste	  politics	   is	   fruitful	   if	   the	  research	  
focus	   is	   laid	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  decision-­‐making	  processes.	  Using	  governance	  concepts	  can	  help	  to	  qualify	  
decision-­‐making	   procedures	   regarding	   “process	   quality”	   and	   the	   “quality	   of	   arguing”	   (instead	   of	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Abstract:	  This	  paper	  compares	  national	  approaches	  in	  Finland,	  Sweden,	  and	  France.	  These	  three	  EURATOM	  
Member	  States	  are	  in	  an	  advanced	  stage	  of	  siting	  deep	  geological	  disposal	  (DGD)	  facilities.	  The	  procedures	  in	  
these	  countries	  are	  largely	  based	  on	  voluntarism,	  but	  differ	  in	  their	  approach	  to	  public	  consultation	  as	  they	  
were	  based	  on	  the	  so-­‐called	  staged	  volunteer	  process	  leading	  to	  working	  partnership	  arrangements	  between	  
the	  operator	  and	  the	  hosting	  communities	  and	  veto	  rights	  (Sweden),	  decisions	  with	  strong	  local	  community	  
support	   and	   veto	   rights	   for	   municipalities	   until	   the	   final	   decision	   (Finland),	   and	   final	   top-­‐down	   decision	  
making	   after	   consultative	   processes	   (débat	   public)	   with	   the	   affected	   communities	   without	   veto	   rights	  
(France).	  This	  presentation	  focuses	  on	  participation	  and	  acceptance	  issues;	  it	  analyses	  the	  different	  modes	  of	  
governance	  with	   diverse	   conditions	   regarding	   transparency,	   trust,	   communication,	   and	   participation	   that	  
have	   been	   at	   work.	   Moving	   beyond	   the	   fact	   that	   variance	   exists	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   relevant	   national	  
institutional,	  legal,	  cultural,	  industrial,	  and	  energy	  frameworks,	  the	  authors	  take	  evidence	  from	  national	  case	  
studies	  and	  look	  for	  common	  patterns.	  
	  
	  
1	  Introduction	  	  
	  
Deep	   Geologic	   Disposal	   (DGD)	   has	   been	   indicated	   for	   a	   long	   time	   by	   a	   large	  majority	   of	   scientific	   and	  
technical	   experts	  —	   and	   endorsed	   by	   national	   governments	  —	   as	   the	  most	   adequate	  way	   of	   disposing	  
highly	  radioactive	  waste	  (HLW).	  However,	  the	  paradigm	  of	  DGD	  has	  started	  to	  erode.	  The	  ENEF-­‐Working	  
Group	   "Risks”	   (2009:3)	   claimed	   that	   “[..]	   it	   is	  nevertheless	   recognized	   that	   there	  are	  diverging	  views	   in	  
some	  groups	  and	  that	  there	  are	  remaining	  concerns	  in	  the	  public	  about	  geological	  repositories”.	  Although	  
the	   advocates	   of	   permanent	   closure	   of	   wastes	   in	   DGD	   continue	   to	   be	   numerous,	   reversibility	   and	  
retrievability	  (R&R)	  is	  now	  seen	  as	  a	  more	  “prudent	  approach”	  (NEA/OECD	  2012:3).	  Nowadays,	  the	  R&R	  
option	  is	   included	  in	  several	  national	  waste	  disposal	  concepts	  as	  a	  possible	  way	  to	  adjust	  to	  progress	   in	  
science	  and	  technology	  and	  to	  respond	  to	  societal	  pressures.	  
	  
People,	  regardless	  of	  their	  views	  of	  nuclear	  power,	  realize	  that	  radioactive	  waste	  needs	  to	  be	  disposed	  of.	  
In	  most	  countries,	  the	  debate	  on	  siting	  criteria	  is	  no	  longer	  confined	  to	  the	  scientific	  and	  techno-­‐political	  
spheres,	  but	  involves	  stakeholders,	  including	  civil	  society.	  However,	  nuclear	  waste	  governance	  varies	  from	  
country	  to	  country.	  Various	  actors	  and	  factors,	  such	  as	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  political	  and	  legal	  systems,	  formal	  
and	  informal	  rules	  and	  procedures,	  political	  constraints,	  geographical	  conditions,	  technical	  skills,	  the	  stock	  
of	   knowledge,	  degrees	  of	  public	   acceptance,	   and	  a	   country’s	  nuclear	  history	   can	   shape	   siting	  processes.	  
The	  way	  in	  which	  competing	  information	  and	  knowledge	  is	  processed	  and	  put	  to	  use	  by	  different	  actors	  
and	  in	  different	  political	  and	  cultural	  contexts	  plays	  also	  an	  important	  role.	  Certainly	  without	  knowledge	  
about	  geological	  formations	  and	  their	  corresponding	  morphologies	  and	  hydrological	  conditions	  no	  siting	  
selection	  would	  be	  possible.	  But	  the	  process	  that	  leads	  to	  a	  selection	  of	  clay,	  salt	  or	  granite	  as	  host-­‐rock	  for	  
DGD	  is	  hardly	  only	  technical	  and	  we	  witness	  a	  shift	  from	  “geology”	  to	  “political	  geography”.	  	  
	  




Under	   the	   Directive	   2011/70/Euratom,	  Member	   States	   are	   required	   to	   establish,	   implement,	   and	   keep	  
updated	   “national	  programs”	   for	   the	  management	  of	   spent	  nuclear	   fuel	   (SNF)	  and	  HLW	  waste	  by	  2015.	  
The	  state	  of	  implementation	  of	  the	  EURATOM	  directive	  at	  the	  national	  level	  varies	  considerably.	  In	  most	  
Member	   States	   legal	   and	   institutional	   frameworks	   are	   now	   in	   place.	   Licensing	   requirements	   and	  
procedures	   for	   site	   selection	   and	   safety	   criteria	   have	   been	   established,	   and	   the	   responsibilities	   of	  
stakeholders	  defined.	  The	  major	  actors	  involved	  are:	  waste	  producers,	  waste	  management	  organizations,	  
regulatory	  authorities,	  civil	  society,	  and	  policy	  makers	  at	  the	  national,	  regional,	  and	  local	  levels.	  Amongst	  
the	  EURATOM	  countries,	  only	  Sweden,	  Finland,	  and	  France	  are	  in	  an	  advanced	  stage	  of	  planning	  and/or	  
implementation	  of	  a	  DGD	  facility.	  These	  are	  the	  cases	  analyzed	  in	  the	  following	  sections.	  
	  
	  
2	  Common	  patterns	  and	  diversities	  	  
	  
The	   management	   and	   governance	   of	   spent	   fuel	   and	   radioactive	   waste	   in	   Finland,	   Sweden	   and	   France	  
present	  a	  number	  of	  similarities,	  but	  also	  marked	  differences.	  All	  three	  countries	  have	  nuclear	  programs.	  
In	   Sweden	   ten	   reactors	   are	   presently	   in	   operation,	   providing	   about	   40%	   of	   the	   nation’s	   electricity.	   In	  
Finland,	  there	  are	  four	  reactors	  which	  make	  up	  approximately	  30%	  of	  its	  domestic	  electricity.	  Olkiluoto	  3	  
(European	  Pressurised	  Reactor-­‐EPR)	  has	  been	  under	  construction	  since	  2005	  and	  two	  new	  reactors	  were	  
approved	  by	  parliament	  in	  2010.	  France	  counts	  58	  nuclear	  reactors,	  which	  provide	  approximately	  75%	  of	  
its	  domestic	  electricity.	  Moreover	  a	  new	  reactor,	  Flamanville	  3	  (EPR	  type),	  has	  been	  under	  construction	  
since	  2007	  and	  another	  reactor	  (Penly)	  has	  been	  approved.	  
	  
Amongst	   the	   three	   countries	   there	   are	   some	   similarities	   in	   the	   subdivision	   of	   responsibilities	   between	  
waste	  producer	  and	  the	  waste	  management	  organization.	  There	   is	  also	  a	  common	  functional	  separation	  
between	   “operators”	   and	   “regulators”	   in	   charge	   of	   overseeing	   safety	   requirements	   and	   standards.	  
Differences	   are	   most	   prominent	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   ownership	   structure	   of	   the	   implementing	  
organizations,	  which	   are	   state	   agencies	   (France)	   or	   in	   private	   hands	   (Finland,	   Sweden).	   There	   are	   also	  
differences	  in	  the	  host	  rocks	  chosen	  for	  the	  geological	  disposal,	  i.e.	  crystalline	  rock	  in	  Finland	  and	  Sweden	  
and	  clay	   in	  France.	  For	   the	  system	  of	   financing,	   the	   ‘polluter	  pays’	  principle	   is	  usually	  applied.	  All	   three	  
countries	   can	   count	   on	   specific	   disposal	   funds	   which	   cover	   the	   financing	   of	   a	   wide	   spectrum	   of	   tasks,	  
ranging	  from	  feasibility	  studies	  to	  decommissioning	  and	  to	  operating	  costs.	  	  
	  
The	   siting	   procedures,	   mostly	   based	   on	   volunteer	   processes,	   had	   unique	   outcomes	   in	   each	   country:	  
partnership	   arrangements	   between	   the	   operator	   SKB	   and	   the	   hosting	   communities	   and	   veto	   rights	  
(Sweden);	  decisions	  with	  strong	  local	  community	  support	  and	  veto	  rights	  for	  municipalities	  till	   the	  final	  
decision	  (Finland);	  and	  final	  top	  down	  decision	  making	  after	  some	  consultative	  processes	  (débat	  public)	  
with	  the	  affected	  communities	  (France)	  without	  veto	  rights.	  In	  France,	  the	  final	  decision	  on	  site	  selection	  
is	   subject	   to	   the	   outcome	   of	   a	   public	   debate;	   however,	   it	   is	   not	   binding	   and	   has	   been	   boycotted	   by	  
opponents.	   The	   sites	   in	   Sweden	   and	   Finland	   are	   “nuclearized,”	   as	   nuclear	   facilities	   exist	   within	   the	  
municipality	  or	  in	  the	  neighborhood,	  whereas	  in	  France	  the	  designated	  site	  already	  hosts	  an	  underground	  
research	   laboratory	   (URL).	   Moving	   beyond	   the	   fact	   that	   variance	   exists	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   relevant	  
national	   institutional,	   legal,	   cultural,	   industrial,	  and	  energy	   frameworks,	  we	   take	  evidence	   from	  national	  









2.1	  Finland	  	  
	  
Finland	  has	  attracted	  worldwide	  attention,	  as	   it	  has	  already	  started	  building	  a	  DGD.	  The	  construction	  of	  
the	   Onkalo	   nuclear	   waste	   repository	   at	   Olkiluoto	   started	   in	   2004	   and	   the	   HLW	   disposal	   facility	   is	  
scheduled	  to	  begin	  operations	  by	  2020.	  	  
	  
Onkalo	   construction	   is	   proceeding	   with	   very	   little	   public	   debate;	   the	   influence	   of	   non-­‐governmental	  
organizations	  has	  been	  limited	  (Lehtonen	  2010).	  In	  fact,	  the	  siting	  process	  in	  Finland	  has	  been	  based	  on	  
voluntarism.	  In	  1983,	  a	  list	  of	  101	  potential	  sites	  for	  a	  repository	  was	  prepared	  and	  a	  consultation	  process	  
with	   the	  affected	  communities	  was	  started.	  This	   resulted	   in	   the	   identification	  of	   five	  potential	  sites	   that	  
“volunteered”	  to	  accept	  more	  detailed	  investigations;	  these	  were	  subsequently	  carried	  out	  in	  three	  sites.	  
The	  respective	  interim	  reports	  were	  released	  in	  1996.	  Six	  areas	  were	  analyzed	  for	  their	  suitability	  and	  a	  
list	   of	   four	   candidate	   regions	   was	   selected.	   The	   EIA	   (environment	   impact	   assessment)	   regulations	  
represented	  a	  very	  important	  step	  preceding	  the	  licensing	  process	  and	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  major	  driver	  for	  
initiating	  participatory	  planning	  processes.	  The	  need	  to	  ensure	  local	  acceptance	  was	  the	  major	  motive	  for	  
the	  operator	  POSIVA’s	  adoption	  of	  a	  more	  dialogue-­‐oriented	  strategy	  (Lehtonen	  2010;	  Kojo	  et	  al.	  2012).	  
	  
Finland	  made	  use	  of	   the	   so-­‐called	  Decision	   in	  Principle	   (DiP)	  process	   in	  which	  municipalities	  have	  veto	  
rights.	   A	   positive	   decision	   by	   the	   local	   municipality	   and	   a	   preliminary	   safety	   appraisal	   of	   the	   disposal	  
concept	   by	   the	   regulator	   STUK	  were	   required	   before	   the	   government	   decided	   on	  whether	   to	   build	   the	  
repository	  (NEA	  2010).	  Cooperation	  took	  place	  between	  the	  operator	  Posiva	  and	  the	   local	  councils	  with	  
whom	  the	  negotiations	  were	  carried	  out.	  The	   final	  positive	  decision	  by	   the	  municipal	  council	  was	   taken	  





Like	   Finland,	   Sweden	  has	   gained	   international	   attention	   for	   having	   found	   a	   solution	   for	   the	   disposal	   of	  
radioactive	   waste.	   Its	   approach	   to	   the	   governance	   and	   management	   of	   radioactive	   waste	   and	   the	  
legislation	  governing	  it	  is	  often	  seen	  as	  a	  model	  for	  other	  countries.	  The	  Swedish	  state	  takes	  the	  ultimate	  
responsibility	   for	   the	   management	   of	   radioactive	   wastes.	   However,	   differently	   from	   many	   Euratom	  
countries,	  the	  state	  has	  somehow	  shifted	  responsibility	  to	  the	  industry.	  This	  applies	  to	  management	  and	  
final	   disposal,	   but	   also	   to	   the	   financing	   of	   all	   related	   activities	   and	   regulation.	   The	   Swedish	   concept	   for	  
RWG	   thus	   places	   the	   whole	   responsibility	   on	   the	   owners	   and	   operators	   of	   the	   nuclear	   power	   plants	  
(Kåberger	  and	  Swahn	  2014).	  The	  nuclear	   industry	  has	   transferred	   this	   responsibility	   to	   their	   co-­‐owned	  
radioactive	  waste	  company	  SKB,	  which	  is	  in	  charge	  of	  RWM	  and	  the	  decommissioning	  of	  nuclear	  facilities.	  
	  
Transparency	  and	  public	  participation	  are	  regarded	  as	  key	  elements	  of	  the	  safety	  of	  all	  nuclear	  facilities	  
(IAEA	  2006).	  The	  Nuclear	  Activities	  Act	  requests	  formal	  consultations	  with	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  stakeholders	  
before	   a	   license	   application	   can	   be	   submitted.	   Sweden	   has	   already	   implemented	   Article	   10	   (on	  
transparency	  and	  public	  participation)	  of	  the	  2011/70/Euratom	  Directive	  and	  the	  regulator	  takes	  care	  of	  
consulting	  stakeholders	  including	  environmental	  organizations	  while	  developing	  the	  program.	  	  
	  
The	  current	  status	  is	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  long	  process,	  one	  which	  started	  with	  nationwide	  test-­‐drillings	  in	  the	  
1980s	  that	  resulted	  in	  widespread	  local	  protests.	  Original	  opposition	  led	  to	  a	  decision	  to	  turn	  towards	  a	  
voluntary	   siting	   process	   in	   which	   all	   municipalities	   in	   Sweden	   were	   invited	   to	   host	   initial	   ‘feasibility	  
studies’.	   After	   local	   referenda	   blocked	   potential	   sites	   in	   northern	   Sweden,	   the	   focus	   shifted	   to	  




communities	  already	  housing	  nuclear	  waste	   facilities.	  Two	  municipalities,	  Oskarshamn	  and	  Östhammar,	  
both	  hosting	  NPPs,	  expressed	  interest	  and	  competed	  with	  each	  other	  to	  be	  the	  preferred	  site.	  As	  stipulated	  
by	  environmental	   law	  since	  2004,	  resources	  have	  been	  made	  available	   from	  the	  Nuclear	  Waste	  Fund	  to	  
enable	  environmental	  groups	  and	  other	  NGOs	  to	  participate	   in	  the	  evaluation	  and	  public	  examination	  of	  
Swedish	  RWM	  policy.	  The	  SKB	  decision	  for	  Forsmark	  in	  the	  municipality	  of	  Östhammar	  was	  made	  in	  2009.	  	  
	  
2.3	  France	  	  
	  
In	   France,	   the	   search	   for	   a	   site	   to	   host	   a	   nuclear	   waste	   repository	   started	   in	   the	   late	   1970s.	   Site	  
investigations	  conducted	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  generated	  intense	  local	  opposition,	  prompting	  the	  government	  
to	   declare	   a	   one-­‐year	   moratorium	   on	   the	   search	   for	   a	   site	   in	   1990.	   After	   extensive	   consultation,	   the	  
parliament	  adopted	  the	  country’s	  first	  nuclear	  law	  in	  1991	  (Bataille	  Law),	  which	  reopened	  the	  search	  for	  a	  
waste	   solution.	   The	   law	   also	   marked	   the	   beginnings	   of	   a	   more	   participatory	   approach	   to	   waste	  
management	   policy.	   French	   legislation	   requires	   both	   retrievability	   of	   the	   waste	   packages	   and	   the	  
reversibility	  of	  decisions	  concerning	  the	  project.	  In	  1998,	  the	  village	  of	  Bure	  (89	  inhabitants),	  situated	  in	  
the	  Northeast	  of	  the	  country	  was	  first	  chosen	  as	  the	  site	  for	  an	  underground	  research	  laboratory	  (URL)	  for	  
deep	  geological	  disposal;	  subsequently	  it	  was	  designated	  to	  host	  the	  final	  disposal	  facility.	  	  
	  
The	   focus	   of	   the	   French	   participation	   procedures	   is	   on	   consultative	   instruments	   and	   –	   as	   in	   any	  
infrastructure	   process	   –	   they	   include	   an	   “enquête	   publique”	   and	   a	   “débat	   public”.	   The	   first	   has	   an	  
administrative	  character;	  the	  second	  is	  considered	  as	  more	  important,	  but	  its	  results	  are	  non-­‐binding.	  	  The	  
disposal	   concept	   was	   confirmed	   after	   a	   controversial	   public	   consultation	   process	   organized	   by	   the	  
National	  Commission	  of	  Public	  Debate	   in	  2005-­‐2006.	  Environmental	  and	  citizens	  groups	  contended	  that	  
the	  law	  passed	  in	  2006	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  public	  debate	  ignored	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  citizens	  in	  
the	  public	  debate	  in	  2005	  were	  against	  the	  DGD	  facility.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  second	  débat	  public	  in	  May	  2013,	  
a	   grouping	   of	   citizens´	   initiatives,	   BURESTOP	   55,	   called	   for	   a	   boycott.	   Consequently,	   the	   debate	   was	  
continued	  on	   the	  web	  and	  comments	  could	  only	  be	  provided	  online.	  Three	  members	  of	   the	  commission	  
disassociated	   themselves	   before	   the	   end	   report	   of	   the	   commission	   was	   completed.	   In	   Bure	   there	   is	   a	  
Committee	  (Comité	  local	  d'information	  et	  de	  suivi	   (CLIS)),	  which	  consists	  of	  90	  members	  (state,	  regional,	  
district	  &	  local	  governments,	  MPs,	  NGOs,	  environmental	  groups,	  Trade	  Unions,	  ANDRA,	  etc.)	  who	  work	  in	  
several	  commissions,	  but	  its	  influence	  is	  limited.	  	  
	  
The	  Cigéo	  repository	  remains	  a	  controversial	  project,	  which	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  captivates	  an	  economically	  
declining	   region	   with	   potential	   socio-­‐economic	   benefits,	   but	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   also	   generates	   many	  
doubts	   and	   concerns,	   especially	   regarding	   possible	   negative	   impacts	   on	   local	   image	   and	   economic	  
development	  (Lettonen	  2014).	  Upon	  approval	  from	  the	  government	  and	  the	  nuclear	  safety	  authority	  ASN,	  
the	  waste	  management	  operator	  ANDRA	  will	  start	  constructing	  Cigéo	  in	  2017.	  
	  
	  
3	  Participation	  and	  acceptance	  in	  comparison	  	  
	  
Looking	  for	  a	  suitable	  framework	  to	  embed	  the	  three	  different	  cases	  in	  and	  compare	  them,	  we	  make	  use	  of	  
the	  so-­‐called	  “ladder	  of	  participation”	  (Arnstein	  1969),	  as	  well	  as	  subsequent	  adaptations.	  In	  spite	  of	  being	  
almost	  45	  years	  old	  and	  not	  immune	  from	  criticism,	  Arnstein´s	  ladder	  —	  once	  developed	  to	  frame	  citizen	  
involvement	   in	   planning	   processes	   in	   the	   USA	  —	   still	   represents	   an	   adequate	   heuristic	   tool.	   Its	   charm	  
resides	   mostly	   in	   its	   simplicity.	   The	   eight	   types	   of	   participation	   are	   grouped	   under:	   non-­‐participation	  
(step	  1-­‐2);	  tokenism	  (step	  3-­‐5);	  and	  citizen	  power	  (step	  6-­‐8).	  The	  lower	  rungs	  are	  non-­‐participatory	  and	  




include	   (1)	  manipulation	   and	   (2)	   therapy,	   and	   are	   characterized	   by	   plans	   to	   achieve	   public	   support	   by	  
“public	  relations	  approaches”.	  The	  next	  step,	   (3),	   includes	  participation,	  but	   the	   information	  provided	   is	  
unidirectional	   and	   no	   feedback	   is	   envisaged.	   Consultation	   (4)	   follows	   on	   the	   ladder	   and,	   in	   this	   step,	  
instruments	  such	  as	  surveys,	  neighborhood	  meetings,	  and	  enquiries	  are	  used.	  This	  step	  is	  considered	  by	  
Arnstein	   to	   be	   “window	   dressing”.	   In	   rung	   5	   (placation),	   citizens’	   advice	   or	   plan,	   but	   decision	   makers	  
ultimately	  decide	  whether	  or	  not	   to	   accept	   their	   input.	   It	   is	  only	   in	   the	  next	   stage	   (6),	   characterized	  by	  
partnership,	  where	  negotiations	  are	  possible	  and	  decision-­‐making	  responsibilities	  are	  shared,	  for	  example	  
in	   committees.	  The	  next	   stages,	   7	   and	  8,	   include	  delegated	  power,	   citizen	   control	   and	  opportunities	   for	  
power	  sharing	  and	  (co-­‐)	  governance,	  but	  are	  hardly	  realistic	  in	  the	  case	  of	  RWG.	  
	  
M.	  Wiedemann	  and	  S.	  Femers	  (1993)	  built	  upon	  Arnstein's	  ladder	  and	  considered	  public	  participation	  in	  
risk-­‐related	  decision-­‐making.	  Their	  ladder	  goes	  from	  (a)	  public	  right	  to	  know,	  (b)	  informing	  the	  public,	  (c)	  
public	   right	   to	   object	   and	   determine	   the	   agenda,	   (d)	   public	   participation	   in	   defining	   interests	   and	  
recommending	  solutions,	  and	  (e)	  public	  partnership	  in	  the	  final	  decision.	  
	  
In	  the	  EURATOM	  countries,	  most	  of	   the	  participation	  procedures	  are	   limited	  to	  rung	  4	  (consultation)	  or	  
are	   even	   at	   an	   inferior	   level	   of	   Arnstein´s	   ladder.	   Consultative	   participation	   processes	   are	   the	   most	  
frequently	  used	  instruments;	  there	  are	  hearings	  where	  mostly	  experts,	  politicians,	  and	  NGOs	  take	  part	  and	  
advisory	  committees	  where	  NGOs	  and	  other	  stakeholders	  have	  an	  important	  role.	  Amongst	  the	  countries	  
analyzed,	   Sweden	   could	  be	  placed	  on	   scales	   6	   (Arnstein´s	   ladder)	   and	   e)	   (in	   the	  Wiedemann	  &	  Femers	  
ladder)	  as	  it	  adopted	  a	  partnering	  approach.	  The	  procedure	  in	  France	  could	  be	  classified	  between	  steps	  4	  
and	   5	   (Arnstein´s	   ladder)	   and	   between	   b)	   and	   c)	   on	   the	   expanded	   ladder.	   Finland	   has	   been	   often	  
considered	  an	  example	  of	  a	  good	  balance	  between	  the	  requirements	  of	  fair	  representation	  and	  competent	  
participation.	   NEA	   (2004)	   considers	   this	   to	   be	   one	   of	   the	   underlying	   elements	   of	   the	   partnership	  
approach,	  which	  is	  linked	  to	  helping	  to	  achieve	  a	  combination	  of	  licensable	  site	  and	  management	  concepts	  
with	   host	   community	   support	   and	   a	   balance	   between	   compensation,	   local	   control,	   and	   development	  
opportunities.	  However,	   it	   has	  been	  observed	   that	   in	  Finland,	   there	   is	   no	   tradition	  of	   radical	  NGOs	   and	  
there	  is	  a	  strong	  trust	  in	  local	  and	  official	  experts	  and	  a	  preparedness	  to	  let	  them	  negotiate	  agreements	  in	  
their	   interest	   (Kojo	   et	   al.	   2012,	   Litmanen	   2009,	   Lehtonen	   2010).	   Moreover,	   demand	   for	   participation	  
appears	   to	   be	   limited.	   	   Against	   this	   background	   Finland	   could	   be	   placed	   between	   rungs	   5	   and	   6	   on	  
Arnstein’s	  Ladder	  and	  between	  b)	  and	  c)	  in	  Wiedemann	  &	  Femers	  ladder.	  	  
	  
We	  can	  speak	  of	  real,	  active	  participation	  starting	  from	  rung	  6	  of	  the	  the	  Arnstein	  ladder	  and	  c)-­‐e)	  of	  the	  
Wiedmann	  &	  Femers	  ladder.	  In	  order	  for	  the	  public	  to	  participate	  and	  exert	  influence,	  additional	  criteria	  
need	  to	  be	  fulfilled.	  NEA	  (2010)	  puts	  forward	  criteria	  that	  emphasizes	  the	  importance	  of	  considering	  local	  
interests,	   i.e.	   voluntarism	  and	   veto	   rights,	   and	   speaks	   of	   local	   partnerships.	   These	   approaches	   have	   the	  
potential	  to	  increase	  local	  acceptance	  and	  build	  trust.	  Moreover,	  the	  stakeholders	  must	  be	  involved	  at	  the	  
very	  beginning	  of	  the	  process;	  if	  a	  participatory	  process	  starts	  late,	  than	  these	  criteria	  cannot	  be	  fulfilled.	  	  
	  
Transparency	  and	  access	  to	  information	  are	  a	  prerequisite	  in	  participatory	  siting	  processes	  that	  are	  on	  the	  
higher	  rungs	  of	  the	  ladder,	  but	  the	  affected	  stakeholders	  should	  also	  be	  endowed	  with	  sufficient	  resources.	  
This	   is	   the	  case	   in	  Sweden,	  where	  since	  2005	  some	  environmental	  organizations	  have	  received	  support	  
from	  the	  nuclear	  waste	  fund.	  In	  France,	  the	  CLIS	  has	  a	  budget	  of	  300,000	  Euro	  per	  year	  for	  commissioning	  
independent	  reviews	  of	  the	  program	  and	  hiring	  experts	  (NEA	  2010).	  In	  contrast,	  in	  Finland	  only	  once,	  in	  
1999,	  have	  NGOs	  been	  financed	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Trade	  and	  Industry.	  
	  




According	   to	   the	   Nuclear	   Energy	   Agency,	   key	   elements	   of	   the	   partnership	   approach	   are	  —	   apart	   from	  
voluntarism	  and	  right	  of	  veto	  —	  cooperation	  with	  local	  stakeholders	  in	  facility	  design	  and	  implementation	  
and	   the	   provision	   of	   community	   benefits	   (NEA	   2010).	   The	   provision	   of	   community	   benefits	   or	  
compensations	  can	  manifest	  in	  several	  ways.	  It	  provides	  financial	  backing	  for	  the	  affected	  stakeholders	  to	  
empower	  the	  generation	  of	  knowledge	  and	  expertise	  (capacity	  building)	  and	  allow	  citizens	  to	  participate.	  
However,	   it	   can	   also	   hide	   forms	   of	   bribery	   and	   in	   a	  way,	   serve	   as	   a	   subtle	  manipulation	   (which	  would	  
bring	  the	  process	  back	  to	  the	  initial	  rungs	  of	  the	  ladder).	  For	  this	  reason,	  it	  is	  important	  that	  compensation	  
is	  settled	  only	  after	  important	  aspects,	  such	  as	  safety	  and	  security	  issues,	  have	  been	  sufficiently	  discussed,	  




4	  Summary	  –	  Lessons	  learnt	  
	  
In	   the	   case	   of	   complex	   political	   issues	   such	   as	   RWG,	   the	   classical	   transmission	   mechanisms	   between	  
politics	   and	   civil	   society	   are	   not	   enough;	   citizens	   want	   to	   influence	   political	   decisions.	   The	   processes	  
leading	   to	   a	   site	   selection	   are	   unforeseeable	   and	   conflict	   ridden;	   they	   cannot	   be	   encompassed	   by	   a	  
narrowly	  defined	  planning	  approach	  in	  which	  problems	  are	  defined,	  analyzed,	  and	  solved	  in	  consecutive	  
steps.	  Especially	  because	  of	  changing	  requirements	  that	  are	  difficult	  to	  identify	  or	  anticipate	  and	  because	  
of	   the	   many	   interdependencies	   at	   play,	   efforts	   to	   solve	   one	   aspect	   of	   the	   problem	   (whether	   societal,	  
technical,	  or	  political)	  may	  end	  up	  creating	  new	  problems.	  Key	  conditions	   for	  an	   inclusive	  approach	  are	  
access	   to	   information,	   early	   involvement	   of	   the	   affected	   population	   and	   stakeholders,	   openness	   for	  
unforeseen	  results,	   inclusiveness	  of	   the	  process	  and	  compensation.	   In	  voluntary	  approaches,	  negotiated	  
mechanisms	  to	  compensate	  the	  affected	  communities	  have	  played	  an	  important	  role.	  Proper	  provision	  of	  
resources	  for	  local	  capacity	  building,	  including	  support	  for	  NGOs,	  is	  a	  factor	  which	  enhances	  engagement,	  
increases	  public	   confidence,	  and	  possibly	  helps	   the	  quality	  of	  decision-­‐making.	  The	  support	  of	  potential	  
host	   communities,	   however,	   cannot	   exclusively	   rely	   on	   compensation	   which	   is	   expected	   to	   be	  
commensurate	   to	   offset	   the	   potential	   detriments	   of	   the	   project.	   Another	   key	   element	   is	   trust	   in	   the	  
institutions	  and	  preparedness	  to	  delegate	  negotiation	  agreements	  to	  them,	  as	  this	  is	  perceived	  to	  be	  in	  the	  
community´s	   interest.	  However,	   this	  also	   implies	   that	   local	  authorities	  are	  capable	  of	  negotiation	   in	   this	  
circumstance,	   and	   this	   depends	   on	   the	   capacity	   building	   support	   that	   they	   received	   in	   the	   process.	  
Moreover,	  this	  is	  a	  not	  only	  a	  political	  factor,	  but	  also	  an	  especially	  influential	  cultural	  factor.	  In	  France,	  the	  
population	  is	  said	  to	  mistrust	  the	  political	  elite;	  in	  Sweden	  and	  Finland	  there	  is	  a	  consensual	  approach.	  	  
	  
Although	   participations	   strategies	   are	   not	   completely	   replicable	   in	   other	   countries,	   lessons	   learnt	   from	  
these	   contexts	   can	   help	   us	   avoid	   underestimating	   the	   influence	   of	   the	   participatory	   factor	   in	   the	   siting	  
process.	  This	  is	  of	  critical	  importance,	  as	  such	  an	  underestimation	  could	  result	  in	  the	  further	  hardening	  of	  
attitudes	  and	  lead	  to	  deadlock	  situations.	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Abstract:	  Nuclear	  waste	  disposal	  is	  a	  two-­‐faceted	  challenge:	  a	  scientific	  and	  technological	  endeavour,	  on	  the	  
one	  hand,	  and	  confronted	  with	  social	  dimensions,	  on	  the	  other.	  In	  this	  paper	  I	  will	  sketch	  the	  respective	  social	  
dimensions	   and	   will	   give	   a	   plea	   for	   interdisciplinary	   research	   approaches.	   Relevant	   social	   dimensions	   of	  
nuclear	  waste	  disposal	  are	  concerning	  safety	  standards,	  the	  disposal	  ‘philosophy’,	  the	  process	  of	  determining	  
the	   disposal	   site,	   and	   the	   operation	   of	   a	   waste	   disposal	   facility.	   Overall,	   cross-­‐cutting	   issues	   of	   justice,	  





The	  challenge	  of	  disposing	  high-­‐level	  nuclear	  waste	  in	  a	  safe	  and	  civil	  way	  remains	  an	  unsolved	  problem	  
in	  most	  countries	  operating	  nuclear	  power	  plants.	  In	  the	  last	  years	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  there	  are	  -­‐	  besides	  
technical	   and	   scientific	   challenges	   -­‐	   also	   social	   dimensions	   involved	   (Hocke/Grunwald	   2006).	   The	   high	  
relevance	  of	  the	  social	  dimension	  can	  easily	  be	  seen	  by	  looking	  at	  protest	  and	  demonstrations	  in	  the	  case	  
of	  Castor	  transports	  in	  Germany,	  or	  at	  the	  severe	  difficulties	  in	  most	  countries	  to	  determine	  a	  technically	  
and	  scientifically	  	  appropriate	  and	  socially	  accepted	  site	  for	  nuclear	  waste	  disposal.	  
	  
In	  this	  paper	  I	  woiuld	  like	  to	  fokus	  on	  these	  social	  dimensions	  and	  will	  present	  a	  structured	  overview	  of	  
those	  dimensions	   in	  different	   stages	   in	   the	   overall	   process	   of	   designing,	   siting,	   and	  operating	   a	  nuclear	  
waste	   disposal	   facility.	   The	  main	   thesis	   will	   be	   (a)	   that	   technical	   and	   scientific	   dimensions	   on	   the	   one	  
hand,	   and	   social	   ones,	   on	   the	   other,	   are	   not	   strictly	   separated	   but	   interlinked;	   and	   (b)	   that	   promising	  
solutions	  to	  meeting	  the	  challenge	  under	  consideration	  will	  need	  close	  interdisciplinary	  cooperation.	  
	  
	  
2	  Social	  dimensions	  of	  nuclear	  waste	  disposal	  
	  
Nuclear	   waste	   disposal	   is	   a	   two-­‐faceted	   challenge:	   it	   is	   a	   highly	   ambitious	   scientific	   and	   technological	  
endeavour,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  is	  simultaneously	  confronted	  with	  social	  dimensions,	  on	  the	  other.	  In	  this	  
section	   I	  will	   sketch	   the	   respective	   social	  dimensions	  along	   the	   ‘process	   chain’	  of	   establishing	  a	  nuclear	  
waste	   disposal	   facility.	   Relevant	   social	   dimensions	   of	   nuclear	   waste	   disposal	   are	   concerning	   safety	  
standards,	  the	  overall	  disposal	  approach,	  the	  process	  of	  determining	  the	  disposal	  site,	  and	  the	  operation	  of	  
a	  disposal	  facility.	  
	  
2.1	  Safety	  standards	  
	  
Conceptually,	   the	  determination	  of	  safety	  standards	   is	  crucial	   to	  any	  approach	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  nuclear	  
waste.	   All	   the	   other	   elements	   such	   as	   determining	   the	   overall	   disposal	   approach	   and	   the	   search	   for	   an	  




appropriate	   site	   depend	   crucially	   on	   the	   safety	   standards	   agreed	   upon.	   Frequently,	   determining	   safety	  
standards	   is	  regarded	  an	   issue	  of	  natural	  and	  engineering	  sciences.	  Without	  any	  doubt	   these	  disciplines	  
are	   urgently	   needed	   in	   this	   field	   because	   they	   provide	   the	   required	   knowledge	   about	   cause/effect	  
relationships,	   about	   long-­‐term	  developments	   in	   the	   geological	   layers,	   about	  migration	   of	   radionuclides,	  
about	   the	   toxicity	   of	   materials	   and	   so	   forth.	   However,	   they	   cannot	   cover	   all	   questions	   involved.	   For	  
example,	  questions	  such	  as	  “how	  safe	  is	  safe	  enough?”	  or	  “how	  safe	  must	  a	  nuclear	  waste	  disposal	  facility	  
be	   to	  ensure	  a	  responsible	  approach	  to	  current	  and	   future	  generations?”	  necessarily	   include	  ethical	  and	  
social	  considerations	  and	  reflections,	  and	  are,	  as	  soon	  as	  it	  comes	  to	  decision-­‐making,	  in	  need	  of	  a	  political	  
legitimization.	  This	  issue	  is	  structurally	  similar	  to	  determining	  thresholds	  for	  an	  acceptable	  concentration	  
of	   toxic	  materials:	  while	   toxicology,	  medicine,	  and	  chemistry	  are	  needed	  to	  provide	  knowledge	  showing	  
the	  dependency	  of	  the	  toxicity	  on	  concentration	  ethical	  reflection	  is	  required	  to	  think	  about	  a	  maximum	  
‘responsible’	   or	   an	   acceptable	   concentration,	   and	   political	   decision	   would	   be	   required	   to	   put	   this	   into	  
practice,	  based	  on	  both	  types	  of	  knowledge	  and	  orientation.	  
	  
2.2	  Disposal	  approach	  
	  
Decision-­‐making	  between	  different	  ‘philosophies’	  and	  approaches	  how	  to	  dispose	  nuclear	  waste	  (e.g.	  in	  a	  
deep	  geological	  formation,	  close	  to	  the	  Earth’s	  surface,	  or	  in	  long-­‐term	  but	  still	  interim	  technical	  facilities)	  
is	  not	  sensible	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  technical	  criteria	  alone.	  It	  rather	  needs	  ethical	  and	  social	  criteria	  because	  the	  
decision	  on	  the	  disposal	  ‘philosophy’	  also	  will	  touch	  justice	  issues,	  the	  distribution	  of	  risks	  among	  people	  
living	   today	   and	   future	   generations,	   and	   also	   the	   type	   of	   risks	  which	  might	   be	   involved.	   Distributional	  
justice	  is	  involved	  because	  risks	  are	  not	  abstract	  numbers	  but	  always	  risks	  to	  certain	  persons,	  groups	  or	  
generations	   -­‐	   risks	   have	   a	   social	   dimension	   in	   themselves.	   Also	   the	   question	   of	   the	   accessibility	   of	   the	  
waste	   disposal	   site	   after	   fill-­‐in	   is	   not	   only	   a	   technical	   one	   but	   influences	   options	   of	   later	   human	  
intervention	  which	  can	  be	  regarded	  positive	  (intervention	  in	  case	  of	  unexpected	  and	  possibly	  dangerous	  
developments)	  or	  negative	  (accessibility	  also	  for	  terrorists	  or	  in	  case	  of	  rumor?).	  Thus,	  the	  selection	  of	  a	  
specific	  approach	  to	  nuclear	  waste	  disposal	  must	  take	  into	  account	  technical	  and	  scientific	  but	  also	  ethical	  
social	   issues.	   This	   is	   an	   illustration	   of	   a	   general	   property	   of	   complex	   technological	   solutions:	   they	   are	  
never	  value-­‐free.	  
	  
2.3	  Determination	  of	  the	  disposal	  site	  
	  
The	  determination	  of	  the	  site	  where	  to	  establish	  the	  waste	  disposal	  facility	  is	  probably	  the	  field	  with	  the	  
highest	   consensus	   that	   the	   social	   dimension	   is	   not	   only	   involved	   but	   perhaps	   even	   dominant.	   In	  many	  
countries	  the	  established	  procedures	  of	  determining	  national	  sites	  for	  nuclear	  waste	  disposal	  have	  failed	  
so	  far.	  Protest	  and	  rejection	  based	  on	  different	  reasons	  are	  not	  exceptional	  but	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  rule	  (except	  
few	  cases).	  Defining	  and	  implementing	  a	  process	  of	  determining	  an	  appropriate	  site	  with	  respect	  to	  safety	  
and	   other	   criteria	   in	   a	   civil	   way	   remains	   a	   challenge	   in	   most	   countries.	   Participatory	   and	   inclusive	  
approaches	   observing	   ethical	   issues	   of	   fairness,	   equity,	   and	   transparency	   are	   looked	   for.	   Trust	   is	   an	  
essential	   issue	  because	   results	  of	  participatory	  proceeses	  will	   only	  be	   taken	   serious	   in	   formal	  decision-­‐
making	   if	   there	   is	   trust	   into	   the	   group	  which	   activcely	   participated	   and	   into	   the	  procedure,	  Knowledge	  
from	  natural	  and	  engineering	  sciences	  must	  not	  be	  forgotten	  or	  ignored	  in	  these	  processes.	  In	  the	  field	  of	  









2.4	  Establishing	  and	  Operating	  the	  waste	  disposal	  facility	  
	  
The	   operation	   phase	   of	   a	   nuclear	   waste	   facility	   needs	   technical	   knowledge	   and	   competence	   but	   also	  
appropriate	  capabilities	   to	  deal	  with	   its	  social	  environment	   in	  a	  civiland	  open	  and	  trustful	  way.	  Trust	   is	  
crucial	  not	  only	  for	  determining	  the	  site	  but	  also	  in	  operating	  the	  respective	  facility	  over	  decades	  or	  even	  
longer.	   This	   is	   even	   more	   ambitious	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   monitoring	   activities	   with	   posible	   options	   or	  




3	  On	  the	  necessity	  of	  interdisciplinary	  cooperation	  
	  
The	  above-­‐mentioned	  social	  dimensions	  of	  nuclear	  waste	  disposal	  are	  part	  of	  the	  challenge	  to	  dispose	  this	  
specific	  type	  of	  waste	  in	  a	  safe	  and	  civil	  way.	  However,	  the	  question	  might	  arise	  for	  the	  relation	  of	  these	  
dimension	   to	   all	   the	   other	   important	   dimensions	   such	   as	   technology,	   geology,	   and	   hydrology.	   If	   these	  
dimensions	  were	  disjunct	   they	  could	  be	  tackled	  separated	  from	  each	  other.	  Then,	   in	  the	   final	  process	  of	  
nuclear	   waste	   disposal	   the	   results	   from	   considering	   the	   various	   dimensions	   could	   be	   put	   together	   as	  
individual	  mosaic	  stones.	  
	  
My	  plea	  is	  that	  this	  would	  be	  a	  misleading	  image.	  The	  various	  dimensions	  do	  substantially	  overlap	  in	  spite	  
of	   the	   fact	   that	   each	   of	   them	   provides	   specific	   knowledge.	   For	   example	   the	   determination	   of	   safety	  
standards	  has	  an	  ethical	  (how	  safe	  is	  safe	  enough	  and	  relative	  to	  which	  criteria?),	  a	  social	  (how	  will	  safety	  
standards	   influence	  public	   debate	   and	   acceptance?),	   a	   technical	   (how	   can	   safety	   standards	  be	   ensured)	  
and	   a	   scientific	   dimension	   (what	   can	   long-­‐term	   geology	   and	   hydrology	   say	   to	   future	   developments?).	  
These	  dimensions	  are	  not	  independent	  from	  each	  other	  but	  interrelated.	  Another	  example	  is	  the	  question	  
for	  the	  overall	  disposal	  approach.	  This	   is	  obviously	  a	  question	  highly	  relevant	  to	  technology	  and	  science	  
but	  also	  shows	  social	  dimensions,	  e.g.	  because	  the	  overall	  approach	  influences	  the	  types	  of	  risk	  involved	  
and	   the	  distribution	  of	   risks	  among	  people	   today	  and	   in	   the	   future.	  Taking	   these	  observations	  seriously	  
demonstrates	  that	  integrated	  and	  interdisciplinary	  work	  is	  necessary	  in	  this	  field,	  e.g.	  to	  assess	  different	  
disposal	  options	  as	  is	  currently	  being	  done	  in	  the	  ENTRIA	  project.	  
	  
There	  is	  also	  a	  more	  general	  argument	  in	  favour	  of	  this	  position.	  For	  providing	  orientation	  and	  strategies	  
for	  nuclear	  waste	  disposal	   research	  has	   to	  provide	  different	   types	  of	   knowledge	   from	  various	   scientific	  
disciplines	   and	   has,	   thus,	   to	   be	   inter-­‐disciplinary	   in	   nature.	   This	   knowledge	   can	   be	   categorized	   in	   the	  
following	  way	  (extended	  after	  Grunwald	  2004):	  
	  
• Systems	  Knowledge:	  Insight	  into	  natural,	  technological	  and	  societal	  systems	  and	  knowledge	  about	  
the	   relations	   between	   them	   are	   necessary	   prerequisites	   for	   successful	   action	   in	   meeting	   the	  
challenge	   of	   disposing	   nuclear	   waste	   in	   a	   safe	   and	   civil	   way.	   Scientific	   disciplines	   are	   used	   to	  
provide	  explanatory	  knowledge	  about	  relevant	  systems,	  in	  particular	  in	  the	  form	  of	  cause/effect-­‐
relationships:	  this	  knowledge	  shall	  explain	  how	  specific	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  ‘work’,	  e.g.	  in	  the	  form	  
of	  models.	  	  
• Prospective	  knowledge:	  The	   time	  dimension,	   in	  particular	   the	   issue	  of	   taking	  over	   responsibility	  
for	   future	   generations,	   is	   key	   to	   meeting	   the	   challenge	   under	   consideration.	   It	   requires	  
considering	   possible,	   probable	   or	   desirable	   future	   developments,	   based	   on	   today’s	   knowledge	  
and	  assessments.	  A	  lot	  of	  research-­‐based	  methods	  such	  as	  scenario	  techniques	  and	  model-­‐based	  




simulation	  techniques	  with	  roots	  in	  different	  disciplines	  are	  required	  to	  provide	  comprehensive	  
prospective	  knowledge.	  
• Orientation	   knowledge:	   The	   appraisal	   of	   societal	   circumstances	   and	   developments,	   of	   global	  
trends,	   and	   of	   measures	   must	   build	   on	   ethical,	   social	   and	   perhaps	   political	   goals,	   criteria	   and	  
targets.	  Orientation	  knowledge	  serves	  as	  a	  ‘compass’	  for	  assessments,	  to	  determine	  priorities,	  to	  
find	  out	  the	  direction	  where	  to	  go	  to	  and	  to	  distinguish	  between	  alternative	  paths	  of	  action.	  
• Knowledge	  for	  action:	   In	   the	   final	  analysis,	  measures	   for	  disposing	  nuclear	  waste	  need	  coherent	  
and	   integrative	   action-­‐guiding	   knowledge	   for	   politics	   and	   society	   by	   elaborating	   on	   possible	  
measures	   and	   strategies,	   taking	   into	   account	   the	   uncertainty	   and	   incompleteness	   of	   the	  
knowledge	  produced.	  
	  
Regarding	   the	   sources	  of	   these	  different	   categories	  of	   knowledge	   it	   is	   obvious	   that	   (a)	   interdisciplinary	  
integration	  must	   take	   place.	   Positive	   sciences	   such	   as	   geology	   and	   hydrology,	   engineering	   sciences	   but	  
also	  social	  sciences	  do	  provide	  systems	  knowledge;	  normative	  sciences	  such	  as	  ethics	  and	  legal	  sciences	  
do	   contribute	   to	   orientation	   knowledge,	   and	   action-­‐oriented	   sciences	   such	   as	   engineering,	   political	   and	  





Meeting	   the	   challenge	  of	  disposing	  high	   level	  nuclear	  waste	   in	  a	   safe	  and	   civil	  way	  necessarily	   involves	  
several	  social	  dimensions.	  They	  expose	  themselves	  differently	  in	  differnet	  stages	  along	  the	  process	  from	  
determining	   safety	   standards	   via	   fixing	   the	   disposal	   approach	   and	   the	   siting	   process	   up	   to	   establishing	  
and	  operating	  a	  disposal	  site.	  The	  issues	  of	  justice	  (just	  distribution	  of	  burdens	  and	  risks),	  of	  trust	  (e.g.	  by	  
transparency)	   and	   of	   fairness	   (concerning	   the	   opportunities	   to	   intervene	   into	   decision-­‐making	  
procedures)	   are	   of	   highest	   importance	   and	   are	   cross-­‐cutting	   items	   over	   the	   whole	   process	   chain	  
(Grunwald	   2010).	   These	   are	   not	   merely	   additional	   to	   natural	   and	   engineerinmg	   sciences’	   inputs	   but,	  
rather,	  scientific,	  technical	  and	  ethical	  aspects,	  dimensions	  and	  issues	  often	  are	  unseparably	  intertwined	  
(e.g.	  in	  determining	  safety	  standards).	  This	  situation	  makes	  close	  interdisciplinary	  cooperation	  necessary.	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Abstract:	  Nuclear	  waste	  disposal	  indisputably	  is	  a	  controversial	  socio-­‐technical	  issue	  in	  most	  societies	  widely	  
using	   nuclear	   technology.	   All	   the	   more	   it	   is	   pivotal	   to	   proceed	   in	   a	   comprehensive,	   transparent	   and	  
participative	  manner.	   The	   contribution	   suggests	   fundamental	   rules	   to	   follow	  and	   confronts	   them	  with	   the	  
currently	  ongoing	  site-­‐selection	  process	  in	  Switzerland.	  Finally	  it	  draws	  some	  lessons	  for	  the	  audience.	  
	  
	  
1	  Basic	  rules	  and	  procedure	  to	  follow	  
	  
The	  nuclear	  community	  recognizes	  that	  the	  long-­‐term	  safety	  of	  repositories	  “is	  not	  …	  a	  rigorous	  proof	  of	  
safety	  ...	  but	  rather	  a	  convincing	  set	  of	  arguments”	  (NEA	  1999).	  It	  has,	  however,	  been	  difficult	  to	  “live”	  its	  
socio-­‐technical	   nature	   (NEA	   2013).	   Albeit	   the	   waste	   problem	   is	   driven	   by	   technology	   and,	   indeed,	   a	  
technological	   constraint,	   in	   the	   end,	   it	   has	   to	   be	   solved	   by	   society.	   Building	   upon	   the	   defense-­‐in-­‐depth	  
principle,	   the	  concept	  of	   integral,	   technical	  and	  societal,	  robustness	  was	  developed	  (Flüeler	  2002/06).	  A	  
system	   is	   “socially	   robust”	   if	  most	  arguments,	   evidence,	   social	   alignments,	   interests,	   and	  cultural	  values	  
lead	   to	   a	   consistent	   option	   (Rip	   1987).	   The	   concept	   attempts	   to	   consider	   technical	   and	   social	   issues	   in	  
parallel,	  as	  to	  force	  players	  (both	  from	  the	  technical	  community	  and	  society)	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  (and	  strive	  
at)	  an	  integrative	  “solution”,	  satisfying	  technical	  (passive	  safety)	  and	  societal	  needs	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  This	  
combination	   sets	   it	   apart	   from	   other	   approaches,	   either	   purely	   technocratic	   along	   the	   conventional	  
decide-­‐announce-­‐defend	   line	  or	   the	  voluntaristic	  policy	  some	  national	  programs	  have	  reverted	  to	   in	   the	  
face	   of	   the	   failed	   technocratic	   approach	   (e.g.	   Sweden,	   Japan,	   UK,	   USA)	   or	   any	   unsystematic	   negotiated	  
mixed	   versions.	   Based	   on	   international	   experience	   (Flüeler	   2002/05/06/14),	   we	   propose	   a	   3-­‐step	  
approach	  for	  a	  site-­‐selection	  procedure,	  followed	  by	  a	  proposal	  for	  an	  integrative	  assessment	  framework	  –	  
in	  Chapter	  1	  we	  outline	  the	  concept,	  in	  Chapter	  2	  we	  give	  pertinent	  examples.	  
	  
1.1	  Step	  1:	  Discuss	  –	  comprehensive	  societal	  discourse	  
	  
First,	  discuss	  the	  issue	  from	  all	  conceivable	  angles.	  “Involvement	  of	  stakeholders”	  cannot	  mean	  to	  call	  for	  
as	  many	   individuals	   but	   for	   as	  many	  perspectives	   as	   possible	   to	   systematically	   incorporate	   all	   relevant	  
facets	  in	  the	  multi-­‐dimensional	  discourse.	  The	  aim	  is	  to	  lay	  all	  pertinent	  aspects	  (values,	  norms,	  context,	  
evidence	  …)	  open,	   to	   successfully	   “close”	   issues,	   and	  proceed	   to	   the	   following	  phase.	  A	   “socially	   robust”	  
procedure	   must,	   per	   se,	   allow	   for	   some	   flexibility	   and	   adaptability	   to	   an	   evolving	   social	   context,	  
particularly	  given	  the	   long	  timeframe	  involved	  (decades	  to	   find	  a	  suitable	  site,	   to	   license,	  build,	  operate,	  
and	  duly	  close	  it).	  “Closing”	  steps,	  however,	  is	  crucial	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  starting	  all	  over	  again.	  
	  
This	  long-­‐time	  process	  has	  to	  be	  overseen,	  e.g.	  by	  a	  widely	  credible	  and	  trustworthy	  body.	  In	  2002,	  Flüeler	  
suggested	  a	  “National	  Council	  for	  the	  Safe	  [and	  Secure]	  Governance	  of	  Radioactive	  Waste“	  as	  the	  guardian	  
of	  the	  process,	  the	  Swiss	  expert	  committee	  EKRA	  foresaw	  a	  “Disposal	  Council”.	  It	  should	  be	  pluralistically	  
composed,	  independent	  of	  the	  industry	  yet	  knowledgeable	  and	  not	  driven	  by	  daily	  politics.	  
	  




1.2	  Step	  2:	  Decide	  –	  “common	  ground”	  in	  goals	  and	  stepwise	  strategy	  
	  
The	   goals	   have	   to	  be	  prioritized	   so	   as	   to	   adopt	   the	   stakeholders’	   respective	   responsibilities.	   Conflicting	  
goals	  exist	  (see,	  e.g.,	  ENTRIA	  2014).	  The	  concept	  of	  “sustainability”,	  a	  complex	  goal	  indeed,	  encompasses	  
protection	  of,	   and	   leeway	   for,	   future	  generations.	  Transferred	   to	  nuclear	  waste,	  both	  passive	   safety	  and	  
“active”	  control	  or	  surveillance	  need	  due	  care	  and	  attention	  in	  parallel.	  No	  consensus	  will	  be	  reached	  “at	  
heart”,	   in	   the	   stakeholders’	   core	   beliefs.	   In	   the	   1980’s,	   Carter	   called	   in	   to	   find	   a	   “common	   ground”,	   yet	  
without	  specifying	  (Carter	  1987,	  427).	  Society	  must	  agree	  on	  three	  levels:	  1.	  Problem	  recognition	  (waste	  
exists,	   problem	   to	   be	   tackled,	   eventually	   “solved”,	   at	   least	   set	   on	   track	   to	   be	   solved);	   2.	   Main	   goal	  
consensus	  (degree	  of	  protection	  and	  intervention);	  3.	  Procedural	  strategy	  (“rules	  of	  the	  game”).	  
	  
1.3	  Step	  3:	  Implement	  –	  start	  program	  and	  prepare	  long-­‐term	  knowledge	  basis	  
	  
In	   view	   of	   a	   successful	   transfer	   of	   knowledge,	   it	   is	   vital	   to	   explore	   contextual	   issues	   and	   tacit/implicit	  
knowledge	   –	   they	   determine	   the	   degree	   of	   societal	   understanding	   of	   the	   eventual	   disposition	   system.	  
Unless	  the	  rationale	  of	  conceptual	  reasoning	  is	  appropriately	  handed	  over	  to	  next	  –	  technical,	  political	  and	  
societal	  –	  generations,	  the	  entire	  undertaking	  is	  bound	  to	  failure	  (Flüeler	  2005).	  
	  
The	  rules	  and	  criteria	  of	  site-­‐selection	  procedures	  have	  to	  be	  consented	  to	  before	  the	  start	  (see	  1.1/2.1)	  
and	  adhered	  to	  during	  the	  process.	  Revisions	  should	  undergo	  a	  careful	  review	  and	  be	  consented	  to.	  A	  clear	  
distinction	  between	  implementer	  and	  regulatory	  bodies	  is	  vital.	  The	  regulators	  must	  establish	  a	  platform	  
for	   inclusive	   knowledge	   generation,	   based	   on	   a	   (pre)defined	   set	   of	   criteria.	   This	   necessity	   to	   integrate	  
different	  requirements,	  the	  step-­‐by-­‐step	  approach,	  the	  chance	  of	  “institutional	  constancy”,	  and	  the	  special	  
“national”	   task	   of	   the	   issue	   call	   special	   attention	   to	   the	   role	   of	   the	   authorities	   (NEA	   2003).	   Issues	   like	  
regulatory	  capture,	  expert	  blocking,	  or	  technological	  lock-­‐ins	  have	  to	  be	  duly	  considered	  (see	  1.4).	  
	  
1.4	  Accompanying	  policy	  evaluation	  
	  
A	  periodic	  policy	  evaluation	  is	  vital	  to	  assess	  whether	  a	  program	  is	  on	  track	  (see	  e.g.,	  Leeuw	  et	  al.	  1994).	  





















Table	  1.	  Criteria	  and	  respective	  attributes	  (Italics)	  for	  an	  appraisal	  of	  governance	  and	  other	  theoretical	  concepts	  (own	  
tabulation,	  draft).	  
	  
Area	   Approach/concept	   	   	   	  
	   „Good“	  governance	   (Regulatory	  et	  al.)	  
capture	  
Safety	  culture	   Path	  
dependence,	  
lock-­‐ins	  




Legitimation	   Asymmetry	   Continuous	  
learning	  
	  
	   Legislation	   Research	  &	  development	   Education,	  
permanent	  training	  
	  
	   Participation	  in	  …	   Resources	  (staff,	  financial)	   …	   	  
	   Players	   Competence(s)	  and	  
experience	  
	   	  




Division	  of	  roles	   	   	   Open	  decision	  
making	  
	   Tasks	  in	  the	  Sectoral	  
Plan	  (program)	  
	   	   Comparison	  of	  
options	  
	   Strategic	  
planning/leadership	  ...	  
	   	   …	  







	   Failure	  culture	   	  
	   Justification	  of	  
decisions	  
	   Openness	  of	  
communication	  
	  
	   Framework	  and	  
respective	  guidelines	  
	   Trust	   	  
	   Controlling	   	   …	   	  
	   Quality	  management	   	   	   	  
...	   Reviewing...	   	   	   	  
	  
	  
2	  Application	  to	  context	  and	  insights	  from	  reality	  
	  
2.1	  Step	  1,	  Discuss:	  evolving	  from	  a	  linear	  to	  a	  more	  pluralistic	  model	  
	  
Having	   learnt	   from	   the	   failures	   at	  Wellenberg,	   the	   planned	   site	   für	   low-­‐	   and	   intermediate-­‐level	   waste,	  
where	   the	   cantonal	   voters	   rejected	   an	   initial	   as	   well	   as	   a	   developed	   project,	   the	   Swiss	   Confederation	  
started	   an	   extensive	   consultation	   about	   a	   site-­‐selection	   process	   to	   be	   set	   up.	   The	   underlying	   concept	  
document	  was	  reviewed	  in	  several	  rounds	  by	  technical	  and	  political	  actors,	  in	  fact,	  it	  was	  a	  comprehensive	  




stocktaking	   in	   the	   policy	   field	   (BFE	   2008,	   5),	   even	   though	   it	   was	   not	   as	   widespread	   as	   the	   Canadian	  
dialogue	   called	   “Choosing	   a	  way	   forward”	   (NWMO	  2005).	   The	   ongoing	   so-­‐called	   Sectoral	   Plan	   for	   deep	  
geological	   repositories	   contains	   a	   thorough	   so-­‐called	   “regional	  participation”	  of	  potential	   siting	   regions.	  
When	   setting	   up	   “regional	   conferences”	   in	   each	   of	   six	   geologically	   suitable	   areas	   it	   was	   given	   special	  
attention	  to	  consider	  the	  entire	  societal	  spectrum,	  from	  political	  parties	  to	  churches,	  though	  females	  and	  
youngsters	  are	  still	  underrepresented	  (Planval	  2014).	  The	  conferences	  have	  a	  consultative	  character;	   to	  
give	  them	  sufficient	  legitimation	  (and	  stability)	  the	  quorum	  of	  elected	  members	  of	  municipal	  councils	  was	  
set	   to	   be	   50	   percent.	   Experience	   so	   far	   shows	   that	   the	   safety-­‐first	   paradigm	   is	   accepted	   on	   all	   levels,	  
national,	  cantonal,	  regional,	  communal,	  but	  regional	  stakeholders	  have	  been	  able	  to	  have	  a	  say,	  esp.	  on	  the	  
spatial-­‐planning	  topics	  (see	  2.4).	  
	  
The	  idea	  of	  an	  oversight	  body	  was	  somewhat	  embraced	  by	  the	  Swiss	  federal	  authorities	  (BFE	  2008)	  when	  
starting	  the	  ongoing	  site-­‐selection	  process.	  The	  six-­‐member	  “Nuclear	  Waste	  Management	  Advisory	  Board”	  
is	   pluralistically	   composed,	   with	   one	   representative	   of	   the	   nuclear	   industry;	   others	   are	   independent	  
experts	   from	   the	   geological	   disposal	   community,	   ethics,	   and	   media.	   It	   is	   chaired	   by	   a	   member	   of	   the	  
Council	   of	   States	   (Senate).	   The	   anti-­‐nuclear	   NGOs	   refused	   to	   collaborate	   but	   they	   do	   participate	   in	  
Sectoral-­‐Plan	  bodies.	  Even	  though	  its	  mandate	  is	  to	  “offer	  views	  from	  an	  outside	  perspective”	  and	  to	  “help	  
identify	   process	   risks	   and	   barriers	   to	   progress”	   (BFE	   2014,	  website)	   the	   board	   has	   not	   become	   clearly	  
visible	  so	  far.	  At	  any	  rate	  and	  overall,	  however,	  the	  traditional	  strategy	  of	  linear	  decision	  making	  (by	  the	  
authorities	  and	  proponents)	  is	  tentatively	  superseded	  by	  a	  dynamic	  and	  integrative,	  pluralistic	  model.	  
	  
2.2	  Step	  2,	  Decide:	  passive	  safety	  and	  retrievability	  in	  a	  phased	  and	  flexible	  process	  
	  
Way	  back	  in	  the	  1970’s	  the	  Swiss	  national	  electorate,	  by	  a	  two-­‐third	  majority,	  voted	  for	  a	  Federal	  Decree	  
on	  the	  then	  Atomic	  Energy	  Act,	  according	  to	  which	  “the	  permanent	  and	  safe	  final	  disposition	  and	  disposal	  
of	   the	   …	   radioactive	   wastes”	   have	   to	   be	   “guaranteed	   (Federal	   Decree	   1979).	   The	   primary	   goal	   of	  
radioactive	  waste	  management,	  passive	  safety	  in	  a	  geological	  environment,	  was	  confirmed	  in	  the	  currently	  
valid	  Nuclear	   Energy	   Act	   of	   2005.	   The	   notion	   of	   final	   and	   domestic	   disposal	   has	   since	   overwhelmingly	  
been	   endorsed	   in	   numerous	   national	   and	   regional	   surveys.	   One	  may,	   therefore,	   conclude	   that	   there	   is	  
consensus	  in	  the	  Swiss	  society	  on	  geological	  disposal	  as	  the	  way	  to	  go.	  The	  national	  Parliament	  passed	  the	  
revised	  respective	  act	  prohibiting	  –	  upon	  the	  Cantonal	  vetoes	  on	  Wellenberg	  –	  a	  final	  vote	  by	  an	  eventual	  
host	  canton	  but	  stipulating	  that	  “the	  Department	  [Ministry]	  gives	  a	  share	  to	  the	  host	  canton	  as	  well	  as	  to	  
the	   neighboring	   cantons	   and	   countries	   in	   direct	   vicinity	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   preparation	   of	   the	   general	  
licensing	  decision”	  (Federal	  Nuclear	  Energy	  Act,	  art.	  44).	  The	  option	  of	  a	  –	  final	  –	  national	  referendum	  on	  
the	  ultimately	  chosen	  site	  is	  foreseen	  by	  this	  law.	  	  
	  
With	   regard	   to	   the	   technical	   concept,	   a	   pluralistically	   composed	   expert	   group	  was	   initiated	   in	   1999.	   It	  
proposed	  the	  concept	  of	  “monitored	  long-­‐term	  geological	  disposal”,	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  traditional	  concept	  
of	   final	   disposal	   by,	   to	   a	   certain	   extent,	   integrating	   controllability/monitoring	   and	   retrievability	   (EKRA	  
2000).	   These	   aspects	  were	   adopted	   in	   legislation,	   although	   clearly	   as	   secondary	   to	   passive	   safety.	   The	  
mentioned	  Sectoral	  Plan	  for	  site	  selection	  foresees	  three	  phases	  and	  is	  evidently	  in	  line	  with	  the	  U.S.	  NRC’s	  
“adaptive	  staging”	  (NRC	  2002),	  progressively	  become	  common	  in	  the	  community	  (NEA	  2004).	  	  
	  
2.3	  Step	  3,	  Implement:	  well	  started	  –	  but	  prepared	  for	  the	  long	  term?	  
	  
After	  more	  than	  five	  years	  of	  Sectoral	  Plan,	   in	  the	  middle	  of	  phase	  2,	  one	  may	  say	  that	  the	  site	  selection	  
process	  is	  and	  continues	  to	  be	  long	  and	  tough	  (longer	  than	  initially	  planned	  by	  the	  Office	  of	  Energy),	  but	  it	  




is	  ongoing,	  there	  are	  no	  major	  dropouts,	  critical	  comments	  were	  recognized,	  the	  work	  has	  been	  improved.	  
The	  players	  recognize	  each	  other	   to	  contribute	   their	  part	   (Flüeler	  2014).	  They	  have	   to	  plan	   for	   the	  real	  
long-­‐term,	   also	   staff	   wise	   and	   institutionally,	   and	   need	   persistence	   and	   stamina.	   Whether	   they	   are	  
prepared	   for	   the	  program’s	   longevity	   remains	   to	  be	   seen:	   find	   the	   “right”	   location,	  build,	  operate,	   close,	  
post-­‐monitor	  the	  site,	  and	  all	  this	  in	  a	  positive	  national	  to	  local	  embedding.	  
	  
2.4	  (Instead	  of)	  Policy	  evaluation:	  a	  quick	  glimpse	  on	  SWOTs	  
	  
Technical	  assessments	  are	  continually	  undertaken	  in	  the	  Swiss	  site-­‐selection	  procedure	  (e.g.,	  Leuz	  &	  Rahn	  
2014).	  But	  full-­‐fledged	  policy	  evaluations,	  whether	  continuous	  or	  periodic,	  are	  rare,	   in	  fact	   just	  punctual	  
up	   to	   this	  point	   (like	  Planval	  2014,	  on	  regional	  participation).	  To	  give	  a	  current	   impression	  at	   least,	   the	  
presentation	   reflects	   on	   a	   quick-­‐and-­‐dirty	   profile	   of	   strengths,	   weaknesses,	   opportunities	   and	   threats	  
recently	  rendered	  by	  members	  of	  major	  players	  (SWOT	  analysis,	  Kotler	  et	  al.	  2010).	  Strengths	  are:	  overall,	  
the	  Sectoral	  Plan	  is	  a	  suitable	  instrument	  with	  adequate	  flexibility;	  the	  players	  stick	  to	  their	  given	  roles;	  
safety	   first	   is	   held	   up;	   transparency	   and	   traceability	   are	   practiced.	  Weaknesses:	   asymmetry	   of	   players;	  
concerned	   regions	  without	   right	  of	  decision;	  motivation	   sinking;	   frustration	   rising.	  Chances:	   freedom	  of	  
action.	  Risks:	  clash	  of	  interests;	  diverse	  levels	  of	  state,	  introduction	  of	  veto	  right	  for	  stakeholders.	  
	  
	  
3	  Lessons	  learned	  
	  
To	  consider	  both	  technical	  and	  social	  issues	  needs	  an	  inclusive,	  systematic	  and	  participatory	  approach	  to	  
single	  out	  goal	  priorities	  (presumably	  with	  safety	  first).	  Setting	  up	  a	  respective	  process	  is	  a	  prerequisite	  to	  
proceed	  in	  site	  selection.	  It	  is	  essential	  to	  have	  a	  (national)	  lead	  agency	  in	  conjunction	  with	  a	  clear	  division	  
of	   roles	   among	   the	   players,	   rules	   of	   the	   “game”	   and	   criteria	   to	   judge.	   The	   complex	   and	   long-­‐lasting	  
procedure	  necessitates	  extensive	  resources	  on	  all	  sides	  and	  of	  all	  types	  over	  time.	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Abstract:	  ENTRIA	  (“Disposal	  Options	  for	  Radioactive	  Residues:	  Interdisciplinary	  Analyses	  and	  Development	  
of	  Evaluation	  Principles”)	  is	  a	  joint	  research	  project	  funded	  by	  the	  German	  Federal	  Ministry	  of	  Education	  and	  
Research	   BMBF)	   and	   carried	   out	   by	   12	   departments	   from	   German	   universities	   and	   major	   research	  
institutions	   and	   one	   partner	   from	   Switzerland.	   The	   scientists	   participating	   in	   ENTRIA	   represent	   natural	  
sciences,	   civil	   engineering,	   philosophy,	   law,	   social	   and	   political	   sciences,	   and	   technology	   assessment.	  
Recognizing	  that	  all	  these	  disciplines	  need	  to	  interact	  when	  radioactive	  waste	  management	  is	  concerned,	  the	  
project	   aims	   at	   investigating	   and	   developing	   evaluation	   principles	   for	   three	   options	   to	  manage	   especially	  
high-­‐level	   radioactive	   waste:	   Deep	   disposal	   without	   retrievability	   provisions,	   emplacement	   in	   deep	  
formations	  with	  monitoring	  and	  retrievability,	  and	  prolonged	  surface	  storage.	  While	  ENTRIA	  performs	  both	  
disciplinary	  and	  interdisciplinary	  research,	  the	  paper	  focusses	  on	  the	  latter.	  
	  
	  
1	  Introduction	  	  
	  
Obviously,	  radioactive	  waste	  management	  (RWM)	  concerns	  society	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  therefore	  needs	  more	  
than	   technological	   and	  natural	   science	   research.	  BMBF	   (The	  German	  Federal	  Ministry	  of	  Education	  and	  
Research)	  is	  funding,	  inter	  alia,	  the	  joint	  research	  project	  ENTRIA	  in	  order	  to	  support	  the	  development	  of	  
interdisciplinary	   research	   approaches	   as	   well	   as	   professional	   (academic)	   education	   and	   knowledge	  
management.	  	  
	  
ENTRIA	   (“Disposal	   Options	   for	   Radioactive	   Residues:	   Interdisciplinary	   Analyses	   and	   Development	   of	  
Evaluation	   Principles”)	   is	   carried	   out	   by	   12	   departments	   and	   institutes	   from	   German	   universities	   and	  
major	  research	  institutions	  and	  one	  partner	  from	  Switzerland:	  
	  
• Niedersachsen	  Institutes	  of	  Technology	  (NTH,	  coordinator)	  with	  	  
o Institute	  of	  Disposal	  Research	  (Clausthal,	  2	  departments)	  
o Institute	  of	  Mineral	  and	  Waste	  Processing,	  Waste	  Disposal	  and	  Geomechanics	  (Clausthal)	  
o Institute	  of	  Law	  (Braunschweig)	  
o Institute	  of	  Foundation	  Engineering	  and	  Soil	  Mechanics	  (Braunschweig)	  
o Institute	   for	   Building	   Materials,	   Concrete	   Construction	   and	   Fire	   Protection	  
(Braunschweig)	  
o Institute	  for	  Radioecology	  and	  Radiation	  Protection	  (Hannover)	  
o Institute	  of	  Materials	  Science	  (Hannover)	  
• Karlsruhe	  Institute	  of	  Technology	  (KIT)	  with	  	  
o Institute	  for	  Technology	  Assessment	  and	  Systems	  Analysis	  
o Institute	  for	  Nuclear	  Waste	  Disposal	  




• Freie	  Universität	  Berlin	  with	  
o Environmental	  Policy	  Research	  Centre	  
• Kiel	  University	  with	  
o Chair	  of	  Philosophy	  and	  Environmental	  Ethics	  
• risicare	   GmbH	   (Switzerland,	   an	   independent	   expert	   group	   with	   experiences	   in	   Swiss	   risk	  
governance	  and	  advanced	  technologies)	  
	  
The	  scientists	  participating	  in	  ENTRIA	  represent	  natural	  sciences,	  civil	  engineering,	  philosophy,	  law,	  social	  
and	  political	  sciences,	  and	  technology	  assessment.	  Recognizing	  that	  all	   these	  disciplines	  need	  to	   interact	  
when	   radioactive	   waste	   management	   is	   concerned,	   the	   project	   aims	   at	   investigating	   and	   developing	  
evaluation	   principles	   and	   knowledge	   about	   “context	   structures”	   for	   three	   options	   to	  manage	   especially	  
high-­‐level	  radioactive	  waste:	  	  
	  
• Deep	  disposal	  without	  retrievability	  provisions	  
• Emplacement	  in	  deep	  formations	  with	  monitoring	  and	  retrievability	  	  
• Prolonged	  surface	  (or	  near-­‐surface)	  storage	  
	  
The	   scientists	   involved	   are	   well	   aware	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   this	   is	   not	   the	   first	   time	   that	   such	   options	   are	  
evaluated,	   and	   many	   of	   them	   have	   developed	   their	   preferences	   over	   the	   years	   and	   decades	   of	   their	  
professional	   life.	  Though	   there	   is	  a	  number	  of	   synoptical	   studies	   (like	  EKRA	  2000,	  AkEnd	  2002,	  NWMO	  
2005,	   CoWRM	   2006,	   Streffer	   et	   al.	   2011),	   screening	   literature,	   documents	   and	  media	   showed	   that	   the	  
conceptual	  arguments	  are	  not	  well	  published.	  Therefore,	  discourses	  with	  the	  general	  public,	  mass	  media	  
and	   the	   interested	   public	   are	   not	   as	   differentiated	   as	   needed.	   There	   is	   apparently	   a	   lack	   of	   systematic	  
description	   of	   these	   three	   key	   options,	   their	   scientific	   comparison,	   and	   of	   communication	   on	   basic	  
features,	   advantages	   and	   drawbacks	   of	   these	   options.	   This	   will	   not	   spare	   society	   the	   decision(s)	   to	   be	  
made,	   but	   will	   hopefully	  make	   such	   decisions	   better	   informed.	   Apparently,	   the	   relevant	   articles	   of	   the	  
recently	  adopted	  German	  Site	  Selection	  Act	  (StandAG)	  are	  based	  on	  similar	  considerations.	  
	  
It	  has	  been	  decided	  to	  address	  these	  options	  because	  they	  are	  the	  only	  ones	  for	  which	  technical	  concepts	  
exist.	  All	  other	  „solutions“	  (e.g.	  partitioning	  &	  transmutation,	  emplacement	  in	  subduction	  zones,	  launching	  
to	   outer	   space)	   can	   either	   be	   excluded	  due	   to	   legal	   considerations	   or	   because	   of	   unacceptable	   risks,	   or	  
would	  need	  considerable	  development	  time	  (decades	  and	  more)	  and	  would	  therefore	  require	  (prolonged)	  
interim	  storage	  as	  first	  step.	  Consequently,	  these	  three	  options	  are	  the	  ones	  available	  for	  now.	  However,	  
the	  options	  are	  not	  considered	  as	  equally	  ranking	  “endpoints”	  of	  an	  RWM	  strategy:	  storage	  is	  seen	  as	  an	  
interim	  step	  for	  a	  prolonged,	  but	  limited	  timeframe	  after	  which	  an	  (yet	  unknown)	  endpoint	  still	  would	  be	  
needed.	   The	   same	   would	   apply	   if	   the	   waste	   was	   retrieved	   from	   a	   deep	   repository.	   Thus,	   amongst	   the	  
options	   considered	   only	   a	   safely	   decommissioned	   deep	   repository	   (be	   it	   constructed	   with	   or	   without	  
retrievability	  provisions)	  can	  be	  considered	  an	  endpoint.	  
	  
	  
2	  ENTRIA	  structure	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  facilitate	  interdisciplinary	  research	  and	  cooperation,	  the	  project	  is	  organized	  in	  three	  so-­‐called	  
vertical	   projects,	   each	   addressing	   one	   of	   the	   management	   options	   and	   all	   mainly	   treated	   by	   natural	  
scientists	   and	   civil	   engineers.	   In	   addition,	   overarching	   aspects	   such	   as	   “Synthesis,	   Coordination	   and	  
Communication”,	   “Technology	   Assessment	   and	   Governance”,	   “Ethical	   and	   Moral	   Substantiation,	   Legal	  




Prerequisites,	  and	  Implications”,	  and	  “Interdisciplinary	  Risk	  Research”	  are	  addressed	  by	  interdisciplinary	  
so-­‐called	  transversal	  projects	  (Fig.	  1).	  
	  
	  
Fig.	  1.	  ENTRIA	  structure	  
	  
	  
3	  First	  steps	  towards,	  end	  experiences	  with,	  interdisciplinarity	  
	  
For	   ENTRIA,	   sound	   disciplinary	   research	   forms	   an	   indispensable	   basis	   for	   interdisciplinarity.	   Topics	  
addressed	  in	  disciplinary	  research	  include:	  
	  
• Radionuclide	  source	  terms	  and	  migration	  	  
• Numerical	  simulation	  of	  safety	  relevant	  processes	  
• Monitoring	  of	  waste	  containers	  
• Safety	  case	  for	  prolonged	  surface	  storage	  
• Comparison	  of	  radiological	  risks	  /	  exposures	  
• Citizens	  panel	  as	  an	  instrument	  for	  discourse	  analysis	  in	  ethics	  
• Situation	  analysis	  from	  the	  viewpoint	  of	  communal	  decision	  makers	  and	  local	  population	  
• Forms,	  constraints	  and	  dilemmas	  of	  RWM	  governance	  
• Requirements	  and	  implications	  regarding	  constitutional	  law	  
	  
During	  the	  first	  year	  of	  project	  work,	  major	  challenges	  concerning	  interdisciplinarity	  became	  evident	  and	  
means	  to	  address	  them	  were	  developed.	  Obviously,	  all	  disciplines	  involved	  need	  to	  learn	  the	  basics	  of	  the	  
respective	   other	  disciplines.	   Formats	   for	   interdisciplinary	   cooperation	  between	   the	   research	   teams	   and	  
mutual	  learning	  such	  as	  interdisciplinary	  lecture	  series	  held	  by	  senior	  scientists,	  joint	  field	  trips,	  as	  well	  as	  
presentation	  and	  workshop	  formats	  for	  junior	  scientists	  have	  been	  put	  in	  place.	  This	  is	  not	  only	  meant	  to	  
serve	   the	   project	   work	   itself,	   but	   also	   to	   educate	   scientists	   with	   disciplinary	   excellence	   but	   also	  
understanding	  of	  the	  basics	  of	  other	  disciplines.	  
	  




Terminology	  and	  semantics	  are	  crucial	  to	  understanding	  each	  other.	  Seminars,	  workshops	  and	  discussant	  
panels	   addressing	   terms	   such	   as	   “wicked	   problem”,	   ”confining	   rock	   zone”,	   “good	   governance”,	  
“retrievability”	   as	   well	   as	   web-­‐based	   collaborative	   formats	   (wikis)	   for	   fora	   and	   glossaries	   are	   being	  
implemented.	  
	  
Furthermore,	   the	  project	   is	   increasingly	  working	  on	   joint	   interdisciplinary	  publications,	  PhD	  theses,	  and	  
events	   for	   the	   interested	   public	   held	   by	   interdisciplinary	   teams.	   As	   a	   very	   first	   step	   towards	   an	  
interdisciplinary	   synthesis,	   the	   senior	   scientists	   from	   all	   teams	   published	   a	   memorandum	   naming	   the	  
specific	   challenges	   and	   target	   conflicts	   of	   importance	   when	   deciding	   about	   management	   options.	   The	  
drafting	  has	  been	  carried	  out	   in	  an	   iterative	  process	   involving	  20	   individuals	   from	  all	  ENTRIA	  partners.	  
After	   having	   decided	   about	   scope,	   topics,	   and	   structure,	   chapters	   were	   developed	   by	   drafting	   teams	  
(typically	   2	   individuals	   –	   one	   “technician”,	   one	   “non-­‐technician”).	   In	   several	   iterations	   chapters	   were	  
merged,	   redundancies	   were	   removed,	   controversial	   issues	   were	   resolved	   and	   the	   language	   was	  
harmonized	   by	   small	   editing	   teams	   with	   moving	   membership.	   These	   iterations	   involved	   bi-­‐	   and	  
multilateral	   exchanges	   amongst	   the	   authors.	   Finally,	   the	  memorandum	  was	   approved	   by	   all	   authors.	   It	  
was	   felt	   that	   the	   process	   greatly	   helped	   developing	   a	   common	   terminology	   and	  mutual	   understanding	  
about	  issues	  and	  topics.	  Under	  the	  headlines	  
	  
• Problem	  description	  
• RWM	  strategies	  and	  facility	  types	  
• Risk	  and	  safety	  
• Procedural	  fairness	  
• Societal	  and	  technological	  innovation	  
	  
the	  memorandum	  identified	  areas	  of	  tension	  and	  conflict	  at	  stake,	  including	  
	  
• Burdens	  on	  future	  generations	  –	  flexibility	  
• Accessibility	  –	  safe	  confinement	  
• Delay	  process	  –	  urge	  process	  
• Interests	  of	  society	  –	  particular	  interests	  
• Classic	  representative	  democracy	  –	  parliamentary	  democracy	  with	  strong	  deliberative	  elements	  
• Criteria	  constant	  over	  time	  –	  fallibility	  and	  need	  for	  revision	  
	  
When	   addressing	   the	   objective	   of	   deriving	   evaluation	   principles,	   the	   issue	   of	   risk,	   its	   conceptions	   and	  
definitions,	   assessment,	   perception	   and	   management	   is	   of	   particular	   interest.	   ENTRIA	   tackles	   the	   risk	  
issue	  in	  a	  dedicated	  transversal	  project	  (see	  Fig.	  1),	  which	  cooperates	  with	  all	  other,	  but	  particularly	  with	  
the	  vertical	  projects.	  In	  interdisciplinary	  meetings,	  a	  set	  of	  propositions	  or	  premises	  about	  the	  handling	  of	  
the	  risk	  issue	  in	  ENTRIA	  has	  been	  agreed	  upon,	  including	  the	  following:	  
	  
• Risks	  can	  be	  analyzed	  and	  assessed.	  
• Risk	  analysis	  integrates	  technical	  and	  societal	  aspects.	  
• Part	  of	  risk	  analysis	  is	  to	  disclose	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  analysis.	  
• Risk	  assessments	  must	  be	  based	  on	  good	  reasons	  and	  exposed	  transparently.	  
	  
It	  is	  planned	  to	  structure	  further	  work	  based	  on	  the	  development	  of	  “risk	  landscapes”	  i.e.	  graphical	  means	  
to	   provide	   overview,	   identify	   issues	   and	   uncover	   normative	   aspects.	   Exemplified	   and	   illustrative	  
considerations	   of	   sections	   of	   these	   landscapes	   can	   then	   be	   carried	   out	   using	   reference	   concepts.	   E.g.,	  




ENTRIA’s	   reference	   concept	   on	   deep	   emplacement	   with	   retrievability	   and	   monitoring	   involves	   a	  
repository	  to	  be	  dimensioned	  appropriately	  to	  allow	  retrieval,	  monitoring	  drifts	  above	  the	  emplacement	  
areas,	   and	   backfill	   and	   sealing	   the	   individual	   emplacement	   drifts	   after	   waste	   emplacement.	   The	  
infrastructure	  area	  and	  the	  shaft	  will	  be	  kept	  open.	  The	  host-­‐rock	  specific	  timeframe	  for	  which	  this	  will	  be	  
possible	  will	   be	   derived	   based	   on	   safety	   considerations	   taking	   into	   account	   geomechanics,	   degradation	  
processes	  etc.	  The	  hypothesis	   is	   that	   –	   assuming	   that	   a	  decision	   is	   taken	  not	   to	   retrieve	  –	   the	   complete	  
repository	  will	  be	  backfilled	  and	  sealed	  at	  the	  latest	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  timeframe.	  From	  then	  on,	  only	  waste	  
recovery	   will	   be	   conceivable.	   Of	   course,	   choosing	   a	   reference	   concept	   implies	   an	   illustrative	   and	  
exemplary	  character	  of	   the	  related	  considerations:	  Many	  statements	  will	  apply	   to	   this	  specific	  reference	  
concept	  rather	  than	  to	  „retrievability	  in	  general“.	  
	  
	  
4	  Conclusions	  for	  interdisciplinary	  work	  
	  
Challenges	   when	   working	   beyond	   disciplinary	   boundaries	   include	   widely	   varying	   terminology	   and	  
semantics	  as	  well	   as	  widely	  varying	  working	  and	  communication	  cultures.	   Sound	  disciplinary	  work	   is	  a	  
basis	  and	  starting	  point	  for	  interdisciplinary	  activities.	  Another	  prerequisite	  for	  the	  scientists	  involved	  is	  
knowledge	  about	   the	  basics	   in	   the	   respective	  other	  disciplines.	  ENTRIA	  successfully	   tested	  a	  number	  of	  
formats	   to	   address	   these	   challenges.	   Cross-­‐disciplinary	   education	   formats	   are	   especially	   necessary	   and	  
helpful.	  Working	  on	   joint	  projects	   such	  as	   journal	  articles,	  books,	  PhD	   theses,	  and	   jointly	  organized	  and	  
held	  events	  (presentations,	  summer	  schools,	  podium	  discussions)	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  most	  effective.	  ENTRIA	  
is	  moving	  towards	  an	  interdisciplinary	  analysis	  leading	  to	  the	  development	  of	  evaluation	  principles	  for	  the	  
key	  options	  and	  knowledge	  about	  relevant	  “context	  structures”	  for	  radioactive	  waste	  management.	  
	  
Acknowledgements	  	  
The	   authors	   would	   like	   to	   thank	   the	   whole	   ENTRIA	   team.	   Special	   thanks	   go	   to	   Anne	   Eckhardt	   (risicare	  
GmbH)	  and	  Joachim	  Stahlmann	  (TU	  Braunschweig)	  for	  their	  input.	  
ENTRIA	   is	   a	   joint	   research	   project	   financed	   by	   the	   German	   Ministry	   of	   Education	   and	   Research	   (BMBF,	  
SUPPORT	  CODES	  02S9082A-­‐F).	  
	  
References	  
AkEnd	  (Arbeitskreis	  Auswahlverfahren	  Endlagersuche)	  2002.	  Site	  selection	  procedure	  for	  repository	  sites:	  Recommendations	  of	  the	  
AkEnd	  (Committee	  on	  a	  Site	  Selection	  Procedure	  for	  Repository	  Sites).	  Final	  report	  for	  the	  Federal	  Ministry	  for	  the	  Environment,	  
Nature	  Conservation	  and	  Nuclear	  Safety.	  Cologne,	  December	  2002,	  248	  pp.	  
CoWRM	  (Committee	  on	  Radioactive	  Waste	  Management).	  2006.	  Managing	  our	  radioactive	  waste	  safely:	  CoRWM’s	  recommendations	  
to	  government	  (Doc	  700,	  July	  2006).	  London:	  CoRMW.,	  https://www.gov.uk/government/	  uploads/system/uploads/attachment	  
_data/file/294118/700_-­‐_CoRWM_July_2006_Recommendations_to_Government_pdf.pdf	  	  
EKRA	   (Expertengruppe	   Entsorgungskonzepte	   für	   radioaktive	   Abfälle)	   2000.	   Entsorgungskonzepte	   für	   radioaktive	   Abfälle.	  
Schlussbericht,	  31.	  Januar	  2000.	  http://static.ensi.ch/1336309693/ekra-­‐bericht_entsorgungskonzeptschweiz.pdf	  	  
ENTRIA	  Memorandum	  about	  the	  Disposal	  of	  Highly	  Radioactive	  Residues	  (in	  German)	  http://www.entria.de/fileadmin/entria/Doku	  
mente/ENTRIA_Memorandum_140430.pdf	  
Gesetz	   zur	   Suche	   und	   Auswahl	   eines	   Standortes	   für	   ein	   Endlager	   für	   Wärme	   entwickelnde	   radioaktive	   Abfälle	   (Stand-­‐
ortauswahlgesetz	  -­‐	  StandAG)	  vom	  23.	  Juli	  2013	  (BGBl.	  I	  S.	  2553)	  
Streffer,	   C.,	   Gethmann,	   C.	   F.,	   Kamp,	   G.,	   Kröger,	  W.,	   Rehbinder,	   E.,	   Renn,	   O.,	   Röhlig,	   K.-­‐J.	   (2011):	   Radioactive	  Waste	   Technical	   and	  
Normative	  Aspects	  of	  its	  Disposal	  (Vol.	  38).	  Berlin,	  Heidelberg:	  Springer	  Verlag.	  
NWMO	   (Nuclear	   Waste	   Management	   Organization)	   2005.	   Choosing	   a	   Way	   Forward.	   The	   Future	   Management	   of	   Canada’s	   Used	  
Nuclear	  Fuel.	  Final	  Study.	  http://www.nwmo.ca/studyreport	  	  
	   	  




Reflecting	  Socio-­‐Technical	  Combinations	  in	  Radioactive	  Waste	  
Management	  –	  Results	  from	  the	  InSOTEC	  European	  Research	  
Project	  
	  
BEATE	  KALLENBACH-­‐HERBERT1,	  ANNE	  BERGMANS2,	  MERITXELL	  MARTELL3,	  JANTINE	  SCHRÖDER2,	  4	  
1Öko-­‐Institut	   e.V.,	   Rheinstrasse	   95,	   64295	   Darmstadt,	   Germany,	   b.kallenbach@oeko.de,	   2University	   of	  
Antwerp,	   Prinsstraat	   13,	   2000	   Antwerpen,	   Belgium,	   anne.bergmans@uantwerpen.be,	   3Merience	   Strategic	  
Thinking,	  Carrer	   Llimoner	  30,	  08734,	  Olèrdola,	   Spain,	  meritxell.martell@merience.com,	   4SCK•CEN,	  Boeretang	  
200,	  2400	  Mol,	  Belgium,	  jantine.schroder@sckcen.be	  
	  
InSOTEC	  is	  a	  three-­‐year	  collaborative	  social	  sciences	  research	  project	  funded	  under	  the	  European	  Atomic	  
Energy	   Community's	   7th	   Framework	   Programme	   FP7.	   The	   project	   aims	   to	   generate	   a	   better	  
understanding	  of	  the	  complex	  interplay	  between	  the	  technical	  and	  the	  social	   in	  the	  context	  of	  geological	  
disposal	  of	   radioactive	  waste.	   In	  doing	   so,	   InSOTEC	  has	  moved	  beyond	   the	   social	   and	   technical	  division	  
that	  is	  frequently	  being	  found	  in	  this	  context	  by	  	  
-­‐ investigating	   the	   consideration	   of	   social	   sciences	   and	   the	   recognition	   of	   socio-­‐technical	  
combinations	  in	  research	  programs	  on	  geological	  disposal,	  	  
-­‐ analyzing	   the	   socio-­‐technical	   entanglement	   in	   selected	   contexts	   like	   siting,	   reversibility	   and	  
retrievability,	  demonstrating	  safety	  and	  technology	  transfer	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  case	  studies,	  and	  
-­‐ exploring	  the	  integration	  of	  diverse	  stakeholders	  in	  technology	  oriented	  networks.	  
The	   analyses	   reveal	   that	   activities	   in	   the	   context	   of	   geological	   disposal,	   whether	   related	   to	   research,	  
planning,	   siting	   etc.,	   rather	   support	   the	   divide	   of	   social	   and	   technical	   aspects	   than	   fostering	   the	  
consideration	   of	   their	   entanglement.	   Reasons	   identified	   for	   this	   are	   manifold.	   The	   wish	   to	   reduce	  
complexity	  by	   focusing	  stakeholder	   involvement	  on	  social	  questions	  and	   fixing	  the	  technical	  part	  “when	  
acceptance	  is	  reached”	  is	  only	  one	  of	  them.	  
	  
However,	  the	  analyses	  also	  show	  that	  over	  the	  long	  timescales	  of	  repository	  planning	  and	  implementation,	  
robust	   management	   strategies	   must	   provide	   the	   flexibility	   to	   adapt	   to	   both	   technical	   and	   social	  
developments	   and	  demands.	  Understanding	   the	   socio-­‐technical	   interplay	   and	   creating	   structures	   for	   its	  
consideration	  provides	  the	  basis	  for	  dealing	  with	  this	  challenge.	  
	  
This	  presentation	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  main	  findings	  of	  the	  InSOTEC	  project	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  consideration	  
of	  socio-­‐technical	  combinations	   in	  practice.	  These	   insights	  are	  currently	  under	  development	  and	  will	  be	  
finalized	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  project	   in	  June	  2014.	  We	  will	  reflect	  on	  the	  “added	  value”	  associated	  with	  the	  
notion	  of	   “socio-­‐technical”	   as	  developed	   in	   InSOTEC,	   e.g.	   in	   terms	  of	   getting	  better	   insights,	   being	  more	  
reflexive,	   being	   more	   open	   etc.	   Based	   on	   this	   we	   will	   discuss	   how	   socio-­‐technical	   approaches	   can	   be	  
facilitated,	   focusing	   on	   inter-­‐	   and	   transdisciplinarity,	   public	   participation	   and	   the	   constructive	   role	   of	  
conflicts.	   We	   are	   furthermore	   going	   beyond	   the	   experience	   gathered	   in	   the	   context	   of	   nuclear	   waste	  
management	   as	   it	   is	   becoming	   apparent	   that	   socio-­‐technical	   combinations	   are	   inadequately	   covered	  by	  
current	  practices	   in	  this	   field.	   Insights	  will	  be	  drawn	  from	  methods	  used	   in	  transition	  processes	  namely	  
innovation	  governance,	  transition	  management	  and	  adaptive	  management.	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The	  disposal	  of	  nuclear	  waste	  has	  gained	  attention	  of	  the	  public	  for	  decades.	  Accordingly,	  nuclear	  waste	  
has	  been	  a	  prominent	  issue	  in	  natural,	  engineer	  and	  social	  science	  for	  many	  years.	  Although	  bearing	  risks	  
for	  todays	  and	  future	  generations	  hazardous1	  waste	  in	  contrast	  is	  much	  less	  an	  issue	  of	  public	  concern.	  	  
	  
In	   2011,	   we	   conducted	   a	   postal	   survey	   among	   Swiss	   Germans	   (N	   =	   3.082)	   to	   learn	   more	   about,	   how	  
nuclear	   waste	   is	   perceived	   against	   hazardous	   waste.	   We	   created	   a	   questionnaire	   with	   two	   versions,	  
nuclear	  waste	  and	  hazardous	  waste,	  respectively.	  Each	  version	  included	  an	  identical	  part	  with	  well-­‐known	  
explanatory	   factors	   for	   risk	   perception	   on	   each	   of	   the	  waste	   types	   separately	   and	   additional	   questions	  
directly	  comparing	  the	  two	  waste	  types.	  
	  
Results	   show	   that	   basically	   both	  waste	   types	   are	   perceived	   similarly	   in	   terms	   of	   risk/benefit,	   emotion,	  
trust,	  knowledge	  and	  responsibility.	  However,	  in	  the	  direct	  comparison	  of	  the	  two	  waste	  types	  a	  complete	  
different	   pattern	   can	   be	   observed:	   Respondents	   perceive	   nuclear	   waste	   as	   more	   long-­‐living,	   more	  
dangerous,	   less	   controllable	   and	   it,	   furthermore,	   creates	   more	   negative	   emotions.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	  
respondents	  feel	  more	  responsible	  for	  hazardous	  waste	  and	  indicate	  to	  have	  more	  knowledge	  about	  this	  
waste	  type.	  Moreover,	  nuclear	  waste	  is	  perceived	  as	  more	  carefully	  managed.	  	  
	  
We	  conclude	  that	  mechanisms	  driving	  risk	  perception	  are	  similar	  for	  both	  waste	  types	  but	  an	  overarching	  
negative	   image	   of	   nuclear	   waste	   prevails.	   We	   propose	   that	   hazardous	   waste	   should	   be	   given	   more	  
attention	   in	   the	   public	   as	   well	   as	   in	   science	   which	   may	   have	   implications	   on	   further	   management	  
strategies	  of	  hazardous	  waste.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Hazardous	  waste	  is	  non-­‐ionizing	  toxic	  material	  which	  cannot	  be	  further	  used.	  Accordingly,	  this	  material	  has	  to	  be	  isolated	  from	  
men	  and	  environment	  e.g.	  in	  exploited	  mines.	  Hazardous	  waste	  accumulates	  from	  industry,	  business	  and	  households.	  Examples	  are	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ABSTRACT:	   In	  summer	  2010	  the	  German	  Federal	  Government	  launched	  a	  preliminary	  safety	  analysis	  to	  
assess	   whether	   the	   salt	   dome	   at	   Gorleben	   is	   suitable	   to	   host	   all	   heat-­‐generating	   radioactive	   waste	  
generated	  by	  German	  NPPs.	  On	   the	  basis	  of	   the	   “Safety	  Requirements	  Governing	   the	  Final	  Disposal	  of	  
Heat-­‐Generating	  Radioactive	  Waste	   as	   at	   30	   September	   2010”	   (BMU	  2010)	   a	   repository	   concept	  was	  
developed	  which	  was	  optimized	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  during	  project	  evolution.	  The	  repository	  design	  was	  
tailored	   to	   the	   specific	   geologic	   environment	   at	   the	   Gorleben	   site	   and	   served	   as	   the	   main	   technical	  
basis	  for	  the	  site-­‐specific	  preliminary	  safety	  analysis	  (VSG).	  For	  comparison,	  two	  different	  emplacement	  
strategies	  were	  considered.	  One	  strategy	  considered	  that	  all	  of	   the	  waste	  packages	  will	  be	  disposed	  of	  
in	   horizontal	   drifts	   within	   a	   mined	   geologic	   repository,	   while	   the	   other	   strategy	   considered	   that	   all	  
waste	   packages	  will	   be	   disposed	   of	   in	   deep	   vertical	   boreholes	   drilled	   into	   the	   floor	   of	   the	   repository.	  
The	   fundamentals,	   the	   design	   approach,	   and	   the	   resulting	   repository	   designs	   for	   two	   different	  
emplacement	   strategies	   (GRS	   2011)	   are	   presented	   in	   this	   paper.	   The	   designs	   took	   into	   account	   an	  
updated	  set	  of	   fundamental	  data	  regarding	  the	  amounts	  and	  types	  of	  expected	  heat-­‐generating	  waste	  
and	  the	  documented	  results	  of	  the	  exploration	  of	  the	  Gorleben	  salt	  dome.	  The	  designs	  aimed	  to	  transfer	  
the	  new	  “Safety	  Concept	  and	  Safety	  Assessment	  Concept”,	   i.e.	   the	  methodology	  on	  how	  to	  demonstrate	  






The	   revised	   Atomic	   Energy	   Act	   of	   June	   2011	   stipulates	   a	   phase-­‐out	   of	   nuclear	   energy	   production	   in	  
Germany	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2022.	  Prior	  to	  this	  revision	  –	  in	  summer	  2010	  –	  the	  German	  Federal	  Government	  
launched	  a	  preliminary	  safety	  analysis	  to	  assess	  whether	  the	  salt	  dome	  at	  Gorleben	  is	  suitable	  to	  host	  all	  
heat-­‐generating	   radioactive	   waste	   generated	   by	   German	   NPPs.	   This	   safety	   assessment	   includes	   a	  
repository	   concept	   which	   was	   optimized	   to	   a	   certain	   extent	   during	   project	   evolution.	   The	   repository	  
design	   was	   tailored	   to	   the	   specific	   geologic	   environment	   at	   the	   Gorleben	   site	   and	   served	   as	   the	   main	  
technical	  basis	  for	  the	  site-­‐specific	  preliminary	  safety	  analysis.	  This	  preliminary	  safety	  analysis	  took	  into	  
account	  the	  “Safety	  Requirements	  Governing	  the	  Final	  Disposal	  of	  Heat-­‐Generating	  Radioactive	  Waste	  as	  
at	  30	  September	  2010"	  (BMU	  2010)	  for	  the	  very	  first	  time.	  The	  resulting	  repository	  designs	  for	  the	  two	  
main	   emplacement	   strategies	   took	   into	   account	   an	   updated	   set	   of	   fundamental	   data	   regarding	   the	  




amounts	  and	   types	  of	  expected	  heat-­‐generating	  waste	  and	   the	  documented	  results	  of	   the	  exploration	  of	  
the	  Gorleben	  salt	  dome.	  The	  designs	  were	  to	  transfer	  a	  new	  safety	  and	  verification	  concept	  (GRS	  2011),	  i.e.	  
a	   methodology	   on	   how	   to	   demonstrate	   operational	   and	   long-­‐term	   safety,	   into	   technical	   solutions	   for	  
repository	  components,	  systems	  and	  processes.	  	  
	  
	  




The	  primary	  objective	  of	  the	  preliminary	  safety	  assessment	  for	  the	  potential	  site	  Gorleben	  was	  a	  traceably	  
documented	  prognosis	  of	   the	  suitability	  of	   the	  site.	  This	   requires,	   among	  others,	   the	  development	  of	  an	  
optimized	  repository	  concept.	  For	  this	  purpose,	  two	  main	  repository	  concepts	  were	  considered.	  Variant	  1	  
comprises	   the	   emplacement	   of	   all	   heat-­‐generating	   radioactive	  waste	   (spent	   fuel	   and	   vitrified	  waste)	   in	  
self-­‐shielding	  waste	  containers	  (POLLUX®	  casks)	  in	  horizontal	  drifts.	  In	  addition	  –	  for	  comparison	  only	  –	  
the	   emplacement	  of	   all	   heat-­‐generating	   radioactive	  waste	   in	   transport	  und	   storage	   casks	   (CASTOR®)	   in	  
horizontal	   boreholes	   was	   considered.	   Variant	   2	   consists	   of	   the	   emplacement	   of	   all	   heat-­‐generating	  
radioactive	   waste	   in	   multi-­‐purpose	   cylindrical	   canisters	   in	   deep	   vertical	   boreholes.	   As	   an	   option,	   the	  
emplacement	  of	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  non-­‐heat-­‐generating	  radioactive	  waste	  was	  considered	  (in	  horizontal	  
emplacement	   chambers).	   For	  both	  variants	   (emplacement	   in	  drifts/emplacement	   in	  vertical	  boreholes),	  
the	  respective	  final	  technical	  designs	  were	  elaborated	  and	  documented	  in	  a	  final	  report	  (GRS	  2012).	  	  
	  
2.2	  Technical	  Design	  of	  the	  Repository	  Mine	  
	  
The	   technical	   designs	   comprise	   first	   the	   selection	   and	   description	   of	   waste-­‐specific	   (spent	  
fuel/reprocessing	   waste)	   waste	   packages	   for	   both	   strategies.	   Based	   on	   the	   expected	   waste	   inventory	  
(10,445	  tons	  of	  heavy	  metal	  resulting	  from	  34,430	  spent	  fuel	  elements	  and	  8,141	  canisters	  of	  waste	  from	  
reprocessing	  (CSD-­‐V,	  CSD-­‐B	  and	  CSD-­‐C),	  3D	  thermal	  calculations	  were	  carried	  out	  to	  determine	  canister,	  
drift,	   and	   borehole	   distances.	   The	   calculations	   showed	   that	   both	   disposal	   concepts	   (drift	   disposal	   and	  
borehole	  emplacement)	  for	  the	  heat-­‐generating	  waste	  meet	  the	  200°C	  design	  criteria.	  The	  only	  difference	  
is	  the	  smaller	  horizontal	  foot	  print	  in	  the	  case	  of	  borehole	  disposal.	  Compared	  with	  previous	  calculations	  
(EUR	   2004)	   the	   thermal-­‐mechanical	   calculations	   used	   a	   more	   comprehensive	   and	   refined	   set	   of	  
parameters	  (e.g.	  higher	  stress	  levels	  and	  faster	  creep	  classes	  for	  the	  host	  rock)	  which	  led	  to	  a	  substantially	  
faster	  enclosure	  of	  the	  waste	  canisters	  or	  casks.	  Thus,	  the	  results	  provide	  suitable	  design	  parameters	  for	  
the	   layout	  of	  emplacement	  drifts	  and	  fields	  and	  the	  entire	  repository,	   including	  infrastructure	  areas	  and	  
drifts	  for	  the	  transportation	  of	  waste	  packages	  and	  excavated	  rock	  salt	  material.	  The	  respective	  repository	  
design	  approaches	  comprise	  two	  steps;	   first	  a	  conceptual	  design	  was	  developed,	   followed	  by	  a	  technical	  
design,	  which	  includes	  suggestions	  for	  optimization.	  The	  final	  design	  results	  for	  both	  main	  variants	  are	  as	  
follows:	  	  
	  
Variant	  1:	   Disposal	  of	  POLLUX®	  casks	  in	  horizontal	  drifts	  of	  the	  repository	  mine	  
	  
The	   total	   inventory	   of	   heat-­‐generating	  waste	  will	   be	   disposed	   of	   in	   heavy	   (weight	  max.	   65	  metric	   tons	  
[Mt]),	  self-­‐shielding	  POLLUX®	  casks	  containing	  the	  fuel	  rods	  of	  disassembled	  spent	  fuel	  elements	  or	  waste	  
from	   reprocessing	   in	   horizontal	   drifts	   of	   the	   salt	  mine.	   A	  minor	   quantity	   of	   remaining	   structural	   parts	  
from	  the	  conditioning	  of	  spent	  fuel	  elements	  will	  be	  disposed	  of	  in	  cast	  iron	  containers.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  
thermal	  calculations	  for	  cask	  and	  drift	  distances	  have	  been	  transferred	  into	  a	  repository	  layout,	  as	  shown	  




in	  Figure	  1	  for	  the	  drift	  disposal	  concept.	  In	  total,	  the	  north-­‐eastern	  part	  of	  the	  repository	  –	  adjusted	  to	  the	  
assumed	  geologic	  structure	  of	  the	  Gorleben	  salt	  dome	  at	  the	  emplacement	  level	  of	  870	  m	  below	  surface	  –	  
will	  have	  a	  length	  of	  approximately	  4	  km	  and	  a	  width	  varying	  between	  300	  m	  and	  700	  m.	  	  
	  
Figure	  1	  also	  shows	  a	  sketch	  of	   the	  POLLUX®	  cask	  and	  a	  photograph	  of	   the	   test	  set-­‐up	   for	   the	   full-­‐scale	  




Fig.	  1.	  Repository	  design	  for	  the	  emplacement	  of	  all	  heat-­‐generating	  spent	  fuel	  and	  vitrified	  waste	  in	  horizontal	  drifts	  at	  a	  
level	  of	  app.	  900	  m	  below	  surface	  in	  the	  center	  of	  the	  Gorleben	  salt	  dome	  
	  
Variant	  2:	   Disposal	  of	  canisters	  for	  fuel	  rods	  and	  vitrified	  waste	  in	  vertical	  boreholes	  
	  
Under	  Variant	  2,	  the	  total	  inventory	  of	  heat-­‐generating	  radioactive	  waste	  will	  be	  disposed	  of	  in	  canisters	  
lowered	   into	   300-­‐m	   deep,	   lined	   vertical	   boreholes	   drilled	   from	   the	   870-­‐m	   level	   of	   the	   repository.	   The	  
canisters	   (weight	  5.2	  Mt)	   contain	   fuel	   rods,	   vitrified	  waste,	   or	   structural	   parts	   from	   the	   conditioning	  of	  
spent	  fuel	  assemblies.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  thermal	  calculations	  took	  into	  account	  the	  heat	  transfer	  into	  the	  
surrounding	  rock	  salt	  at	  a	  depth	  of	  more	  than	  300	  m.	  The	  results	  provided	  borehole	  and	  drift	  distances,	  
thus	  again	  guarantying	  that	  the	  temperature	  limit	  of	  200°C	  at	  the	  contact	  between	  the	  liner	  and	  the	  salt	  
will	   not	   been	   exceeded.	   The	   corresponding	   repository	   layout	   is	   shown	   in	   Figure	   2.	   In	   total,	   the	   north-­‐
eastern	  part	  of	  the	  mine	  –	  adjusted	  to	  the	  geologic	  structure	  of	  the	  Gorleben	  salt	  dome	  at	  the	  emplacement	  
level	  of	  870	  m	  below	  surface	  –	  will	  have	  a	  length	  of	  approximately	  1	  km	  and	  a	  width	  varying	  between	  400	  
m	  and	  800	  m.	  The	  emplacement	  of	  non-­‐heat-­‐generating	  waste	  was	  considered	  as	  an	  option	  in	  the	  south-­‐
eastern	  part	  of	  the	  mine.	  




Figure	  2	  shows	  a	  sketch	  of	  a	  vitrified	  waste	  canister	  and	  a	  spent	  fuel	  canister	  and	  a	  photograph	  of	  the	  test	  
set-­‐up	   for	   the	   full-­‐scale	   canister	   emplacement	   demonstration	   tests	   in	   vertical	   boreholes	   successfully	  
performed	  in	  2008	  and	  2009.	  
	  
	  
Fig.	  2.	  Repository	  design	  for	  the	  emplacement	  of	  all	  heat-­‐generating	  waste	  in	  lined	  vertical	  boreholes	  drilled	  into	  the	  center	  
of	  the	  Gorleben	  salt	  dome	  from	  the	  emplacement	  level	  of	  the	  repository	  at	  app.	  900m	  below	  surface	  
	  
For	   comparison	   purposes	   the	   disposal	   of	   all	   heat	   generating	  waste	   by	  means	   of	   transport	   and	   storage	  
casks	  was	  considered	  as	  well.	  This	  emplacement	  concept	  comprises	  the	  emplacement	  of	  heavy	  casks	  (up	  
to	   160	   t)	   into	   single	   horizontal	   boreholes	   drilled	   perpendicular	   to	   the	   emplacement	   drift.	   Due	   to	   the	  
design	  temperature	  of	  200°C	  the	  appropriate	  draft	  repository	  design	  shows	  that	  the	  footprint	  is	  more	  or	  





The	  repository	  design	  took	  into	  account	  the	  retrievability	  requirements	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  new	  Safety	  
Requirements	   (BMU	  2010).	  As	  a	  boundary	  condition	   for	   the	   repository	  design,	   it	  was	  considered	   that	  a	  
decision	  to	  retrieve	  waste	  canisters	  would	  comprise	  all	  waste	  canisters	  disposed	  of	  and	  that	  the	  evolution	  
of	  the	  repository	  in	  a	  reference	  scenario	  does	  not	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  waste	  containers.	  
Retrievability	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   drift	   disposal	   concept	   does	   in	   principle	   imply	   a	   reversion	   of	   the	  
emplacement	  process.	  New	  access	  drifts	  will	  be	  excavated	   in	  parallel	   to	   the	  emplacement	  drifts	  and	  the	  
remaining	   material	   above	   and	   in	   between	   the	   containers	   will	   be	   removed.	   Eventually	   a	   modified	  
emplacement	  device	  can	  pick	  up	   the	  container.	   In	   the	  case	  of	  borehole	  disposal	   the	  design	  of	   the	  waste	  




canister	  was	  modified	  to	  facilitate	  retrieval	  and	  the	  boreholes	  will	  be	  equipped	  with	  a	  casing	  that	  shall	  be	  
closed	   and	   sealed	   tightly	   at	   the	   top	   of	   casing	   to	   guarantee	   retrieval	   even	   decades	   after	   emplacement.	  
However,	   it	   is	  noted	   that	  before	   the	  canisters	  can	  be	  retrieved,	  a	  concept	   for	   their	   subsequent	  handling	  





The	  preliminary	  safety	  analysis	  of	  the	  Gorleben	  salt	  dome	  was	  carried	  out	  to	  investigate	  its	  suitability	  as	  a	  
repository	  for	  heat-­‐generating	  waste.	  It	  was	  based	  on	  the	  “Requirements	  Governing	  the	  Final	  Disposal	  of	  
Heat-­‐Generating	  Radioactive	  Waste	  as	  at	  30	  September	  2010",	  and	  took	  into	  account	  the	  total	  amount	  of	  
expected	  heat-­‐generating	   radioactive	  waste	   based	  on	   the	  decision	  of	   2011	   to	   phase	   out	   nuclear	   energy	  
production.	  Two	  different	  emplacement	  strategies,	   i.e.	  emplacing	  all	  heat-­‐generating	  waste	   in	  horizontal	  
drifts	  and	  emplacing	  all	  heat-­‐generating	  waste	  in	  deep	  vertical	  boreholes,	  respectively,	  were	  designed	  and	  
considered.	   Thermal-­‐mechanical	   calculations	   demonstrate	   that	   both	   strategies	   can	   be	   readily	  
accommodated	  by	  the	  repository	  concepts	  under	  consideration	  of	  all	  applicable	  performance	  and	  safety	  
requirements.	  The	  technical	  design	  work	  shows	  that	  the	  Gorleben	  salt	  dome	  provides	  sufficient	  space	  on	  a	  
single	   level	   to	   host	   a	   repository	   for	   all	   the	   heat-­‐generating	   waste	   arising	   in	   Germany.	   Additionally,	  
technical	   approaches	   on	   the	   retrieval	   of	   waste	   containers	   were	   developed	   for	   both	   disposal	   concepts.	  
Room	  for	  optimization	  was	  identified	  in	  the	  area	  of	  retrievability	  technique	  and	  systems,	  mine	  ventilation,	  
allocation	   of	   waste	   containers	   in	   emplacement	   fields	   and	   emplacement	   drifts	   as	   a	   function	   of	   heat	  
generation.	   For	   comparison	   purposes	   an	   alternative	   emplacement	   concept	  was	   also	   considered	   for	   the	  
emplacement	  of	  transport	  and	  storage	  casks	  into	  individual	  horizontal	  boreholes.	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Safety	   analysis	   for	   a	   geological	   repository	   for	   radioactive	   waste	   as	   well	   as	   remediation	   measures	   for	  
uranium	  mining	  and	  processing	  legacies	  share	  an	  essential:	  the	  need	  for	  a	  reliable,	  traceable	  and	  accurate	  
assessment	  of	  potential	  migration	  of	  toxic	  constituents	  into	  the	  biosphere.	  The	  respective	  computational	  
codes	   require	   site-­‐independent	   thermodynamic	   data	   concerning	   aqueous	   speciation,	   solubility	   limiting	  
solid	  phases	  and	  ion-­‐interaction	  parameters.	  Such	  databases,	  however,	  show	  several	  constraints:	  
	  
• Incompleteness	  in	  terms	  of	  major	  and	  trace	  elements	  
• Inconsistencies	  between	  species	  considered	  and	  corresponding	  formation	  constants	  
• Restricted	  variation	  ranges	  of	  intensive	  parameters	  (temperature,	  density,	  pressure)	  
• Limitations	  with	  respect	  to	  solution	  compositions	  (ionic	  strength)	  
	  
To	  overcome	   these	   limitations	   to	   a	   significant	  degree,	   an	   ambitious	  database	  project	   –	  THEREDA	  –	  has	  
been	  launched	  in	  2006	  by	  institutions	  leading	  in	  the	  field	  of	  safety	  research	  for	  nuclear	  waste	  disposal	  in	  
Germany	  [1].	  
	  
The	   main	   objective	   is	   a	   centrally	   administrated	   and	   maintained	   database	   of	   verified	   thermodynamic	  
parameters	  for	  environmental	  applications	  in	  general	  and	  radiochemical	  issues	  in	  particular.	  
	  
During	   the	   last	   year,	   the	   most	   important	   point	   was	   the	   official	   release	   of	   four	   more	   datasets	   (adding	  
carbonate,	   An(III),	   Np(V)	   and	   Cs	   to	   the	   hexary	   system	   of	   oceanic	   salts),	   all	   based	   on	   the	   Pitzer	  model	  
describing	  the	  ion-­‐ion	  interactions.	  They	  can	  all	  be	  downloaded	  as	  separate	  files	  from	  the	  project	  web	  site	  
www.thereda.de	   (navigation	  menu:	  THEREDA	  Data	  Query	  !	  Tailored	  Databases)	  as	  generic	  ASCII	   type,	  
and	  in	  formats	  specific	  to	  the	  geochemical	  speciation	  codes	  PhreeqC,	  EQ3/6,	  ChemApp	  and	  Geochemist’s	  
Workbench.	   Moreover,	   access	   to	   data	   records	   is	   now	   also	   possible	   through	   interactive	   forms	   (menu:	  
THEREDA	  Data	  Query	  !	  Single	  Data	  Query	  //	  Complex	  Systems),	  both	  with	  export	  options	  as	  CSV	  or	  MS	  
Excel	  file.	  Additional	  releases	  of	  thermodynamic	  data	  for	  Th(IV),	  U(IV)	  and	  U(VI)	  are	  already	  under	  way.	  
	  
In	   connection	  with	   these	   data	   releases	   several	   other	  measures	   have	   been	   successfully	   implemented	   in	  
THEREDA,	   namely	   a	   new	   interactive	   web-­‐based	   tool	   for	   data	   entry	   and	   editing	   including	   a	   variety	   of	  
internal	  checks	  for	  data	  consistency	  and	  plausibility.	  
	  
The	  new	  auditing	  scheme	  is	  a	  further	  major	  milestone	  providing	  an	  independent	  measure	  to	  monitor	  data	  
manipulations.	   Another	   significant	   improvement	   to	   THEREDA	   is	   the	   establishment	   of	   benchmark	  
calculations	   –	   all	   being	   fully	   documented	   and	   accessible	   to	   the	   public.	   So	   one	   can	   monitor	   whether	  
changes	  in	  the	  database	  (or	  the	  export	  parsers)	  affect	  the	  results	  of	  speciation	  calculations.	  They	  may	  also	  
detect	  deviations	  between	  the	  various	  codes	  when	  fed	  with	  an	  identical	  data	  input.	  Test	  subjects	  are	  the	  
concentrations	  and	  pH	  values	  of	  well-­‐defined	  multiple-­‐salt	  points	  or	  solubility	  curves	  of	  solids.	  




The	  most	   recent	   advance	   is	   the	   integration	   of	   sorption	   data	   (parameterization	   of	   surface	   complexation	  
models)	  into	  the	  existing	  database	  management	  system.	  
	  
Eight	  issued	  technical	  papers	  (Downloads	  !	  Documentations)	  promot	  the	  transition	  of	  THEREDA	  into	  a	  
real	   information	   and	   discussion	   platform	   on	   issues	   concerning	   the	   database	   but	   also	   on	   geochemical	  
modeling	  at	  large.	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Abstract:	  A	  new	  classification	  scheme	  for	  the	  disposal	  of	  radioactive	  waste	  was	  developed	  for	  Ukraine	  within	  
the	   framework	  of	   the	  EC	  project	  U.04.01/08-­‐C.	  This	   scheme	   is	   based	  on	   final	   disposal	   options	   for	  different	  
waste	   classes	   and	   complies	   with	   IAEA	   recommendations.	   The	   implementation	   of	   the	   new	   classification	  
scheme	   leads	   to	  an	  essential	   reduction	   in	  disposal	  costs	  and	  allows	  solving	   the	  problem	  of	   ‘accident	  waste’	  
disposal	   using	   an	   economically	   acceptable	   method.	   The	   economic	   effect	   of	   the	   new	   classifications	  
implementation	  makes	  the	  use	  of	  both	  concepts	  of	  geological	  repositories	  appealing	  in	  Ukraine:	  repository	  at	  
the	  intermediate	  depth	  for	  disposal	  intermediate	  level	  waste,	  and	  the	  deep	  geological	  repository	  of	  borehole	  





In	   Ukraine,	   utilization	   of	   nuclear	   energy	   started	   in	   the	   1950s.	   Currently,	   half	   of	   the	   electricity	   in	   the	  
country	   is	   generated	   by	   nuclear	   power	   plants,	   which	   in	   turn	   generate	   radioactive	   waste	   (RW)	   with	  
different	   activities,	   isotope	   compositions	   and	   aggregate	   states.	   Ukraine	   inherited	   the	   approach	   to	  
radioactive	   waste	  management	   from	   the	   former	   Soviet	   Union.	   The	  main	   feature	   of	   this	   approach	   is	   to	  
minimize	   the	   costs	   of	  waste	   reprocessing	   and	  disposal,	  which	  means	   shifting	   the	  burden	  of	   radioactive	  
waste	  disposal	  to	  future	  generations.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  important	  tasks	  for	  improving	  the	  RW	  management	  





The	  purpose	  of	  this	  poster	  is	  to	  describe	  a	  new	  scheme	  of	  radioactive	  waste	  classification	  in	  Ukraine	  and	  
possible	   positive	   effects	   of	   its	   implementation.	   Special	   attention	   is	   paid	   to	   the	   influence	   of	   the	   new	  
classification	  scheme	  on	  the	  selection	  of	  concepts	  for	  geological	  disposal	  of	  waste.	  
	  
	  
2	  Ukrainian	  waste	  inventory	  
	  
Currently,	   15	   WWER	   reactors	   (2	   of	   WWER-­‐440	   and	   13	   of	   WWER-­‐1000)	   are	   being	   operated	   at	   four	  
Ukrainian	  NPPs.	   Four	  RBMK	  reactors	  were	  operated	  at	   the	  Chernobyl	  NPP;	  one	  of	   them	  was	  destroyed	  
during	  the	  accident	  in	  1986.	  The	  total	  capacity	  of	  the	  operating	  units	  is	  13.8	  GW.	  	  They	  generate	  approx.	  
90∙109	  kWh	  of	  electricity	  (up	  to	  50%)	  annually.	  It	  is	  intended	  to	  build	  new	  reactors	  and	  to	  extend	  the	  life	  
of	  existing	  ones.	  It	  is	  expected	  that	  more	  than	  15,000	  tHM	  of	  SNF	  and	  almost	  200,000	  m3	  of	  waste	  will	  be	  
generated	  by	  the	  existing	  NPPs.	  	  
	  




In	  the	  near	  future,	  vitrified	  high-­‐level	  radioactive	  waste	  from	  the	  reprocessing	  of	  spent	  nuclear	  fuel	  (SNF)	  
from	  WWER-­‐440	  reactors	  will	  arrive	  in	  Ukraine	  from	  the	  Russian	  Federation.	  	  
	  
Mining	   and	   processing	   of	   uranium	   ore	   is	   performed	   in	   Ukraine,	   and	   as	   a	   result	   approx.	   65	  million	  m3	  
waste	   from	   uranium	   ore	   processing	   has	   been	   accumulated.	   This	   waste	   is	   not	   declared	   as	   radioactive	  
waste.	  	  
	  
Six	  plants	  of	  the	  Ukrainian	  State	  Association	  “Radon”	  (UkrSA	  “Radon”)	  deal	  with	  the	  collection,	  transport,	  
storage	   and	   disposal	   of	   radioactive	   waste	   from	   Ukrainian	   enterprises	   and	   medical	   and	   research	  
institutions	  (including	  sealed	  radiation	  sources).	  There	  are	  two	  research	  reactors	  in	  Ukraine.	  
	  
The	  accident	  at	  the	  Chernobyl	  NPP	  contributed	  approx.	  3.3	  million	  m3	  to	  the	  total	  amount	  of	  waste.	  This	  
’accident	   waste’	   contains	   high	   concentrations	   of	   alpha-­‐emitting	   nuclides.	   The	   waste	   is	   located	   mostly	  
within	  the	  Chernobyl	  exclusion	  zone.	  	  
	  
	  
3	  Current	  waste	  classifications	  
	  
Depending	  on	  the	  classification	  aim,	  all	  waste	  is	  divided	  into	  the	  units:	  types,	  groups,	  categories	  and	  kinds	  
(OSPU-­‐2005,	  NRBU-­‐97).	  The	  classification	  criteria	  are:	  
	  
-­‐ possibility	  of	  disposal	  for	  types:	  short-­‐	  and	  long-­‐lived	  waste	  (SL	  and	  LL)	  
-­‐ specific	   activity	   or	   dose	   for	   categories:	   low-­‐level,	   intermediate-­‐level	   and	   high-­‐level	   waste	   (LLW,	  
ILW	  and	  HLW)	  
-­‐ the	  aggregate	  state	  for	  kinds:	  solid	  and	  liquid	  waste.	  
	  
The	   current	  Ukrainian	  waste	   classification	   focuses	  mainly	  on	  ensuring	   radiation	   safety	   for	  workers	  and	  
the	  population	  during	  waste	  management	   (collection,	   sorting,	   transport	   and	   storage)	  at	   the	  operational	  
phase	  of	  nuclear	   facilities.	  The	  current	  classification	   is	  not	  suited	  for	  the	  disposal	  of	  all	   types	  of	  existing	  
waste.	  It	  allows	  the	  use	  of	  only	  two	  types	  of	  repositories:	  near-­‐surface	  repositories	  for	  short-­‐lived	  waste	  
and	  deep	  geological	  repositories	  (DGR)	  for	  long-­‐lived	  waste.	  According	  to	  the	  current	  classification,	  most	  
of	  the	  ‘accident	  waste’	  is	  to	  be	  disposed	  of	  in	  a	  DGR.	  
	  
	  
4	  New	  classification	  scheme	  
	  
A	   new	   classification	   scheme	   (NCS)	   for	   the	   disposal	   of	   radioactive	   waste	   was	   developed	   in	   2011-­‐2012	  
within	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  EC	  project	  U.04.01/08-­‐C	  “Improvement	  of	  the	  Radwaste	  Classification	  System	  
in	   Ukraine”.	   The	   project	   was	   carried	   out	   by	   a	   consortium	   that	   consisted	   of	   DBE	   TECHNOLOGY	   GmbH	  
(Germany,	   consortium	   leader),	   SKB	   International	  AB	   (Sweden),	  ANDRA	   (France),	  COVRA	   (Netherlands),	  
and	  ENRESA	  (Spain).	  The	  consortium	  was	  assisted	  by	  REC	  (Ukraine).	  
	  
The	  new	  classification	  scheme	  (Table	  1)	  is	  based	  on	  final	  disposal	  options	  for	  different	  waste	  classes	  and	  








Table	  1.	  Description	  of	  new	  classification	  scheme	  proposed	  for	  Ukraine	  
Class	   Description	   Disposal	  option	  
Exempt	  waste	  (EW)	   Exists	  in	  Ukraine	  
Exempt	  waste	  does	  not	  need	  to	  
be	  managed	  as	  radioactive	  waste	  
NORM	  waste	  
Not	  determined	  in	  Ukraine.	  
Contains	  only	  natural	  nuclides.	  It	  
is	  not	  considered	  as	  radioactive	  
waste.	  	  
Disposal	  outside	  the	  nuclear	  
legislation	  (except	  for	  separate	  
streams	  of	  TE-­‐NORM)	  	  
Very	  Low	  Level	  Waste	  (VLLW)	  
Not	  determined	  in	  Ukraine.	  
There	  are	  large	  volumes	  of	  waste	  
in	  Ukraine	  that	  can	  be	  classified	  
as	  VLLW.	  
Landfill	  repositories	  	  
Low	  Level	  Waste	  (LLW)	  




Intermediate	  Level	  Waste	  
(ILW)	  
This	  corresponds	  to	  existing	  
long-­‐lived	  waste	  
Repository	  at	  intermediate	  depth	  
,	  or	  deep	  geological	  repository	  	  
High	  Level	  Waste	  (HLW)	  
This	  corresponds	  to	  existing	  
heat-­‐generating	  HLW	  
Deep	  geological	  repository	  
(DGR)	  
Disused	  Sealed	  Radiation	  
Sources	  (DSRS)	  
Not	  determined	  in	  Ukraine.	  Due	  
to	  high	  risks	  associated	  with	  
DSRS,	  a	  special	  class	  was	  created.	  
Separate	  DSRS	  may	  be	  disposed	  
as	  LLW	  or	  ILW	  	  
	  
Despite	  the	  large	  amounts	  of	  ‘accident	  waste’,	  it	  is	  not	  appropriate	  to	  define	  a	  special	  class	  of	  ‘Chernobyl	  
waste’.	   Sorting	   such	  waste	   into	   classes	   should	  be	  determined	  only	  by	   the	  waste	  parameters,	  not	  by	   the	  
origin.	   ‘Chernobyl	   waste’	   contains	   higher	   amounts	   of	   long-­‐lived	   nuclides	   than	   ‘ordinary’	   waste.	   This	  
constitutes	  the	  main	  problem	  associated	  with	  its	  disposal.	  	  
	  
The	  problem	  can	  be	  solved	  by	  disposing	  of	  the	  ‘Chernobyl	  waste’	  in	  the	  Chernobyl	  Exclusion	  Zone	  (CEZ)	  
applying	   less	   restrictive	  Waste	  Acceptance	  Criteria	   (WAC).	   Special,	   less	   restrictive	  WAC	   for	   repositories	  
for	  VLLW	  and	  LLW	  of	  Chernobyl	  origin,	  which	  are	  located	  in	  the	  CEZ,	  are	  based	  on	  the	  limited	  access	  to	  
the	   CEZ.	   These	   general	   WAC	   are	   based	   on	   estimates	   of	   the	   radiation	   exposure	   to	   critical	   groups	   of	  




5	  The	  economic	  effects	  of	  NCS	  
	  
The	  NCS	  provides	  significant	  savings	  by	  allocating	  the	  waste	  to	  the	  optimal	  repository	  types.	  To	  use	  these	  
advantages,	   some	   sorting	   and	   characterization	   activities	   should	   be	   carried	   out	   immediately	   after	  waste	  
generation.	  This	  may	  temporarily	  entail	  additional	  costs.	  However,	   it	   is	  much	  easier	  and	  cheaper	  to	  sort	  
and	   characterize	   a	   particular	   waste	   immediately	   after	   its	   generation	   than	   to	   carry	   out	   these	   tasks	   on	  
mixed	  waste	  located	  in	  a	  common	  storage	  facility	  much	  later.	  These	  activities	  and	  associated	  costs	  are	  not	  
a	   consequence	   of	   implementing	   the	   proposed	   new	   classification	   scheme.	   They	   are	   inevitable	   and	  
predetermined	   by	   the	   existing	   requirements	   of	   the	   Ukrainian	   legislation	   and	   standards.	   Thus,	   no	  
additional	  or	  excess	  expenses	  are	  expected	  as	  a	  result	  of	  introducing	  the	  NCS.	  
	  
	  




The	  implementation	  of	  the	  NCS,	  deciding	  to	  dispose	  of	  ‘accident	  waste’	  as	  VLLW	  or	  LLW	  in	  the	  CEZ,	  using	  
three	  repository	  types	  (landfill,	  near-­‐surface	  and	  deep	  geological)	  for	  RW	  disposal,	  and	  co-­‐disposal	  of	  ILW	  
and	  HLW	  in	  a	  deep	  geological	  repository	  will	  allow	  a	  tenfold	  decrease	  in	  total	  disposal	  costs.	   If	   ILW	  and	  
HLW	  are	  disposed	  of	  separately	  in	  different	  repositories,	  the	  costs	  will	  decrease	  by	  40	  times	  (DBE,	  2012).	  	  
	  
	  
6	  Choice	  of	  geological	  repository	  concept	  and	  potential	  sites	  
	  
The	  borehole	  concept	  of	  DGR	  has	  a	  number	  of	  advantages:	  not	  only	  the	  lower	  construction	  costs,	  but	  also	  
the	   shorter	   construction	   time	   and	   lower	   risks	   of	   human	   intrusion,	   etc..	   However,	   its	   inherent	  
shortcomings	  (limited	  canister	  dimensions)	  will	  not	  allow	  the	  disposal	  of	  the	  complete	  inventory	  of	  ILW	  
and	   HLW	   (Shestopalov	   et	   al.,	   2005).	   This	   can	   be	   an	   additional	   reason	   for	   developing	   two	   geological	  
repositories	  in	  Ukraine:	  
	  
• Borehole	  DGR	  for	  disposal	  of	  vitrified	  HLW	  and	  SNF	  
• Mined	  geological	  repository	  at	  intermediate	  depth	  for	  ILW	  disposal.	  
	  
In	   Ukraine,	   all	   types	   of	   prospective	   geological	   formations	   for	   DGR	   construction	   are	   present,	   namely:	  
crystalline	  rocks	  of	  the	  Ukrainian	  Shield,	  clays	  of	  Ciscarpathians	  and	  CEZ,	  as	  well	  as	  salts	  of	  Donbass	  and	  
Transcarpathians.	   For	   sociopolitical	   reasons	   (to	   avoid	   population	   protests),	   the	   stakeholders	   give	  
preference	   to	   DGR	   construction	   in	   crystalline	   rocks	   within	   the	   uninhabited	   CEZ	   and	   the	   surrounding	  
areas.	  The	  location	  of	  promising	  areas	  within	  CEZ	  is	  shown	  on	  the	  Fig.1.	  
	  
	  
Fig.1.	  Sites	  for	  DGR	  within	  or	  close	  to	  the	  Chernobyl	  Exclusion	  Zone:	  1	  –	  Novosilky,	  2	  –	  Veresnia,	  3	  –	  Zhovtneva	  
	  
In	  all	  most	  promising	  areas,	  the	  typical	  is	  hornblend-­‐biotite,	  rapakivi-­‐like	  granite	  dated	  at	  1,75	  Ga.	  These	  
rocks	   are	   covered	   by	   Jurassic-­‐Quarternary	   sediments	   (clays,	   marls,	   aleurites,	   sandstone,	   sands)	   with	   a	  
thickness	  between	  180	  and	  350	  m	  (see	  Fig.2).	  	  
	  





Fig.2.	  Geological	  cross-­‐section	  through	  the	  central	  part	  of	  CEZ	  along	  the	  line	  A-­‐B	  
	  
The	  geological	  conditions	  at	  the	  Ukrainian	  sites	  are	  very	  similar	  to	  those	  in	  Sweden	  and	  Finland	  regarding	  
rock	  types,	  age	  and	  geological	  history,	  tectonics,	  hydraulic	  and	  mechanical	  properties,	  seismicity,	  etc..	  The	  
difference	   at	   the	   Ukrainian	   sites	   is	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   thick	   sedimentary	   layer	   and	   a	   much	   lower	   total	  
salinity	  of	  the	  groundwater.	  
	  
The	  results	  of	  preliminary	  safety	  assessments	  (Shestopalov	  et	  al.,	  2006,	  IAEA,	  2013)	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  
crystalline	  rocks	  of	  the	  investigated	  areas	  are	  suitable	  for	  waste	  disposal	  and	  emphasize	  the	  urgent	  need	  
for	  detailed	  field	  investigations	  (including	  drilling)	  in	  promising	  areas.	  
	  
The	  prospects	  of	  using	  various	  DGR	  concepts	  differ	  among	  sites:	  
• All	  sites,	  (1),	  (2),	  (3),	  are	  suitable	  for	  the	  borehole	  concept	  of	  DGR	  
• The	  Zhovtneva	  (3)	  and	  Veresnia	  (2)	  sites	  are	  more	  suitable	  for	  mined	  DGR	  construction	  





• The	  implementation	  of	   the	  new	  classification	  scheme	  leads	  to	  an	  essential	  reduction	   in	  disposal	  
costs.	  	  
• Implementation	  of	   the	  new	  classification	  scheme	  allows	  solving	   the	  problem	  of	   ‘accident	  waste’	  
disposal	  using	  an	  economically	  acceptable	  method.	  	  
• Economic	  effects	  and	  various	  technical	  considerations	  make	  the	  use	  of	  both	  geological	  repository	  
concepts	   appealing	   for	   Ukraine:	   mined	   repository	   at	   intermediate	   depth	   for	   ILW	   disposal	   and	  
deep	  geological	  repository	  of	  the	  borehole	  type	  for	  the	  disposal	  of	  SNF	  and	  vitrified	  HLW.	  
• The	   Chernobyl	   Exclusion	   Zone	   and	   adjacent	   areas	   have	   good	   prospects	   for	   siting	   geological	  
repositories	  of	  both	  types	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Abstract:	  The	  capability	  of	  retrieving	  radioactive	  waste	  emplaced	  in	  deep	  geological	  formations	  is	  nowadays	  
in	   discussion	   in	   many	   countries.	   Based	   on	   the	   storage	   of	   high-­‐level	   radioactive	   waste	   (HAW)	   in	   deep	  
geological	   repositories	   there	   is	   a	   number	   of	   possible	   scenarios	   for	   their	   retrieval.	   Measurements	   for	   an	  
improved	  retrieving	  capability	  may	  impact	  on	  the	  geotechnical	  and	  geological	  barriers,	  e.g.	  keeping	  open	  the	  
access	  drifts	  for	  a	  long	  period	  of	  time	  can	  result	  in	  a	  bigger	  evacuation	  damage	  zone	  (EDZ)	  in	  the	  host	  rock	  
which	  implies	  potential	  flow	  paths	  for	  ground	  water.	  Nevertheless,	  to	  limit	  the	  possible	  scenarios	  associated	  
to	   the	   retrieval	   implementation,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   take	   in	   consideration	  which	   criteria	  will	   be	   used	   for	   an	  
efficient	   monitoring	   program,	   while	   clearly	   determining	   the	   performance	   reliability	   of	   the	   geotechnical	  
barriers.	   In	   addition,	   the	   integrity	   of	   the	   host	   rock	  as	   geological	   barrier	   has	   to	   be	   verified.	   Therefore,	   it	   is	  
important	  to	  evaluate	  different	  design	  solutions	  and	  the	  most	  appropriate	  measurement	  methods	  to	  improve	  
the	   retrievability	   process	   of	  wastes	   from	   a	   geological	   repository.	   A	   short	   presentation	   of	   the	   host	   rocks	   is	  
given	  is	  this	  paper.	  
	  
	  
1.	  Life-­‐Cycle	  Stages	  of	  a	  Geological	  Repository	  for	  High-­‐Level	  Radioactive	  
Waste	  (HAW)	  with	  Retrievability	  
	  
A	   geological	   repository	   involves	   three	  main	  phases:	  pre-­‐operational	  phase,	   operational	  phase	  and	  post-­‐
operational	  phase	  (Figure	  1).	  	  
	  
	  
Fig.	  1.	  Definitions	  of	  reversibility,	  retrievability	  and	  recoverability	  
	  
In	  the	  pre-­‐operational	  phase	  the	  siting	  decision	  and	  the	  licensing	  procedure	  take	  place.	  In	  the	  operational	  
phase	   the	  waste	   is	   emplaced	   and	   the	   emplacement	   drifts	  will	   be	   backfilled.	   The	   duration	   of	   this	   phase	  
depends	   of	   the	   amount	   of	   waste	   and	   the	   repository’s	   design.	   In	   this	   phase	   the	   repository	   will	   be	  
maintained	  open	  until	  demand	  of	  the	  disposal	  radioactive	  waste	  exists.	  
	  




Retrievability	  is	  the	  possibility	  to	  recover	  the	  radioactive	  waste	  in	  a	  planned	  manner.	  The	  retrieval	  of	  the	  
radioactive	   waste	   can	   take	   place	   while	   monitoring.	   Recoverability	   is	   the	   possibility	   to	   recover	   the	  
radioactive	  waste	   at	   a	   late	   stage	   after	   disposal.	   The	   integrity	   of	   the	  waste	   containers	   is	   not	   necessarily	  
ensured.	  Near-­‐field	  monitoring	  is	  provided	  until	  the	  monitoring	  drifts	  are	  closed	  in	  the	  repository	  closure.	  
	  
The	  repository	  closure	  occurs	  in	  the	  post-­‐operational	  phase.	  The	  waste	  remains	  sealed	  as	  far	  as	  a	  decision	  
of	   recovery	   takes	  place.	  Even	   though	   the	  near-­‐field	  monitoring	   is	  no	   longer	   feasible,	   further	  monitoring	  
strategies	  and	  the	  preserve	  of	  records	  are	  highly	  recommended.	  
	  
Within	  all	  phases	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  overturn	  decisions	  –	  reversibility	  is	  implied.	  
	  
	  
2.	  Generic	  Models	  of	  Deep	  Geological	  Disposal	  
	  
Measurements	   for	   an	   improved	   retrieving	   capability	   may	   impact	   on	   the	   geotechnical	   and	   geological	  
barriers,	   e.g.	   keeping	   open	   the	   access	   drifts	   for	   a	   long	   period	   of	   time	   can	   result	   in	   a	   bigger	   evacuation	  
damage	  zone	  (EDZ)	  in	  the	  host	  rock.	  This	  implies	  potential	  flow	  paths	  for	  ground	  water.	  To	  evaluate	  the	  
impact	  of	  an	   improved	  retrievability	  a	  generic	  deep	  geological	   repository	  model	  was	  created	  (Figures	  2	  
and	  3).	  	  
	  
	  
Fig.	  2.	  Generic	  deep	  geological	  repository	  
	  
This	  model	  could	  be	  applied	  for	  all	  types	  of	  host	  rock.	  The	  waste	  will	  be	  emplaced	  in	  drifts,	  for	  monitoring	  
purposes	  a	  further	  monitoring	  drift	  is	  implemented	  (Figure	  3).	  
	  





Fig.	  3.	  Cross-­‐section	  through	  the	  emplacement	  and	  the	  monitoring	  drifts	  
	  
This	   design	   is	   applied	   to	   five	   host	   rocks	   types,	   flat	   and	   steep-­‐bedded	   rock	   salt,	   clay,	   claystone	   and	  
crystalline	   rock.	   Their	   characteristic	   hydrological	   and	   mechanical	   behavior	   was	   used	   to	   compare	   the	  
performance	  of	   these	  host	  rocks	   in	  a	  repository	  with	   implemented	  retrievability.	  The	   favorable	   features	  
for	  each	  host	  rock	  and	  their	  response	  on	  the	  access	  drifts	  remaining	  open	  were	  compared	  and	  evaluated.	  
	  
	  
3.	  Potential	  Host	  rocks	  
	  
3.1	  Rock	  Salt	  
	  
The	  mechanical	  behavior	  of	   flat	  and	  steep-­‐bedded	  rock	  salt	   is	  quite	  similar.	  Rock	  salt	   in	  natural	  storage	  
conditions	  has	  a	  very	   low	  permeability	  and	  the	  construction-­‐induced	  damage	  is	  reduced	  by	  self-­‐healing.	  
Rock	  salt	  is	  capable	  to	  creep;	  therefore	  the	  stress	  deviator	  has	  to	  be	  reduced.	  If	  not,	  the	  EDZ	  will	  increase	  
and	  the	  geological	  barrier	  will	  be	  degraded.	  The	  cavities	  in	  salt	  rock	  do	  not	  need	  a	  pit	  supporting	  system.	  
But	  if	  long-­‐term	  stability	  is	  required,	  the	  support	  system	  has	  to	  bear	  the	  total	  overburden	  pressure.	  Drifts	  
in	  rock	  salt	  will	  be	  backfilled	  with	  crushed	  salt.	  
	  
	  
Fig.	  4.	  Flat-­‐bedded	  rock	  salt,	  salt	  mine	  Bernburg.	  esco,	  2014	  
	  






Clay	   has	   a	   very	   low	   self-­‐support	   therefore	   a	   heavy	   support	   system	   is	   required	   particularly	   when	   the	  
disposal	  vaults	  and	  access	  tunnels	  are	  keeping	  open	  for	  a	  long	  period	  of	  time.	  The	  support	  system	  has	  to	  
bear	   the	   total	   overburden	  pressure.	   The	  material	   has	   a	   slightly	   anisotropic	   behavior.	  Due	   to	   stagnating	  
pore-­‐water	   the	   sediment	   is	   sensitive	   against	   desiccation	   and	   chemical	   changes.	   Drifts	   in	   Clay	   will	   be	  
backfilled	  and	  sealed	  with	  bentonite.	  
	  
	  




Claystone,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  its	  lithified	  structure,	  has	  a	  low	  self-­‐support	  too.	  However	  their	  required	  pit	  support	  
system	  is	  less	  extent	  as	  in	  clay.	  As	  a	  rock	  it	  has	  a	  latent	  joint	  network	  which	  can	  result	  in	  flow	  paths	  for	  ground	  
water.	   The	   rock	   has	   a	   strong	   anisotropic	   behavior.	   Due	   to	   its	   geological	   history	   claystones	   are	   less	  
sensitive	  against	  desiccation	  and	  chemical	  changes	  compared	  to	  clays.	  Drifts	  in	  claystone	  will	  be	  backfilled	  
and	  sealed	  with	  bentonite.	  
	  
	  
Fig.	  6.	  Shale	  of	  the	  Fladentonstein	  series,	  Konrad	  mine.	  Stahlmann	  et	  al.,	  2014	  
	  
3.4	  Crystalline	  Rocks	  
	  
Crystalline	  Rocks	  such	  as	  granite	  or	  gneiss	  are	  high	  solidity	  and	  provide	  cavity	  stability	  over	  a	  long	  period	  
of	   time.	   Nevertheless	   it	   is	   strongly	   jointed	   because	   of	   cooling	   in	   its	   geological	   history.	   These	  




discontinuities	   result	   in	   a	   groundwater	   flow,	   therefore	   the	   rock	   has	   no	   retention	   capability	   for	   ground	  
water.	   The	   rock	   has	   not	   the	   features	   of	   a	   geological	   barrier	   and	   engineered	   barriers	   (canisters	   and	  
bentonite)	  are	  needed	  for	  long-­‐term	  security.	  
	  
	  





Figure	  8	  shows	  a	  qualitative	  comparison	  of	  the	  five	  host	  rocks.	  Rock	  salt	  has	  a	  good	  self-­‐support	  if	  short-­‐
term	  stability	  is	  required.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  its	  viscoplastic	  behavior,	  it	  needs	  a	  heavy	  support	  system	  if	  long-­‐
term	   stability	   is	   required.	   Clay	   has	   a	   low	   self-­‐support	   cavity	   stability	   and	   support	   systems	   are	   always	  
needed.	  Claystone	  has	  a	  better	   self-­‐support	  unlike	  clay	  but	   lower	  plasticity;	   consequently	   its	  EDZ’s	   self-­‐
healing	  capability	   is	  not	  as	  good	  as	   in	  clay.	  Due	  to	   its	  great	  self-­‐support	  crystalline	  rocks	  cavities	  can	  be	  
kept	  open	  over	  a	  long	  period	  of	  time.	  However	  they	  have	  a	  higher	  permeability	  because	  of	  their	  fractures.	  
	  
Furthermore,	  the	  long-­‐term	  safety	  of	  these	  five	  above	  mentioned	  host	  rocks	  were	  compared	  during	  an	  ice	  
age.	  To	  prevent	  negative	  impacts	  in	  the	  repository	  system	  it	  is	  recommended	  a	  minimum	  depth	  of	  600	  m	  
to	  all	  models.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  a	  minimum	  depth	  of	  800	  m	  is	  recommended	  for	  steep-­‐bedded	  rock	  salt	  
owing	  to	  its	  potential	  uprising;	  400	  m	  for	  clay	  as	  a	  result	  of	  its	  low	  self-­‐support.	  
	  
	  
Fig.	  8.	  Qualitative	  comparison	  of	  the	  five	  host	  rocks	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  AND	  PARTICIPATION	  	  
	  
Multi-­‐Level	  Governance-­‐Perspective	  on	  Management	  of	  Nuclear	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  Disposal.	  A	  Comparative	  Analysis	  
	  
ACHIM	  BRUNNENGRÄBER,	  DANIEL	  HÄFNER	  (GERMANY)	  
 
The	  primary	  aim	  of	  the	  project	  is	  to	  conduct	  a	  detailed	  social	  and	  political	  analysis	  of	  the	  preconditions	  for	  
the	   development	   of	   an	   acceptable	   strategy	   for	   nuclear	   waste	   disposal	   in	   Germany.	   This	   includes	   the	  
identification	  of	  stakeholders	  and	  their	   interests,	  responsibilities,	  value	  systems,	  views	  and	  expectations	  
as	   well	   as	   paths	   for	   a	   constructive	   approach	   to	   dialogue	   and	   problem-­‐solving.	   A	   focus	   of	   the	   research	  
project	  will	  be	  an	   international	  comparative	  multi-­‐level	  governance	  analysis	  of	  acceptance	  patterns	  and	  
steering	  mechanisms	  for	  conflict	  resolution.	  
	   	  




Opinions	  and	  Social	  Values	  Related	  to	  the	  Disposal	  of	  Nuclear	  
Waste	  in	  Switzerland	  
	  
ROMAN	  SEIDL1,	  ANNALISA	  STEFANELLI1	  
1	  ETH	  Zurich,	  Institute	  for	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  Switzerland	  
	  
Discourse	  in	  media	  and	  politics	  about	  nuclear	  waste	  and	  its	  disposal	  in	  so-­‐called	  “Endlager”	  (Germany)	  or	  
“Tiefenlager”	  (geological	  deep	  ground	  repositories;	  Switzerland)	  often	  consider	  positions	  and	  arguments	  
of	  diverse	   interest	  groups.	  Mostly	  polarized	  discussions	  are	   in	   the	   focus.	  However,	  we	   find	  a	   temporally	  
consistent	  pattern	  of	  four	  opinion	  clusters	  in	  German	  speaking	  communities	  in	  Switzerland:	  one	  cluster	  in	  
favor	   of	   a	   repository	   (perceiving	   mostly	   benefits)	   and	   one	   cluster	   with	   high-­‐risk	   ratings	   opposing	   a	  
repository;	  a	   third	  cluster	  of	  moderate	  opposition	   is	  ambivalent	  regarding	  risks	  and	  benefits,	  whereas	  a	  
fourth	  cluster	  seems	  indifferent.	  	  
	  
Moreover,	   in	   qualitative	   interviews	  we	   found	   high	   importance	   of	   the	   development	   of	   the	   participatory	  
process.	   Participants	   were	   sensitive	   to	   value	   related	   issues	   such	   as	   absence	   of	   political	   influence,	  
transparency,	  comprehensive	  and	  independent	  information.	  Important	  to	  note	  is	  the	  problem	  that	  some	  of	  
these	   values	   can	   be	   used	   as	   pro-­‐	   or	   con-­‐argument	   regarding	   a	   repository	   by	   different	   individuals.	   For	  
instance,	   all	   agree	   that	   safety	   is	   essential	   –	   but	   both	   conclusions,	   to	   be	   for	   or	   against	   a	   repository,	   are	  
possible.	  
	  
A	   recent	   study	   focused	   on	   the	   arguments,	   underlying	   people’s	   opinions.	   The	   salient	   arguments	   that	  
participants	   report	   are	   related	   to	   the	   sense	   of	   responsibility	   for	   the	   country	   to	   store	   safely	   the	  nuclear	  
waste	  and	  to	  avoid	  its	  export.	  Moreover,	  people	  recognize	  the	  necessity	  of	  a	  safe	  solution	  for	  the	  storage	  in	  
order	   to	  preserve	   future	  generations	   from	  the	  risks	  of	  nuclear	  waste.	  These	  arguments	  may	  be	  relevant	  
for	  the	  fact	  that	  participants,	  on	  average,	  have	  a	  favorable	  position	  regarding	  a	  deep	  ground	  repository	  in	  
Switzerland.	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Independent	  Monitoring	  of	  a	  Release	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The	   Waste	   Isolation	   Pilot	   Plant	   (WIPP)	   is	   a	   transuranic	   (TRU)	   waste	   repository	   operated	   by	   the	   U.S.	  
Department	  of	  Energy	  (DOE).	  The	  repository	  is	  emplacing	  defense-­‐related	  transuranic	  (TRU)	  wastes	  into	  
a	   bedded	   salt	   formation	   approximately	   655	  m	   (2150	   ft.)	   below	   the	   surface	   of	   the	   Earth.	   Located	   near	  
Carlsbad,	  New	  Mexico,	  an	  area	  with	   less	   than	  30,000	  people,	   the	  WIPP	  facility	   is	   licensed	  to	  accept	  TRU	  
waste	  with	  activity	  concentrations	  of	  alpha-­‐emitting	  isotopes	  >3700	  Bq/m3	  (>	  100	  nCi/g)	  and	  half-­‐life	  >20	  
years.	   The	   upper	  waste	   acceptance	   limit	   is	   0.85	   TBq/liter	   (<23	   Ci/liter)	   of	   total	   activity)	   and	   10	   Sv/hr	  
dose	  rate	  on	  contact.	  The	  repository,	  which	  opened	  in	  March	  1999	  will	  eventually	  contain	  the	  equivalent	  
of	  ~176,000	  m3	  of	  TRU	  waste.	  The	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  waste	  disposed	  in	  the	  WIPP	  repository	  is	  “contact-­‐
handled”	  waste,	  meaning	  it	  has	  a	  surface	  dose	  rate	  less	  than	  2	  mSv	  per	  hour.	  Local	  acceptance	  of	  WIPP	  is	  
in	  part	  due	  to	  an	  independent	  environmental	  monitoring	  program	  that	  began	  before	  and	  continues	  after	  
WIPP	   began	   receiving	   nuclear	  waste.	   This	   independent	  monitoring	   is	   being	   conducted	   by	   the	   Carlsbad	  
Environmental	   Monitoring	   and	   Research	   Center	   (CEMRC),	   which	   is	   associated	   with	   New	   Mexico	   State	  
University.	  CEMRC	  is	   funded	  by	  DOE	  through	  a	  grant	  process	  that	  respects	   its	   independence	  in	  carrying	  
out	  and	  reporting	  the	  results	  of	  environmental	  monitoring	  at	  and	  near	  the	  WIPP	  site.	  The	  primary	  focus	  of	  
CEMRC	  monitoring	   is	   on	   airborne	   radioactive	  particulate;	   however	  other	  pathways	   are	   also	  monitored.	  
Pre-­‐disposal	   baseline	   data	   of	   various	   anthropogenic	   radionuclides	   present	   in	   the	  WIPP	   environment	   is	  
essential	   for	   the	   proper	   evaluation	   of	   the	   WIPP’s	   integrity.	   These	   data	   are	   compared	   against	   disposal	  
phase	   data	   to	   assess	   whether	   or	   not	   there	   is	   any	   radiological	   impact	   from	   the	   presence	   of	   WIPP	   on	  
workers	  and	  on	  the	  regional	  public.	  The	  program	  has	  capabilities	  to	  detect	  radionuclides	  rapidly	  in	  case	  of	  
accidental	  releases	   from	  the	  repository	  or	  the	  site	  during	  operations.	  For	  the	   first	   time	   in	  almost	   fifteen	  
years	  of	  operation,	  there	  was	  an	  airborne	  radiation	  release	  from	  	  WIPP.	  An	  independent	  study	  released	  by	  
CEMRC	  confirmed	  detection	  of	  trace	  amounts	  of	  241Am	  and	  239+240Pu	  in	  the	  air	  samples	  collected	  half	  a	  mile	  
from	  the	  WIPP	  site.	  The	  cause	  of	  the	  release	  is	  currently	  under	  active	  investigation.	  It	  is	  speculated	  that	  it	  
may	  have	  involved	  the	  collapse	  of	  a	  section	  of	  roof	  in	  the	  active	  waste	  emplacement	  area,	  damaging	  one	  or	  
more	  drums	  containing	  a	  type	  of	  waste	  readily	  dispersed	  into	  the	  ventilation	  air.	  This	  paper	  presents	  and	  
makes	  an	  evaluation	  of	  the	  data	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  this	  incident.	  These	  results	  were	  reported	  to	  the	  public	  by	  
CEMRC	  as	  they	  were	  obtained	  through	  analyses.	  At	  this	  point	  in	  time	  the	  concentrations	  of	  radionuclides	  
in	  air	  and	  other	  samples	  have	  been	  very	  small	  and	  well	  below	  any	  level	  of	  public-­‐health	  or	  environmental	  
concern.	  CEMRC’s	   independence	  and	   its	  extensive	  monitoring	  program	  and	  constant	  public	  engagement	  
provide	  confidence	  to	  the	  local	  public.	  CEMRC’s	  independent	  monitoring	  program	  is	  a	  potential	  model	  for	  
nuclear	  facilities,	  and	  especially	  nuclear	  waste	  repositories,	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  world.	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Abstract:	   Since	  many	  decades,	  pressure	  grouting	   is	  an	  effective	   technique	  of	  civil	  engineering	   for	   sealing	  and	  
stabilization	   purposes.	   Due	   to	   the	   potential	   contamination	   of	   fluids,	   grouting	   is	   of	   particular	   importance	   in	  
repositories	   of	   radioactive	   waste.	   Traditional	   grouts	   for	   the	   sealing	   of	   fine	   fractures	   are	   sodium	   silicate	   so-­‐
lutions.	   Laboratory	  and	   field	   investigations	  prove	   that	   the	  particle-­‐free	   solutions	   can	  be	  used	   to	  permanently	  
seal	  excavation	  damaged	  zones	  (EDZ)	  in	  salt	  formations,	  because	  the	  solid	  reaction	  products	  are	  inert	  or	  almost	  
insoluble.	   EDZ	   permeabilities	   of	   10–17	  m²	   can	   be	   achieved	   and	  were	   determined	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   injection	  
pressures	  and	  flow	  rates.	  High	  grouting	  pressures	  were	  realized	  as	  local	  test	  loadings.	  Laboratory	  tests	  show	  the	  
fixation	  of	  Co2+,	  Ni2+,	  Sr2+,	  Ba2+,	   [UO2]






The	   excavation	   of	   underground	   openings	   results	   in	   inhomogeneous	   stress	   states	   and	   the	   formation	   of	  
fractures,	  if	  the	  stresses	  exceed	  the	  dilatancy	  boundary	  of	  the	  rocks.	  The	  fractures	  may	  form	  a	  network	  of	  
flow	  paths.	  Consequently,	   the	   construction	  of	   seals	   requires	   the	  use	  of	   technical	  methods	   to	   reduce	   the	  
permeability	  of	   the	  excavation	  damaged	  zones	   (EDZ).	  Providing	   that	   the	  possibility	  of	   a	  profiling	  of	   the	  
drift	   or	   shaft	   contour	   is	   limited	  and	  a	   considerable	   low	  permeability	  of	   the	  EDZ	   is	   required,	   a	  pressure	  
grouting	  of	  the	  fractures	  using	  particle-­‐free	  grouts	  is	  essential.	  A	  classical	  grout	  used	  in	  civil	  engineering	  
for	  sealing	  and	  stabilization	  purposes	  are	  sodium	  silicate	  solutions	  (e.g.	  Karol	  2003,	  Zhilkani	  2010).	  
	  
Sodium	  oxide	  (Na2O)	  can	  maintain	  the	  pH	  level	  sufficiently	  high	  that	  silicate	  (SiO2)	  is	  soluble	  in	  water.	  The	  
solutions,	   commercially	   called	   water	   or	   liquid	   glass,	   are	   available	   in	   different	   densities	   that	   are	  
characterized	   by	   their	   SiO2:Na2O	   ratios	   and	   water	   contents.	   In	   dependence	   of	   the	   composition,	   the	  
viscosity	   of	   sodium	   silicate	   solutions	   varies	   (e.g.	   Urbain	   et	   al.	   1982,	   Yang	   et	   al.	   2008).	   In	   general,	   the	  
consistency	   of	   most	   grouts	   is	   comparable	   to	   concentrated	   magnesium	   chloride	   solutions.	   Classical	  
grouting	  techniques	  use	  reactants	  to	  initialize	  a	  gelation	  or	  polymerization	  of	  the	  silica.	  The	  reactants	  can	  
be	  classified	   in	   three	  generic	  groups:	   inorganic	  salts,	  organic/aliphatic	  esters	  or	  amides,	  and	  stabilizers,	  
such	  as	  cement.	  	  
	  
Due	  to	  the	  successful	  application	  in	  numerous	  projects,	   the	  availability	  of	  high-­‐quality	  products,	  and	  the	  
reaction	  with	  saline	  solutions	  and	  the	  salts	  of	  the	  host	  rock,	  investigations	  were	  carried	  out	  with	  respect	  
to	  the	  sealing	  of	  EDZ	  in	  evaporite	  rocks.	  Laboratory	  investigations	  focused	  on	  the	  reactions	  with	  salts	  and	  
their	  kinetics,	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  the	  grout	  selection	  and	  the	  specification	  of	  injection	  parameters.	  In	  addition,	  
the	   long-­‐term	  stability	  of	   the	   reaction	  products	  was	   investigated.	  The	  works	   finalized	   in	  pressure	  grout	  
tests	  in	  a	  salt	  mine.	  




2	  Basics	  of	  the	  gelation	  and	  hardening	  of	  sodium	  silicate	  solutions	  
	  
Due	  to	  the	  property	  of	  silica	  species	  to	  form	  silanol	  (Si-­‐OH)	  and	  siloxane	  groups	  (Si-­‐O-­‐Si),	  sodium	  silicate	  
solutions	   contain	   varying	   proportions	   of	   monomeric,	   oligomeric	   linear,	   cyclic	   or	   complex	   polysilicate	  
anions.	  The	  degree	  of	  polymerization	  of	   the	  silicate	  anions	  rises	  with	   increasing	  concentration	  (density)	  
and	   increasing	   SiO2/Na2O	   ratio	   of	   the	   solution.	   In	   addition,	   the	   pH-­‐value	   is	   influencing	   the	  
polymerization/depolymerization	   equilibrium.	   According	   to	   their	   chemical	   composition	   (25–34	   wt.-­‐%	  
SiO2)	  and	  pH-­‐value	  (>	  11)	  most	  concentrated	  commercial	  solutions	  are	  dominated	  by	  ring	  structures	  and	  




Fig.	  1.	  A	  monomeric	  tetrahedral	  silicate	  and	  a	  branched	  ring	  polysilicate	  structure,	  which	  are	  present	  in	  sodium	  
silicate	  solutions.	  
	  
As	   the	   pH	   is	   reduced	   or	   through	   charge	   screening	   and	   reducing	   the	   dielectric	   constant	   of	   the	   aqueous	  
phase	   by	   adding	   inorganic	   salts,	   the	   silanol	   groups	   condense	   to	   build	   larger	   particles.	   Gelation	   occurs	  
when	   particle	   aggregation	   ultimately	   forms	   a	   uniform,	   three-­‐dimensional	   network	   of	   silicate	   particles.	  
Most	   notable	   is	   the	   dependence	   of	   the	   reaction	   rate	   on	   the	   dissolution	   rate	   of	   the	   salt	   mineral,	   the	  
temperature,	  and	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  water	  glass.	  Divalent	  metal	  ions	  such	  as	  Ca2+	  and	  Mg2+	  accelerate	  
the	  gelling	  kinetics	  more	  than	  monovalent	  cations	  (Na+).	  	  
	  
Major	  products	  of	   the	  reaction	  with	  pure	  halite	  or	  sodium	  chloride	  solution	  are	  amorphous	  silicate	  and	  
halite.	   Salt	   formations	   contain	   a	   variety	   of	   Mg-­‐containing	   minerals	   and	   solutions.	   Experiments	   and	  
observations	  made	  during	  in-­‐situ	  grouting,	  illustrate	  that	  these	  Mg2+	  ions,	  together	  with	  water,	  are	  fixed	  in	  
the	  structure	  of	  magnesium	  oxichlorides	  and	  Mg-­‐silicates.	  The	  formation	  of	  magnesium	  oxichlorides	  can	  
be	  described	   according	   to	   the	   system	  NaOH-­‐MgCl2-­‐H2O	   (Bilinski	   et	   al.	   1984,	  Mazuranic	   et	   al.	   1982).	  All	  
reaction	   products	   have	   a	   low	   solubility	   (cf.	   Engelhardt,	   von	   Borstel	   2014).	   For	   example,	   laboratory	  
experiments	   show	   that	   highly	   concentrated	   MgCl2-­‐solutions	   (cf.	   Q-­‐/IP21-­‐	   or	   R-­‐/IP19-­‐solution)	   have	   Si	  
concentrations	  of	  <	  1	  µg/g.	  In	  comparison,	  the	  Si	  concentrations	  of	  low-­‐saline	  waters	  are	  <	  5	  µg/g	  due	  to	  
the	  solubility	  of	  macro-­‐crystalline	  quartz.	  
	  
The	   crystalline	   state	   is	   a	   relatively	   more	   stable	   state	   than	   the	   amorphous	   state.	   This	   accounts	   for	   the	  
transformation	   of	   an	   amorphous	   solid	   into	   its	   crystalline	   state.	   However,	   the	   amorphous	   solid	   is	   quite	  
stable	   due	   to	   the	   low	   energy	   difference.	   This	   is	   attributed	   to	   the	   high	   energy	   of	   activation,	   which	   is	  
required	  to	  induce	  the	  rearrangement	  of	  the	  bonds	  and	  the	  high	  viscosity	  of	  solids.	  The	  study	  of	  natural	  
analogs	  showed	  that	  amorphous	  silicates	  can	  preserve	   for	   thousands	  of	  years,	  however,	   it	   is	  sometimes	  
difficult	  to	  evaluate	  the	  results	  due	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  organic	  substances.	  Natural	  amorphous	  silica	  such	  
as	   diatomite	   and	   opal	   (natural	   hydrated	   amorphous	   silica)	   are	   examples	   of	   non-­‐crystalline	   silicates.	   In	  




evaporite	   rocks	   of	   the	   Zechstein	   age	   (Perm)	   common	   authigenic	   silicates	   are	   quartz	   and	   talc	  
(Mg3Si4O10(OH)2).	  	  
	  
The	   low	   rate	   of	   the	   structural	   changes	   is	   coupled	   with	   a	   low	   volume	   decrease	   (syneresis)	   of	   sodium	  
silicates,	  because	  this	  type	  of	  shrinkage	  is	  a	  result	  of	  the	  formation	  of	  siloxane	  (Si-­‐O-­‐Si)	  bonds,	  which	  takes	  
less	  space	   that	   the	   two	   individual	  silanol	  groups,	  and	   the	  release	  of	  hydroxyl	   ions.	   In	  addition,	   it	  can	  be	  
assumed	   that	   syneresis	   is	   limited	   by	   the	   reaction	   of	   these	   hydroxyl	   ions	   with	  Mg2+-­‐ions	   resulting	   in	   a	  
formation	   of	  magnesium	   oxichlorides	   or	  magnesium	   silicates.	   These	   facts	   and	   the	   low	   solubility	   of	   the	  
reaction	  products	  suggest	  the	  use	  of	  sodium	  silicate	  solutions	  for	  sealing	  measures.	  
	  
Like	  Mg2+	  or	  Ca2+,	  experiments	  demonstrate	  that	  silicate	  solutions	  are	  able	  to	  fix	  many	  toxic	  or	  radioactive	  
heavy	  metals,	   which	   are	   dissolved	   in	   NaCl-­‐	   and	   NaCl-­‐MgCl2-­‐solutions,	   in	   insoluble	  minerals.	   First	   tests	  
showed	   the	   formation	  of	   solids	  during	   the	  mixing	  of	  water	   glass	  with	  barium	   (Ba2+),	   cobalt	   (Co2+),	   iron	  
(Fe2+),	  nickel	  (Ni2+),	  and	  strontium	  (Sr2+)	  salt	  solutions.	  The	  results	  are	  comparable	  with	  the	  well-­‐known	  
crystal	  or	  chemical	  garden	  experiments.	  In	  particular,	  chemical	  analyses	  prove	  a	  removal	  of	  small	  divalent	  
ions	   (Co,	   Ni)	   as	  well	   as	   a	   significant	   decrease	   in	   the	   UO2	   concentration.	   The	   precipitates	   can	   comprise	  
insoluble	   salts,	   as	  well	   as	   hydroxides	   and	   silicate	   phases.	   Another	  well-­‐known	   and	   in	  water	   treatment	  
frequently	  used	  property	  of	  amorphous	  silicates	  is	  a	  high	  sorption	  capacity.	  
	  
	  
3	  The	  sealing	  of	  excavation	  damaged	  zones	  
	  
Fundamental	  for	  the	  grouting	  of	  an	  EDZ	  are	  the	  negligible	  size	  of	  the	  cyclic	  and	  polysilicate	  anions	  and	  the	  
absence	   of	   a	   yield	   strength	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   the	   sodium	   silicate	   solutions	   can	   be	   considered	   as	  
Newtonian	  fluids.	  The	  viscosity	  decreases	  with	  temperature	  and	  increases	  with	  density,	  according	  to	  the	  
Krieger-­‐Dougherty	   equation.	   Due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   sodium	   silicate	   solutions	   are	   particle-­‐free,	   a	   pre-­‐
wetting	  of	  fractures	  is	  not	  necessary.	  The	  flow	  velocity	  in	  fractures	  depends	  in	  particular	  from	  its	  size,	  the	  
roughness	  of	  the	  fracture	  surfaces,	  the	  grout	  pressure	  and	  the	  water	  glass	  viscosity.	  The	  reactions	  of	  the	  
sodium	  silicate	  solutions	  with	  exposed	  soluble	  salts	   induce	  a	  rapid	  gelation,	  which	  causes	  an	  increase	  in	  
viscosity	  and	  the	  development	  of	  a	  yield	  strength.	  The	  formation	  of	  solids	  and	  the	  resulting	  changes	  of	  the	  
flow	  process	  in	  a	  fracture	  are	  illustrated	  by	  Fig.	  2.	  
	  
	  
Fig.	   2.	  Conceptual	  model	  of	  the	  injection	  of	  a	  sodium	  silicate	  solution	  into	  a	  fracture	  in	  rock	  salt.	  The	  contact	  of	  the	  
sodium	   silicate	   with	   the	   soluble	   rock	   salt	   components	   (blue)	   results	   in	   the	   formation	   of	   amorphous	   silicates	   and	  
secondary	   halite	   at	   the	   fracture	   surface.	   The	   thickness	   of	   the	   reaction	   products	   increases	   (the	   fracture	   width	  
decreases)	  and	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  injection,	  the	  fracture	  is	  filled	  with	  solids	  and	  residual	  solutions,	  which	  occur	  as	  fluid	  
inclusions.	  




The	  injection	  pressure	  is	  chosen	  in	  dependence	  of	  minimum	  principal	  stress.	  In	  general,	  it	  can	  be	  expected	  
that	  the	  maximum	  injection	  pressure	  is	  about	  2	  MPa	  larger	  than	  the	  minimum	  principal	  stress.	  The	  fact	  of	  
a	  negligible	  particle	  size	  opens	  the	  possibility	  to	  simultaneously	  fill	  and	  seal	  fractures	  and	  to	  measure	  the	  
permeability	  of	  the	  EDZ.	  The	  pressures	  and	  flow	  rates	  are	  registered	  during	  the	  whole	  work	  duration	  and	  
the	  injection	  pressure	  is	  increased	  step	  by	  step.	  The	  permeability	  of	  the	  system	  of	  a	  sealing	  body	  and	  the	  
EDZ	  can	  be	  determined	  form	  the	  change	  in	  pressure	  over	  time.	  The	  execution	  and	  the	  evaluation	  of	  these	  
pressure	  drop	  measurements	  are	  comparable	  to	  standard	  instationary	  permeability	  measurements	  in	  the	  
laboratory.	  However,	  in	  contrast	  to	  laboratory	  measurements	  with	  pressure	  cells	  only	  the	  input	  pressure	  
can	  be	  registered	  and	  analyzed.	  Numerical	  methods	  are	  used	  to	  solve	  the	  differential	  equation	  of	  pressure	  
decay	  and	  to	  match	  the	  observed	  pressure	  decay	  with	  the	  calculated	  decay	  curves.	  	  
	  
Mechanical	   investigations	   show	   that	   the	   rate	   of	   the	   hardening	  decreases	  with	   increasing	   density	   of	   the	  
sodium	  silicate	  solutions.	  This	  behavior	  is	  caused	  by	  the	  lower	  water	  content	  of	  the	  high	  density	  solutions,	  
which	  result	  in	  a	  decrease	  of	  the	  capability	  to	  dissolve	  salts	  at	  the	  fracture	  surfaces.	  Consequently,	  a	  lower	  
amount	  of	  dissolved	  salts	  (“hardener”)	  can	  react	  with	  the	  sodium	  silicate	  solutions.	  In	  addition,	  lower	  final	  
strength	  values	  can	  be	  expected.	  The	  dissolution	  of	  carnallite	  (KMgCl3⋅6H2O)	  results	  in	  an	  increase	  of	  the	  
amount	   of	   salt	   solution,	   due	   to	   the	   release	   of	   crystal	   water.	   As	   a	   result	   of	   the	   increased	   amount	   of	  
hardener,	  high	  density	  sodium	  silicate	  solutions,	  e.g.	  with	  a	  density	  of	  1.56	  g/cm³,	  were	   investigated	  for	  
the	   sealing	   of	   fractures	   in	   carnallitite.	   Independent	   of	   the	   kind	   of	   salt,	   the	   strength	   should	   rise	   with	   a	  
decreasing	  width	  of	  the	  fractures.	  
	  
Presently,	  quantitative	  strength	  measurements	  focus	  on	  the	  strength	  development	  between	  the	  contact	  of	  
sodium	  silicate	  (density	  1.36	  g/cm³	  or	  37–40	  degrees	  Baumé)	  and	  rock	  salt.	  The	  measurements	  results	  in	  
56	  d-­‐tensile	  strength-­‐values	  of	  up	  to	  1600	  kN/m².	  The	  shear	  strength	  rises	  with	  increasing	  normal	  stress	  
on	   the	   area	   of	   contact	   and	   amounts	   to	   about	   2.3	  MPa	   at	   a	   normal	   stress	   of	   1.5	  MPa.	   Figure	   3	   shows	   a	  
hardened	  sodium	  silicate	  between	  the	  front	  surfaces	  of	  two	  splitted	  cores	  and	  on	  the	  lateral	  surfaces.	  
	  
	  
Fig.	  3.	  Rock	  salt	  cores	  with	  polymerized	  sodium	  silicates.	  The	  specimen	  was	  stored	  about	  three	  months	  in	  an	  air-­‐tight	  













The	   formation	   of	   excavation	   damaged	   zones	   (EDZ)	  may	   strongly	   affect	   the	   performance	   of	   engineered	  
barriers	  in	  underground	  repositories.	  In	  dependence	  on	  the	  requirement	  on	  the	  barrier	  permeability,	  the	  
EDZ	  needs	  to	  be	  removed	  mechanically	  as	  far	  as	  possible	  and/or	  the	  fractures	  of	  the	  host	  rock	  formation	  
must	  be	  grouted.	  The	  sealing	  of	  small	   fractures	  requires	  the	  use	  of	  particle-­‐free	  solutions.	  The	  following	  
properties	  favor	  the	  use	  of	  sodium	  silicate	  solutions	  in	  rock	  salts:	  
	  
• Sodium	   silicate	   solutions	   are	   available	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   densities	   and	   viscosities.	   For	   this	   reason,	  
products	  can	  be	  selected	  according	  to	  the	  required	  material	  properties.	  
• The	   absence	   of	   a	   yield	   strength	   and	   the	   small	   size	   of	   the	   silicate	   complexes	   guarantees	   the	  
penetrability	   into	   small	   fractures	   and	   opens	   the	   possibility	   to	   simultaneously	   fill	   and	   seal	  
fractures	  and	  to	  measure	  the	  rock	  permeability.	  
• The	  solutions	  are	  not	  self-­‐hardening.	  The	  formation	  of	  the	  solids	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  reaction	  
with	  soluble	  salts	  and	  brines.	  
• The	  low	  solubility	  of	  the	  reaction	  products	  guarantees	  long-­‐term	  stability	  of	  fracture	  fillings.	  	  
• Low	  rates	  of	  syneresis	  are	  a	  result	  of	   the	  relative	  high	  Na2O-­‐	  and	  SiO2-­‐amounts	  of	   the	  solutions	  
and	  the	  long	  time-­‐spans	  necessary	  for	  the	  transformation	  into	  the	  crystalline	  state.	  	  
	  
Up	   to	   now	   comprehensive	   practical	   experiences	   were	   gained	   using	   sodium	   silicate	   solutions	   with	   a	  
SiO2/Na2O-­‐mass-­‐ratio	  between	  2.5	  to	  3.3	  and	  a	  density	  between	  1.34	  g/cm³	  (37–40	  degrees	  Baumé)	  and	  
1.56	  g/cm³	  (50–52	  degrees	  Baumé).	  The	  sealing	  of	  the	  EDZ	  was	  tested	  around	  a	  drift	  in	  a	  salt	  mine	  using	  a	  
solution	  with	  a	  density	  of	  1.34	  g/cm³.	  It	  was	  possible	  to	  significantly	  reduce	  the	  permeability	  of	  the	  rock	  
salt.	  Most	  values	  were	  in	  the	  range	  of	  10–17	  m³.	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Abstract:	  Salt-­‐based	  materials	  are	  intended	  to	  use	  for	  backfill	  and	  sealing	  systems	  in	  geotechnical	  barriers	  in	  
underground	   HLW-­‐repositories.	   Due	   to	   the	   creep	   of	   the	   saliniferous	   host	   rock,	   the	   salt	   backfill	   will	   be	  
compacted	   during	   several	   hundreds	   or	   thousands	   years	   of	   operation	   to	   a	   minimum	   of	   porosity	   resp.	  
permeability.	  To	  raise	  the	  sealing	  potential	  of	  a	  salt-­‐based	  backfill,	  the	  porosity	  after	  construction	  should	  be	  
minimized	  by	  optimal	  material	  performance	  and	  compaction	  performance.	  A	  procedure	  to	  optimize	  the	  grain	  
size	  distribution	  of	  crushed	  salt	  and	  its	  water	  and	  clay	  content	  is	  described.	  	  The	  optimized	  salt	  fraction	  gets	  a	  
better	  compaction	  behavior	  than	  straight	  mine-­‐run	  salt.	  The	  addition	  of	  a	  filler-­‐like	  material	  (e.g.	  Friedland	  
Clay	  Powder)	  reduces	  the	  total	  porosity	  and	  permeability.	  Backfill	  columns	  made	  from	  crushed	  salt	  and	  clay	  





In	   saliniferous	   host	   rock	   salt-­‐based	   materials	   are	   intended	   to	   use	   for	   backfill	   and	   sealing	   systems	   in	  
geotechnical	   barriers	   in	   underground	   HLW-­‐repositories.	   In	   this	   case	   the	   most	   favorable	   material	   is	  
crushed	  salt,	  which	  is	  used	  as	  backfill	  in	  drifts	  and	  shafts.	  Due	  to	  the	  creep	  of	  the	  saliniferous	  host	  rock,	  the	  
salt	  backfill	  will	  be	  subsequent	  compacted	  (consolidated)	  during	  several	  hundreds	  or	  thousands	  years	  of	  
operation	   to	   a	  minimum	  of	   porosity	   resp.	   permeability.	  Within	   the	   future	   shaft	   closing	   concepts	   of	   the	  
WIPP	   site	   in	   Carlsbad	   NM	   [2,	   12]	   or	   the	   shaft	   “Saale”	   [16]	   in	   Germany,	   highly	   compacted	   crushed	   salt	  
columns	   are	   envisaged.	   The	   preliminary	   safety	   analysis	   for	   the	   Gorleben	   site	   also	   evaluates	   long-­‐term	  
sealing	   elements	   in	   drifts	   and	   shafts	  made	   from	   crushed	   salt.	   The	   published	   results	   [14,	   15]	   state,	   that	  
within	   	   approx.	   1,000	   years,	   the	   crushed	   salt	   (wetted	   with	   1.5	   wt%	   water)	   consolidates	   down	   to	   a	  
minimum	  porosity	  and	  fulfills	  the	  requirements	  for	  a	  long-­‐term	  stable	  sealing.	  This	  calculated	  result	  bases	  
upon	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	   initial	   porosity	   of	   the	   emplaced	   crushed	   salt	   in	   the	   shaft	   is	   10%.	   As	  
reference,	  the	  WIPP	  project	  is	  cited,	  where	  intensive	  investigations	  on	  the	  dynamical	  in-­‐situ	  compaction	  of	  
crushed	  salt	  are	  described.	  Calculations	  according	  to	  the	  WIPP	  site	  indicates	  that	  the	  salt	  column	  becomes	  
an	  effective	  long-­‐term	  barrier	  in	  under	  100	  years	  [1].	  The	  differences	  are	  caused	  by	  the	  site	  specific	  creep	  
behavior	  of	  the	  different	  salt	  formations.	  
	  
Beside	  the	  application	  of	  crushed	  salt	  in	  shaft	  sealing	  elements,	  the	  use	  of	  crushed	  salt	  to	  seal	  reposition	  
boreholes	   and	   drifts	   is	   intended	   [9,	   13].	   The	   in-­‐situ	   compaction	   in	   such	   constricted	   resp.	   horizontal	  
structures	  is	  impossible	  resp.	  very	  limited.	  Initial	  porosities	  up	  to	  35%	  are	  assumed	  and	  therefore	  longer	  
consolidation	   times	   for	   reaching	   a	   “sealing	   state”	   are	   needed	   [9].	   Calculations	   regarding	   consolidation	  
under	   conditions	   of	   the	   intended	   panel	   closure	   concept	   of	   the	  WIPP	   site	   showing	   the	   influence	   of	   the	  
initial	  porosity.	  While	  an	  initial	  porosity	  of	  35%	  needs	  around	  150	  years	  to	  consolidate	  down	  to	  5%,	  the	  
initial	  porosity	  of	  20%	  reaching	  5%	  porosity	  already	  after	  65	  years	  [9].	  
	  
To	   raise	   the	   sealing	   potential	   of	   a	   salt-­‐based	   backfill,	   the	   initial	   porosity	   after	   emplacement	   should	   be	  
minimized	   by	   an	   optimal	   material	   performance	   and	   compaction	   performance.	   Also,	   a	   highly	   pre-­‐




compacted	  backfill	  needs	  much	  less	  time	  to	  re-­‐consolidate	  to	  a	  “sealing	  state”	  due	  to	  the	  creep	  of	  the	  host	  
rock.	  
	  
A	   maximum	   packing	   density	   is	   therefore	   a	   desired	   performance	   of	   an	   optimal	   backfill	   material.	   The	  
packing	  density	  of	  technical	  compacted	  crushed	  salt	  depends	  on	  the	  following	  parameters:	  
	  
• Particle	  size	  distribution	  of	  the	  crushed	  salt,	  
• Particle	  shape	  of	  the	  crushed	  salt,	  
• Additives	  (e.g.	  clay),	  
• Moisture	  content	  (additional	  water	  or	  brine)	  and	  
• Compaction	  technology	  /	  specific	  compaction	  energy.	  
	  
The	  VSG-­‐report	  [15]	  also	  states	  an	  optimization	  potential	  for	  the	  initial	  porosity	  of	  the	  emplaced	  crushed	  
salt.	   As	   a	   first	   improvement,	   an	   emplacement	   or	   partial	   emplacement	   of	   pre-­‐cut	   salt	   stones	   was	  
recommended.	  Naturally,	   the	  emplacement	  of	  pre-­‐cut	  salt	  stones	   in	  an	  underground	  section	  requires	  an	  
extensive	   salt	   stone	   masonry	   with	   salt-­‐filled	   gaps	   to	   achieve	   a	   sealing	   effect	   within	   1,000	   years	   of	  
operation.	   First	   investigations	   on	   this	   topic	   were	   carried	   out	   at	   the	   TU	   Clausthal	   and	   reported	   with	  
promising	   results	   [10].	   So	   it	   seems	   to	  be	   theoretical	   achievable,	   to	   construct	   a	   salt	   stone	  masonry	  with	  
initial	  porosities	  of	  lower	  than	  10%.	  
	  
Another	  and	  maybe	  less	  extensive	  way,	  is	  to	  optimize	  the	  crushed	  salt	  itself	  and	  the	  technical	  compaction	  
procedure	   in-­‐situ.	   Until	   now,	   many	   investigations	   were	   undertaken	   to	   characterize	   the	   behavior	   of	  
crushed	  salt	  during	  the	  consolidation	  under	  or	  near	  host	  rock	  conditions	  [8,	  13,	  16-­‐18].	  
	  
The	  only	  published	  investigations	  according	  to	  the	  technical	  compaction	  of	  crushed	  salt	  are	  from	  the	  WIPP	  
site	  investigations	  [1,	  4,	  5,	  7].	  The	  shaft	  sealing	  concept	  of	  the	  WIPP	  site	  envisages	  a	  dynamic	  compaction	  
by	  dropping	  a	  tamper	  on	  the	  emplaced	  lifts	  (1.5	  m	  thick)	  of	  crushed	  salt.	  Preliminary	  studies	  showing	  that	  
the	  application	  of	  three	  times	  Modified	  Proctor	  Energy	  (MPE	  equals	  2.7	  MJ/m³)	  to	  each	  lift	  result	  in	  10%	  
to	  15%	  remaining	  porosity	  (fractional	  density	  between	  0.85	  to	  0.90)	  [7].	  To	  reach	  this	  result,	  the	  crushed	  
salt	  will	  be	  moistured	  with	  1.5	  ±	  0.3	  wt%	  freshwater	  [3]	  and	  132	  tamper	  drops	  (height	  up	  to	  18	  m)	  are	  
intended	  on	  each	  lift	  [2].	  	  
	  
For	  all	  these	  investigations	  straight	  mine-­‐run	  salt	  with	  a	  limited	  maximum	  grain	  size,	  but	  unaffected	  size	  
distribution	  was	  used.	  
	  
The	  following	  investigations	  are	  on	  the	  optimization	  of	  the	  material	  composition	  of	  crushed	  salt	  with	  the	  
aim	  of	  a	  maximum	  packing	  density	  resp.	  minimum	  porosity	  achieved	  by	  technical	  compaction.	  
	  
	  
2	  Preliminary	  studies	  
	  
To	  influence	  the	  grain	  size	  distribution	  of	  the	  crushed	  salt,	  specifically	  defined	  grain	  size	  fractions	  must	  be	  
available.	  The	   thesis	   from	  BECKER	   [6],	   dealing	  with	   the	  development	  of	   an	  optimal	   structure-­‐stabilized	  
backfill,	   describes	   different	   crushed	   salt	   fractions	   (Table)	   available	   from	   the	   processing	   plant	   of	   the	  
Sondershausen	  mine	  (GSES	  GmbH).	  
	  
	  




Table	  1:	  Grain	  size	  fractions	  available	  from	  Sondershausen	  mine	  
salt	  fractions,	  
labelling	  according	  to	  the	  
Sondershausen	  processing	  
plant	  
grain	  size	  distribution	  
d5	  –	  d95 
composition	  of	  the	  optimal	  
crushed	  salt	  mixture	  acc.	  to	  
GLAUBACH	  [11]	  
Überkorn	  (ÜK)	   3	  mm	  –	  10	  mm	   52.3	  wt%	  
Band	  6	  (B6)	   0.4	  mm	  –	  4	  mm	   21.4	  wt%	  
Band	  8	  (B8)	   0.1	  mm	  –	  1	  mm	   11.8	  wt%	  
Feinsalz	  (FS)	   0.03	  mm	  –	  0.3	  mm	   14.5	  wt%	  
	  
To	  evaluate	   the	   influence	  of	   the	  grain	  size	  distribution	  on	  the	  compaction	  process,	  different	  mixtures	  of	  
crushed	   salt	   were	   compacted	   with	   a	   percussive	   Marshall-­‐Compactor.	   The	   Marshall	   Compactor	   is	  
international	   used	   to	   prepare	   specimens	   of	   hot	   rolled	   asphalt	   and	   the	  machinery	   resp.	   the	   compaction	  
process	  is	  standardized	  in	  Europe	  after	  DIN	  EN	  12697-­‐30.	  
	  
The	   specimens	   were	   compacted	   with	   the	   same	   cumulative	   specific	   compaction	   energy	   of	   approx.	   15	  
MJ/m³.	   The	   cumulative	   specific	   compaction	   energy	   results	   from	   200	   hammer	   blows	   on	   270	   cm³	   grain	  
volume.	  
	  
The	  tested	  mixtures	  were	  mixed	  per	  hand	  and	  afterwards	  the	  desired	  moisture	  level	  adjusted	  (in	  relation	  
to	  the	  dry	  material).	  Shortly	  after	  sample	  preparation,	  the	  samples	  were	  compacted	  and	  analyzed.	  
	  
The	  main	  criterion	  to	  evaluate	  the	  compaction	  result	  is	  the	  calculated	  total	  porosity	  Φ!	  of	  the	  compacted	  
specimens	  according	  to	  Eq.	  1.	  
	  
Φ! = 1 −
𝜌!,!
𝜌!
100%	   Eq. 1 
𝜌!,! 	   bulk	  dry	  density	  of	  the	  compacted	  specimen	  
𝜌!	   particle	  density	  
	  
The	  bulk	  dry	  density	  of	   the	   compacted	   specimen	  was	   calculated	  using	  a	  mass	  and	  volume	  balance.	  The	  
particle	  densities	  were	  measured	  in	  advance	  by	  Helium-­‐Pycnometry.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  used	  materials	  are	  
specified	  in	  Table.	  For	  analysis	  of	  mixed	  materials	  (salt	  and	  clay)	  the	  mean	  particle	  density	  according	  to	  
the	  volumetric	  fractions	  were	  used.	  
	  
Table	  2:	  Grain	  densities	  of	  the	  investigated	  materials	  
material	   grain	  density 
Sondershausen	  rock	  salt	   2.198	  g/cm³	  
Friedland	  Clay	  Powder	  (FCP)	   2.655	  g/cm³	  
	  
According	  to	  GLAUBACH	  el	  al.	  [11]	  the	  grain	  size	  distribution	  of	  the	  crushed	  salt	  has	  an	  important	  effect	  
on	  its	  packing	  density.	  As	  a	  result	  the	  well-­‐known	  FULLER	  distribution	  is	  used	  to	  optimize	  the	  grain	  size	  
distribution	  of	  crushed	  salt	  as	  a	  practical	  approach	  in	  engineering.	  During	  a	  systematic	  investigation,	  the	  
optimal	  FULLER	  exponent	   could	  be	   identified	  around	  0.5	   [11].	  This	   result	  was	  unexpected,	  because	   the	  
FULLER	  distribution	  with	  an	  exponent	  of	  0.5	  has	  its	  origin	  in	  the	  packing	  of	  spheres.	  The	  grain	  shape	  of	  
crushed	   salt	   varies	   instead	   between	   cubic	   and	   splintered	   shape,	   which	   is	   unfavorable	   for	   an	   effective	  
compaction.	  









Fig.	  1.	  The	  used	  grain	  fractions	  and	  their	  grain	  size	  distribution	  
	  
As	   a	   reference,	   the	   well-­‐known	   REPOPERM	   [13]	   material	   was	   used	   to	   evaluate	   the	   effort	   of	   the	  
optimization	   of	   the	   grain	   size	   distribution.	   The	   achieved	   total	   porosities	   of	   the	   optimized	  mixtures	   are	  
significant	  lower	  than	  the	  achieved	  porosities	  of	  the	  REPOPERM	  reference	  [11].	  
	  
The	   figure	  2	  shows	  the	  results	  of	   this	   test	  series	  on	   the	  optimized	  salt	   fractions	  with	  different	  moisture	  
contents	  and	  compaction	  energies.	  
	  
	  
Fig.	  2.	  Gained	  porosities	  of	  the	  optimized	  salt	  fractions	  	  compared	  to	  the	  REPOPERM	  reference	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The	   optimized	   material	   achieved	   the	   same	   porosity	   of	   the	   REPOPERM	   material	   with	   only	   20%	   of	  
compaction	   energy.	   On	   another	   point	   of	   view,	   the	   optimized	   material	   achieved	   a	   30%	   lower	   porosity	  
under	   technical	   compaction	  with	   comparable	   compaction	   energy.	   An	   addition	   of	   1.0	   to	   1.5	  wt%	  water	  
suffice	  for	  an	  optimum	  compaction,	  which	  confirms	  the	  earlier	  investigations	  of	  AHRENS	  &	  HANSEN	  [4,	  5].	  
	  
BUTCHER	   [8]	   and	   STÜRENBERG	   [17,	   18]	   demonstrated	   that	   crushed	   salt	   –	   bentonite	   mixtures	   are	  
achieving	   lower	  porosities	  and	   lower	  permeability	   then	  pure	  crushed	  salt.	  For	   the	  sealing	  system	  of	   the	  
shaft	   “Saale”	   (Teutschenthal	   mine)	   a	   support	   abutment	   with	   an	   in-­‐situ	   compacted	   crushed	   salt	   –	   clay	  
mixture	  was	  developed.	  Laboratory	  tests	  revealed	  an	  optimal	  mixture	  of	  85	  wt%	  crushed	  salt	  (maximum	  
grain	  size	  10	  mm)	  and	  15	  wt%	  Friedland	  Clay	  Powder	  with	  a	  moisture	  content	  of	  4.5	  wt%.	  The	  described	  
material	  mixture	   is	   optimal	   to	   achieve	   a	   high	   density	  with	   a	   specific	   porosity	   of	   about	   15%	  by	   specific	  
compaction	  energy	  of	  about	  2.65	  MJ/m³	  (one	  MPE).	  POPP	  et	  al.	  [16]	  indicated	  that	  corresponding	  to	  the	  
specific	  porosity	  of	  15	  vol.%,	  the	  initial	  brine	  permeability	  amounts	  6∙10-­‐17	  m².	  
	  
Based	   on	   these	   facts,	   the	   FULLER	   optimized	   salt	  mixture	   (Table,	   last	   row)	  was	   further	   investigated	   to	  
achieve	  an	  optimal	  clay	  and	  water	  content.	  
	  
	  
3	  Optimization	  and	  compaction	  tests	  on	  crushed	  salt-­‐clay	  mixtures	  
	  
The	  aim	  of	  this	  optimization	  was	  to	  find	  the	  optimal	  content	  of	  clay	  (Friedland	  Clay	  Powder)	  and	  water	  in	  
the	  FULLER	  optimized	  salt	  mixture	  for	  a	  minimum	  porosity	  after	  a	  technical	  compaction.	  The	  compaction	  
procedure	  was	  the	  same	  like	  the	  optimization	  of	  the	  pure	  salt	  fractions	  (described	  above).	  The	  compaction	  
results	   were	   determined	   at	   4	   different	   amounts	   of	   spec.	   compaction	   energies	   (3.1,	   6.2,	   10.8	   and	  
15.4	  MJ/m³).	   In	   an	   extensive	   test	   series	   34	   mixtures	   with	   different	   amount	   of	   water	   and	   clay	   were	  
investigated.	  The	  investigated	  water	  content	  was	  between	  1.1	  and	  11	  vol%	  (of	  dry	  solids),	  while	  the	  clay	  
content	  varied	  between	  0	  and	  11.9	  vol%	  (of	  solids).	  The	  figure	  3	  shows	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  investigated	  
samples	  within	  the	  stated	  range.	  
	  
	  
Fig.	  3.	  Investigated	  salt	  –	  clay	  mixtures	  (desired	  range	  of	  
water/clay	  mass	  ratio	  is	  red	  shaded)	  
	  
Fig.	  4.	  Typical	  compacted	  sample	  









































The	  distribution	  of	  the	  samples	  is	  not	  homogenous,	  because	  the	  water	  content	  of	  the	  samples	  containing	  
clay	   regards	   to	   a	   specific	   range	   of	   water/clay	  mass	   ratio	   (w/cl)	   between	   0.1	   and	   0.5.	   This	   range	   (red	  
shaded	  in	  Fig)	  was	  chosen	  previously	  to	  avoid	  a	  high	  saturation	  of	  the	  clay.	  During	  the	  optimization	  tests,	  
while	  the	  clay	  content	  was	  forced	  to	  a	  minimum,	  it	  was	  not	  possible	  to	  stay	  within	  the	  suggested	  range	  of	  
water/clay	  mass	  ratio.	  Due	  to	  the	  water	  requirement	  of	  the	  fine	  salt	   fractions	  (optimum	  4.4	  vol%	  ref.	  to	  
dry	   solids),	   the	   resulting	   required	  water/clay	  mass	   ratio	   raised	  up	   to	  1.1.	   Such	  mixtures	   contain	  nearly	  
saturated	  clay	  with	  a	  minimum	  of	  swellability	  as	  a	  safety	  reserve.	  
	  
The	   results	   of	   the	   optimization	   are	   shown	   in	   Fig.	   	   regarding	   four	   different	   compaction	   energies.	   The	  
results	  are	  visualized	  in	  three	  dimensional	  diagrams,	  with	  the	  investigated	  water	  and	  clay	  content	  at	  the	  
basis	  and	  the	  gained	  porosity	  in	  the	  z-­‐direction.	  
	  
	  
Fig.	  5.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  optimizing	  test	  series	  
	  
The	  optimal	  clay	  content	  is	  approx.	  8	  vol%	  (of	  dry	  solids),	  while	  the	  optimal	  water	  content	  depends	  from	  

























































































































(mixture	  specific	  ~	  2.7	  wt%)and	  the	  lowest	  gained	  porosity	  was	  7.7	  vol.%	  @	  15.4	  MJ/m³.	  The	  optimized	  
mixture	  has	  a	  water/clay	  mass	  ratio	  of	  approx.	  0.35.	  
	  
	  
4	  Technical	  in-­‐situ	  compaction	  
	  
The	   optimized	   salt/clay	   mixture	   was	   used	   in	   in-­‐situ	   emplacements	   tests,	   using	   conventional	   vibrating	  
compaction	   equipment.	   The	  material	   was	   emplaced	   in	   drifted	   dies	   and	   compacted	   in	   several	   layers	   of	  
0.1	  m	   thickness.	   It	   could	   be	   shown,	   that	   on	   site	   mixing	   using	   conventional	   concrete	   equipment	   is	  
problematic.	  The	  material	   tends	   to	  segregate	  and	   the	   finer	   fractions	  sticking	  at	   the	  mixer	  equipment.	   In	  
further	   investigations	   intensive	  mixers	   (Co.	  EIRICH)	  will	  be	  used	   to	  handle	   this	  problem.	  Also	  a	  specific	  
coating	  of	  the	  salt	  fractions	  with	  the	  clay	  will	  be	  investigated.	  
	  
In	  this	  first	  emplacement	  test,	  the	  gained	  porosities	  where	  around	  15	  vol%	  (integral	  for	  the	  whole	  dies),	  
which	  is	  a	  good	  result	  on	  the	  effort	  of	  the	  used	  conventional	  compaction	  equipment.	  But,	  the	  conventional	  
vibrating	  compactors	  are	  only	  useful	  for	  pre-­‐compaction	  of	  the	  optimized	  mixture.	  The	  outcome	  from	  the	  
applied	   compaction	   energy	   depends	   on	   the	   applied	   partial	   amounts.	   This	   means,	   that	   a	   continuing	  
application	  of	  low	  partial	  energies	  from	  vibration	  compacters	  will	  not	  lead	  to	  the	  densest	  packaging.	  The	  
final	  compaction	  should	  be	  done	  by	  a	  percussive	  compactor	  with	  a	  much	  higher	  partial	  energy.	  
	  
During	  a	  first	  field	  test	  in	  summer	  2013,	  a	  Rapid	  Impact	  Compactor	  (Co.	  Terra	  Mix)	  was	  used.	  The	  Rapid	  
Impact	  Compactor	  is	  hydraulic	  driven	  with	  a	  guided	  falling	  weight	  of	  9’000	  kg	  and	  controllable	  dropping	  
heights	   between	   0.4	   and	   1.2	  m.	   Up	   to	   40	  blows	   per	   minute	   are	   achievable	   and	   compaction	   foots	   with	  
diameter	  from	  0.8	  m	  to	  2.0	  m	  are	  available.	  
	  
	  
Fig.	  6.	  Rapid	  Impact	  Compactor	   	  
Fig.	  7.	  Future	  test	  setup	  
	  
Currently,	  a	  half-­‐scale	  test	  setup	  with	  the	  Rapid	  Impact	  Compactor	   is	  planned	  (execution	  05/2015).	  The	  
emplacement	  of	   the	  optimized	  material	  will	   be	   in	   a	  drifted	  die	   in	   a	  hard	   rock	  quarry.	  Alternative,	  a	  die	  
made	  from	  reinforced	  concrete	  can	  be	  used.	  
	  
The	   optimized	  material	   will	   be	   compacted	   in	   3	   distinctive	   layers	   (0.4	  m	   each)	   and	   every	   layer	  will	   be	  
composed	  of	  8	  conventional	  pre-­‐compacted	  sub-­‐layers.	  
	  





The	  investigations	  will	  be	  focused	  on:	  
	  
• Material	  behavior	  during	  compaction	  
• Spatial	  distribution	  of	  porosity	  in	  the	  compacted	  body	  
• Gas	  and	  liquid	  permeability	  
• Laboratory	  tests	  as	  reference	  and	  quality	  control	  
	  
	  
5	  Conclusions	  and	  prospects	  
	  
The	   approach	  of	   using	   swellable	   clays	   for	  doping	   crushed	   salt	  mixtures	   according	   to	  BUTCHER	   [8]	   and	  
STÜRENBERG	   [17,	  18]	  was	   successfully	  adopted.	  Based	  of	   the	   former	  work	  of	  GLAUBACH	  et	  al.	   [11]	  an	  
empirical	  optimization	  process	  is	  described	  to	  optimize	  the	  water	  and	  clay	  content.	  As	  a	  result	  the	  water	  
and	  clay	  content	  could	  be	  reduced	  to	  a	  range,	  which	  is	  nearly	  the	  half	  of	  the	  suggested	  content	  according	  
to	  BUTCHER	  [8]	  and	  STÜRENBERG	  [17,	  18].	  Furthermore,	  a	  relation	  between	  the	  spec.	  compaction	  energy	  
and	   the	   optimum	  water/clay	   content	   exists	   and	   can	   be	   used	   to	   adopt	   the	  mixture	   design	   to	   the	   in-­‐situ	  
available	  compaction	  procedure.	  
	  
The	  lab-­‐scale	  compaction	  results	  are	  not	  transferable	  without	  considering	  further	  demands	  to	  large	  scale	  
practice.	   Typically	   underground	   compaction	   procedures	   are	   generally	   comparable	   to	   the	   common	  
earthwork	   compaction.	   Therefore,	   several	   field	   tests	   using	   earthwork	   machinery	   for	   compacting	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Abstract:	  For	  repositories	  in	  rock	  salt,	  demonstrating	  the	  integrity	  of	  drift	  and	  shaft	  seals	  is	  an	  indispensable	  
part	   of	   the	   long-­‐term	   safety	   case.	   In	   this	   study,	   probabilistic	   methods	   are	   applied	   to	   assess	   the	   fictitious	  
abutment	  length	  for	  a	  shaft	  seal	  and	  the	  effective	  permeability	  of	  a	  drift	  seal	  (dam),	  i.e.	  the	  integral	  entity	  for	  
the	  whole	  structure	   including	  contact	  zone	  and	  damaged	  salt	  zone.	  For	   the	  seal	  permeability,	   the	  question	  
arises	  how	  to	  derive	   it	  based	  on	  permeability	  measurements	  with	  a	   limited	  number	  of	   samples	  due	   to	  cost	  
restrictions.	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  of	  interest	  which	  conclusions	  can	  be	  derived	  regarding	  the	  minimum	  length	  of	  
drift	  seals	  if	  the	  failure	  probability	  should	  be	  smaller	  than	  e.g.	  10	  -­‐4.	  Based	  on	  numerical	  experiments	  it	  was	  
demonstrated	  that	  small-­‐scale	  measurements	  can	  be	  upscale	  using	  known	  averaging	  methods.	  This	  suggests	  
that	   dimensioning	   can	   be	   carried	   out	   based	   on	   cautions	   average	   estimates	   and	   the	   required	   reliability	  
statement	   (e.g.	   about	  a	   failure	  probability	   smaller	   than	   e.g.	   10-­‐4)	   can	  be	  derived	   for	   realistic	   dam	   lengths.	  
However,	   due	   to	   the	   limited	   amount	   of	   data	   available	   there	   are	   remaining	   uncertainties	   concerning	   the	  





For	  repositories	  in	  rock	  salt,	  containment	  of	  the	  radioactive	  waste	  is	  provided	  by	  the	  geologic	  barrier	  salt	  
in	  combination	  with	  geotechnical	  barriers.	  Therefore,	  demonstrating	  the	  integrity	  of	  these	  barriers	  is	  an	  
indispensable	   part	   of	   the	   long-­‐term	   safety	   case	   (VSG	   2012a).	   While	   the	   methodological	   basis	   for	  
demonstrating	   the	   integrity	   of	   the	   geologic	   barrier	   is	   established	   (VSG	   2012b),	   there	   is	   still	   R&D	   need	  
concerning	   the	   integrity	   demonstration	   of	   shaft	   and	   drift	   seals	   (VSG	   2013).	   In	   this	   study,	   probabilistic	  
methods	  are	  applied	  to	  assess	  two	  crucial	  parameters:	  The	  fictitious	  abutment	  length	  for	  a	  shaft	  seal	  and	  
the	   effective	  permeability	   of	   a	   drift	   seal	   (dam),	   i.e.	   the	   integral	   entity	   for	   the	  whole	   structure	   including	  
contact	  zone	  and	  damaged	  salt	  zone.	  	  
	  
For	  the	  shaft	  seal,	  the	  structural	  failure	  probability	  can	  be	  computed	  with	  the	  help	  of	  a	  limit	  state	  function.	  
A	  Monte-­‐Carlo	  simulation	  has	  been	  used	  to	  approximate	  the	  failure	  probability	  by	  determining	  parameter	  
sets	  which	  are	  beyond	  the	  limit	  state.	  	  
	  
For	  the	  drift	  seal	  permeability,	  the	  question	  arises	  how	  to	  derive	  it	  based	  on	  permeability	  measurements	  
with	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  samples	  due	  to	  cost	  restrictions.	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  of	  interest	  which	  conclusions	  
can	  be	  derived	  regarding	  the	  minimum	  length	  of	  drift	  seals	  if	  the	  failure	  probability	  should	  be	  smaller	  than	  
e.g.	  10-­‐4.	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  consider	  the	  small-­‐scale	  data	  as	  a	  sample	  for	  which	  its	  probability	  distribution	  is	  
representative	   for	   the	   large-­‐scale	   behavior.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   whole	   structure	   is	   considered	   as	   a	  
homogeneous	  entity	  in	  which	  the	  permeability	  complies	  with	  the	  distribution	  derived	  from	  the	  small	  scale	  
measurements.	  According	   to	   the	  distributions	  of	   the	  material	  parameters	  quantiles	   can	  be	  estimated	  as	  
characteristic	  values	  and	  inserted	  into	  the	  limit	  state	  function.	  	  However,	  using	  just	  the	  10-­‐4	  quantile	  of	  the	  
measurements	   leads	   to	   demands	   concerning	   the	   length	   of	   a	   drift	   seal	   which	   are	   neither	   plausible	   nor	  
viable.	  




It	   is,	   however,	   possible	   to	   account	   for	   heterogeneities	   in	   the	   seal	   structure	   by	   means	   of	   geostatistical	  
methods.	  Then,	   the	  measurements	  are	  used	  not	  only	   for	  deriving	  a	  probability	  distribution	  but	  also	  of	  a	  
so-­‐called	   variogram	   structure	   which	   characterizes	   the	   spatial	   behavior	   of	   the	   permeability.	   Numerous	  
realizations	  of	   the	  seal	  can	  be	  sampled,	  each	  accounting	   for	   the	  derived	  probability	  distribution	  and	  the	  
variogram,	   thus	   reproducing	   the	   spatial	   behaviour	   (heterogeneity)	   found	   in	   the	   sample.	   The	   effective	  
large-­‐scale	  permeability	  can	  then	  be	  calculated	  based	  on	  flow	  simulations.	  
	  
	  
2	  Abutment	  length	  of	  the	  shaft	  seal	  
	  
The	   influence	   of	   different	  material	   parameters	   on	   the	   design	   length	   of	   a	   sealing	   structure	   is	   studied.	   A	  
limit-­‐state	   function	   is	   used	   that	  models	   the	   failure	   due	   to	   shear	   forces	   in	   the	   contact	   zone	   and	   due	   to	  
flexural	   tension	   of	   the	   sealing	   structure.	   This	   limit	   state	   can	   be	   interpreted	   as	   the	   minimal	   necessary	  
length	   of	   a	   fictitious	   abutment.	   The	   values	   for	   shearing	   strength,	   tensile	   strength	   and	   the	   radical	   strain	  
coefficient	   are	   not	   known.	   Their	   probability	   distribution	   was	   estimated	   from	   given	   data.	   A	   normal	  
distribution	  approximates	  these	  data	  well	  enough.	  	  
	  
Given	  the	  probability	  distributions	  of	  the	  input	  parameters	  a	  fully	  probabilistic	  analysis	  is	  carried	  out.	  This	  
consists	   of	   (i)	   generating	   an	   input	   sample	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   assumed	   probability	   laws	   of	   the	   input	  
factors,	  (ii)	  computing	  the	  limit	  state	  for	  these	  realizations,	  and	  (iii)	  obtaining	  the	  failure	  probability	  by	  a	  
Monte-­‐Carlo	   estimate.	   The	   results	   are	   reported	   in	   the	   form	   of	   complementary	   cumulative	   distribution	  
functions	  that	  demonstrate	  the	  failure	  probability	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  abutment	  length.	  For	  a	  40	  m	  length,	  








The	  overall	  aim	  is	  to	  estimate	  a	  probability	  distribution	  of	  the	  large-­‐scale	  effective	  permeability	  (integral	  
over	  the	  whole	  structure	  including	  contact	  zone	  and	  damaged	  rock	  salt)	  based	  on	  small-­‐scale	  data	  in	  order	  
to	  derive	  reliability	  statements.	  	  The	  methodology	  is	  as	  follows:	  
	  
• Univariate	   analysis	   of	   the	   small-­‐scale	   permeability	   measurements	   (histograms,	   normal	  
probability	  plots)	  
• Transformation	   into	  elliptic	  cylinder	  coordinates	   in	  order	  to	  better	  account	   for	   the	  shape	  of	   the	  
seal	  and,	  thus,	  to	  allow	  better	  variography	  	  
• Transformation	  of	  permeability	  data	  into	  univariate	  normally	  distributed	  data	  
• Empirical	  variograms	  for	  the	  elliptic	  system	  
• Derivation	  of	  theoretical	  variograms	  matching	  the	  empirical	  ones	  
• Check	   for	   bivariate	   normal	   distribution	   (as	   empirical	   justification	   for	   the	   assumption	   of	   a	  
multivariate	  normal	  distribution)	  
• Geostatistical	   simulation	   (set	   of	   realizations,	   each	   representing	   a	   possible	   spatial	   permeability	  
distribution)	  
• Back-­‐transformation	  to	  original	  data	  scale	  
• Interpolation	  of	  the	  data	  on	  the	  computational	  grid	  	  




• Flow	  calculation	  und	  computation	  of	  the	  effective	  (large-­‐scale)	  permeability	  for	  each	  realization	  
• Output	  statistics	  for	  the	  calculated	  large-­‐scale	  permeabilities	  
	  
3.2	  The	  Data	  
	  
The	  data	  (Eberth	  &	  Müller-­‐Hoeppe	  2009)	  are	  based	  on	  permeability	  measurements	  carried	  out	  at	  a	  dam	  
building	  at	  the	  Asse	  II	  mine	  (Fig.	  1).	  In	  the	  material	  used,	  small-­‐scale	  imperfections	  can	  be	  detected	  (Fig.	  
2).	  
	  
Fig.	  1.	  Measurement	  locations	  (projection	  on	  vertical	  plane,	  blue	  =	  dam	  construction,	  green	  =	  contact	  zone,	  red	  =	  
disturbed	  rock	  salt).	  Left:	  Cartesian	  system,	  right:	  transformed	  system)	  
	  
	  
Fig.	  2.	  Imperfections	  in	  salt-­‐concrete	  (DMT	  2005)	  












3.3	  Geostatistical	  simulation	  results	  and	  estimated	  permeability	  distribution	  
	  
In	  Fig.	  3,	  an	  example	  for	  a	  simulated	  permeability	  distribution	  is	  presented.	  
	  
Fig	  3.	  Permeability	  distribution	  for	  one	  realization	  (half	  of	  model	  area)	  
	  




Fig.	  4.	  Empirical	  pdfs	  for	  large-­‐scale	  permeability	  (blue	  =	  original	  variogram,	  green	  =	  alternative	  variogram,	  red	  =	  
with	  imperfections,	  light	  blue	  =	  dam	  length	  4	  m	  
	  


























Due	  to	  the	  limited	  amount	  of	  data,	  the	  variography	  was	  rather	  fragile.	  Therefore,	  a	  sensitivity	  study	  was	  
undertaken	   assuming	   a	   different	   theoretical	   variogram.	   In	   addition,	   calculations	  were	   carried	   out	   for	   a	  
dam	  of	  half	  the	  length	  (4	  m	  instead	  of	  8	  m)	  as	  well	  as	  for	  permeability	  distributions	  superimposed	  with	  
imperfections	  as	  seen	  in	  Fig.	  2.	  The	  pdf	  is	  rather	  insensitive	  against	  the	  dam	  length	  and	  the	  assumption	  of	  
imperfections.	  Even	  the	  alternative	  variogram	  does	  not	  yield	  significant	  changes	  (note	  the	  linear	  scale	  for	  




Based	  on	  numerical	  experiments	  it	  was	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  small-­‐scale	  measurements	  can	  be	  upscale	  
using	  averaging	  methods	  known	  from	  literature	  (Journel	  et	  al.	  1986).	  This	  suggests	  that	  dimensioning	  can	  
be	   carried	   out	   based	   on	   cautions	   average	   estimates	   and	   the	   required	   reliability	   statement	   (e.g.	   about	   a	  
failure	  probability	  smaller	  than	  10	  4)	  can	  be	  derived	  for	  realist	  dam	  lengths.	  However,	  due	  to	  the	  limited	  
amount	  of	  data	  available	  there	  are	  remaining	  uncertainties	  concerning	  the	  underlying	  model	  assumptions.	  	  
It	   is	   all	   the	  more	   important	   to	   carry	   out	   sensitivity	   studies	   during	  which	   the	   results	   are	   tested	   against	  
changes	  in	  the	  model	  assumptions.	  	  Also,	  it	  should	  be	  checked	  whether	  a	  priori	  information,	  such	  as	  data	  
from	  QA	  during	  construction,	  or	  radar	  measurements,	  could	  be	  used	  to	  substantiate	  these	  assumptions.	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Due	  to	  its	  favorable	  properties,	  in	  particular,	  low	  permeability	  and	  swelling	  capacity,	  bentonite	  has	  been	  
favored	  as	  an	  engineered	  barrier	  and	  backfill	  material	  for	  the	  geological	  storage	  of	  radioactive	  waste.	  To	  
ensure	  safe	   long-­‐term	  performance	   it	   is	   important	   to	  understand	  any	  changes	   in	   these	  properties	  when	  
the	  material	   is	   subject	   to	  heat	  emitting	  waste.	  As	   such,	   this	   study	  will	   investigate	   the	  hydro-­‐mechanical	  
response	  of	  bentonite	  under	  multi-­‐step	  thermal	  loading	  subject	  to	  a	  constant	  volume	  boundary	  condition.	  
The	  experimental	  set	  up	  allows	  continuous	  measurements	  of	  hydraulic	  and	  mechanical	  response	  during	  
each	  phase	  of	  the	  thermal	  cycle.	  	  
	  
The	  constant	  volume	  cell	  was	  placed	  inside	  an	  oven	  and	  connected	  to	  a	  hydraulic	  system	  with	  the	  water	  
reservoir	  located	  externally.	  A	  pressure	  gradient	  of	  4	  MPa	  was	  placed	  across	  the	  sample	  for	  the	  duration	  
of	   the	   test	   in	  order	   to	  map	  the	  evolution	  of	  permeability.	  After	   initial	  hydration	  of	   the	  bentonite,	   in	   this	  
case	  signified	  by	  reaching	   the	  asymptote	   in	   total	   stress,	   the	   temperature	  was	  raised	   in	  20°C	   increments	  
from	  20	  to	  80°C	   followed	  by	  a	   final	  10°C	  step	  to	  reach	  90°C.	  Each	  temperature	  was	  held	  constant	   for	  at	  
least	  7-­‐10	  days	  to	  allow	  the	  stresses	  and	  hydraulic	  transients	  to	  equilibrate.	  	  
	  
This	  data	  set	  will	  provide	  an	  insight	  into	  the	  hydromechanical	  behavior	  of	  the	  bentonite	  and	  the	  evolution	  
of	  its	  permeability	  when	  exposed	  to	  elevated	  temperatures.	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The	  migration	  of	  radionuclides	  in	  the	  geosphere	  is	  to	  a	  large	  extend	  controlled	  by	  sorption	  processes	  onto	  
minerals	   and	   colloids.	   On	   a	   molecular	   level,	   sorption	   phenomena	   involve	   surface	   complexation,	   ion	  
exchange	   as	   well	   as	   solid	   solution	   formation.	   The	   formation	   of	   solid	   solutions	   leads	   to	   the	   structural	  
incorporation	  of	  radionuclides	  in	  a	  host	  structure.	  Such	  solid	  solutions	  are	  ubiquitous	  in	  natural	  systems	  –	  
most	  minerals	   in	  nature	   are	   atomistic	  mixtures	  of	   elements	   rather	   than	  pure	   compounds	  because	   their	  
formation	   leads	   to	   a	   thermodynamically	   more	   stable	   situation	   compared	   to	   the	   formation	   of	   pure	  
compounds.	   However,	   due	   to	   a	   lack	   of	   reliable	   data	   for	   the	   expected	   scenario	   at	   close-­‐to	   equilibrium	  
conditions,	   solid	   solution	   systems	   have	   so	   far	   not	   been	   considered	   in	   long-­‐term	   safety	   assessments	   for	  
nuclear	  waste	  repositories.	  
	  
In	   recent	   years,	   various	   solid-­‐solution	   aqueous	   solution	   systems	   have	   been	   studied.	   Here	   we	   present	  
state-­‐of-­‐the	  art	  results	  regarding	  the	  formation	  of	  (Ra,Ba)SO4	  solid	  solutions.	  In	  some	  scenarios	  describing	  
a	   waste	   repository	   system	   for	   spent	   nuclear	   fuel	   in	   crystalline	   rocks	   226Ra	   dominates	   the	   radiological	  
impact	   to	   the	  environment	  associated	  with	   the	  potential	   release	  of	  radionuclides	   from	  the	  repository	   in	  
the	  future.	  The	  solubility	  of	  Ra	  in	  equilibrium	  with	  (Ra,Ba)SO4	  is	  much	  lower	  than	  the	  one	  calculated	  with	  
RaSO4	  as	   solubility	   limiting	  phase.	  Especially,	   the	  available	   literature	  data	   for	   the	   interaction	  parameter	  
WBaRa,	  which	  describes	  the	  non-­‐ideality	  of	  the	  solid	  solution,	  vary	  by	  about	  one	  order	  of	  magnitude	  (Zhu,	  
2004;	  Curti	  et	  al.,	  2010)).	  The	  final	  226Ra	  concentration	  in	  this	  system	  is	  extremely	  sensitive	  to	  the	  amount	  
of	   barite,	   the	   difference	   in	   the	   solubility	   products	   of	   the	   end-­‐member	   phases,	   and	   the	   degree	   of	   non-­‐
ideality	  of	  the	  solid	  solution	  phase.	  
	  
Here,	  we	  have	  enhanced	  the	  fundamental	  understanding	  	  regarding	  (1)	  the	  thermodynamics	  of	  (Ra,Ba)SO4	  
solid	   solutions	   and	   (2)	   the	   kinetics	   of	   Ra	   uptake.	   A	   novel	   approach	   combining	   atomistic	   simulations,	  
radiochemical	   batch-­‐type	   laboratory	   experiments	   and	   modern	   analytical	   techniques	   supported	   by	  
thermodynamic	   modeling.	   The	   kinetic	   results	   indicate	   a	   very	   fast	   uptake	   of	   Ra	   which	   leads	   to	   a	  
concentration	  plateaue	  with	  a	  reduction	  of	  more	  than	  99%	  of	  the	  Ra	  concentration.	  The	  thermodynamic	  
modeling	   indicate	   a	   good	   agreement	   of	   the	   apparent	   final	   Ra(aq)	   equilibrium	   concentration	   from	  
experimental	  data	  at	  RT	  with	  the	  computed	  WBaRa.	  	  
	  
A	  comprehensive	  model	  was	  developed	  for	  the	  thermodynamic	  definition	  of	  a	  (Ra,Ba)SO4,	  which	  can	  now	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Thick-­‐walled	   cast-­‐iron	   containers	   encapsulate	   highly	   radioactive	   waste	   in	   a	   deep	   geological	   repository	  
and	  provide	  mechanical	  stabilization	  against	  lithostatic	  pressure	  and	  shear	  forces.	  Intrusion	  of	  water	  and	  
corrosion,	  however,	  limits	  container	  integrity	  to	  a	  certain	  time	  period	  of	  several	  hundreds	  (BMU,	  2010)	  to	  
several	   thousands	  of	  years	   (NAGRA,	  2002).	  Repository	  concepts	   in	  crystalline	  rock	   therefore	   include	  an	  
additional	  copper	  coating,	  providing	  chemical	  resistance	  against	  water	  corrosion.	  	  	  
	  
Safety	   analyses	   usually	   do	   not	   consider	   chemical	   barrier	   functions	   of	   corroding	   cast	   iron	   containers.	  
Anaerobic	   iron	   corrosion	   establishes	   strongly	   reducing	   conditions	   with	   redox	   potentials	   at	   the	   water	  
stability	  limit	  (see	  Fig.).	  H2	  produced	  upon	  anaerobic	  iron	  corrosion	  strongly	  inhibits	  the	  radiolysis	  driven	  
corrosion	   of	   used	   nuclear	   fuel	   (Spahiu	   et	   al.,	   2000).	   Simultaneously,	   iron	   converts	   into	   secondary	  
corrosion	  phases	  such	  as	  Fe(OH)2,	  green	  rust	  phases,	  magnetite	  etc..	  In	  a	  disposal	  concept	  as	  discussed	  in	  
Germany	   for	   horizontal	   waste	   emplacement	   of	   heat-­‐producing	   radioactive	   waste	   that	   involves	   thick-­‐
walled	   (e.g.	  POLLUX®)	   containers	   the	  Fe-­‐inventory	   (ca.	   270.000	  Mg)	   is	  by	   far	   exceeding	   the	   forecasted	  
inventory	   of	   uranium,	   the	   main	   component	   of	   used	   nuclear	   fuel	   (ca.	   15.000	   Mg)	   (Bollingerfehr	   et	   al.,	  
2011).	   It	   is	   obvious	   that	   the	   corroding	   container	  must	  be	   considered	  as	   a	  potential	   additional	   chemical	  
barrier	   in	   nuclear	   waste	   disposal	   concepts,	   that	   retards	   migration	   or	   even	   causes	   immobilization	   of	  
dissolved	  radionuclides.	  	  
	  
We	   have	   investigated	   the	   interactions	   of	   various	   radionuclides	   representative	   for	   heat-­‐producing	  
radioactive	   waste	   with	   various	   iron	   mineral	   phases.	   According	   to	   our	   results	   and	   in	   agreement	   with	  
published	  studies	  radionuclides	  do	  react	  with	  secondary	  iron	  corrosion	  products	  via	  various	  mechanisms:	  	  
	  
	  
Fig.	  1.	  Possible	  radionuclide	  retention	  processes	  schematically	  indicated	  in	  a	  simplified	  redox	  diagram	  of	  iron	  (10-­‐4	  
mol	  L-­‐1	  total	  Fe	  concentration)(Metz	  et	  al.,	  2012)	  
	  
Fe3O4(s)




• surface	  induced	  reduction	  of	  actinides	  (e.g.	  U,	  Np,	  Pu)	  and	  fission	  products	  (e.g.	  Tc,	  Se)	  by	  which	  
they	  transform	  to	  reduced	  and	  poorly	  mobile	  species	  
• surface	   complexation	   of	   redox	   inactive	   radionuclides	   (e.g.	   Am)	   at	   reactive	   surfaces	   by	   which	  
migration	  is	  retarded	  
• formation	  of	  secondary	  solid	  phases	  (e.g.	  FeSex)	  
	  
Recent	   experimental	   findings	  on	   radionuclide	   retention	  on	   iron	   corrosion	  products	  will	   be	   summarized	  
and	  their	  relevance	  for	  safety	  case	  consideration	  will	  be	  discussed.	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For	   the	   safe	  disposal	   of	   high-­‐level	   radioactive	  waste,	   different	  host	   rocks	   are	   currently	   considered.	  The	  
favorable	  properties	  of	  claystone	  are	  low	  permeability,	  retention	  capacity	  for	  some	  radionuclides,	  and	  the	  
ability	  to	  self-­‐seal	  cracks,	  e.g.	  by	  swelling	  or	  time-­‐dependent	  compaction	  creep.	  For	  the	  understanding	  of	  
the	  long-­‐term	  behavior	  of	  clay	  host	  rocks,	  the	  interaction	  between	  mechanical	  behavior,	  micro	  fabric,	  and	  
mineral	  composition	  has	  to	  be	  understood	  (Bock	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  In	  the	  international	  research	  project	  Mont	  
Terri	   (Switzerland)	   the	   Opalinus	   Clay	   (Jurassic	   Formation)	   is	   investigated	   in	   an	   underground	   rock	  
laboratory	  (URL).	  	  
	  
In	  the	  present	  study	  the	  relationship	  between	  mechanical,	  mineralogical	  and	  micro	  fabric	  properties	  were	  
studied	  on	   representative	   samples	   of	   the	   sandy	   and	   shaly	   facies	   of	   the	  Opalinus	  Clay	   (OPA)	   from	  Mont	  
Terri.	  	  
	  
The	   mineral	   composition	   of	   all	   samples	   was	   analysed	   by	   using	   a	   complex	   mineral	   phase	   analysis.	  
Therefore,	   the	   results	   of	   the	   X-­‐ray	   diffraction,	   X-­‐ray	   fluoreszence,	   organic	   and	   inorganic	   carbonate	  
analysis	  (LECO)	  were	  adjusted	  with	  each	  other.	  	  
	  
In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   sandy	   facies	   (OPA)	   the	   mechanical	   strength	   inrcreases	   with	   increasing	   carbonate	  
content.	  Here	  small	  carbonate	  particles	  form	  the	  matrix	  and	  act	  as	  stabilisator.	  The	  carbonates	  of	  the	  shaly	  
facies	  (OPA),	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  mainly	  fossil	  fragments	  (e.g.	  shells)	  aligned	  parallel	  to	  bedding.	  These	  
large	  carbonate	  particles	  are	  acting	  as	  predetermined	  breaking	  surfaces.	  Hence,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  shaly	  facies	  
(OPA)	  the	  mechanical	  strength	  decreases	  with	  increasing	  carbonate	  content.	  
	  
Image	   Analyses	   (Fiji®)	   of	   scattering	   electron	   microscope	   images	   of	   polished	   sections	   proved	   the	  
determined	   microstructural	   differences.	   Besides,	   carbonate	   particles	   in	   the	   sandy	   facies	   are	   mostly	  
isometric,	   in	   contrast	   carbonates	   of	   the	   shaly	   facies	   show	  different	   shapes.	   This	   is	   explained	   further	   in	  
terms	  of	  the	  aspect	  ratio.	  
	  
The	  mechanical	  tests	  were	  carried	  out	  as	  triaxal	  strength	  test	  (Kármán	  cell).	  The	  samples	  were	  analysed	  
parallel	  and	  perpendicular	  to	  the	  bedding.	  For	  both	  cases	  the	  failure	  strength	  of	  σfail	  was	  twice	  as	  high	  as	  it	  
was	  found	  for	  the	  samples	  of	  the	  shaly	  facies.	  
	  
The	   results	   improve	   the	   understanding	   of	   the	   mechanical	   properties	   and	   behavior	   of	   claystones,	  
particulary	  considering	  the	  variability	  of	  mineral	  composition	  and	  micro	  fabric.	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The	   use	   of	   cementitious	   materials	   in	   nuclear	   waste	   management	   is	   quite	   widespread.	   It	   covers	   the	  
solidification	  of	  low/intermediate-­‐level	  liquid	  as	  well	  as	  solid	  wastes	  (e.g.	   laboratory	  wastes)	  and	  serves	  
as	   shielding.	   For	   both	   high-­‐level	   and	   intermediate-­‐low	   level	   activity	   repositories,	   cement/concrete	  
likewise	   plays	   an	   important	   role.	   It	   is	   used	   as	   construction	   material	   for	   underground	   and	   surface	  
disposals,	  but	  more	  importantly	  it	  serves	  as	  barrier	  or	  sealing	  material.	  	  
	  
For	  the	  requirements	  of	  waste	  conditioning,	  special	  cement	  mixtures	  have	  been	  developed.	  These	  include	  
special	  mixtures	  for	  the	  solidification	  of	  evaporator	  concentrates,	  borate	  binding	  additives	  and	  for	  spilling	  
solid	   wastes.	   In	   recent	   years,	   low-­‐pH	   cements	   were	   strongly	   discussed	   especially	   for	   repository	  
applications,	   e.g.	   (Céline	   CAU	   DIT	   COUMES	   2008;	   García-­‐Siñeriz,	   et	   al.	   2008).	   Examples	   for	   relevant	  
systems	   are	   Calcium	   Silicate	   Cements	   (ordinary	   Portland	   cement	   (OPC)	   based)	   or	   Calcium	   Aluminates	  
Cements	   (CAC).	   Low-­‐pH	   pore	   solutions	   are	   achieved	   by	   reduction	   of	   the	   portlandite	   content	   by	   partial	  
substitution	   of	   OPC	   by	   mineral	   admixtures	   with	   high	   silica	   content.	   The	   blends	   follow	   the	   pozzolanic	  
reaction2	  consuming	   Ca(OH)2.	   Potential	   admixtures	   are	   silica	   fume	   (SF)	   and	   fly	   ashes	   (FA).	   In	   these	  
mixtures,	   super	  plasticizers	   are	   required,	   consisting	  of	  polycarboxilate	  or	  naphthalene	   formaldehyde	  as	  
well	  as	  various	  accelerating	  admixtures	  (García-­‐Siñeriz,	  et	  al.	  2008).	  
	  
The	   pH	   regime	   of	   concrete/cement	   materials	   may	   stabilize	   radionuclides	   in	   solution.	   Newly	   formed	  
alteration	   products	   retain	   or	   release	   radionuclides.	   An	   important	   degradation	   product	   of	   celluloses	   in	  
cement	   is	   iso-­‐saccharin	   acid.	   According	   to	   Glaus	   2004	   (Glaus	   and	   van	   Loon	   2004),	   it	   reacts	   with	  
radionuclides	   forming	   dissolved	   complexes.	   Apart	   from	   potentially	   impacting	   radionuclide	   solubility	  
limitations,	   concrete	   additives,	   radionuclides	   or	   other	   strong	   complexants	   compete	   for	   surface	   sites	   for	  
sorbing	  onto	  cement	  phases.	  
	  
In	  Germany,	  the	  alteration	  of	  cement	  and	  the	  mobilization/immobilization	  of	  radionuclides	  were	  studied	  
in	   laboratory	   and	   in	   full-­‐scale	   experiments.	  Most	   of	   these	   experiments	  were	  performed	   in	   relevant	   salt	  
brines.	  The	  results	  on	  following	  investigations	  have	  been	  obtained:	  
	  
• Mechanical	  properties	  	  
• Element	  analyses	  
• Radioactive	  element	  and	  non-­‐radioactive	  constituents	  distributions	  
• Scanning	  electron	  microscopic	  analyses	  	  
• Mineralogical	  analyses	  by	  
! Thermogravimetric	  measurements	  
! Powder	  X-­‐ray	  diffraction	  analyses	  	  
! Raman	  spectroscopy.	  
! XANES/EXAFS	  analyses.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Ca(OH)2	  +	  H4SiO4	  →	  Ca2+	  +	  H2SiO42-­‐	  +	  2	  H2O	  →	  CaH2SiO4"2	  H2O	  




A	   résumé	   of	   the	   results	   including	  modeling	  will	   be	   presented	   and	   the	   impact	   on	   the	   radioactive	  waste	  
disposal	  safety	  will	  be	  demonstrated.	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Abstract:	  Predictions	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  interfacial	  chemistry	  of	  corroding	  iron	  in	  high	  salinary	  milieus	  
at	   temperatures	   of	   25°C	   to	   100°C	   based	   on	   an	   extended	   thermodynamic	   data	   basis	   for	   the	   system	   Fe(II)-­‐
Fe(III)-­‐Na-­‐K-­‐Cl-­‐Mg-­‐Ca-­‐SO4-­‐S-­‐CO3-­‐H2	  are	  presented.	  Future	  research	  directions	  are	  discussed.	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
1	  Introduction	  	  
	  
The	   choice	   of	   a	   host	   rock	   for	   a	   deep	   repository	   for	   the	   final	   disposal	   of	   high-­‐level	   radioactive	  waste	   is	  
subject	  of	  ongoing	  debate	  in	  Germany.	  One	  candidate	  type	  is	  salt	  rock,	  which	  is	  present	  beneath	  the	  entire	  
north	  of	  Germany.	  One	  favorite	  property	  of	  salt	  rock	  is	  its	  impermeability	  for	  aqueous	  solutions,	  which,	  if	  
the	   repository	   is	   constructed	   and	  managed	   properly,	   renders	   the	   probability	   of	   direct	   contact	   between	  
waste	  containments	  and	  aqueous	  solution	  very	  low.	  However,	  as	  it	  cannot	  be	  excluded	  altogether	  that	  the	  
repository	   undergoes	   an	   unforeseen	   evolution,	   a	   situation	   must	   be	   considered	   where	   the	   steel	  
containment	  of	  high-­‐level	  radioactive	  waste	  comes	  into	  contact	  with	  aqueous	  solution.	  Due	  to	  the	  nature	  
of	  the	  host	  rock,	  this	  solution	  will	  be	  a	  high	  ionic	  strength,	  saturated	  salt	  solution.	  Due	  to	  the	  high-­‐saline	  
nature	  of	  the	  solution,	  an	  appropriate	  method	  for	  the	  calculation	  of	  aqueous	  species	  activities	  needs	  to	  be	  
applied.	  The	  overall	  performance	  and	   longevity	  of	   the	  steel	   containment	  will	  ultimately	  be	  governed	  by	  
metallic	   corrosion	   in	   this	   environment.	   The	   corrosion	   process	   can	   only	   be	   understood	   taking	  
thermodynamic	   relations,	   reaction	  kinetics	   and	   transport	  processes	   into	   account.	  Thus,	   thermodynamic	  
aspects	   of	   Fe(II)	   and	   Fe(III)	   in	   concentrated	   solutions	   of	   the	   hexary	   oceanic	   salt	   system	   constitute	   an	  
essential	   frame	   for	  modeling	   and	  predicting	   corrosion	  processes	   in	   repositories	   in	   salt	   rock	   formations	  
upon	   contact	   with	   salt	   solution	   and	   traces	   of	   oxygen	   trapped	   in	   the	   backfill	   salt	   initiate	   an	   aerobic	  
corrosion	   phase	   which	   further	   evolves	   under	   reducing	   conditions	   where	   corrosion	   proceeds	   with	  
hydrogen	  evolution	  (Wang	  et	  al	  2001).	  The	  stability	  of	  corrosion	  products	  generated	  upon	  contact	  of	  steel	  
containers	  with	  saline	  solutions	  may	  have	  a	  large	  impact	  on	  the	  transport	  of	  radioactive	  contaminants	  that	  
have	  been	  mobilized	  from	  the	  waste	  matrix.	  For	  instance,	  zero-­‐valent	  iron	  was	  tested	  for	  the	  removal	  of	  
uranium	   by	   reductive	   precipitation	   of	   uranyl	   to	   less	   soluble	   U(IV)-­‐compounds	   and	   the	   adsorption	   of	  
uranyl	  cations	  on	  iron	  corrosion	  products	  (Farrel	  et	  al	  1999).	  The	  removing	  rate	  by	  reduction	  of	  U(VI)	  to	  
slightly	   soluble	   U(IV)	   species	   depends	   greatly	   on	   the	   activity	   of	   solution	   species	   and	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  
corrosion	  products	  .	  	  
	  
The	  corrosion	  rate	  can	  be	  controlled	  by	  the	  nature	  of	  precipitation	  products,	  which	  may	  be	  constituted	  by	  
oxy-­‐chlorides,	  sulfates,	  sulfides	  and	  carbonates,	  depending	  on	  the	  composition,	  temperature	  and	  pressure	  
of	   the	   salinary	   surrounding	   media	   and	   the	   availability	   of	   water	   (by	   its	   transport	   rate	   into	   the	   direct	  
proximity	  of	  the	  waste	  canister).	  This	  work	  presents	  the	  progress	  achieved	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  self-­‐
consistent	  data	  base	  for	  the	  prediction	  of	  the	  thermodynamic	  stability	  of	  the	  canister	  material.	  	  
	  
	  






The	  stability	  of	  iron	  corrosion	  products	  for	  given	  T,	  P	  and	  chemical	  composition	  of	  the	  salinary	  media	  in	  
salinary	   solutions,	   without	   regarding	   a	   priori	   kinetic	   aspects,	   is	   defined	   by	   the	   Gibbs	   free	   energy	   of	  
dissolution	  reaction:	  
	  








ir 0fRTln)(mRTln(T)GΔνG(T)Δ ji 	   	   	   	   (1)	  
	  
where	  ΔfG0i	  is	  the	  standard	  partial	  molar	  Gibbs	  energy	  of	  formation	  of	  the	  species	  i	  at	  temperature	  T	  and	  ai	  
is	   the	   corresponding	  activity,	   given	  by	  miγi,	  where	  mi	   and	  γi	   are	   the	  molality	  and	   the	  activity	   coefficient	  
respectively	  and	   fj	   is	   the	   fugacity	  of	  gas	   j.	  This	  equation	  synthetizes	   the	   two	   fields	   in	  which	   this	  work	   is	  
structured.	  The	  first	  one	  consists	  in	  the	  calculation	  of	  the	  Gibbs	  free	  energy	  of	  the	  reaction	  at	  T≠T0.	  This	  is	  



























−Δ+== ∫∫∑ 	   	   (2)	  
	  
The	  activity	  of	   solution	  species,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	   is	  calculated	  by	   the	  Pitzer	  model	   (Pitzer	  1991).	  This	  
model	  describes	  the	  thermodynamic	  behavior	  of	  electrolyte	  solutions	  at	  high	  ionic	  strengths	  by	  adding	  a	  
virial	   term	   accounting	   for	   non-­‐electrostatic	   ion	   interactions	   to	   the	   expression	   extended	   Debye-­‐Hückel	  













φ 	  	   	   	   	   	   (3)	  
	  
can	  be	  derived,	  where	  fs(I)	  is	  a	  function	  of	  the	  ionic	  strength	  and	  fs	  (αij(1),	  αij(2),	  βij(0),	  βij(1),	  βij(2),	  Cijφ,	  θii,	  ψijk	  )	  
is	  a	  function	  of	  binary	  (αij(1),	  αij(2),	  βij(0),	  βij(1),	  βij(2),	  Cijφ)	  and	  ternary	  interaction	  parameters	  (θii,	  ψijk	  ),	  which	  
are	   calculated	   by	   regression	   of	   experimentally	   determined	   activities	   and	   osmotic	   coefficients.	   The	  
temperature	  dependence	   of	   interaction	  parameters,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   is	   expressed	  by	   the	   generalized	  
function:	  
	  
( ) ( ) )TT(cT/TlnbT/1T/1a)T(Y)T(Y 0000 −++−+= 	   	   	   	   	   (4)	  
	  
where	   Y:	   βij(0),	   βij(1),	   βij(2),	   Cijφ.	   θii,	  ψijk	   and	   T0	  =	   298.15	   K.	   This	   expansion	   suits	   very	  well	   in	   the	   range	   of	  
investigated	  temperatures.	  	  
	  
For	   modeling	   of	   iron	   corrosion	   in	   high-­‐level	   radioactive	   waste	   rock	   repositories,	   a	   set	   of	   binary	   and	  
ternary	   interaction	  parameters	  of	  Fe(II)	  and	  Fe(III)	   in	   the	   system	  K-­‐Na-­‐Mg-­‐Ca-­‐Cl-­‐SO4-­‐S-­‐SO4-­‐CO3	  valid	   in	  
the	  temperature	  range	  of	  25°C	  to	  100°C	  is	  mandatory.	  Pitzer	  parameters	  for	  ions	  of	  the	  system	  K-­‐Na-­‐Mg-­‐
Ca-­‐Cl-­‐SO4-­‐CO3-­‐H2O	   can	   be	   taken	   from	   the	   data	   basis	   THEREDA.	   Interaction	   parameters	   of	   Fe(III)	   and	  
Fe(II)	  in	  the	  system	  K-­‐Na-­‐Mg-­‐Ca-­‐Cl-­‐SO4-­‐H2O	  at	  25°C	  are	  taken	  from	  the	  literature	  (Rumyantsev	  et	  al	  2004)	  
(Moog	  et	  al	  2004).	  In	  this	  work,	  temperature	  coefficients	  of	  interaction	  parameters	  for	  Fe(II)	  in	  the	  system	  
K-­‐Na-­‐Mg-­‐Ca-­‐Cl-­‐SO4-­‐H2O	  were	  calculated	  from	  data	  obtained	  by	  an	  extensive	  literature	  review	  of	  solubility	  
and	   isopiestic	   data	   and	   own	   isopiestic	   experiments.	   Experimental	   details	   are	   described	   elsewhere	  
(Scharge	  et	  al	  2013).	  	  
	  
	  




3	  Results	  and	  discussion	  
	  
The	   equilibrium	   constants	   for	   the	   formation	   reactions	   of	   possible	   corrosion	   products	   were	   calculated	  
using	   thermodynamic	   properties	   of	   basis	   species	   and	   corrosion	   products	   selected	   from	   an	   extensive	  
literature	  review	  (see	  Table	  A1).	  They	  were	  added	  in	  the	  parameter	  file	  for	  Geochemist´s	  Workbench	  as	  ln	  
K(T)	  in	  the	  form	  of	  eq.(4).	  	  
	  
The	   temperature	   coefficients	   of	   Pitzer	   parameters	   for	   the	   system	  Fe(II)-­‐K-­‐Na-­‐Mg-­‐Ca-­‐Cl-­‐SO4-­‐H2O,	   on	   the	  
other	  hand,	  were	  calculated	  from	  a	  large	  set	  of	  solubility	  data	  in	  binary	  and	  ternary	  systems	  reported	  in	  
the	   literature.	   This	   procedure	   requires	   the	   input	   of	   solubility	   constants	   of	   Fe(II)-­‐salts	   and	   their	  
temperature	  dependency.	  Because	  in	  most	  of	  the	  cases	  these	  data	  are	  not	  available,	  they	  are	  introduced	  as	  
new	  unknown	  variables	   to	  be	  calculated	  by	  regression	  of	  experimental	  solubility	  data	   together	  with	  the	  
temperature	  coefficients	  of	  Pitzer	  parameters.	  Calculated	  parameters	  are	  shown	  in	  Table	  A2.	  The	  use	  of	  
this	  set	  of	  parameters	  does	  not	  consider	  the	  formation	  of	  iron	  complexes.	  	  
	  
The	  environmental	  condition,	  under	  which	  the	  corrosion	  of	  iron	  canisters	  in	  long-­‐term	  repositories	  takes	  
place,	  changes	  with	  time.	  In	  a	  first	  stage,	  corrosion	  occurs	  under	  hot	  (100-­‐150°C)	  and	  aerobic	  conditions.	  
As	  the	  initially	  trapped	  oxygen	  is	  consumed	  by	  corrosion	  (partial	  electrochemical	  reduction	  reaction)	  or	  
microbiological	   processes,	   the	   repository	   environment	   becomes	   anaerobic	   and	   remains	   so	   indefinitely.	  
Eq.(5)	  and	  (6)	  represents	  the	  total	  corrosion	  reaction	  for	  aerobic	  and	  anaerobic	  conditions	  respectively:	  
	  
Fe	  +	  ½	  O2(aq)	  +	  H2O	  →	  Fe(OH)2	   	   	   	   	   (5)	  
Fe	  +	  2	  H2O	  →	  Fe(OH)2	  +	  H2(aq)	   	   	   	   	   (6)	  
	  
where	   Fe(OH)2	   is	   considered	   the	   primary	   corrosion	   product.	   The	   thermodynamic	   stability	   of	   the	  
corroding	   interface	  was	  modelled	  by	  using	   the	   titration	  modus	   (React)	   of	   the	  Geochemist´s	  Workbench	  
tool	   after	   adding	   the	   calculated	   log	  K(T)	   and	  Pitzer	   parameters	   into	   the	   parameter	   file.	   In	   our	   reaction	  
model	   shown	   in	   Fig.	   1	   the	   salty	   phase	   in	   contact	   with	   the	   corroding	   interface	   is	   regarded	   as	   an	   open	  
system.	  For	  modeling	  purposes,	  Fe(OH)2	  is	  injected	  in	  the	  system,	  while	  stoichiometric	  amounts	  of	  O2	  are	  
extracted.	  The	  enclosed	  air	  is	  regarded	  as	  a	  gas	  buffer	  with	  an	  unconstrained	  fugacity.	  	  
	  
	  
Fig.1.	  Schematic	  diagram	  of	  the	  reaction	  model	  for	  the	  corrosion	  of	  iron	  
	  
Fig.	   2	   shows	   the	   masses	   of	   iron	   minerals	   formed	   by	   Fe(OH)2	   titration	   for	   three	   different	   brine	  
compositions	   at	   25°C	   and	   70°C	   at	   1	   bar.	   In	   particular,	   the	   transition	   of	   aerobic	   to	   an	   anaerobic	  
environment	   is	  given	  by	  consumption	  of	   initially	  present	  O2(aq)	   followed	  by	   its	   further	  extraction	   from	  
water	   and	   the	   corresponding	   generation	   of	   H2	   according	   to	   H2O	   –	   ½	   O2(aq)	   →	   H2(aq).	   Further	  




assumptions	  are	  unhindered	  equilibration	  of	  the	  couples	  Fe2+/Fe3+	  and	  HS-­‐/SO42-­‐	  and	  an	  initial	  fugacity	  of	  
0.2	  for	  oxygen	  in	  the	  enclosed	  air.	  	  
	  
	  
Fig.	  2.	  Stability	  diagrams	  of	  corrosion	  products	  for	  different	  composition	  and	  temperatures	  of	  the	  salinary	  media.	  
	  
It	  can	  be	  observed,	  that	  hematite	  (α-­‐Fe2O3)	  is	  the	  predominant	  corrosion	  product	  in	  saturated	  NaCl-­‐brine	  
at	  70°C	  in	  the	  aerobic	  stage.	  Its	  formation	  is	  connected	  with	  the	  initial	  consumption	  of	  dissolved	  oxygen.	  
Further	  iron	  dissolution	  forces	  the	  generation	  of	  a	  reducing	  environment	  and	  the	  conversion	  of	  hematite,	  
a	   first	   into	   magnetite	   and	   into	   green	   rust	   (Cl)	   later.	   This	   reaction	   picture	   contrasts	   with	   that	   at	   25°C,	  
where	   the	   main	   product	   in	   the	   initial	   oxidizing	   environment	   is	   goethite;	   hematite	   and	   green	   rust	   (Cl)	  
coexist	  in	  the	  anaerobic	  phase.	  The	  presence	  of	  sulfate	  in	  the	  brine	  inhibits	  the	  formation	  of	  magnetite	  and	  
green	  rust	  (Cl)	  in	  the	  anaerobic	  environment.	  Instead,	  pyrite	  appears	  as	  coexisting	  corrosion	  product.	  The	  
presence	  of	  MgCl2	  in	  the	  brine	  acts	  as	  buffer,	  limiting	  the	  increase	  of	  interfacial	  pH	  by	  formation	  of	  brucite.	  
The	  formation	  of	  pyrite	  in	  the	  reducing	  environment	  is	  conditioned	  to	  an	  equilibrium	  of	  the	  redox	  couple	  
HS-­‐/SO42-­‐,	  which	  is	  conceivable	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  sulfate	  reducing	  bacteria.	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Fe2+	   -­‐90.72	   -­‐102.17	   -­‐23.0	  
Fe3+	   -­‐16.23	   -­‐282.40	   -­‐108.0	  
O2(g)	   0.00	   205.15	   29.4	  
H2O(l)	   -­‐228.58	   188.84	   33.6	  
H+	   0.00	   0.00	   0.0	  
Cl-­‐	   -­‐131.22	   56.60	   -­‐120.57	  
SO42-­‐	   -­‐744.00	   18.50	   -­‐261.94	  
CO32-­‐	   -­‐527.90	   -­‐50.00	   -­‐284.86	  
HS-­‐	   12.24	   67.00	   -­‐92.01	  
HCO3-­‐	   -­‐586.85	   98.40	   -­‐33.12	  
	   	   	   	  
corrosion	  products	   	   	   	  
α-­‐Fe2O3	   -­‐744.45	   87.40	   103.9	  
γ-­‐	  Fe2O3	   -­‐727.83	   93.04	   104.7	  
α-­‐FeOOH	   -­‐489.54	   59.70	   74.4	  
γ-­‐FeOOH	   -­‐479.88	   65.08	   69.1	  
α-­‐Fe3O4	   -­‐1012.719	   145.89	   150.78	  
β-­‐FeOOH	   -­‐481.7	   53.8	   91.416	  
Fe(OH)2	   -­‐483.99	   87.864	   86.312	  
FeCO3(cr)	   -­‐679.557	   95.537	   82.45	  
FeS2(cr)	   -­‐187.317	   52.916	   62.124	  
FeS(cr)	   -­‐125.155	   60.321	   50.888	  
FeII4FeIII2(OH)12SO4	   -­‐3819.40	   	   	  
Fe2(OH)3Cl	   -­‐923.50	   	   	  
FeII3FeIII(OH)8Cl	   -­‐2145.00	   	   	  
FeII4FeIII2(OH)12CO3	   -­‐3588.00	   	   	  
	  
	   	  




Table	   A2:	   Set	   of	   interaction	   Pitzer	   parameters	   for	   the	   system	   Fe(II)-­‐K-­‐Na-­‐Mg-­‐Ca-­‐Cl-­‐SO4-­‐H2O.	   (Moog	   et	   al,	   2004,	  
Rumyantsev	  et	  al	  2004).	  
System	   Pitzer	  parameter	   T	  =	  25°C	   a	   b	   c	  
Fe(II)-­‐Cl	   βij(0)	   0,37324	   0,00630	   -­‐0,00719	   -­‐0,00171	  
	   βij(1)	   1,13499	   0,00012	   -­‐0,01910	   0,01722	  
	   βij(2)	   0,00000	   0,00000	   0,00000	   0,00000	  
	   Cijφ	   -­‐0,02152433	   0,03862	   0,01409	   0,00008	  
Fe(II)-­‐SO4	   βij(0)	   0,28863	   0,16231	   -­‐1,99485	   0,00784	  
	   βij(1)	   2,70661	   0,04271	   -­‐6,59538	   0,01765	  
	   βij(2)	   -­‐42,00000	   0,00043	   -­‐0,05944	   0,23281	  
	   Cijφ	   0,00748	   0,14951	   1,42619	   -­‐0,00533	  
Fe(II)-­‐Na-­‐Cl	   θii	   0,12956	   -­‐0,01134	   0,66065	   -­‐0,00246	  
	   ψijk	   -­‐0,02119	   -­‐0,04760	   -­‐0,25691	   0,00084	  
Fe(II)-­‐Na-­‐SO4	   ψijk	   -­‐0,06550	   -­‐0,00411	   0,76916	   -­‐0,00154	  
Fe(II)-­‐K-­‐Cl	   θii	   -­‐0,028460	   -­‐0,01415	   2,50679	   -­‐0,00680	  
	   ψijk	   -­‐0,01405	   -­‐0,05412	   0,71357	   -­‐0,00220	  
Fe(II)-­‐K-­‐SO4	   ψijk	   -­‐0,02598	   0,00633	   -­‐0,92055	   0,00451	  
Fe(II)-­‐Mg-­‐Cl	   θii	   0,07310	   0,00514	   -­‐0,72877	   0,00382	  
	   ψijk	   -­‐0,02436	   0,01223	   -­‐2,15550	   0,00638	  
Fe(II)-­‐Mg-­‐SO4	   ψijk	   -­‐0,01342	   -­‐0,00603	   1,09739	   -­‐0,00367	  
Fe(II)-­‐Ca-­‐Cl	   θii	   0,08581	   -­‐0,00003	   0,00507	   -­‐0,02459	  
	   ψijk	   -­‐0,02423	   -­‐0,00015	   0,02200	   0,00340	  
Fe(II)-­‐Ca-­‐SO4	   ψijk	   -­‐0,29597	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	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Argillaceous	  rock	  formations	  are	  under	  consideration	  as	  a	  potential	  host	  rock	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  high-­‐
level	  nuclear	  waste	  repositories.	  Under	  environmental	  conditions	  the	  most	  stable	  oxidation	  states	  of	  237Np	  
(t1/2=2.1×106	  a)	  are	  Np(IV)	  and	  Np(V).	  We	  have	  investigated	  the	  sorption	  and	  diffusion	  of	  the	  more	  mobile	  
Np(V)	  in	  Opalinus	  Clay	  (OPA,	  Mont	  Terri,	  Switzerland)	  (Wu	  et	  al.	  2009,	  Fröhlich	  et	  al.	  2011	  and	  2012	  a).	  
OPA,	  which	  is	  present	  in	  Switzerland	  and	  southern	  Germany,	  possesses	  a	  micro-­‐scale	  heterogeneity	  and	  is	  
composed	  of	  several	  types	  of	  clay	  minerals,	  but	  also	  of	  calcite,	  quartz	  and	  iron(II)-­‐bearing	  minerals.	  In	  our	  
previous	   diffusion	   (Wu	   et	   al.	   2009)	   and	   anaerobic	   sorption	   experiments	   (Fröhlich	   et	   al.	   2011),	   we	  
observed	   higher	   distribution	   coefficients,	   Kd,	   than	   expected	   from	   batch	   experiments	   performed	   in	   air,	  
indicating	   that	   a	   partial	   reduction	   of	   Np(V)	   to	   Np(IV)	   had	   occurred.	   To	   test	   this	   hypothesis,	   different	  
sorption	  and	  diffusion	  samples	  with	  Np(V)	  were	  prepared	  at	  pH	  7.6	  for	  spatially	  resolved	  molecular-­‐level	  
investigations	  at	  the	  microXAS	  beamline	  at	  the	  Swiss	  Light	  Source	  (PSI,	  Villigen,	  Switzerland)	  (Fröhlich	  et	  
al.	  2012	  b).	  	  
	  
Elemental	   distributions	  of	   Ca,	   Fe	   and	  Np	  have	  been	  determined	  by	  µ-­‐XRF	  mapping.	  Regions	  of	   high	  Np	  
concentration	  were	   subsequently	   investigated	   by	  Np	  LIII-­‐edge	   µ-­‐XANES.	   In	  most	   samples	  Np	   spots	  with	  
considerable	   amounts	   of	   tetravalent	   Np	   could	   be	   found,	   even	   when	   the	   experiments	   were	   performed	  
under	  ambient-­‐air	  conditions.	  In	  some	  cases,	  almost	  pure	  Np(IV)	  LIII-­‐edge	  XANES	  spectra	  were	  recorded.	  
In	  case	  of	  the	  anaerobic	  sorption	  sample,	  a	  clear	  correlation	  between	  Np	  and	  Fe	  was	  observed	  by	  µ-­‐XRF,	  
indicating	   that	   iron(II)-­‐bearing	   minerals	   could	   be	   responsible	   for	   the	   reduction	   of	   Np(V).	   µ-­‐XRD	  
measurements	  of	  this	  sample	  showed	  that	  pyrite	  is	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  redox-­‐active	  phases	  determining	  the	  
speciation	  of	  Np	   in	  OPA.	   In	  this	  case,	  Np	  was	  accumulated	  on	  pyrite,	   indicating	  that	   the	  reduction	  of	  Np	  
occured	  near	  the	  surface.	  
	  
In	  our	  recent	  long-­‐term	  diffusion	  experiment	  using	  8	  µM	  Np(V)	  in	  OPA	  pore	  water	  (pH	  7.6),	  we	  were	  able	  
to	  map	  the	  speciation	  of	  Np	  along	  a	  2	  mm	  long	  diffusion	  path	  parallel	  to	  the	  bedding	  of	  the	  clay.	  These	  µ-­‐
XANES	  measurements	  showed	  that	  mobile	  Np(V)	  is	  immobilized	  in	  Opalinus	  Clay	  as	  Np(IV)	  by	  progessive	  
reduction	  along	  its	  diffusion	  path,	  further	  consolidating	  the	  suitability	  of	  argillaceous	  rocks	  with	  regard	  to	  
the	  long-­‐term	  storage	  of	  Np.	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   financed	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Recent	  safety	  assessments	   for	  repository	  concepts	   that	  combine	  a	  clay	  engineered	  barrier	  system	  (EBS)	  
with	  a	  fractured	  rock	  have	  shown	  that	  melt	  water	  intrusion	  may	  have	  a	  direct	  impact	  on	  the	  EBS	  barrier	  
function	  in	  two	  aspects:	  
	  
• Generation	  of	  colloids	  may	  degrade	  the	  engineered	  barrier	  
• Colloid	  transport	  of	  radionuclides	  may	  reduce	  the	  efficiency	  of	  the	  natural	  barrier	  
	  
The	  studies	  presented	  here	  are	  performed	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  Federal	  Ministery	  of	  Economic	  Affairs	  
and	   Energy	   (BMWi)	   KIT/GRS	   project	   KOLLORADO-­‐e,	   the	   EU	   collobarative	   project	   CP	   BELBaR	  
(www.skb.se/belbar)	   and	   especially	   within	   the	   Colloid	   Formation	   and	   Migration	   (CFM)	   project	   at	   the	  
Grimsel	  Test	  Site,	  GTS	  (www.grimsel.com).	  	  
	  
Key	   research	   areas	   are	   (a)	   the	   erosion	   of	   the	   bentonite	   buffer,	   (b)	   clay	   colloid	   stability	   and	   (c)	   colloid-­‐
radionuclide-­‐	   host	   rock	   surface	   interactions.	   Concerning	   bentonite	   buffer	   integrity	   parameters	   like	   the	  
bentonite	   type,	   Na-­‐/Ca-­‐exchangeable	   cation	   ratio,	   compaction	   density,	   role	   of	   accessory	   minerals,	   the	  
fracture	  aperture	  size	  and	  groundwater	  chemistry	  and	  flow	  velocity	  are	  investigated	  in	  order	  to	  identify	  
controlling	   factors,	   understand	   the	   main	   mechanisms	   of	   erosion	   from	   the	   bentonite	   surface	   and	   to	  
quantify	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  possible	  erosion	  under	  these	  different	  conditions.	  Clay	  colloid	  stability	  studies	  
are	   performed	   under	   different	   geochemical	   conditions.	   The	  main	   objective	   is	   to	   answer	   the	   question	   if	  
colloids	   formed	   at	   the	   near/far	   field	   interface	   would	   be	   stable	   only	   if	   favourable	   conditions	   exist	   and	  
therefore	  their	  relevance	  for	  radionuclide	  transport	  will	  be	  strongly	  dependent	  on	  the	  local	  geochemical	  
conditions	  (inorganic	  cations	  Na+,	  Ca2+,	  Mg2+,	  Al3+	  and	  organic	  complexing	  agents).	  Finally,	  the	  interaction	  
between	  colloids	  and	  radionuclides	  and	   the	  host	   rock	   is	   intensively	   investigated	   in	  order	   to	  answer	   the	  
question,	  how	  colloid	  mobility	  may	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  host	  rock,	  surface	  roughness	  and	  
the	   mechanism	   of	   sorption	   and	   de-­‐sorption	   of	   radionuclides	   on/from	   colloids.	   In	   all	   these	   areas	  
mentioned	  above	  substantial	  laboratory	  studies	  are	  and	  will	  be	  undertaken.	  Beside	  this	  laboratory	  studies	  
the	  unique	  set-­‐up	  installed	  in	  the	  controlled	  zone	  of	  the	  GTS	  gives	  the	  opportunity	  within	  CFM	  to	  study	  the	  
bentonite	  erosion	  and	  colloid	  formation	  under	  near-­‐natural	  repository	  post	  clossure	  hydraulic	  conditions	  
on	  the	  approx.	  deca-­‐meter	  scale.	  	  	  	  
	  
Modeling	   studies	   will	   support	   the	   laboratory	   program	   through	   development	   of	   conceptual	   and	  
mathematical	   descriptions	   of	   the	   observed	   phenomena.	   For	   example,	   simulations	   of	   a	   virtual	   clay	   plug	  
using	   a	   constant	   or	   flow	   rate	   dependent	   erosion	   rate	   are	   compared	   to	   results	   with	   2D/cubic	   law	  
simplifications	  for	  uncertainty	  analysis.	  
	  




The	   final	   outcome	   is	   to	   verify	  how	  colloids	   and	   related	  phenomena	   can	  be	   considered	   in	   the	   long-­‐term	  
safety	   case	   and	   to	   make	   recommendations	   on	   how	   safety	   case	   studies	   could	   pursue	   to	   address	   this	  
potentially	  very	  significant	  issue.	  An	  increased	  understanding	  of	  the	  processes	  investigated	  here	  will	  have	  
an	  effect	  on	  the	  outcome	  of	  future	  assessments.	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When	   the	   in-­‐situ	  monitoring	   in	  a	  geological	  disposal	   facility	   is	   continued	  during	   the	  post-­‐closure	  phase,	  
monitoring	   data	   need	   to	   be	   transmitted	   wirelessly	   from	   the	   repository	   to	   the	   surface.	   Wireless	   data	  
transmission	   is	   used	   today	   in	   many	   applications,	   but	   the	   large	   attenuation	   by	   the	   geologic	   medium	  
between	   de	   disposal	   facility	   and	   the	   surface	  makes	   the	   application	   of	   high-­‐frequency	   based	   techniques	  
impractical.	  	  
	  
As	  part	  of	   the	  EURATOM	  FP-­‐7	  project	  MoDeRn	   (Monitoring	  Developments	   for	  safe	  Repository	  operation	  
and	   staged	   closure),	   NRG	   has	   investigated	   the	   feasibility	   of	   wireless	   data	   transmission	   through	   an	  
argillaceous	  host	  rock	  (Boom	  Clay),	  making	  use	  of	   low	  frequency	  magnetic	   fields.	  The	  main	   focus	  of	   the	  
contribution	   was	   to	   analyze	   and	   optimize	   the	   energy	   efficiency	   of	   this	   technique.	   Therefore,	   a	  
mathematical	  model	  description	  has	  been	  developed	  that	  allows	  to	  estimate	  the	  expected	  signal	  strength	  
on	   the	   earth’s	   surface	   on	   basis	   of	   the	   most	   relevant	   characteristics	   of	   transmitter,	   receiver	   and	  
transmission	  path.	  The	  model	  is	  used	  to	  analyze	  the	  complex	  interactions	  of	  different	  system	  parameters,	  
and	   is	   applied	   to	   design	   an	   optimized	   set-­‐up	   for	   through-­‐the-­‐earth	   data	   transmission	   and	   to	   estimate	  
minimum	  energy	  demands	  for	  signal	  transmission.	  	  
	  
To	   demonstrate	   the	   potentials	   of	   this	   technique,	   experiments	   were	   performed	   in	   the	   225	   m	   deep	  
underground	  research	  facility	  HADES	  in	  Mol,	  Belgium.	  Signal	  propagation	  and	  attenuation	  by	  the	  geologic	  
medium	   between	   the	   HADES	   and	   the	   surface	   has	   been	   measured,	   and	   the	   site-­‐specific	   magnetic	  
background	  noise	  at	  the	  surface	  in	  Mol	  has	  been	  characterized.	  Based	  on	  the	  results,	  optimum	  conditions	  
for	   signal	   transmission	   have	   been	   derived	   and	   data	   transmission	   experiments	   have	   been	   performed.	  
Results	   show	   that	   despite	   large	   local	   interferences	   on	   the	   surface	   in	   Mol,	   wireless	   data	   transmission	  
through	   225	   m	   of	   a	   geological	   medium	   is	   possible.	   Data	   transmission	   rates	   up	   to	   100	   bit/s	   has	   been	  
successfully	  tested.	  	  
	  
The	  experiments	  performed	  clearly	  demonstrated	  the	  feasibility	  to	  transmit	  data	  through	  225	  m	  of	  highly	  
conductive	   geological	  medium,	   even	   under	   unfavorable	   experimental	   conditions	   as	   present	   in	  Mol.	   The	  
amount	  of	  energy	  necessary	  to	  transmit	  data	  to	  the	  surface	  is	  within	  the	  expectations,	  and	  extrapolation	  to	  
generic	  Dutch	  disposal	  concepts	  in	  Boom	  Clay	  (500	  m)	  and	  rock	  salt	  (800	  m)	  shows	  that	  transmission	  of	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Abstract:Results	  are	  presented	  of	  a	  case	  groundwater	   flow-­‐transport	  modeling	  to	  predict	   the	  radionuclide	  
migration	   from	  a	   deep	   geological	   repository	   (DGR)	   of	   radioactive	  waste.	   The	   influence	   of	   hydrogeological	  
conditions	   in	   the	   upper	   aquifers	   of	   a	   storey	  water	   exchange	   system	  on	   the	   rate	   of	   contaminant	  migration	  
from	  the	  DGR	  to	  its	  natural	  far-­‐field	  groundwater	  discharges	  (a	  shallow	  well	  and	  a	  river)	  as	  a	  general	  DGR	  





In	  course	  of	  implementation	  of	  an	  IAEA-­‐coordinated	  Research	  Project	  and	  of	  National	  Academy	  of	  Science	  
of	   Ukraine,	   a	   2D	   vertical-­‐section	   groundwater	   flow	   and	   transport	   modelling	   was	   performed	   for	   a	  
prospective	  DGR	  site	  Veresnya	  in	  the	  Chernobyl	  Exclusion	  Zone	  in	  Ukraine	  (IAEA,	  2013).	  	  
	  
The	  numerical	  model	  was	  developed	  using	  Processing	  Modflow	  groundwater	  modeling	   system	   (Chiang,	  
Kinzelbach,	  2001)	  based	  on	  MODFLOW	  code	  for	  the	  groundwater	  flow	  (McDonald,	  Harbaugh,	  1988),	  and	  
MT3DMs	  code	  for	  the	  contaminant	  transport	  (Zheng	  &	  Wang,	  1998).	  The	  advection	  transport	  paths	  and	  
transport	  times	  were	  evaluated	  using	  the	  particle	  tracking	  method	  with	  PmPath	  code	  (Pollock,	  1989),	  by	  
successive	  execution	  of	  MODFLOW	  and	  PMPath	  codes	  for	  each	  simulation	  series.	  	  
	  
The	   modelling	   was	   aimed	   at	   studying	   the	   DGR	   safety	   condition	   as	   related	   with	   the	   assessed	   rate	   of	  
possible	   radionuclide	  migration	   from	   the	  DGR	   to	   the	   natural	   groundwater	   discharge	   boundaries	   of	   the	  
site.	  The	  hydrogeological	  scheme	  of	  the	  site	  and	  the	  model	  grid	  section	  are	  shown	  on	  Fig.	  1.	  
	  
Fig.	  1.	  Site	  hydrogeological	  scheme	  and	  model	  section	  
	  
The	  model	  section	  domain,	  1.5	  km	  deep	  and	  5	  km	  long,	   is	  gridded	  into	  9	  layers,	  and	  each	  layer	  into	  100	  
50-­‐m	   blocks.	   The	   constant	   head	   boundaries	   are	   applied	   at	   the	   upper	   right	   corner	   of	   the	   section	  




representing	   a	   river,	   and	   a	   shallow	  well	   is	   at	   3	   km	   distance	   from	   the	   DGR	   borehole.	   The	   groundwater	  
infiltration	  recharge	  100	  mm‧year-­‐1	   is	  applied	  at	   the	   top	  model	  boundary.	  The	  river	  and	  well	   represent	  
the	   natural	   groundwater	   discharge	   boundaries	   of	   the	   site.	   During	   the	   transport	   simulations,	   the	   tracer	  
particles	  are	  released	  or	  a	  constant-­‐concentration	  boundary	  condition	  is	  applied	  in	  the	  DGR	  block	  at	  the	  
left	  boundary	  of	  layer	  7	  (depth	  800-­‐1000	  m).	  	  	  
	  
An	   inclined	   fracture	   zone	   at	   slope	   angle	   near	   45°	   passing	   from	   the	  DGR	   location	   upward	   to	   the	  well	   is	  
considered	   for	   studying	   its	   influence	   on	   the	   rate	   of	   possible	   radionuclide	  migration	   from	   the	  DGR.	   The	  
geological	  composition	  of	  the	  section	  and	  initial	  sets	  of	  hydraulic	  parameters	  of	  rocks	  and	  deposits	  were	  
set	  according	  with	  results	  of	  previous	  study	  of	  the	  site	  (STCU,	  2006),	  Table	  1.	  
	  
Table	  1.	  Initial	  hydraulic	  parameters	  for	  model	  layers	  and	  corresponding	  geological	  strata	  	  
	  
Layer	  No	   Depth,	  [m]	  
Hydraulic	  conductivity	  K,	  
[m·∙s-­‐1	  ]	  
Porosity	   Description	  
1	   0-­‐90	   5.8E-­‐05	   0.15	   Quaternary+	  Paleogene	  aquifer	  
2	   90-­‐120	   2.3E-­‐07	   0.01	   Confining	  layer	  (Paleogene	  marls)	  
3	   120-­‐200	   1.2E-­‐05	   0.1	   Cretaceous+Jurassic	  aquifer	  
4	   200-­‐230	   5.8E-­‐08	   0.01	  
Confining	  layer	  
	  (Jurassic	  clays+	  weathering	  bedrock)	  
5	   230-­‐500	   5.8E-­‐07	   0.005	   Upper	  fractured	  zone	  of	  bedrock	  
6	   500-­‐800	   1.2E-­‐08	   0.002	   Monolithic	  crystalline	  bedrock	  
7	   800-­‐1000	   5.8E-­‐09	   0.002	  
Monolithic	  crystalline	  bedrock.	  
Geological	  repository	  location	  
8	   1000-­‐1200	   5.8E-­‐09	   0.002	   Monolithic	  crystalline	  bedrock	  
9	   1200-­‐1500	   5.8E-­‐09	   0.002	  
Monolithic	  crystalline	  bedrock,	  
conventional	  lower	  boundary	  layer	  
	  
	  
2	  Results	  and	  discussion	  
	  
2.1	  Effects	  caused	  by	  different	  hydraulic	  heads	  in	  the	  well	  
	  
Increasing	  the	  drawdown	  in	  the	  well	  from	  -­‐2	  to	  -­‐3.2	  m	  below	  the	  initial	  zero	  level	  at	  constant	  drawdown	  
in	  the	  river	  -­‐3.0	  m	  results	  in	  decreasing	  flow	  velocity	  in	  the	  deep	  part	  of	  the	  model.	  When	  the	  drawdown	  is	  
around	   -­‐3.2	   m,	   the	   flow	   changes	   its	   endpoint	   from	   the	   river	   to	   the	   well.	   The	   travel	   time	   reaches	   its	  
maximum	  4.5	  million	  years,	  and	  the	  travel	  path	  is	  the	  longest.	  At	  further	  increasing	  well	  drawdown	  to	  -­‐3.5	  
m,	  the	  travel	  path	  and	  travel	  time	  decrease.	  The	  relative	  concentration	  (initial	  value	  100	  in	  the	  DGR)	  of	  the	  
contaminant	   in	   both	   discharge	   points	   increase	  with	   increasing	   drawdown	   in	   the	  well.	   Velocities	   of	   the	  




















Fig.	  2.	  Different	  types	  of	  flow	  and	  contaminant	  pathways	  (red	  lines)	  for	  simulations	  with	  different	  drawdown	  in	  the	  well	  
(-­‐2.0,	  -­‐3.2,	  -­‐3.5	  m).	  Red	  balls	  mark	  the	  time	  interval	  100	  thousand	  years.	  	  
	  
1.2	   Effects	   caused	   by	   different	   hydraulic	   conductivity	   K1	   of	   the	   first	   from	   the	   surface	  
aquifer	  	  
	  
Obtained	  contaminant	  travel	  time	  (Fig.	  3)	  and	  contaminant	  relative	  concentration	  at	  time	  1	  My	  in	  the	  well	  
(Fig.	  4),	  and	  in	  the	  river	  (Fig.	  5)	  are	  shown	  for	  different	  hydraulic	  conductivity	  values	  K1	  of	  the	  first	  from	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Fig.	  5.	  Dependence	  plots	  of	  the	  relative	  concentration	  in	  the	  river	  at	  time	  1	  My	  against	  the	  well	  drawdown	  for	  different	  K1	  values.	  
	  
2.3	  Effects	  caused	  by	  the	  fracture	  zone	  	  
	  
The	  results	  of	  simulation	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  fracture	  zone	  with	  increased	  hydraulic	  conductivity	  on	  the	  
relative	  contaminant	  concentration	  in	  the	  river	  (for	  simulation	  period	  1	  My)	  and	  travel	  time	  to	  the	  river	  
are	   shown	   in	   Table	   2.	   The	   predicted	   raising	   of	   the	   plume	   boundary	   with	   relative	   contaminant	  
concentration	  10-­‐6	  is	  shown	  on	  Fig.	  6.	  
	  
Table	  2.	   Influence	  of	  the	  fracture	  with	  different	  times-­‐increased	  hydraulic	  conductivity	  on	  the	  relative	  contaminant	  concentration	   in	  the	  
river	  (for	  simulation	  period	  1	  My)	  and	  travel	  time	  to	  the	  river	  
Conductivity	  K	  in	  the	  fracture	  zone	   Travel	  time	  to	  the	  river,	  [My]	  
Predicted	   relative	   concentration	  
in	  the	  river	  for	  time	  period	  1	  My	  
Background	  K	  (no	  fracture)	   0.42	   1.7·∙10-­‐6	  
Background	  K	  x	  2	   0.40	   1.9·∙10-­‐6	  
Background	  K	  x	  5	   0.38	   2.4·∙10-­‐6	  
Background	  K	  x	  10	   0.36	   2.8·∙10-­‐6	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The	   principal	   DGR	   indirect	   safety	   characteristics	   such	   as	   predicted	   contaminant	   concentrations	   and	  
contaminant	  travel	  time	  depend	  on	  location	  and	  drainage	  ability	  of	  discharge	  boundaries	  (rivers,	  wells),	  
and	  hydraulic	  conductivity	  of	  water-­‐bearing	  deposits	  of	  the	  upper	  groundwater.	  Furthermore,	  changes	  in	  
hydraulic	  conductivity	  of	   the	  near-­‐surface	  aquifers	  may	  significantly	  affect	  not	  only	  the	  shallow	  but	  also	  
deep	   groundwater	   flow	   pattern	   in	   the	   basement	   rocks,	   leading	   to	   noticeable	   changes	   in	   predicted	  
transport	   behavior.	   Presence	   of	   the	   fracture	   with	   increased	   hydraulic	   conductivity	   in	   the	   DGR	   locality	  
increases	  the	  predicted	  radionuclide	  concentrations	  in	  the	  groundwater	  discharge	  location.	  	  
	  
Consequently,	   the	  presence	  of	  distributed	  shallow	  discharge	  wells	  or	   small	   rivers	  on	   the	  background	  of	  
general	  watershed	  conditions	  with	  well-­‐developed	  covering	  deposits	  and	  downward	  infiltration	  is	  not	  an	  
unfavorable	  factor	  for	  the	  repository	  safety.	  In	  such	  conditions	  the	  infiltration	  flow	  is	  mainly	  intercepted	  
in	  the	  upper	  aquifer,	  and	  the	  deeper	  geological	  medium	  remains	  the	  intact	  zone	  of	  slow	  groundwater	  flow	  
and	  probable	  contaminant	  transport.	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Nuclear	   waste	   disposal	   in	   deep	   geological	   formations	   such	   as	   crystalline	   (granite),	   sedimentary	  
(claystone)	  or	  rock	  salt,	  is	  the	  favored	  option	  of	  the	  international	  nuclear	  waste	  disposal	  community.	  For	  
the	   long-­‐term	   safety	   assessment	   of	   nuclear	   waste	   repositories,	   a	   reliable	   prediction	   of	   radionuclide	  
migration	  behavior	  is	  required.	  A	  potentially	  relevant	  mobilization	  and	  migration	  mechanism	  is	  caused	  by	  
water	   intrusion	   into	   the	  repository,	   leading	   to	  radionuclide	  release	  via	   transport	  pathways.	   In	   this	  case,	  
detailed	   knowledge	   of	   key	   parameters	   controlling	   the	   retention	   and	   mobilization	   of	   radionuclides	   in	  
solution,	  i.e.	  redox	  processes,	  solubility	  limits	  and	  sorption	  properties,	   is	  essential.	  Dedicated	  research	  is	  
required	   in	  order	   to	  derive	  process	  understanding	  and	  develop	  accurate	  site-­‐independent	  chemical	  and	  
thermodynamic	  models,	  applicable	  for	  all	  considered	  host	  rock	  formations	  and	  scenarios.	  
	  
Technetium-­‐99	  is	  a	  β-­‐emitting	  fission	  product	  highly	  relevant	  for	  the	  safety	  assessment	  of	  nuclear	  waste	  
repositories	   due	   to	   its	   significant	   content	   in	   radioactive	   waste	   (fission	   yield	   >6%),	   long	   half-­‐life	   (t½	   ≈	  
2.1·105	  a)	  and	  redox	  sensitivity.	  The	  mobility	  of	  Tc	  in	  the	  environment	  strongly	  depends	  on	  its	  oxidation	  
state.	  Tc(VII)	  exists	  as	  highly	  soluble	  and	  mobile	  TcO4−	  pertechnetate	  anion	  under	  sub-­‐oxic	  and	  oxidizing	  
conditions,	   whereas	   Tc(IV)	   forms	   sparingly	   soluble	   hydrous	   oxide	   (TcO2∙xH2O)	   solid	   phases	   under	  
reducing	  conditions.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  first	  part	  of	  this	  study	  focusing	  on	  fundamental	  Tc	  chemistry,	  the	  redox	  behavior	  of	  Tc(VII)/Tc(IV)	  
was	   investigated	   in	  dilute	  to	  concentrated	  solutions.	  The	  results	  are	  systematized	  according	  to	  Pourbaix	  
diagrams	   calculated	   with	   the	   NEA–TDB	   data	   selection	   for	   Tc	   to	   assess	   the	   effect	   of	   homogeneous	   and	  
heterogeneous	  reducing	  systems	  and	  ionic	  strength	  on	  Tc	  redox	  behaviour.	  Investigations	  focusing	  on	  the	  
solubility	   and	   speciation	   of	   TcO2∙xH2O(s)	   were	   performed	   in	   dilute	   to	   concentrated	   solutions	   over	   the	  
entire	  pH	  range.	  Complete	  and	  improved	  chemical,	  thermodynamic	  and	  activity	  (SIT,	  Pitzer)	  models	  were	  
derived.	  
	  
The	   second	   part	   of	   this	   work	   focuses	   on	   applied	   Tc	   chemistry	   in	   near-­‐natural	   systems.	   Interaction	   of	  
Tc(VII)	  with	   crystalline	   rock	  material	   from	  a	   prospective	   repository	   site	   (Nizhnekansky	  massif,	   Russia)	  
and	   from	   an	   underground	   research	   laboratory	   (Äspö	   HRL,	   Sweden)	  were	   studied.	   Drilling	   of	   the	   Äspö	  
cores	  were	  performed	  under	   anoxic	   conditions.	   Part	   of	   the	  material	  was	   artificially	   oxidized	   to	   test	   the	  
importance	  of	   sample	  preservation.	  Batch	   sorption	   studies	  under	  variation	  of	   the	  Tc(VII)	   concentration	  
were	  performed	  in	  synthetic	  groundwater	  simulate	  to	  estimate	  the	  retention	  kinetics	  and	  Rs	  values.	  For	  
better	   understanding	   of	   the	   retention	   mechanisms,	   advanced	   surface	   sensitive	   analytics	   (XPS,	   XANES)	  
were	   carried	   out	   and	   the	   data	   compared	   to	   reference	   systems.	   Tc	   migration	   behavior	   was	   further	  
investigated	   by	   injections	   of	   Tc(VII)-­‐containing	   groundwater	   simulant	   into	   the	   natural	   fracture	   in	   the	  
unoxidized	  Äspö	  diorite	  core.	  The	  data	  obtained	  are	  compared	  with	  the	  results	  of	  batch	  sorption	  studies	  
and	  will	  be	  used	  for	  subsequent	  geochemical	  reactive	  transport	  modeling.	  




This	  work	  highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  combining	  fundamental	  Tc	  chemistry	  and	  applied	  studies	  in	  order	  
to	   derive	   a	   comprehensive	   assessment	   of	   Tc	   mobilization	   and	   retention	   processes	   in	   support	   of	   the	  
nuclear	  waste	  disposal	  Safety	  Case.	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Selenium-­‐79	  (Se-­‐79)	  is	  a	  radioactive	  isotope	  of	  selenium,	  which	  is	  considered	  as	  one	  of	  the	  highly	  mobile	  
nuclides	   since	   Se-­‐79	   would	   be	   presented	   in	   an	   anion	   species	   when	   dissolving	   into	   the	   intruded	  
groundwater.	   Being	   an	   anionic	   species,	   the	   transport	   of	   Se-­‐79	  would	   be	   regulated	   by	   the	  metal	   oxides	  
relevant	   minerals	   such	   as	   goethite	   and	   hematite	   (Jan	   et	   al.,	   2008).	   This	   is	   true	   that	   the	   transport	   of	  
selenium	   in	   the	   shallow	   surface	   environment	   could	   be	   relatively	   easy	   to	   estimate	   by	   considering	   the	  
amount	   of	   these	  metal	   oxides	  presenting	   in	   the	   soils	   and	   sediments.	  However,	  when	  dealing	  with	  deep	  
geological	  repository,	  the	  transport	  of	  Se-­‐79	  becomes	  less	  predictable	  because	  of	  the	  much	  less	  content	  of	  
metal	   oxide	   residing	   in	   the	   host	   rock	   such	   as	   granite.	   In	   order	   to	   conduct	   a	   reliable	   performance	  
assessment	  of	   repository,	   it	   is	  very	   important	   to	  establish	   the	  correlation	  between	  selenium	  adsorption	  
and	  the	  properties	  of	  potential	  host	  rock,	  in	  this	  study,	  the	  mineral	  and	  chemical	  compositions	  of	  Taiwan	  
local	  granite.	  From	  this	  point	  of	  view,	  selenium	  adsorption	  experiments	  were	  conducted	  with	  54	  different	  
Taiwan	  local	  granite	  samples	  collected	  from	  the	  depth	  ranging	  from	  100	  ~	  400	  meters	  below	  the	  surface.	  
These	   granite	   samples	   represent	   a	   variety	   of	   deep	   geological	   environments,	   including	   the	   intact	   rock,	  
groundwater	  intruded	  zones,	  and	  some	  weathered	  samples.	  Based	  upon	  our	  preliminary	  results,	  several	  
solid	  conclusions	  could	  be	  made.	  First,	  the	  correlation	  coefficients	  between	  the	  Kd	  values	  and	  the	  mineral	  
and	   chemical	   compositions	   are	   rather	   low	   (R-­‐square	   values	   are	   often	   <	   0.2).	   This	   points	   out	   the	  
complexity	  of	   these	  geological	  samples	  and	  strongly	  suggests	  more	  efforts	  should	  be	  put	   into	  to	  acquire	  
more	   relevant	   information.	   Second,	   the	   correlation	  between	   the	   selenium	  Kd	   values	   and	   the	   content	   of	  
iron	  oxide	  (R-­‐square	  0.110)	  is	  much	  higher	  than	  that	  between	  the	  CEC	  of	  these	  granite	  samples	  (R-­‐square	  
0.001).	  This	  clearly	   indicates	  that	   the	  minerals	   that	  are	  able	  to	  underlie	  cation	  exchange	  reaction	  would	  
not	   be	   the	   minerals	   regulating	   the	   transport	   of	   selenium	   nuclides.	   Further,	   a	   relative	   high	   correlation	  
coefficient	   (R-­‐square	  0.137)	  between	  the	  variation	  of	  pH	  before	  and	  after	  selenium	  adsorption	  and	   iron	  
oxide	   content	   implies	   that	   surface	   complexation	   reaction	   is	   much	   likely	   accounting	   for	   selenium	  
adsorption.	  Future	  works	  would	  be	  particularly	  focusing	  on	  the	  outlet	  data	  interpretation	  (i.e.,	  high	  iron	  
oxide	  content	  but	   low	  Kd	  value	  and	  vice	  versa)	  as	  well	  as	   the	   form/phase	  regarding	   the	  origin	  of	   these	  
iron	  oxide	  contents.	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Fig.	  2.	  Correlation	  between	  CEC	  and	  the	  Kd	  values	  of	  Se(IV)	  adsorption	  





Fig.	  3.	  Correlation	  between	  Fe2O3	  content	  and	  the	  Kd	  values	  of	  Se(IV)	  adsorption	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Excavation	  of	  an	  underground	  repository	   for	  disposal	  of	   radioactive	  waste	   in	  clay	   formations	  generates	  
fractures	   around	   the	   openings,	   which	   may	   act	   as	   pathways	   for	   water	   transport	   and	   radionuclides	  
migration.	  Because	  of	  the	  favorable	  properties	  of	  the	  clay	  rocks	  such	  as	  the	  rheological	  deformability	  and	  
swelling	  capability,	  a	  recovery	  process	  of	  the	  excavation	  damaged	  zone	  (EDZ)	  can	  be	  expected	  due	  to	  the	  
combined	  impact	  of	  rock	  compression,	  backfill	  resistance,	  and	  clay	  swelling	  during	  the	  post-­‐closure	  phase.	  
Another	   important	   issue	  is	  the	  impact	  of	  gases	  produced	  from	  anoxic	  corrosion	  of	  waste	  containers	  and	  
other	  metallic	  components	  within	  the	  repository.	  The	  EDZ	  may	  act	  as	  a	  conduit	  for	  preferential	  gas	  flow,	  
depending	  on	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  recovery	  process.	  For	  the	  safety	  assessment	  of	  a	  repository,	  the	  self-­‐sealing	  
behaviour	  and	  impact	  on	  water	  and	  gas	  transport	  through	  the	  EDZ	  have	  to	  be	  characterized,	  understood,	  
and	  predicted.	  
	  
Recently,	  GRS	  has	  extensively	  investigated	  these	  important	  issues	  with	  various	  kinds	  of	  laboratory	  and	  in-­‐
situ	   experiments	   under	   relevant	   repository	   conditions.	   Test	   samples	   were	   taken	   from	   the	   Callovo-­‐
Oxfordian	   argillite	   at	   Bure	   in	   France	   and	   the	  Opalinus	   clay	   (shaly	   facies)	   at	  Mont	   Terri	   in	   Switzerland.	  
Major	  findings	  are	  summarized	  as	  follows.	  	  
	  
As	   observed	   in	   laboratory	   and	   in-­‐situ,	   the	   gas	   permeabilities	   of	   the	   claystones	   increase	   with	   stress-­‐
induced	  damage	  by	  several	  orders	  of	  magnitude	  from	  the	  impermeable	  state	  up	  to	  high	  levels	  of	  10-­‐12–10-­‐
13	  m2.	  When	  hydrostatic	  confining	  stress	  is	  applied	  and	  increased,	  the	  fractures	  in	  the	  claystones	  tend	  to	  
close	  up,	  leading	  to	  a	  decrease	  in	  gas	  permeability	  down	  to	  different	  levels	  of	  10-­‐16–10-­‐21	  m2	  at	  stresses	  in	  a	  
range	  of	  10	  to	  20	  MPa.	  	  	  
	  
As	  water	  enters	  and	  flows	  through	  fractures,	  the	  clay	  matrix	  can	  take	  up	  a	  great	  amount	  of	  the	  water	  and	  
expand	   into	   the	   interstices.	   Consequently,	   the	   hydraulic	   conductivity	   decreases	   dramatically	   by	   several	  
orders	  of	  magnitude	  down	  to	  very	  low	  levels	  of	  10-­‐19	  to	  10-­‐21	  m2	  even	  at	  low	  confining	  stresses	  of	  2-­‐4	  MPa	  
within	  short	  periods	  of	  months	  to	  years,	  compared	  with	  the	  long	  post-­‐closure	  phase	  of	  tens	  of	  thousands	  
of	  years.	  The	  very	   low	  water	  permeabilities	  reached	  are	   the	  same	  order	  as	   that	  of	   the	   intact	  claystones,	  
indicating	  that	  the	  fractures	  in	  the	  claystones	  can	  be	  completely	  resealed.	  
	  
The	   very	   low	   water	   permeabilities	   do	   not	   change	   significantly	   during	   heating	   and	   cooling	   within	   a	  
temperature	  range	  between	  20°C	  and	  90°C.	  This	  suggests	  no	  negative	  thermal	  impact	  on	  the	  sealing	  of	  the	  
fractures.	  
	  
Before	   water	   saturation,	   the	   fractures	   act	   as	   conduits	   for	   preferential	   gas	   flow.	   However,	   after	   water	  
saturation,	  gas	  entry	  and	  penetration	  into	  the	  resealed	  fractures	  in	  claystone	  needs	  certain	  driving	  forces	  
to	  overcome	  the	  capillary	  thresholds.	  The	  gas	  entry/breakthrough	  pressure	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  sealing	  
intensity	   of	   the	   fractures	   and	   the	   confining	   stress.	   The	   gas	   tests	   carried	   out	   on	   the	   highly-­‐resealed	  
claystones	  show	  that	  the	  gas	  breakthrough	  pressures	  increase	  with	  confining	  stress	  from	  low	  levels	  of	  0.2-­‐
1.0	  MPa	  at	  a	  low	  stress	  of	  2	  MPa	  up	  to	  8.3-­‐11.3	  MPa	  at	  high	  stresses	  of	  12.7-­‐15.0	  MPa	  corresponding	  to	  the	  
rock	  stress	  state	  at	  a	  depth	  of	  ~500	  m.	  It	   is	  obvious	  that	  the	  breakthrough	  pressures	  are	  still	  below	  the	  
applied	  confining	  stresses.	  This	   important	   finding	   implies	   that	   the	  EDZ,	  even	  when	  highly-­‐resealed,	  will	  




still	   have	   the	   capacity	   for	   gas	   migration	   with	   moderate	   pressures	   and	   thus	   contribute	   to	   avoid	   high	  
pressure	  build	  up	  for	  fracturing	  the	  host	  rock.	  
	  
Generally	   speaking,	   the	   significant	   sealing	   capacities	   of	   the	   claystones	   hinder	  water	   transport	   and	   thus	  
radionuclides	  migration	   through	   the	   fractures,	   but	   allow	   gas	  migration	   at	  moderate	   pressures	  without	  
fracturing	   the	   host	   rock.	   These	   significant	   advantages	   guarantee	   the	   long-­‐term	   integrity	   and	   barrier	  
function	  of	  the	  host	  rock.	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The	   assessment	   of	   radiological	   exposure	   of	   the	   public	   is	   an	   issue	   at	   the	   interface	   between	   scientific	  
findings,	  juridical	  standard	  setting	  and	  political	  decision.	  The	  present	  work	  revisits	  the	  German	  regulatory	  
specifications	   for	   calculating	   radiological	   exposure,	   like	   the	   already	   existing	   calculation	   model	   General	  
Administrative	  Provision	  (AVV)	  for	  planning	  and	  monitoring	  nuclear	  facilities.	  We	  address	  the	  calculation	  
models	  for	  the	  recent	  risk	  assessment	  regarding	  the	  final	  disposal	  of	  radioactive	  waste	  in	  Germany.	  To	  do	  
so,	  a	  two-­‐pronged	  approach	  is	  pursued.	  	  
	  
One	  part	  deals	  with	  radiological	  examinations	  of	  the	  groundwater-­‐soil-­‐transfer	  path	  of	  radionuclides	  into	  
the	   biosphere.	   Processes	   at	   the	   so-­‐called	   geosphere-­‐biosphere-­‐interface	   are	   examined,	   especially	  
migration	  of	   I-­‐129	   in	   the	  unsaturated	  zone.	  This	   is	  necessary,	   since	   the	  German	  General	  Administrative	  
Provision	   does	   not	   consider	   radionuclide	   transport	   via	   groundwater	   from	   an	   underground	   disposal	  
facility	  yet.	  Especially	  data	  with	  regard	  to	  processes	  in	  the	  vadose	  zone	  are	  scarce.	  Therefore,	  using	  I-­‐125	  
as	   a	   tracer,	   immobilization	   and	   mobilization	   of	   iodine	   is	   investigated	   in	   two	   reference	   soils	   from	   the	  
German	  Federal	  Environment	  Agency.	  	  
	  
The	   second	   part	   of	   this	   study	   examines	   how	   scientific	   findings	   but	   also	   measures	   and	   activities	   of	  
stakeholders	   and	   concerned	   parties	   influence	   juridical	   standard	   setting,	   which	   is	   necessary	   for	   risk	  
management.	   Risk	   assessment,	   which	   is	   a	   scientific	   task,	   includes	   identification	   and	   investigation	   of	  
relevant	   sources	   of	   radiation,	   possible	   pathways	   to	   humans,	   and	   maximum	   extent	   and	   duration	   of	  
exposure	   based	   on	   dose-­‐response	   functions.	   Risk	   characterization	   identifies	   probability	   and	   severity	   of	  
health	   effects.	   These	   findings	   have	   to	   be	   communicated	   to	   authorities,	   who	   have	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   risk	  
management.	  Risk	  management	  includes,	  for	  instance,	  taking	  into	  account	  acceptability	  of	  the	  risk,	  actions	  
to	  reduce,	  mitigate,	  substitute	  or	  monitor	  the	  hazard,	  the	  setting	  of	  standards	  and	  criteria,	  and	  adaption	  to	  
environmental	  policy	  and	  regulatory	  framework.	  To	  gain	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  relevant	  processes	  
and	  criteria	   in	   this	   transition	  process,	  professional	  experts	  who	  develop	  exposure	  calculation	  models	  or	  
were	   involved	   in	  developing	  existing	  regulations	  are	   interviewed.	  12-­‐15	  guideline	  based	   interviews	  will	  
be	   analyzed	   by	   qualitative	   content	   analysis.	   Results	   will	   be	   discussed	   among	   the	   authors	   and	   further	  
members	  of	  the	  ENTRIA-­‐transversal-­‐project	  Technology	  Assessment	  and	  Governance.	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The	   Transport	   Properties	   Research	   Laboratory	   (TPRL)	   is	   one	   of	   the	   leading	   centers	   in	   Europe	   for	   the	  
study	  of	   fluid	  movement	   in	  ultra-­‐low	  permeability	  media.	  The	   facility	   is	  well	   known	   for	   long-­‐term	  high	  
quality	  experimental	  work	  and	  process-­‐based	  interpretation.	  Focus	  is	  on	  multi-­‐phase	  flow	  in	  natural	  and	  
engineered,	   low	  permeability	  geomaterials	   (e.g.	   caprocks,	  well	  bore	  cements	  and	  engineered	  clays),	  and	  
their	  associated	  deformation	  behavior.	   	  Measurements	   include:	  saturation	  and	  consolidation	  properties;	  
intrinsic	   permeability	   (or	   transmissivity);	   anisotropy;	   specific	   storage;	   coupled	   flow	   parameters	   (e.g.	  
osmotic	  permeability);	  capillary	  entry,	  breakthrough	  and	  threshold	  pressures;	  gas	  permeability	  function;	  
drained	  and	  undrained	  compressibilities;	  and	  rheological	  (creep)	  properties.	  Laboratory	  experiments	  are	  
performed	   under	   simulated	   in-­‐situ	   conditions	   (stress,	   pore	   pressure,	   temperature	   and	   chemical	  
environment).	  	  	  
	  
Three	  key	  areas	  explored	  are:	  	  
	  
(i) baseline	  characterization	  of	  hydromechanical	  properties,	  
(ii) influence	  of	  stress	  path	  and	  stress	  history	  on	  transport	  properties	  and	  	  
(iii) transmissivity	  of	  fractures,	  faults	  and	  discontinuities	  (e.g.,	  wellbore	  interfaces).	  	  
	  
Tests	   are	   designed	   to	   provide	   quantitative	   data	   for	   mathematical	   modeling	   of	   ultra-­‐low	   permeability	  
materials,	   together	  with	   process	   understanding	   of	   key	   transport	  mechanisms.	   Key	   equipment	   includes:	  
high	  pressure	  isotropic	  permeameters	  (70	  MPa);	  constant	  volume	  permeameters	  (70MPa);	  high	  pressure	  
triaxial	   permeameter	   (70	  MPa);	   heavy-­‐duty,	   high-­‐precision	   shear-­‐rigs;	   high	   temperature,	   high	   pressure	  
geochemical	   flow	   reactor	   (130	   MPa	   at	   140°C);	   and	   novel	   tracer	   systems	   (nanoparticle	   injection	   or	  
radiological	  tagging	  of	  gas)	  to	  characterize	  and	  identify	  potential	  migration	  pathways.	  
	  
The	   key	   achievements	   from	   the	  TPRL	   at	   the	  BGS	   include	   generation	   of	   new	   conceptual	  models	   applied	  
throughout	  Europe,	  transfer	  of	  skills	  and	  knowledge	  to	  other	  complex	  geoscience	  problems	  (e.g.	  shale	  gas,	  
CCS).	  	  The	  TPRL	  is	  currently	  involved	  in	  about	  20	  projects	  including	  work	  for	  Andra,	  COVRA,	  Nagra,	  RWM	  
Ltd,	  SKB,	  DECC	  and	  EPSRC.	  	  
	  
The	   above	   described	   research	   has	   also	   a	   long	   history	   in	   collaborations	  with	   national	   radioactive	  waste	  
management	   organizations,	   government	   and	   regulators.	   However,	   the	   work	   at	   the	   TPRL	   is	   constantly	  
improving	   and	   moving	   into	   new	   and	   state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	   research	   areas	   and	   knowledge	   transfer	   and	   new	  
collaborative	  work	  are	  essential.	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In	  the	  context	  of	  safe	  enclosure	  of	  nuclear	  waste	  in	  salt	  formations,	  one	  of	  the	  main	  challenges	  is	  potential	  
water	  inflow	  into	  the	  excavations.	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  hydraulic	  relationship	  between	  the	  abandoned	  Asse	  
I	   salt	   mine	   and	   the	   salt	   dissolution	   network	   at	   the	   base	   of	   the	   caprock	   of	   the	   Asse	   salt	   structure	   in	  
northern	  Germany	  is	  characterized	  by	  utilizing	  time	  series	  analysis	  of	  water	  level	  changes.	  The	  data	  base	  
comprises	  a	   time	  series	  of	  water	   level	  measurements	  over	  eight	  years	  with	  a	   temporal	   resolution	  of	  15	  
minutes	   (in	   general)	   and	   up	   to	   2	   minutes	   for	   specific	   intervals.	   The	   water	   level	   measurements	   were	  
collected	  in	  the	  shaft	  of	  the	  flooded	  mine,	  which	  is	  filled	  with	  ground	  rock	  salt	  until	  a	  depth	  of	  140	  m,	  and	  a	  
deep	  well,	  which	  is	  screened	  in	  240	  m	  depth	  at	  the	  salt	  dissolution	  zone	  at	  the	  base	  of	  the	  caprock.	  The	  
distance	  between	  the	  well	  and	  the	  shaft	  is	  several	  hundred	  meters.	  Since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  continuous	  
observations	  in	  the	  1970s,	  the	  shaft	  has	  shown	  periodically	  abrupt	  declines	  of	  the	  water	  level	  of	  several	  
meters	  occurring	  in	  intervals	  of	  approx.	  8	  to	  10	  years.	  
	  
The	   time	   series	   analysis	   consists	   of	   trend,	   Fourier-­‐,	   autocorrelation	   and	   cross-­‐correlation	   analysis.	   The	  
analysis	   showed	   that	  during	   times	  with	  small	  water	   level	   changes	   the	  measured	  water	   level	   in	   the	  well	  
and	   the	   shaft	   are	   positively	   correlated	   whereas	   during	   the	   abrupt	   water	   level	   drops	   in	   the	   shaft,	   the	  
measured	  water	  levels	  between	  the	  shaft	  and	  the	  well	  are	  negatively	  correlated.	  A	  potential	  explanation	  
for	  this	  behavior	  is	  that	  during	  times	  with	  small	  changes,	  the	  measured	  water	  levels	  in	  the	  well	  and	  in	  the	  
shaft	   are	   influenced	   by	   the	   same	   external	   events	   with	   similar	   response	   times.	   In	   contrast,	   during	   the	  
abrupt	  water	   level	   decline	   events	   in	   the	   shaft,	   a	   negatively	   correlated	  pressure	   signal	   is	   induced	   in	   the	  
well,	  which	  supports	  the	  assumption	  of	  a	  direct	  hydraulic	  connection	  between	  the	  shaft	  and	  the	  well	  via	  
flooded	  excavations	  and	  the	  salt	  dissolution	  network	  along	  the	  base	  of	  the	  caprock.	  
	   	  




Preparation	  and	  Estimation	  of	  Thermodynamic	  Properties	  of	  Fe(II)-­‐,	  
Co(II)-­‐,	  Ni(II)-­‐	  and	  Zr(IV)-­‐Containing	  Layered	  Double	  Hydroxides	  
	  
KONSTANTIN	  ROZOV1,	  HILDE	  CURTIUS1,	  DIRK	  BOSBACH1	  
1Forschungszentrum	   Jülich	   GmbH,	   Institute	   for	   Nuclear	   Waste	   Management	   and	   Reactor	   Safety	   (IEK-­‐6),	  
Wilhelm-­‐Johnen-­‐Str.,	  52425	  Jülich,	  Germany,	  k.rozov@fz-­‐juelich.de	  
	  
The	   investigation	  of	   layered	  double	  hydroxides	   (LDHs)	  was	  performed	  because	   they	  and	  similar	   “green	  
rust”	   phases	  were	   identified	   as	   specific	   secondary	  phases	   forming	  during	   the	   evolution	  of	   the	  disposed	  
research	   reactor	   fuel	   elements	  under	  nuclear	   repository	   relevant	   conditions	   [1].	   LDHs	  or	   “hydrotalcite-­‐
like”	  solids	  are	  of	  interest	  in	  environmental	  geochemistry	  because	  they	  can	  substitute	  various	  cations	  and	  
especially	  due	  to	  the	  anion-­‐exchange	  properties	  and,	  therefore,	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  buffer	  materials	  for	  
retention	  of	  mobile	   and	  hazardous	   radionuclides	   (like,	   14C,	   129I,	   36Cl,	   79Se	  etc.).	   In	   our	   study	  Fe2+-­‐,	   Co2+-­‐,	  
Ni2+-­‐	   and	   Zr4+-­‐containing	   LDHs	   have	   been	   synthesized	   by	   co-­‐precipitation	   method	   and	   characterized	  
(PXRD,	   FT-­‐IR,	   SEM-­‐EDX,	   TGA-­‐DSC)	   in	   order	   to	   investigate	   the	   effect	   of	   substitution	   of	   2-­‐	   and	   4-­‐valent	  
cations	  on	  the	  stability	  of	  LDHs.	  PXRD	  measurements	  demonstrated	  that:	  (1)	  	  pure	  Mg-­‐Al-­‐Fe(II)	  LDHs	  are	  
existing	   in	   the	   range	   of	   the	   mole	   fraction	   of	   iron	   xFe	   =	   Fe/(Mg+Fe)	   between	   0	   and	   0.13.	   Unit-­‐cell	  
parameters	  (ao=bo)	  as	  a	  function	  of	  xFe	  follow	  Vegard’s	  law	  corroborating	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  solid	  solution	  
when	   xFe	   =	   0	   -­‐	   0.13.	   Products	   of	   syntheses	   with	   xFe	   ≥	   0.13	   contain	   detectable	   amounts	   (≥1-­‐2	   wt%)	   of	  
additional	   phases	   (like,	  magnetite,	  maghemite,	   lepidocrocite);	   (2)	   pure	  Ni2+-­‐	   and	   Co2+-­‐containing	   	   LDHs	  
(mole	   fractions	   of	   Ni	   and	   Co	   were	   equal	   to	   0.1)	   have	   been	   synthesized	   successfully;	   (3)	   Mg-­‐Al-­‐Zr(IV)	  
precipitates	  with	  mole	  fraction	  of	  zirconium	  	  xZr	  =	  Zr/(Zr+Al)	  =	  0.0	  -­‐	  0.5	  show	  PXRD	  patterns	  attributed	  to	  
pure	  LDHs	  and	  the	  variation	  of	  lattice	  parameters	  ao=bo	  as	  a	  function	  of	  xZr	  is	  in	  agreement	  with	  Vegard’s	  
law	  demonstrating	  the	  presence	  of	  solid	  solution.	  In	  contrast,	  PXRD	  analyses	  of	  precipitates	  with	  xZr	  ≥	  0.5	  
have	  shown	  the	  presence	  of	  additional	  X-­‐ray	  reflexes	   typical	   for	  brucite.	  The	  stoichiometry	  of	  LDHs	  has	  
been	   established	   by	   ICP-­‐OES	   and	   SEM-­‐EDX	   analyses	   and	   reveals	   that	   (Mg+Fe)/Al,	   (Mg+Co)/Al	   and	  
(Mg+Ni)/Al	   ratios	   in	  Fe2+-­‐,	   Co2+-­‐	   and	  Ni2+-­‐	   containing	   solids	   are	   remarkably	   close	   to	  desired	  3:1	   for	   the	  
whole	  range	  of	  solid	  compositions.	  However,	   in	  Mg-­‐Al-­‐Zr(IV)	  LDHs	  the	  increase	  of	  xZr	   in	  co-­‐precipitating	  
synthesis	  solutions	  leads	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  solids	  with	  significantly	  reduced	  Mg/(Al+Zr)	  ratios.	  This	  fact	  
and	  results	  of	  thermodynamic	  calculations	  with	  GEM-­‐Selektor	  software	  [2]	  indicate	  that	  the	  incorporation	  
of	  Zr	   into	   the	  LDH	  structure	   increases	   significantly	   the	  aqueous	   solubility	  of	  LDHs	  due	   to	   the	  preferred	  
localization	  of	  Zr(OH)5-­‐-­‐ligands	  in	  the	  interlayer	  space	  of	  brucite-­‐like	  layers.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  estimates	  
of	  molar	   Gibbs	   free	   energies	   shown	   that	   the	   substitution	   of	   Fe2+,	   Co2+	   and	  Ni2+	   into	   the	   LDHs	   does	   not	  
affect	  so	  significantly	  on	  the	  stability	  of	  LDHs.	  Finally,	  reliable	  estimate	  of	  standard	  Gibbs	  free	  energy	  of	  
formation	  for	  pure	  Mg-­‐Al	  hydrotalcite	  composition	  (-­‐3619.04±15.27	  kJ/mol)	  has	  been	  provided.	  For	  the	  
first	   time,	   by	   applying	   Calvet-­‐type	   solution	   calorimetry	   values	   of	   standard	   enthalpy	   (-­‐4013.89±13.27	  
kJ/mol)	  and	  absolute	  molar	  entropy	  (254.63±25.34	  J/mol·K)	  of	  pure	  Mg-­‐Al-­‐Cl	  LDH	  have	  been	  determined.	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The	  long-­‐term	  safety	  of	  nuclear	  waste	  in	  a	  deep	  geological	  repository	  is	  an	  important	  issue	  in	  our	  society.	  
Microorganisms	  indigenous	  to	  potential	  host	  rocks	  are	  able	  to	  influence	  the	  oxidation	  state,	  speciation	  and	  
therefore	  the	  mobility	  of	  radionuclides	  as	  well	  as	  gas	  generation	  or	  canister	  corrosion.	  Therefore,	  for	  the	  
safety	  assessment	  of	  such	  a	  repository	  it	   is	  necessary	  to	  know	  which	  microorganisms	  are	  present	  in	  the	  
potential	   host	   rocks	   (e.g.	   clay,	   salt)	   and	   if	   these	   microorganisms	   can	   influence	   the	   performance	   of	   a	  
repository.	  	  
	  
Microbial	   diversity	   in	   potential	   host	   rocks	   for	   geological	   disposal	   of	   nuclear	   waste	   was	   analyzed	   by	  
culture-­‐independent	  molecular	  biological	  methods	   (e.g.	  16S	   rRNA	  gene	   retrieval)	   as	  well	   as	  enrichment	  
and	  isolation	  of	  indigenous	  microbes.	  	  
	  
Among	  other	  isolates,	  a	  Paenibacillus	  strain,	  as	  a	  representative	  of	  Firmicutes,	  was	  recovered	  in	  R2A	  media	  
under	   anaerobic	   conditions	   from	   Opalinus	   clay	   from	   the	   Mont	   Terri	   in	   Switzerland.	   Accumulation	  
experiments	  and	  potentiometric	  titrations	  showed	  a	  strong	  interaction	  of	  Paenibacillus	  sp.	  cells	  with	  U(VI)	  
within	  a	  broad	  pH	  range	  (3-­‐7)	  [1].	  	  
	  
Additionally,	  the	  interactions	  of	  the	  halophilic	  archaeal	  strain	  Halobacterium	  noricense	  DSM	  15987,	  a	  salt	  
rock	   representative	   reference	   strain,	  with	  U(VI)	   at	   high	   ionic	   strength	  was	   investigated.	   After	   48	   h	   the	  
cells	   were	   still	   alive	   at	   uranium	   concentrations	   up	   to	   60	   μM,	   which	   demonstrates	   that	  Halobacterium	  
noricense	  can	  tolerate	  uranium	  concentrations	  up	  to	  this	  level.	  The	  formed	  uranium	  sorption	  species	  were	  
examined	  with	  time-­‐resolved	  laser-­‐induced	  fluorescence	  spectroscopy	  (TRLFS).	  	  
	  
The	   results	   about	   the	   microbial	   communities	   present	   in	   potential	   host	   rocks	   for	   nuclear	   waste	  
repositories	  and	  their	  interactions	  with	  radionuclides	  contribute	  to	  the	  safety	  assessment	  of	  a	  prospective	  
nuclear	  waste	  repository.	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Radioactive	   waste	   in	   the	   Netherlands	   is	   collected,	   treated	   and	   stored	   by	   COVRA	   (Centrale	   Organisatie	  
Voor	   Radioactief	   Afval)	   in	   the	   interim	   storage	   facility	   for	   at	   least	   100	   a.	   After	   this	   period	   of	   long-­‐term	  
storage,	  geological	  disposal	   is	   foreseen.	  The	  policy	   is	  based	  on	  a	  step-­‐wise	  decision	  process	   in	  which	  all	  
decisions	  are	  taken	  to	  ensure	  safe	  disposal	  in	  a	  repository,	  but	  without	  excluding	  unforeseen	  alternative	  
solutions	  that	  might	  develop	  in	  the	  future.	  
	  
OPERA	  is	  the	  Dutch	  acronym	  for	  research	  program	  into	  geological	  disposal	  of	  radioactive	  waste.	  It	  started	  
in	  2011	  and	  is	  running	  for	  five	  years.	  The	  OPERA	  Research	  plan	  is	  developed	  by	  NRG	  in	  close	  collaboration	  
with	  COVRA.	  Radioactive	  waste	  disposal	   in	   the	  Netherlands	   is	  at	  an	  early,	   conceptual	  phase.	  The	  aim	  of	  
Opera	   is	   to	   develop	   a	   first	   preliminary	   safety	   case	   to	   structure	   the	   research	  necessary	   for	   the	   eventual	  
deployment	  of	  a	  repository	  in	  the	  Netherlands.	  The	  OPERA	  research	  program	  aims	  at	  a	  close	  cooperation	  
with	  the	  Belgian	  research	  program	  on	  radioactive	  waste	  disposal.	  
	  
The	  result	  of	  OPERA	  will	  be	  to	  detail	  a	  first	  roadmap	  for	  the	  long-­‐term	  research	  on	  geological	  disposal	  of	  
radioactive	  waste	   in	   the	  Netherlands,	   based	   initially	  on	  a	   re-­‐evaluation	  of	   existing	   safety	   and	   feasibility	  
studies	  conducted	  more	  than	  ten	  years	  ago,	  making	  use	  of	  present	  international	  and,	  wherever	  possible,	  
national	  knowledge.	  This	  will	  be	  done	  by	  developing	  initial	  and	  conditional	  safety	  cases	  for	  generic	  GDFs	  
in	   Zechstein	   rock	   salt	   and	   Boom	   Clay	   formations	   in	   the	   Netherlands.	   The	   goal	   in	   OPERA	   is	   to	   develop	  
initial	  safety	  cases	  that	  are	  intended	  to	  mark	  the	  start	  of	  the	  research	  development	  process	  and	  to	  iterate	  
these	   as	   knowledge	   grows	   to	   new	   developed	   insights.	   The	   safety	   case	   is	   conditional	   since	   plausible	  
assumptions	  must	  later	  be	  confirmed	  in	  a	  safety	  case	  e.g.	  for	  site	  selection.	  
	  
Dutch,	  Belgian,	  German,	  English	  and	  French	  organizations	  participate	  in	  OPERA.	  These	  organizations	  can	  
be	  found	  in	  the	  two	  documents	  with	  awarded	  research	  proposals	  available	  at	  www.covra.nl/downloads/o	  
pera.	  
	  
Building	  up	  competences	  and	  knowledge	  on	  radioactive	  waste	  management	  and	  geological	  disposal	  is	  an	  
important	   goal	   of	   OPERA.	   To	   this	   end	   OPERA	   collaborates	   with	   TU	   Delft	   to	   develop	   an	   academic	  
curriculum	  for	  the	  chair	  Chemistry	  of	  the	  Nuclear	  Fuel	  Cycle	  in	  the	  Master	  of	  Science	  Engineering.	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	  the	  results	  obtained	  in	  OPERA	  will	  be	  presented	  at	  a	  Summer	  School	  which	  is	  planned	  to	  be	  
organized	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Program.	  	  
	  
TU	   Delft	   educates	   young	   specialists,	   bachelor	   and	   master	   students,	   by	   research	   projects	   on	   geological	  
disposal	  at	  the	  new	  actinide	  laboratory	  (U	  and	  Th).	  For	  such	  purpose	  the	  knowledge	  transfer	  from	  other	  
OPERA	  partners	  is	  also	  foreseen,	  including	  students	  internships	  and	  visits	  of	  the	  research	  facilities.	  
	  
	  




Reactor	  Institute	  Delft	  (RID)	  is	  part	  of	  the	  Applied	  Sciences	  faculty	  of	  TU	  Delft	  and	  houses	  the	  Radiation	  
Science	  &	  Technology	  (RST)	  department.	  RID	  operates	  the	  Hoger	  Onderwijs	  Reactor	  (HOR),	  a	  2	  MW	  pool-­‐
type	  research	  reactor	  in	  an	  academic	  setting.	  The	  reactor	  is	  used	  as	  a	  source	  of	  neutrons	  and	  positrons	  for	  
research	   purposes,	   including	   those	   of	   OPERA.	   It	   also	   provides	   neutrons	   to	   a	   variety	   of	   facilities	   for	  
radioisotope	  production	  and	  neutron	  activation	  analysis.	  	  
	  
OPERA	   is	   financed	   by	   the	   Dutch	  Ministry	   of	   Economic	   Affairs	   and	   the	   public	   limited	   liability	   company	  
Elektriciteits-­‐Produktiemaatschappij	  Zuid-­‐Nederland	  (EPZ)	  and	  coordinated	  by	  COVRA.	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  6	  CONSTRUCTION	  OF	  TECHNICAL	  BARRIERS	  
	  
The	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  Seals	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  and	  
Related	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  National	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  of	  Investigation	  
	  
OLIVER	  CZAIKOWSKI1,	  THORSTEN	  MEYER1,	  RÜDIGER	  MIEHE1	  
1GRS	   mbH,	   Final	   Repository	   Safety	   Division,	   Theodor-­‐Heuss-­‐Straße	   4,	   38122	   Braunschweig,	   Germany,	  
oliver.czaikowski@grs.de	  
	  
The	   DOPAS	   Full-­‐Scale	   Demonstration	   of	   Plugs	   and	   Seals	   project	   consisting	   of	   14	   beneficiaries	   from	   8	  
European	   countries	   brings	   forward	   important	   demonstration	   activities	   in	   plugging	   and	   sealing.	   These	  
activities	  are	  also	  a	  part	  of	  each	  participants	  national	  long-­‐term	  RD&D	  programm	  and	  are	  therefore	  jointly	  
funded	   by	   Euratom’s	   Seventh	   Framework	   Programme	   and	   national	   funding	   organizations.	   The	  
Demonstration	  experiments	  which	  will	  be	  partially	  or	  wholly	  implemented	  during	  the	  DOPAS	  project	  are	  
a	  full-­‐scale	  seal	  (FSS)	  implemented	  in	  Saint-­‐Dizier	  in	  France,	  an	  experimental	  pressure	  sealing	  plug	  (EPSP)	  
underground	  in	  the	  Josef	  Gallery	  in	  Czech	  Republic,	  a	  deposition	  tunnel	  dome	  plug	  (DOMPLU)	  in	  the	  Äspö	  
Hard	   Rock	   Laboratory	   in	   Sweden,	   a	   deposition	   tunnel	   wedge	   plug	   (POPLU)	   in	   the	   underground	   rock	  
characterization	   facility	   ONKALO	   (future	   spent	   fuel	   repository)	   in	   Finland,	   and	   components	   of	   a	   shaft	  
sealing	  system	  (ELSA)	  in	  Germany	  (Dopas	  2012).	  
	  
ELSA	  is	  a	  program	  of	  laboratory	  and	  in-­‐situ	  experiments	  that	  will	  be	  used	  to	  further	  develop	  the	  reference	  
shaft	  seal	  for	  the	  German	  disposal	  concept	  for	  a	  repository	  in	  rock	  salt	  and	  to	  develop	  reference	  shaft	  seals	  
for	  a	  repository	  in	  clay	  host	  rocks	  (Kudla	  et	  al.	  2013).	  	  
	  
On	   behalf	   of	   BMWi,	   the	   national	   funding	   organization	   for	   R&D	   work	   related	   to	   radioactive	   waste	  
management,	   facing	   the	   ELSA	   project	   phase	   3,	   GRS	   is	   investigating	   sealing	   and	   backfilling	   materials	  
planned	   to	   be	   utilized	   in	   salt	   and	   clay	   formations.	   The	   program	   aims	   at	   providing	   experimental	   data	  
needed	  for	  the	  theoretical	  analysis	  of	  the	  long-­‐term	  sealing	  capacity	  of	  these	  sealing	  materials.	  According	  
to	   current	   R&D	   work	   on	   the	   salt	   option,	   the	   shaft	   and	   drift	   seal	   components	   considered	   in	   Germany	  
comprise	   seal	   components	   consisting	   of	   MgO	   and	   cement	   based	   salt	   concrete	   (Mueller-­‐Hoeppe	   et	   al.	  
2012).	  	  
	  
In	   order	   to	   demonstrate	   hydro-­‐mechanical	   material	   stability	   under	   representative	   load	   scenarios,	   the	  
sealing	  capacity	  of	  the	  seal	  system	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  EDZ	  as	  well	  as	  hydro-­‐chemical	  long-­‐term	  stability	  
in	   contact	   with	   different	   brines	   under	   diffusive	   and	   advective	   conditions,	   a	   comprehensive	   laboratory	  
testing	  program	  is	  carried	  out.	  	  
	  
One	   of	   the	   most	   challenging	   aspects	   is	   the	   determination	   of	   the	   pre-­‐experimental	   status	   of	   the	   core	  
material	   that	   was	   provided	   for	   laboratory	   investigations,	   since	   the	   salt	   concrete	   was	   taken	   from	   an	  
existing	  dam	  that	  has	  been	  loaded	  in-­‐situ	  by	  the	  creeping	  rock	  salt	  for	  more	  than	  10	  years.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  
obvious	   that	  material	   properties,	   such	   as	   e.g.	   the	   initial	   gas	  permeability,	   have	   to	  be	  measured	  under	   a	  
load	  comparable	  to	  the	  in-­‐situ	  minimum	  stress.	  
	  




Within	   this	   paper	   preliminary	   results	   from	   laboratory	   investigations	   on	   salt	   concrete	  will	   be	   evaluated	  
and	  an	  estimation	  of	  goals	  achievable	  within	  project	   lifetime	  will	  be	  given	   from	  a	  retrospective	  view	  on	  
24-­‐month	  of	  investigation.	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Abstract:	  Within	  the	  preliminary	  safety	  analysis	  for	  the	  Gorleben	  site	  (VSG),	  a	  closure	  system	  was	  designed	  in	  
order	   to	   complement	   the	   containment	  providing	   rock	  zone	   (CRZ)	  by	   sealing	  and	  backfilling	  measures.	  The	  
design	   procedure	   as	   well	   as	   the	   technical	   proof	   of	   function	  was	  mainly	   performed	   according	   to	   standard	  
procedures	  in	  civil	  engineering.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  VSG,	  rough	  individual	  technical	  proofs	  of	  several	  measures	  
were	  carried	  out.	  Meanwhile,	  this	  gap	  has	  been	  closed	  by	  subsequent	  investigations.	  Altogether	  the	  results	  of	  
all	  the	  individual	  technical	  proofs	  of	  function	  indicate	  that	  safe	  containment	  of	  radioactive	  waste	  is	  a	  realistic	  
possibility	  at	  the	  Gorleben	  site.	  
	  
	  
1	  Introduction	  	  
	  
In	   summer	   2010,	   the	   German	   Federal	   Government	   launched	   a	   preliminary	   safety	   analysis	   to	   assess	  
whether	  the	  salt	  dome	  at	  Gorleben	  is	  suitable	  to	  host	  all	  heat-­‐generating	  radioactive	  waste	  generated	  by	  
German	   NPPs.	   Based	   on	   the	   “Safety	   Requirements	   Governing	   the	   Final	   Disposal	   of	   Heat-­‐Generating	  
Radioactive	  Waste	  as	  at	  30	  September	  2010”	  (BMU	  2010),	  a	  repository	  concept	  was	  developed	  that	  also	  
included	   a	   closure	   system.	   The	   repository	   design	   and	   its	   closure	   system	   were	   tailored	   to	   the	   specific	  
geologic	   environment	   at	   the	   Gorleben	   site	   and	   served	   as	   the	   main	   technical	   basis	   for	   the	   site-­‐specific	  
preliminary	  safety	  analysis	  (VSG).	  	  
	  
According	   to	   the	   safety	   requirements,	   the	   radioactive	   waste	   is	   to	   be	   safely	   confined	   in	   a	   so-­‐called	  
containment	   providing	   rock	   zone	   (CRZ),	   from	   which	   only	   insignificant	   releases	   of	   radionuclides	   are	  
tolerated.	  For	  the	  repository	  design	  described	  in	  (GRS	  2011),	  a	  closure	  system	  was	  developed	  in	  order	  to	  
complement	   the	   containment	   providing	   rock	   zone	   (CRZ)	   by	   technical	   measures,	   because	   the	   CRZ	   is	  
impaired	   by	   the	   access	   routes	   into	   the	   repository.	   A	   site-­‐specific	   closure	   system	  was	   developed,	  which	  
includes	   backfilling	   and	   sealing	   measures	   in	   order	   to	   fulfil	   the	   requirement	   of	   safe	   containment	   after	  
repository	   closure.	   The	   crucial	   components	   of	   the	   closure	   system	   are	   situated	   in	   the	   shafts,	   the	  
infrastructure,	   in	   exploration	   area	   1,	   and	   in	   the	   emplacement	   level	   below	   exploration	   area	   1	   of	   the	  
Gorleben	   mine.	   As	   the	   shafts	   are	   already	   sunk	   and	   parts	   of	   the	   infrastructure	   as	   well	   as	   the	   drifts	   of	  
exploration	  area	  1	  have	  already	  been	  excavated,	  detailed	   site-­‐specific	   information	   is	   available	   to	  design	  
the	  seals	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  a	  reliable	  proof	  of	  function	  is	  possible.	  Additionally,	  the	  design	  of	  the	  closure	  
system	  includes	  only	  components	  that	  have	  been	  tested	  in-­‐situ	  on	  a	  1:1	  scale.	  Thus,	  standard	  procedures	  
are	   established	   for	   construction	   as	   well	   as	   for	   quality	   assurance	   measures.	   Using	   this	   practice,	  
constructability	   has	   already	   been	   demonstrated	   and	   realistic	   data	   on	   material	   properties	   as	   well	   as	  
methods	   to	   perform	   the	   proof	   of	   function	   are	   available.	   The	  main	   goal	  was	   to	   design	   a	   closure	   system	  
whose	  feasibility	   is	  guaranteed	  and	  which	  fulfils	   the	  safety	  requirements.	  Optimization	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  
taken	  into	  account.	  	  




2	  Technical	  design	  procedure	  and	  description	  of	  the	  closure	  system	  
	  
For	  designing	   the	   closure	   system,	   the	   technical	  design	  procedure	   in	   civil	   engineering,	  which	   consists	   of	  
five	   steps:	   (1)	   conceptual	   design,	   (2)	   preliminary	   dimensioning,	   (3)	   basic	   design,	   (4)	   dimensioning,	   (5)	  
detailed	  design,	  was	   applied.	   First,	   a	   conceptual	  design	   is	  developed	  and	  a	  preliminary	  dimensioning	   is	  
carried	   out.	   As	   the	  preliminary	  dimensioning	  may	   lead	   to	   significant	   design	  modifications,	   it	   is	   roughly	  
estimated	   and	   focuses	   on	   selected	   impacts	   and	   processes	   with	   high	   risk	   for	   significant	   design	  
modifications.	  In	  this	  case,	  geochemical	  processes	  were	  included	  in	  the	  preliminary	  dimensioning	  due	  to	  a	  
lack	   of	   knowledge	   on	   quantitative	   long-­‐term	   effects	   of	   corrosion	   processes.	   Next,	   the	   results	   of	   the	  
preliminary	   dimensioning	   are	   considered,	   necessary	   design	   modifications	   are	   carried	   out,	   and	   the	  
dimensions	  of	  the	  individual	  components	  of	  the	  closure	  system	  are	  fixed,	  which	  leads	  to	  the	  basic	  design.	  
The	  basic	  design	  serves	  as	  “input	  structure”	  for	  the	  dimensioning,	  which	  comprises	  the	  technical	  proof	  of	  
function.	   Finally,	   the	   detailed	   design	   showing	   only	   minor	   modifications	   of	   the	   basic	   design	   and	   not	  
affecting	  the	  dimensioning	  is	  defined	  and	  serves	  as	  basis	  for	  the	  construction	  process.	  	  
	  
	  
Fig.	  1.	  Basic	  design	  of	  the	  closure	  system	  -­‐	  VSG	  
	  
The	   closure	   system	   comprises	   crushed	   salt	   and	   gravel	   for	   backfilling,	   a	   Bischofite	   buffer,	   and	   drift	   and	  
shaft	  seals.	  Initially,	  the	  seals	  guarantee	  safe	  containment,	   later	  on	  compacted	  crushed	  salt	  backfill	  takes	  
over	  the	   long-­‐term	  sealing	  function.	  The	  gravel	  backfill	  acts	  as	  a	  pore	  storage	  and	  delays	  brine	  pressure	  
build-­‐up	  in	  front	  of	  the	  individual	  seals	  in	  order	  to	  guarantee	  that	  rock	  pressure	  onto	  the	  seals	  exceeds	  the	  
brine	   pressure	   at	   the	   seals´	   position	   at	   all	   times.	   The	   drift	   seals	   are	   made	   of	   magnesium	   oxycloride	  
concrete.	   Each	   shaft	   contains	   three	   seals	   that	   are	   made	   of	   bentonite,	   salt	   concrete,	   and	   magnesium	  
oxycloride	  concrete	  respectively.	  The	  sequence	  of	  the	  seals	  inside	  the	  shafts	  is	  tailored	  to	  the	  geochemical	  
conditions	  of	  potentially	  intruding	  brine	  from	  the	  overburden	  and	  its	  increasing	  magnesium	  content	  when	  




passing	  the	  individual	  seals.	  Finally,	  the	  Bischofite	  buffer	  provides	  the	  basis	  to	  prove	  long-­‐term	  stability	  of	  
the	  drift	  seals.	  The	  basic	  design	  of	  the	  VSG	  shaft	  sealing	  system	  is	  shown	  in	  Fig.	  1	  	  
	  
	  
3	  Linking	  safety	  case	  and	  technical	  proof	  of	  function	  
	  
For	  the	  technical	  proof	  of	  function,	  the	  European	  Standard	  (DIN	  EN	  1990)	  in	  civil	  engineering	  was	  applied	  
on	   a	   trial	   basis.	   Additionally,	   the	   corrosion	   processes	  were	   taken	   into	   account.	   Following	   the	   technical	  
design	   procedure,	   the	   technical	   proof	   of	   function	   was	   carried	   out	   iteratively	   in	   two	   main	   parts	   –	   the	  
preliminary	   dimensioning	   (GRS	   2012a)	   based	   on	   the	   conceptual	   design	   and	   the	   dimensioning	   (GRS	  
2012b),	  which	  relies	  on	  the	  basic	  design.	  The	  scheme	  of	  the	  technical	  proof	  of	  function	  used	  for	  the	  shaft	  
sealing	  system	  and	  its	  coupling	  to	  the	  safety	  case	  are	  shown	  in	  Fig.	  2.	  
	  
	  
Fig.	  2.	  Coupling	  of	  technical	  proof	  of	  function	  and	  systems	  analysis	  
	  
The	  technical	  proof	  of	  function	  requires	  a	  restructuring	  of	  the	  FEPs	  affecting	  the	  sealing	  system	  (=initial	  
FEPs)	  and	  assigning	   them	  to	  actions,	   resistances,	   and	  design	  situations	   (Table	  1	  and	  Table	  2).	  Then	   the	  
resulting	  procedure	  is	  suitable	  to	  undergo	  the	  standard	  dimensioning	  process	  in	  civil	  engineering.	  What	  is	  
not	  standard	  is	  the	  unusual	  design	  working	  life	  of	  50.000	  years	  until	  the	  next	  ice	  age.	  	  
	  
Within	   the	   technical	   proof	   of	   function,	   several	   FEPs	   are	   categorized	   as	   design	   situations.	   These	   are	   the	  
seismic	  design	  situation	   (earthquake)	   (FEP	  1.2.03.01)	  and	  abnormal	   (accidental)	  design	  situations	   (FEP	  
2.1.07.05	  and	  2.1.07.06),	  which	  comprise	  the	  early	  failure	  of	  a	  shaft	  seal	  and	  early	  failure	  of	  a	  drift	  seal.	  All	  
remaining	  FEPs,	  which	  could	  not	  be	  excluded	  in	  prior	  assessments,	  are	  categorized	  as	  actions.	  Table	  1	  and	  
Table	  2	   indicate	  which	  FEPs	  were	  considered	  quantitatively	  within	   the	  dimensioning	  procedure	  of	  VSG,	  
which	  were	  covered	  by	  the	  quantitative	  results	  of	  other	  FEPs,	  which	  were	  covered	  by	  in-­‐situ	  testing,	  and	  








Table	  1.	  Classification	  of	  the	  initial	  FEPs	  within	  the	  technical	  proof	  of	  function	  (DS	  =	  Design	  situation,	  A	  =	  Action,	  R	  =	  
Resistance)	  	  
FEP-­‐No.	   FEP-­‐Name	   Classification	  within	  the	  proof	  of	  function	   Processed	  in	  
1.2.03.01	   Earthquake	   DS,	  A,	  mass	  forces	   supplemented	  
1.2.09.01	   Diapirism	   A,	  restraint	  strains	   VSG	  (covered)	  
1.2.09.02	   Subrosion	  
Excluded,	  not	  significant	  until	  next	  glacial	  
period	  (after	  selected	  performance	  period)	  
-­‐	  
1.3.05.03	  
Formation	  of	  glacial	  
channels	  
Excluded,	  not	  significant	  until	  next	  glacial	  
period	  (after	  selected	  performance	  period)	  
-­‐	  
2.1.05.04	  
Alteration	  of	  drift	  and	  shaft	  
seals	  
A,	  consequence	  of	  chemical	  action	  incl.	  
temperature	  
VSG	  
2.1.07.01	   Convergence	  
A,	  equivalent	  to	  rock	  pressure	  due	  to	  
constitutive	  equation	  
VSG	  
2.1.07.02	   Fluid	  pressure	   A,	  fluid	  pressure	   VSG	  
2.1.07.04	  
Volume	  changes	  in	  materials	  




2.1.07.07	   Displacement	  of	  shaft	  seal	  
A,	  restraint	  strains	  or	  a	  consequence	  of	  
forces/stresses	  
VSG	  
2.1.08.08	   Swelling	  of	  bentonite	   A,	  swelling	   VSG	  
2.1.09.02	   Solution	  and	  precipitation	  




Corrosion	  of	  materials	  with	  
cement	  or	  magnesium	  
oxychloride	  phases	  
A,	  consequence	  of	  chemical	  action	  incl.	  
temperature	  
VSG	  
2.2.01.01	   Excavation	  damaged	  zone	  
Neither	  DS,	  A	  nor	  R	  but	  component	  of	  the	  
seal	  
-­‐	  
2.2.06.01	   Change	  of	  stresses	  
A,	  dead	  load,	  rock	  pressure,	  fluid	  pressure,	  
flow	  forces,	  restraint	  stresses	  
VSG	  
	  
Table	  2.	  Classification	  of	  less	  likely	  FEPs	  within	  the	  technical	  proof	  of	  function	  (DS	  =	  Design	  situation,	  A	  =	  Action,	  R	  =	  
Resistance)	  	  
FEP-­‐No.	   FEP-­‐Name	   Classification	  within	  the	  proof	  of	  function	   Processed	  in	  
2.1.07.05	   Early	  failure	  of	  a	  shaft	  seal	   DS,	  abnormal	  situation	   VSG	  
2.1.07.06	   Early	  failure	  of	  a	  drift	  seal	   DS,	  abnormal	  situation	   VSG	  
2.1.08.05	   Piping	  in	  seals	  






4	  Dimensioning	  and	  detailed	  design	  
	  
The	  dimensioning	  is	  done	  mainly	  by	  numerical	  calculations.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  VSG,	  the	  submodeling	  technique	  
was	  used	  in	  order	  to	  cover	  large-­‐scale	  far	  field	  actions	  (impacts)	  as	  well	  as	  small-­‐scale	  near	  field	  actions,	  
e.g.	  modeling	   the	   hydraulic	   saturation	   of	   the	   bentonite	   seal.	   Details	   are	   given	   in	   (GRS	   2012b).	   All	   FEPs	  
processed	  numerically	  in	  VSG	  within	  the	  technical	  proof	  of	  function	  are	  denoted	  by	  “VSG”	  in	  Table	  1	  and	  
Table	   2.	   Some	   aspects	   of	   the	   seismic	   design	   situation	   for	   the	   salt	   concrete	   seal	   were	   subsequently	  
investigated	   by	   numerical	   calculations	   (Neubert	   2014).	   The	   empirical	   assessment	   that	  mass	   forces	   of	   a	  




site-­‐specific	   earthquake	   are	   of	   minor	   influence	   and	   will	   not	   affect	   the	   hydraulic	   resistance	   of	   the	   salt	  
concrete	   seal	  was	   confirmed.	   Furthermore,	   FEP	   2.1.09.02	   “solution	   and	   precipitation”	  was	   investigated	  
quantitatively.	   It	  has	   to	  be	  considered	  because	   temperature	   increase	  due	   to	  heat-­‐generating	  radioactive	  
waste	  may	  affect	  the	  salt	  content	  of	  the	  intruding	  brine	  close	  to	  the	  emplacement	  areas.	  As	  the	  rock	  salt	  
solubility	   does	   not	   highly	   depend	   on	   the	   temperature,	   it	   turned	   out	   that	   the	   influence	   of	   “solution	   and	  
precipitation”	  may	  be	  neglected.	  
	  
As	   the	   last	   step,	   the	   detailed	   design	   is	   specified	   after	   dimensioning	   in	   order	   to	   serve	   as	   basis	   for	   the	  
construction	  process.	  The	  detailed	  design	  was	  not	  directly	  addressed	   in	  VSG.	   Instead,	   it	  was	  referred	   to	  
existing	  pilot	  seals.	  	  
	  
	  
5	  Summary	  	  
	  
As	  a	  result,	   the	  closure	  system	  shows	  its	  proper	  functionality	  for	  the	  designed	  repository	  concept	  at	  the	  
Gorleben	   site.	   The	   technical	   proof	   of	   function	  was	   achieved	   using	   calculation	  methods	  mainly.	   In	   some	  
cases,	  results	   from	  in-­‐situ	  tests	  were	  used.	  Very	   few	  issues	  that	  need	  further	  research	  for	  quantification	  
were	   identified.	   Nevertheless,	   using	   current	   knowledge,	   it	   can	   be	   concluded	   that	   safe	   containment	   of	  
radioactive	  waste	  at	  the	  Gorleben	  site	  is	  a	  realistic	  possibility.	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The	  FEBEX	  experiment	  at	   the	  Grimsel	  Test	  Site	  (GTS)	  consists	  of	  an	   in-­‐situ	   full-­‐scale	  engineered	  barrier	  
system	  (EBS)	  test	  for	  the	  disposal	  of	  high-­‐level	  waste	  (HLW).	  It	  is	  performed	  under	  natural	  conditions	  in	  
crystalline	   rock	   in	   which	   the	   canisters	   are	   placed	   horizontally	   in	   drifts	   and	   are	   surrounded	   by	   a	   clay	  
barrier	  constructed	  of	  highly	  compacted	  bentonite	  blocks.	  A	  partial	  dismantling	  and	  sampling	  of	  the	  EBS	  
was	  carried	  out	  during	  2002.	  
	  
Heating	   of	   the	   FEBEX	   started	   in	   1997	   and	   since	   then	   a	   constant	   temperature	   of	   100°C	   has	   been	  
maintained,	  while	  the	  bentonite	  buffer	  has	  been	  slowly	  hydrating	  in	  a	  natural	  way.	  A	  total	  of	  632	  sensors	  
in	   the	   bentonite	   barrier,	   the	   rock	   mass,	   the	   heaters	   and	   the	   service	   zone	   record	   temperature,	   water	  
saturation,	  humidity,	  total	  pressure,	  displacement,	  and	  water	  pressure.	  	  
	  
The	  hydration	  pattern	  is	  relatively	  symmetric,	  with	  no	  major	  differences	  along	  the	  axis.	  Although	  the	  host	  
rock	   is	   characterized	   by	   heterogeneities	  with	   zones	   of	   higher	   permeability,	   the	   resaturation	   process	   is	  
driven	  by	  the	  suction	  of	  the	  bentonite	  rather	  than	  by	  the	  availability	  of	  water	  in	  the	  rock,	  especially	  in	  the	  
early	  phase.	  After	  17	  years,	  the	  water	  content	  in	  the	  buffer	  close	  to	  the	  heater	  still	  continues	  to	  increase	  
slowly.	  The	  hydraulic	  pore	  pressures	  in	  the	  buffer	  and	  the	  geosphere	  have	  practically	  stabilized.	  The	  total	  
pressure	  in	  general	  continues	  to	  increase	  in	  most	  points	  into	  the	  buffer,	  where	  in	  some	  parts	  pressures	  of	  
over	  6	  MPa	  are	  registered.	  	  
	  
The	   long	   monitoring	   phase	   and	   the	   partial	   dismantling	   in	   2002	   indicate	   that	   the	   EBS	   has	   largely	  
performed	  as	  expected	  and	  the	  major	  processes	  and	  couplings	  affecting	  the	  buffer	  saturation	  during	  the	  
initial	   thermal	   period	   identified	   prior	   to	   the	   start	   of	   the	   experiment	   have	   been	   confirmed.	   A	  
comprehensive	  report	  documents	  and	  reviews	  the	  state	  of	  the	  FEBEX	  (Lanyon	  &	  Gaus,	  2013).	  
	  
After	  18	  years	  of	  operation	  the	  experiment	  will	  be	  excavated	  and	  dismantled	  in	  2015.	  The	  main	  objectives	  
of	  the	  FEBEX	  dismantling	  project	  (FEBEX-­‐DP)	  are:	  	  
	  
• Characterization	   of	   the	   key	   physical	   properties	   (e.g.,	   density,	  water	   content)	   of	   the	   barrier	   and	  
their	  distribution	  	  
• Characterization	   of	   corrosion	   and	   microbiological	   processes	   on	   instruments	   and	   coupons	  
resulting	  from	  evolving	  redox	  conditions	  and	  saturation	  states,	  including	  gas	  analysis	  
• Characterization	   macro-­‐	   and	   micro	   level	   studies	   of	   mineralogical	   interactions	   at	   material	  
interfaces	  (e.g.,	  cement-­‐bentonite	  or	  iron-­‐bentonite,	  rock-­‐bentonite)	  
• Assessment	  of	  sensor	  performance	  
• Further	   increasing	   understanding	   of	   the	   thermo-­‐hydro-­‐mechanical	   (THM)	   and	   thermo-­‐hydro-­‐
chemical	  (THC)	  processes	  through	  integration	  of	  monitoring	  and	  dismantling	  results	  
	  
An	   intensive	   laboratory	  program	  will	  be	  conducted	   in	  2015/2016	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  the	  outlined	  main	  
objectives.	  It	  includes	  extensive	  mineralogical,	  chemical	  and	  biological	  investigations	  of	  the	  buffer	  and	  the	  




related	  interfaces.	  It	  will	  be	  accompanied	  by	  pre-­‐	  and	  post	  dismantling	  modeling	  efforts.	  Unique	  data	  are	  
expected	  after	  completing	  one	  of	  the	  longest	  running	  1:1	  in-­‐situ	  EBS	  experiment	  under	  continued	  heating	  
and	   natural	   saturation	   conditions.	   It	   will	   further	   consolidate	   the	   EBS	   knowledge	   and	   will	   act	   as	   a	  
benchmark	  for	  major	  coupled	  modeling	  codes.	  	  
	  
The	  dismantling	  project	   is	  set-­‐up	  as	  an	   international	  project	  with	  partners	   from	  Europe,	  Asia	  and	  North	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  7	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  STRATEGIES	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Decision	  making	  and	  design	  processes	  for	  radioactive	  waste	  repositories	  are	  guided	  by	  safety	  goals	  that	  
need	   to	  be	  achieved.	   In	   this	  context,	   the	  comparison	  of	  different	  disposal	  concepts	  can	  provide	  relevant	  
support	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  repository	  systems.	  Such	  a	  task	  requires	  a	  method	  
for	  a	  traceable	  comparison	  that	  is	  as	  objective	  as	  possible.	  	  
	  
We	  present	  a	  versatile	  method	  that	  allows	  for	  the	  comparison	  of	  different	  disposal	  concepts	  in	  potentially	  
different	  host	  rocks.	  The	  condition	  for	  the	  method	  to	  work	  is	  that	  the	  repository	  systems	  are	  defined	  to	  a	  
comparable	   level	   including	   designed	   repository	   structures,	   disposal	   concepts,	   and	   engineered	   and	  
geological	  barriers	  which	  are	  all	  based	  on	  site-­‐specific	  safety	  requirements.	  	  
	  
The	  method	  is	  primarily	  based	  on	  quantitative	  analyses	  and	  probabilistic	  model	  calculations	  regarding	  the	  
long-­‐term	   safety	   of	   the	   repository	   systems	   under	   consideration.	   The	   crucial	   evaluation	   criteria	   for	   the	  
comparison	  are	   statistical	   key	   figures	  of	   indicators	   that	   characterize	   the	   radiotoxicity	   flux	  out	   of	   the	   so	  
called	   containment-­‐providing	   rock	   zone	   (einschlusswirksamer	  Gebirgsbereich).	  The	  key	   figures	  account	  
for	  existing	  uncertainties	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  actual	  site	  properties,	  the	  safety	  relevant	  processes,	  and	  the	  
potential	   future	   impact	   of	   external	   processes	   on	   the	   repository	   system,	   i.e.,	   they	   include	   scenario-­‐,	  
process-­‐,	  and	  parameter-­‐uncertainties.	  	  
	  
The	  method	  (1)	  leads	  to	  an	  evaluation	  of	  the	  retention	  and	  containment	  capacity	  of	  the	  repository	  systems	  
and	   its	   robustness	  with	   respect	   to	   existing	  uncertainties	   as	  well	   as	   to	   potential	   external	   influences;	   (2)	  
specifies	  the	  procedures	  for	  the	  system	  analyses	  and	  the	  calculation	  of	  the	  statistical	  key	  figures	  as	  well	  as	  
for	   the	   comparative	   interpretation	   of	   the	   key	   figures;	   and	   (3)	   also	   gives	   recommendations	   and	   sets	  
benchmarks	  for	  the	  comparative	  assessment	  of	  the	  repository	  systems	  under	  consideration	  based	  on	  the	  
key	  figures	  and	  additional	  qualitative	  arguments.	  
	  
We	  demonstrate	  the	  capabilities	  of	  the	  method	  by	  comparing	  two	  rather	  different	  repository	  systems:	  (1)	  
a	   repository	   in	   salt	  with	   layout	   and	   site	  properties	   corresponding	   to	   the	  Gorleben	   site	   according	   to	   the	  
state	  of	  knowledge	  and	  planning	  of	  2007;	  (2)	  a	  fictive	  repository	  in	  the	  Lower	  Cretaceous	  claystones	  at	  a	  
synthetic	  site	  in	  northern	  Germany	  with	  a	  layout	  corresponding	  to	  the	  repository	  planning	  in	  Switzerland	  
and	  France	  in	  the	  years	  around	  2005.	  	  
	  
The	   exemplary	   application	   of	   the	  method	   shows	   the	   kind	   of	   statements	  which	   can	   be	   derived	   and	   the	  
restrictions	  that	  are	  often	  connected	  to	  these	  statements.	  In	  particular,	  it	  is	  shown	  that	  the	  two	  repository	  
systems	  exhibit	  fundamentally	  different	  probability-­‐consequence	  profiles.	  The	  main	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that,	  
according	   to	   the	   model	   calculations,	   radionuclide	   release	   from	   the	   salt	   repository	   occurs	   only	   in	   one	  
scenario	   that	  does	  not	   represent	   the	  expected	   system	  evolution,	  whereas	   radionuclide	   release	   from	   the	  
claystone	  repository	  occurs,	  though	  mostly	  at	  very	  low	  rates,	  in	  all	  scenarios.	  Such	  fundamentally	  different	  




probability-­‐consequence	   profiles	   have	   to	   be	   taken	   into	   account	   when	   evaluating	   the	   results	   of	   the	  
presented	  or	  any	  other	  comparison	  method.	  	  
	  
It	  must	  be	  emphasized	  that	  no	  conclusions	  on	  the	  suitability	  of	  the	  considered	  host	  rocks	  in	  general	  or	  the	  
Gorleben	  site	  in	  particular	  may	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  exemplary	  results	  presented	  here.	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Abstract:	   Within	   the	   framework	   of	   the	   R&D	   project	   “AnSichT”,	   DBE	   TECHNOLOGY,	   BGR	   and	   GRS	   are	  
developing	   a	   method	   to	   demonstrate	   the	   safety	   of	   a	   HLW	   repository	   in	   claystone	   in	   Germany.	   The	  
methodological	  approach	  basing	  on	  a	  holistic	  concept,	  links	  the	  legal	  and	  geologic	  boundary	  conditions,	  the	  
disposal	   and	   closure	   concept,	   the	   demonstration	   of	   barrier	   integrity,	   and	   the	   long-­‐term	   analysis	   of	   the	  
repository	   evolution	   as	   well.	   The	   geologic	   boundary	   conditions	   are	   specified	   by	   the	   description	   of	   the	  
geological	   situation	  and	  generic	  models,	   the	   selection	  of	   representative	  parameters	  and	  geoscientific	   long-­‐





During	   the	   last	   decades	   a	   largely	   global	   agreement	   emerged	   to	   dispose	   of	   radioactive	   waste	   in	   deep	  
geological	  formations.	  The	  geology	  is	  one	  factor	  for	  the	  safe	  long-­‐term	  disposal	  because	  it	  acts	  as	  a	  main	  
part	   in	   the	   multibarrier	   system.	   To	   ensure	   the	   long-­‐term	   safety	   of	   a	   repository,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	  
investigate	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  repository	  onto	  the	  biosphere	  for	  the	  next	  one	  million	  years.	  Other	  German	  
research	   projects	   developed	   the	   method	   to	   demonstrate	   the	   safety	   of	   a	   HLW	   (high-­‐level	   radioactive	  
waste)	  repository	  in	  salt	  rock.	  With	  the	  new	  site	  selection	  law	  (2013)	  the	  three	  possible	  host	  rock	  types	  
salt	  rock,	  crystalline	  rock	  and	  claystone	  need	  to	  be	  considered	  for	  the	  disposal	  of	  HLW.	  The	  R&D	  project	  
“AnSichT”	  aims	  to	  develop	  a	  method	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  safety	  of	  a	  HLW	  repository	  in	  claystone	  on	  basis	  
of	  other	  research	  projects	  for	  salt	  rock	  (ISIBEL,	  VSG).	  For	  this	  purpose	  new	  fundamentals	  like	  disposal	  and	  
closure	  concepts	  for	  claystone	  and	  specific	  geological	  boundary	  conditions	  are	  required.	  
	  
	  
2	  Geological	  boundary	  conditions	  
	  
2.1	  Applied	  criteria	  and	  data	  basis	  
	  
To	  demonstrate	  the	  safety	  and	  verification	  concept,	  the	  selection	  of	  a	  representative	  claystone	  formation	  
is	   necessary.	   An	   evaluation	   of	   argillaceous	   rock	   formations	   has	   identified	   areas	   in	   Germany	  which	   are	  
considerably	  suitable	  for	  a	  HLW	  repository	  (Hoth	  et	  al.	  2007).	  These	  areas	  provide	  an	  outline	  to	  localize	  
representative	   claystone	   formations.	   In	   this	   approach	   the	   safety	   requirements	   of	   BMU	   (2010)	   and	   the	  
criteria	  of	  the	  AkEnd	  (2002)	  are	  considered	  in	  localizing	  areas	  which	  are	  suitable	  to	  test	  the	  new	  method.	  
The	  following	  selection	  criteria	  were	  applied:	  The	  disposal	  depth	  between	  300	  m	  and	  1000	  m,	  a	  host	  rock	  




thickness	  of	  minimum	  100	  m,	  a	  range	  of	  more	  than	  10	  km2	  and	  permeability	  values	  of	  less	  than	  10-­‐10	  m/s.	  
Earthquakes	   (maximum	  of	  zone	  1),	   active	   fault	   zones,	   shift	   in	   the	   relative	   level	  of	   sea	  and	   land	  of	  more	  
than	  1	  mm/a	   and	   active	   volcanism	  are	   criteria	   of	   exclusion.	   The	   results	   of	   a	   preliminary	   application	   of	  
these	  criteria	  were	  summarized	  by	  (Reinhold	  &	  Sönnke	  2012).	  The	  data	  basis	  for	  the	  geological	  boundary	  
conditions	  derive	  from	  the	  exploration	  industry	  on	  oil,	  gas,	  salt	  and	  other	  natural	  resources.	  Further	  data	  
from	   seismics	   and	   data	   from	   site	   investigations	   of	   the	   Konrad	  Mine	   or	   in-­‐situ	   data	   from	   underground	  
research	  laboratories	  in	  argillaceous	  rock	  formations	  (e.g.	  URL	  Mont	  Terri)	  have	  been	  compiled.	  	  
	  
Due	  to	  the	  different	  geological	  conditions	  of	  Northern	  and	  Southern	  Germany,	  different	  implications	  have	  
to	  be	  considered.	  Therefore	  the	  selection	  of	  just	  one	  host	  rock	  formation	  which	  represents	  an	  argillaceous	  
rock	   formation	   in	   Germany	   is	   not	   possible	   and	   two	   reference	   areas	   are	   selected.	   The	   considered	   areas	  
comprise	  parts	  of	  the	  North	  German	  Basin	  and	  a	  smaller	  part	  of	  the	  Molasse	  Basin	  in	  Southern	  Germany.	  
	  
2.2	  Development	  of	  geological	  models	  
	  
The	  developed	  geological	  model	  for	  Northern	  Germany	  represents	  a	  typical	  situation	  where	  potential	  host	  
rock	   formations	   are	   bedded	   in	   a	   suitable	   depth	   under	   600	   m	   (Reinhold	   et	   al.	   2013).	   The	   basin	   is	  
structured	  in	  a	  basement,	  a	  cover	  of	  sedimentary	  rock	  and	  quaternary	  sediments.	  The	  model	  contains	  14	  
units	   from	   the	   basis	   Zechstein	   until	   the	  Quaternary	   (Fig.	   1).	   The	   units	   are	   relatively	   homogeneous	   and	  
regional	   characterizable	   geological	   formations.	   Salt	   domes	   or	   active	   fault	   zones	   are	   excluded	   from	   the	  
model	  to	  guarantee	  a	  representative	  position.	  Also	  a	  position	  where	  deep	  subglacial	  channel	  systems	  may	  
occur	  are	  excluded.	  The	  size	  of	  the	  model	  is	  70	  km2.	  
	  
	  
Fig.	  1.	  Geological	  model	  for	  Northern	  Germany.	  
	  
The	  Barremium	  &	  Hauterivium	   formation	   of	   the	   Lower	  Cretaceous	   represent	   the	   host	   rock	   formations.	  
The	  host	  rock	   formations	  consist	  of	  claystones	  and	  clayey	  marl	  and	  subordinate	  micritic	   lime	  marl.	  The	  
hydrogeologic	   conditions	   include	   a	   near-­‐surface	   groundwater	   reservoir	   of	   low	   salinity	   (unconsolidated	  
quaternary	  sediments)	  and	  several	  deeper	  aquifers	  of	  high	  salinity	  (Rhätsandstein	  =	  S1,	  Aalensandstein	  =	  
S2	   and	  Hilssandstein	   =	   S3).	   The	   topography	   of	   the	  model	   is	   dominated	   by	   the	   glacial	   sediments	   of	   the	  
Saale	  glacial	  period.	  
	  




The	  geological	  model	   for	  Southern	  Germany	   is	  situated	   in	   the	  north	  alpine	  Molasse	  Basin.	  The	  region	   is	  
structured	   in	   a	   crystalline	   basement,	   a	   cover	   of	   mesozoic	   sedimentary	   rock,	   molasse	   sediments	   and	  
quarternary	  sediments.	  The	  model	  contains	  16	  units	  from	  the	  basis	  Muschelkalk	  until	  the	  Quaternary	  (Fig.	  
2),	   which	   are	   relatively	   homogeneous	   and	   regional	   characterizable	   geological	   formations.	   Active	   fault	  
zones	  are	  excluded	  from	  the	  model	   to	  guaranty	  a	  representative	  position.	  The	  model	  regards	  an	  area	  of	  
140	  km2.	  	  
	  
Fig.	  2.	  Geological	  model	  for	  Southern	  Germany.	  
	  
For	  the	  geological	  model	  in	  Southern	  Germany	  the	  Opalinus	  Clay	  in	  the	  Middle	  Jurassic	  is	  defined	  as	  host	  
rock	   formation.	   The	   Opalinus	   Clay	   consist	   of	   claystones	   which	   show	   a	   low	   variability	   in	   facies	   and	  
lithology.	   The	   hydrogeologic	   conditions	   include	   a	   near-­‐surface	   groundwater	   reservoir	   (unconsolidated	  
quarternary	  sediments)	  and	  several	  deeper	  aquifers	  with	  higher	  salinity	  (e.g.	  Oberer	  Muschelkalk	  =	  m3,	  
Stubensandstein	  =	  k2	  and	  Oberer	  Jura	  =	   jo2).	  The	  model-­‐unit	   jo2	  represents	  the	  strong	  dolomitized	  and	  
karstified	   lime	  stones	  of	   the	  Oberer	   Jura.	  The	  topography	  of	   the	  model	   is	  mainly	  shaped	  by	  erosion	  and	  
deposition	  of	  fluvial	  sediments	  of	  several	  glaciations	  in	  the	  Quaternary.	  	  
	  
2.3	  Hydraulic	  and	  petrophysical	  rock	  properties	  
	  
Representative	   parameters	   for	   the	   hydraulic	   and	   petrophysical	   rock	   properties	   are	   assigned	   to	   the	  
geological	  units	  of	  the	  models	  (e.g.	  Jahn	  &	  Sönnke	  2013).	  The	  specifications	  comprise	  average	  values	  and	  
bandwidths	  of	  petrographic,	  mechanic,	  thermic	  and	  hydraulic	  parameters.	  For	  numerical	  simulations	  out	  
of	  the	  bandwidth	  certain	  parameters	  have	  been	  selected	  and	  used	  for	  demonstrating	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  
geologic	  barrier	  (e.g.	  Nowak	  &	  Maßmann	  2013).	  	  
	  
2.4	  Geoscientific	  long-­‐term	  predictions	  
	  
For	   the	   safety	   demonstration	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   geosphere	   during	   the	   demonstration	   period	   of	   one	  
million	  years	  is	  crucial.	  With	  geoscientific	  long-­‐term	  predictions	  further	  geologic	  boundary	  conditions	  can	  
be	  evaluated.	  The	  evolution	  of	  the	  geosphere	  is	  influenced	  by	  regional	  and	  supraregional	  processes,	  which	  
differ	   significantly	   in	   Northern	   and	   Southern	   Germany.	   Some	   processes	   appear	   less	   likely	   or	   can	   be	  
excluded	   in	   the	   different	   areas.	   Northern	   Germany	   was	   strongly	   affected	   by	   the	   glacial	   periods	   of	   the	  




Elsterian,	  Saalian	  and	  Weichselian	  glaciations	  as	  the	  Fennoscandian	  ice	  sheets	  covered	  wide	  areas	  of	  the	  
Central	   European	   Basin	   System.	   The	   geosphere	   was	   influenced	   by	   glacial	   processes	   such	   as	   the	  
accumulation	  of	  glacial	  deposits,	  deep	  subglacial	  channel	  systems	  or	  ice-­‐sheet	  loading.	  The	  model	  site	  in	  
Southern	   Germany	   was	   influenced	   by	   the	   Würmian,	   Rissian,	   and	   Hosskirchian	   glaciations.	   There	   the	  
Rhineglacier	   coming	   from	   the	   Alps	   covered	   a	   smaller	   part	   of	   the	   North	   Alpine	   Basin	   and	   led	   to	   the	  
accumulation	  of	  glacial	  deposits	  or	   the	   formation	  of	  over	  deepened	  basins	  although	   the	   influence	  of	   the	  
ice-­‐sheet	   loading	  must	  have	  been	  smaller	  because	  of	   the	   thinner	   ice	   thickness.	  Further	  differences	  arise	  
from	   the	   tectonic	   setting.	   The	   geosphere	   in	  Northern	  Germany	  was	   affected	  by	   the	   development	   of	   the	  
Lower	  Saxony	  Basin.	  In	  this	  setting	  salt	  tectonics	  play	  a	  major	  role	  and	  led	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  salt	  diapirs	  
or	  pillows	  and	  changes	   in	   the	  sedimentary	  evolution.	   In	  contrast	  Southern	  Germany	  was	  predominantly	  
affected	  by	  the	  orogenesis	  of	  the	  Alps	  and	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  North	  Alpine	  Foreland	  Basin.	  	  
	  
	  
3	  Summary	  and	  Outlook	  	  
	  
The	   description	   of	   the	   geological	   situation	   and	   development	   of	   suitable	   models,	   the	   selection	   of	  
representative	   parameters	   and	   the	   geoscientific	   long-­‐term	   predictions	   provide	   a	   fundament	   for	   the	  
system	  analysis,	  which	  is	  a	  main	  part	  of	  the	  safety	  assessment.	  According	  to	  the	  geological	  models	  two	  FEP	  
(features,	  events	  and	  processes)	  catalogs	  are	  developed	  where	  all	  relevant	  factors	  for	  the	  long-­‐term	  safety	  
assessment	  of	  HLW	  repositories	  are	  recorded.	  The	  FEP	  catalogs	  are	  used	   for	   the	  scenario	  development.	  
Two	  generic	  sites	  with	  different	  boundary	  conditions	  are	  available	  where	  the	  method	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  
safety	  of	  a	  HLW	  repository	  in	  claystone	  in	  Germany	  can	  be	  applied	  and	  advanced.	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Abstract:	   This	   paper	   describes	   the	   development	   of	   the	   rock	   suitability	   classification	   strategies	   applied	   to	  
locate	  the	  spent	  fuel	  repository	  in	  crystalline	  rock	  in	  Finland.	  Development	  of	  the	  classification	  procedure	  is	  
motivated	   not	   only	   by	   the	   regulatory	   requirements,	   but	   also	   by	   the	   need	   to	   more	   closely	   integrate	   site	  
characterization,	   repository	  design	  and	   long-­‐term	  safety	  assessment.	  The	  classification	  procedure	  has	  been	  
developed	   along	   with	   the	   increasing	   level	   of	   detail	   of	   the	   available	   site	   data	   and	   knowledge	   on	   the	  
performance	  of	  the	  engineered	  barrier	  system	  (EBS).	  The	  classification	  system	  has	  also	  been	  adapted	  to	  the	  
changes	   in	   the	   regulations.	   The	   present	   form	  of	   the	   classification	   system	  and	   experiences	   from	   testing	   the	  
system	   at	   the	   site	   are	   described.	   Demonstration	   activities	   have	   shown	   that	   the	   criteria	   and	   the	   stepwise	  





In	  Finland,	  several	  sites	  have	  been	  investigated	  as	  a	  potential	  site	  for	  geological	  disposal	  of	  spent	  nuclear	  
fuel	  since	  the	  1980s	  (McEwen	  and	  Äikäs	  2000).	  In	  2001,	  the	  Parliament	  of	  Finland	  endorsed	  a	  Decision-­‐in-­‐
Principle	   (DiP)	   whereby	   the	   spent	   fuel	   generated	   in	   the	   Loviisa	   and	   Olkiluoto	   power	   plants	   will	   be	  
disposed	   in	   a	   geologic	   repository	   constructed	   at	   the	   Olkiluoto	   site	   in	   South-­‐Western	   Finland.	   An	  
underground	  rock	  characterization	  facility,	  ONKALO,	  reaching	  the	  planned	  repository	  depth	  (400	  meters	  
below	   ground)	   has	   been	   constructed	   at	   the	   site.	   In	   2012,	   Posiva	   Oy	   submitted	   a	   construction	   license	  
application	   for	   a	   KBS-­‐3	   type	   spent	   nuclear	   fuel	   repository	   to	   be	   constructed	   at	   the	   Olkiluoto	   site.	   The	  
application	  is	  currently	  under	  regulatory	  review.	  	  
	  
The	  rock	  conditions	  at	  the	  sites	  studied	  during	  the	  site	  selection	  phase,	  and	  the	  Olkiluoto	  site	  in	  particular,	  
have	  been	  found	  to	  be	  favorable	  for	  the	  long-­‐term	  safety	  of	  a	  geological	  disposal	  in	  general	  (McEwen	  and	  
Äikäs	  2000).	  However,	  there	  are	  features	  of	  the	  host	  rock,	  e.g.	  deformation	  zones	  that	  constrain	  the	  depth	  
and	   layout	   of	   the	   repository	   and	   other	   underground	   openings.	   Rock	   classification	   strategies	   have	   been	  
developed	  in	  order	  to	  take	  such	  constraints	  into	  account.	  	  
	  
	  
2	  Regulatory	  context	  
	  
The	  Finnish	  regulations	  (STUK	  2014)	  specify	  several	  safety	  functions	  for	  the	  natural	  barrier,	  i.e.	  the	  host	  
rock:	  stable	  and	  intact	  rock,	   low	  groundwater	  flow,	  favorable	  groundwater	  chemistry,	  retardation	  of	  the	  
radioactive	   substances	   and	   protection	   provided	   against	   natural	   phenomena	   and	   human	   actions.	   There	  
have	  been	  changes	  in	  the	  regulations	  over	  the	  years,	  which	  have	  meant	  changes	  in	  the	  formalism	  of	  how	  
these	  requirements	  are	  treated.	  In	  addition,	  regulations	  exist	  on	  classification	  of	  the	  rock	  structures	  and	  
properties	  that	  may	  have	  an	  adverse	  impact	  on	  the	  long-­‐term	  safety	  and	  that	  should,	  thus,	  be	  taken	  into	  
account	  in	  the	  repository	  layout.	  	  




3	  Evolving	  site	  characterization	  and	  rock	  classification	  
	  
3.1	  Site	  selection	  phase	  
	  
The	  suitability	  of	  crystalline	  rock	  for	  disposal	  has	  been	  one	  of	  the	  key	  topics	  since	  the	  selection	  process	  for	  
a	  spent	  nuclear	  fuel	  disposal	  site	  began	  in	  the	  1970s	  in	  Finland	  (e.g.	  Niini	  1978,	  Peltonen	  and	  Rouhiainen	  
1980).	  In	  the	  1990s,	  four	  potential	  crystalline	  sites	  were	  being	  investigated	  and	  the	  knowledge	  about	  the	  
sites	   was	   increasing	   along	   with	   the	   progress	   of	   the	   investigations.	   The	   early	   rock	   mass	   classification	  
systems	  applied	  by	  Posiva	  in	  mid-­‐'90s,	  were	  focused	  on	  the	  identification	  and	  classification	  of	  large-­‐scale,	  
potentially	  unstable	  or	  transmissive	  fracture	  zones	  and	  on	  the	  definition	  of	  respect	  distances	  between	  the	  
tunnels	  and	  these	  zones.	  The	  layout	  adaptations	  by	  Riekkola	  et	  al.	  (1996)	  and	  Äikäs	  and	  Riekkola	  (2000)	  
considered	   these	  hydrogeologically-­‐	  and	  geotechnically-­‐significant	   fracture	  zones.	  The	  proposed	  respect	  
distances	  to	  these	  fracture	  zones,	  evaluated	  mainly	  based	  on	  transmissivity,	  were	  based	  on	  an	  evaluation	  
of	  long-­‐term	  safety.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  late	  1990s,	  rock	  mass	  classification	  was,	  however,	  expanded	  to	  consider	  also	  the	  properties	  in	  the	  
rock	  mass	  between	  the	  deformation	  zones,	  focusing	  on	  the	  constructability	  of	  the	  rock	  mass	  (e.g.	  Äikäs	  et	  
al.	  2000).	  The	  parameters	  used	  in	  the	  classification	  fell	  under	  the	  categories	  of	  rock	  quality	  factors,	  state	  of	  
stress,	  groundwater	  chemistry	  and	  rock	  engineering	  properties.	  The	  classification	  was	  general	  enough	  to	  
be	  applied	  to	  the	  different	  sites,	  although	  utilizing	  relatively	  detailed	  data	  from	  the	  sites.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  
classification,	   particularly	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   properties	   of	   the	   fracture	   zones	   and	   the	   strength/stress	  
ratio	  that	  indicated	  a	  low	  suitability	  for	  a	  disposal	  depth	  greater	  than	  500	  m	  at	  Olkiluoto,	  	  were	  taken	  into	  
account	  in	  the	  layout	  work	  by	  Äikäs	  and	  Riekkola	  (2000).	  	  	  
	  
3.2	  Towards	  site	  specific	  classification	  system	  
	  
In	   the	  early	  2000s,	   after	   the	  Olkiluoto	   site	  had	  been	  selected	  as	   the	  disposal	   site	   for	   spent	  nuclear	   fuel,	  
Posiva	   launched	   the	  Host	  Rock	  Classification	   (HRC)	  project	   (Hagros	  2006)	   in	   order	   to	  develop	   the	   first	  
comprehensive	   classification	   system	   for	   host	   rock	   suitability,	   taking	   into	   account	   both	   the	   engineering	  
properties	  of	  the	  rock	  mass	  and	  the	  long-­‐term	  safety	  aspects.	  In	  this	  phase,	  the	  properties	  of	  the	  host	  rock	  
supporting	   the	   performance	   of	   the	   EBS	   were	   also	   taken	   into	   account	   in	   the	   classification.	   The	   rock	  
volumes	   for	   disposal	   were	   classified	   on	   several	   scales,	   i.e.	   the	   repository,	   tunnel	   and	   canister.	   The	  
classification	   system	   was	   intended	   to	   be	   a	   design	   tool	   used	   in	   all	   phases	   of	   repository	   development,	  
starting	  from	  the	  layout	  adaptation	  of	  the	  whole	  repository	  and	  covering	  all	  subsequent	  phases	  of	  design	  
and	  construction	  until	  the	  boring	  of	  the	  deposition	  holes	  and	  their	  final	  acceptance.	  The	  HRC-­‐system	  was	  
initially	  developed	  for	  the	  Olkiluoto	  site	  (Hagros	  et	  al.	  2005),	  but	  was	  later	  expanded	  to	  cover	  any	  disposal	  
site	   in	   crystalline	   bedrock	   (Hagros	   2006).	   The	   system	   considered	   the	   site	   data	   collected	   from	   surface-­‐
based	  and,	  later,	  underground	  studies	  and	  defined	  the	  parameter	  data	  that	  need	  to	  be	  acquired	  to	  perform	  
the	  classification.	  
	  
3.3	  Classification	  system	  for	  construction	  license	  application	  	  
	  
To	   prepare	   for	   the	   construction	   license	   application,	   the	   links	   of	   classification	   system	  both	   to	   the	   safety	  
case	  and	  to	  repository	  design	  and	  construction	  were	  to	  be	  strengthened	  and	  a	  two-­‐phased	  Rock	  Suitability	  
Criteria	   (RSC)	   program	   was	   started	   in	   2007.	   The	   first	   phase	   of	   the	   program,	   reported	   by	   Hellä	   et	   al.	  
(2009),	   concentrated	   on	   defining	   criteria	   for	   the	   host	   rock,	   with	   the	   focus	   on	   the	   rock	   properties	  
contributing	  to	  the	  long-­‐term	  safety.	  The	  RSC	  criteria	  are	  seen	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  select	  the	  rock	  volumes	  for	  the	  




deposition	   tunnels	   and	   holes,	   similar	   to	   requirements	   concerning	   the	   design	   and	   production	   of	   the	  
engineered	  barriers,	  and	  have	  been	  derived	   from	  the	   target	  properties,	  which	  set	   the	  general	   long-­‐term	  
safety	   related	   requirements	   for	   the	   host	   rock	   as	   a	   natural	   barrier.	   The	   resulting	   criteria	   consider	  
measurable	   or	   observable	   host	   rock	   parameters	   dealing	   with	   hydraulic	   properties	   and	   mechanical	  
stability	   of	   the	   host	   rock,	   as	   well	   as	   groundwater	   composition,	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   fulfilling	   the	   target	  
properties	  also	  in	  the	  long-­‐term.	  The	  criteria	  development	  has	  been	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  development	  of	  
the	  requirements	  management	  system	  for	  the	  entire	  disposal	  facility.	  
	  
Criteria	  development	  has	  been	  continued	  in	  the	  second	  phase	  of	  the	  program,	  although	  the	  emphasis	  has	  
been	   on	   the	   actual	   classification	   process	   and	   its	   implementation	   as	   part	   of	   the	   overall	   underground	  
openings	  construction	  process.	  The	  idea	  of	  carrying	  out	  classification	  at	  different	  scales	  introduced	  as	  part	  
of	  the	  HRC	  is	  applied	  also	  in	  the	  RSC	  system.	  The	  scales	  used	  in	  the	  current	  system	  are:	  repository,	  panel,	  
and	   tunnel	   and	   deposition	   hole.	   These	   scales	   coincide	   with	   different	   stages	   of	   repository	   design	   and	  
construction,	  proceeding	  from	  the	  layout	  design	  of	  the	  entire	  repository	  to	  the	  implementation	  design	  and	  
construction	  of	  panels	  consisting	  of	  central	  tunnels	  and	  several	  deposition	  tunnels	  and,	  finally,	  deposition	  
holes.	  The	  current	  Rock	  Suitability	  Classification	  system	  is	  presented	  by	  McEwen	  et	  al.	  (2012).	  
	  
The	  RSC	  system	  was	  used	  to	  define	  the	  rock	  volumes	  suitable	  for	  the	  reference	  layout	  for	  the	  construction	  
license	   application	   (Saanio	   et	   al.	   2013).	   The	   effect	   of	   applying	   the	   rock	   suitability	   criteria	   on	   rock	  
properties	  around	  the	  repository	  in	  the	  long-­‐term	  (e.g.	  flow	  conditions)	  was	  discussed	  in	  Posiva	  (2013).	  	  
	  
	  
4	  Testing	  of	  the	  RSC	  system	  
	  
Testing	  in	  ONKALO	  has	  provided	  feedback	  on	  the	  criteria,	  implementation	  of	  the	  classification	  system	  and	  
investigation	  methods	  used	   to	   gain	  data	  needed	   in	   the	   classification	   (McEwen	  et	   al.	   2012).	   Currently,	   a	  
full-­‐scale	  test/demonstration	  of	  the	  RSC	  system	  is	  underway	  at	  the	  actual	  repository	  level	  (about	  -­‐425	  m),	  
in	  conditions	  representative	  of	  the	  future	  repository	  to	  be	  constructed	  as	  an	  enlargement	  of	  the	  ONKALO	  
facility.	   In	   this	   demonstration,	   the	   RSC	   system	   has	   been	   applied	   to	   design	   and	   construction	   of	   a	  
demonstration	   facility	   comprising	   a	   central	   access	   tunnel	   and	   two	   demonstration	   tunnels	   with	  
experimental	   deposition	  holes,	  mimicking	   the	   repository	   as	   closely	   as	   possible,	   including	   the	   employed	  
construction	  methods	  (McEwen	  et	  al.	  2012).	  	  
	  
The	   construction	   of	   the	   demonstration	   facility	   and	   the	  RSC	  demonstration	   are	   currently	   still	   underway	  
with	  completion	  expected	   in	  early	  2015.	  To	  date,	  eight	   rock	  suitability	   classifications	  have	  been	  carried	  
out	   to	   consecutively	   evaluate	   the	   suitability	   of	   the	   rock	   hosting	   the	   demonstration	   facility,	   the	  
demonstration	   tunnels	   and	   the	   experimental	   deposition	   holes,	   based	   on	   data	   gained	   from	   geological,	  
geophysical	  and	  hydrogeological	  investigations	  and	  a	  frequently	  updated	  model	  of	  the	  significant	  bedrock	  
features	   in	   the	   area.	   The	   earliest	   suitability	   classifications	   of	   the	   demonstration	   facility	   relied	   on	   data	  
collected	   from	   the	   nearby	   ONKALO	   access	   tunnel	   and	   the	   central	   tunnel	   of	   the	   facility.	   Prior	   to	   the	  
excavation	   of	   the	   demonstration	   tunnels,	   so-­‐called	   pilot	   holes	   (cored	   boreholes	  made	   for	   investigation	  
purposes)	  were	  drilled	  on	  the	  planned	  demonstration	  tunnel	  locations,	  to	  gain	  more	  detailed	  information	  
on	   the	   rock	   properties;	   the	   following	   rock	   suitability	   classification	   resulted	   in	   some	   changes	   in	   the	  
planned	   tunnel	   layout.	   After	   investigations	   were	   carried	   out	   in	   the	   excavated	   demonstration	   tunnels,	  
suitability	   classifications	   were	   carried	   out	   for	   each	   tunnel	   to	   define	   which	   tunnel	   sections	   would	   be	  
suitable	  for	  hosting	  experimental	  deposition	  holes.	  Hole	  locations	  were	  selected	  from	  the	  suitable	  tunnel	  
sections,	   and	   vertical	   pilot	   holes	   were	   drilled	   for	   further	   investigations	   at	   the	   chosen	   locations.	   After	  




suitability	  classification	  was	  performed	  for	  the	  locations	  of	  the	  experimental	  deposition	  holes	  on	  the	  basis	  
of	  the	  pilot	  hole	  data,	  their	  construction	  commenced,	  and	  the	  suitability	  of	  each	  experimental	  deposition	  
hole	  (fulfilment	  of	  the	  RSC	  criteria)	  was	  verified	  in	  a	  final	  suitability	  classification	  after	   investigations	  in	  
the	  constructed	  holes.	  	  	  
	  
Demonstration	   tunnel	  1	  was	  completed	   in	  October	  2012	  with	   four	  constructed	  experimental	  deposition	  
holes	   (three	   fulfilling	   the	   RSC	   criteria)	   (Fig.	   1).	   Construction	   of	   the	   experimental	   deposition	   holes	   is	  
currently	   underway	   in	   demonstration	   tunnel	   2,	   where	   six	   locations	   have	   been	   selected	   based	   on	   the	  
suitability	   classification	   of	   the	   excavated	   tunnel;	   after	   drilling	   of	   the	   vertical	   pilot	   holes,	   five	   of	   the	   six	  
locations	  were	  preliminarily	  classified	  as	  suitable.	  	  	  
	  
	  
Fig.	  1.	  Suitability	  of	  the	  experimental	  deposition	  holes	  in	  Demonstration	  tunnel	  1	  (DT1)	  in	  ONKALO.	  The	  image	  shows	  
a	   vertical	   cross-­‐section	   of	   the	   tunnel	   and	   the	   significant	   bedrock	   structures	   (brittle	   fault	   zones	   and	   single	   large	  
fractures)	  modeled	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   investigations	  in	  the	  excavated	  DT1	  and	  older	  data	  from	  the	  area.	  The	  bar	  above	  
the	   experimental	   deposition	  holes	   (ONK-­‐EH...)	   shows	   the	   result	   of	   the	   suitability	   classification	  based	  on	   the	   tunnel	  
data	   and	   the	  model;	   green	   sections	   were	   classified	   as	   suitable	   for	   deposition	   holes,	   red	   ones	   as	   not	   suitable.	   The	  
location	  of	  ONK-­‐EH8	  was	  deemed	  as	  potentially	  suitable	  in	  the	  classification	  carried	  out	  after	  drilling	  of	  the	  vertical	  
pilot	  holes;	  the	  suitability	  was	  verified	  in	  the	  final	  classification	  after	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  holes	  (see	  the	  inserted	  
table).	  The	  hole	  ONK-­‐EH7	  was	  constructed	  even	  if	  the	  location	  was	  classified	  as	  unsuitable	  to	  test	  run	  the	  prototype	  





During	  the	  years,	  the	  classification	  strategies	  have	  become	  more	  tightly	  linked	  to	  the	  safety	  case	  and	  the	  
design	   and	   construction	   of	   the	   underground	   rock	   facilities.	   The	   systems	   have	   evolved	   along	   with	   the	  
increasing	  amount	  of	  information	  about	  the	  site,	  knowledge	  on	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  EBS	  and	  lately	  also	  
experiences	   gained	   from	   testing	   in	   ONKALO.	   Also,	   the	   system	   has	   been	   adapted	   to	   the	   changes	   in	  
regulations.	  
	  




The	   RSC	   system	   provides	   a	   structured	   method	   for	   positioning	   the	   disposal	   facility,	   so	   that	   the	   less	  
favorable	  volumes	  of	  rock,	  e.g.	  brittle	  fault	  zones	  and	  hydraulically-­‐conductive	  features,	  are	  avoided.	  The	  
main	  outcome	  of	  the	  demonstration	  activities	  performed	  to	  date	  indicates	  that	  the	  criteria	  developed	  are	  
applicable	   in	  practice	  and	  that	   the	  stepwise	  research,	  construction	  and	  decision-­‐making	  protocol	  can	  be	  
applied	  successfully.	  	  
	  
However,	   needs	   for	   further	   development	   of	   some	   of	   the	   criteria,	   further	   streamlining	   the	   flow	   of	  
investigations,	   design	   and	   construction,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   associated	   decision-­‐making	   and	   documentation	  
process	   have	   also	   been	   identified.	   Also,	   the	   feedback	   from	   the	   performance	   assessment	   assessing	   how	  
well	  the	  rock	  suitability	  classification	  contributes	  to	  long-­‐term	  safety	  (Posiva	  2013)	  and	  new	  information	  
about	  the	  site	  and	  EBS	  design	  are	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  the	  development	  work	  (Posiva	  2012).	  
	  
References	  	  
Äikäs,	  K.	  &	  Riekkola,	  R.	  2000.	  Locating	  a	  high	  level	  waste	  repository	  within	  the	  Olkiluoto	  site	  (in	  Finnish).	  Helsinki,	  Finland:	  Posiva	  
Oy,	  Report	  Working	  Report	  	  2000-­‐52.	  
Aikas,	   K.	   (ed.),	   Hagros,	   A.,	   Johansson,	   E.,	   Malmlund,	   H.,	   Sievanen,	   U.,	   Tolppanen,	   P.,	   Ahokas,	   H.,	   Heikkinen,	   E.,	   Jaaskelainen,	   P.,	  
Ruotsalainen,	   P.,	   Saksa,	   P.,	   2000.	   Engineering	   rock	   mass	   classification	   of	   the	   Olkiluoto	   investigation	   site.	   Posiva	   Oy,	   Report	  
POSIVA	  2000-­‐08.	  
Hagros,	  A.,	  McEwen,	  T.,	  Anttila,	  P.,	  Äikäs,	  K.,	  2005.	  Host	   rock	  classification.	  Phase	  3:	  Proposed	  classification	  system	  (HRC-­‐system).	  	  
Posiva	  Oy,	  Olkiluoto,	  Working	  Report	  2005-­‐07.	  
Hagros,	   A.	   2006.	   Host	   Rock	   Classification	   (HRC)	   system	   for	   nuclear	   waste	   disposal	   in	   crystalline	   bedrock.	   Helsinki,	   Finland:	  
University	  of	  Helsinki.	  Publications	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Geology	  D8.	  
Hellä,	  P.	   (ed.),	   Ikonen,	  A.,	  Mattila,	   J.,	  Torvela,	  T.,	  Wikström,	  L.	  2009.	  RSC-­‐programme	  -­‐	   Interim	  report.	  Approach	  and	  basis	   for	  RSC	  
development,	  layout	  determining	  features	  and	  preliminary	  criteria	  for	  tunnel	  and	  deposition	  hole	  scale.	  Eurajoki,	  Finland:	  Posiva	  
Oy.	  Working	  Report	  2009-­‐29.	  
McEwen,	  T.	  &	  Äikäs,	  T.	  2000.	  The	  site	  selection	  process	  for	  a	  spent	  fuel	  repository	  in	  Finland	  –	  Summary	  report.	  Helsinki,	  Finland:	  
Posiva	  Oy.	  POSIVA	  2000-­‐15.	  
McEwen,	   T.	   (ed.),	   Aro,	   S.,	   Hellä,	   P.,	   Kosunen,	   P.,	   Käpyaho,	   A.,	   Mattila,	   J.,	   Pere,	   T.,	   RSC	   working	   group.	   2012.	   Rock	   Suitability	  
Classification,	  RSC-­‐2012.	  Eurajoki,	  Finland:	  Posiva	  Oy.	  POSIVA	  2012-­‐24.	  
Niini,	  H.,	  1978.	  The	  geological	  conditions	  in	  Finland	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  disposal	  of	  nuclear	  wastes	  [in	  Finnish].	  Geological	  Survey	  of	  
Finland,	  Research	  Report	  GTL	  YSP	  3.	  
Peltonen,	  E.,	  Rouhiainen,	  P.,	  1980.	  Bedrock	   investigation	  methods	   in	  nuclear	  waste	  disposal.	  Part	   I:	  Content	  of	   studies	   [in	  Finnish	  
with	  an	  English	  summary].	  Nuclear	  Waste	  Commission	  of	  Finnish	  Power	  Companies,	  Helsinki,	  YJT-­‐80-­‐07.	  
Posiva	  2012.	  YJH-­‐2012	  Nuclear	  waste	  management	  at	  Olkiluoto	  and	  Loviisa	  power	  plants:	  Review	  of	  current	  status	  and	  future	  plans	  
for	   2013–2015	   (in	   Finnish:	   Olkiluodon	   ja	   Loviisan	   voimalaitosten	   ydinjätehuollon	   ohjelma	   vuosille	   2013–2015).	   Eurajoki,	  
Finland:	  Posiva	  Oy.	  YJH-­‐2012.	  
Posiva	  2013.	  Safety	  case	  for	  the	  disposal	  of	  spent	  nuclear	  fuel	  at	  Olkiluoto	  –	  Performance	  Assessment	  2012.	  Eurajoki,	  Finland:	  Posiva	  
Oy.	  POSIVA	  2012-­‐04.	  
Riekkola,	   R.,	   Saanio,	   T.,	   Salo,	   J-­‐P.,	   1996.	   Preliminary	   site-­‐specific	   adaptations	   of	   the	   repository	   for	   spent	   nuclear	   fuel	   (1996)	   (in	  
Finnish).	  Posiva	  Oy,	  Report	  TEKA-­‐96-­‐07.	  
Saanio,	  T.	  (ed.),	   Ikonen,	  A.,	  Keto,	  P.,	  Kirkkomäki,	  T.,	  Kukkola,	  T.,	  Nieminen,	   J.	  &	  Raiko,	  H.	  2013.	  Design	  of	  the	  disposal	   facility	  2012.	  
Eurajoki,	  Finland:	  Posiva	  Oy.	  Working	  Report	  2013-­‐17.	  
STUK.	   2014.	   Disposal	   of	   nuclear	  waste.	   	   Helsinki,	   Finland:	   Radiation	   and	  Nuclear	   Safety	   Authority.	   Guide	   YVL	   D.5/15	  November	  







	   	  




SESSION	  8	  SCIENTIFIC	  ASPECTS	  OF	  THE	  NUCLEAR	  WASTE	  DISPOSAL	  
SAFETY	  CASE	  (PART	  II)	  
	  
Application	  of	  Fundamental	  Aquatic	  Chemistry	  to	  the	  Safety	  Case	  
and	  the	  Role	  of	  Thermodynamic	  Reference	  Data	  Bases	  	  
	  
MARCUS	  ALTMAIER1,	  XAVIER	  GAONA1,	  DAVID	  FELLHAUER1,	  HORST	  GECKEIS1	  
1Karlsruhe	  Institute	  of	  Technology,	  Institute	  for	  Nuclear	  Waste	  Disposal,	  PO	  3640,	  76021	  Karlsruhe,	  
marcus.altmaier@kit.edu,	  xavier.gaona@kit.edu,	  david.fellhauer@kit.edu,	  horst.geckeis@kit.edu	  
	  
All	  national	  and	  international	  programs	  developing	  a	  Nuclear	  Waste	  Disposal	  Safety	  Case	  have	  recognized	  
the	   essential	   requirement	   of	   assessing	   aqueous	   (radionuclide)	   chemistry	   and	   establishing	   reliable	  
thermodynamic	  databases.	  Long-­‐term	  disposal	  of	  nuclear	  waste	  in	  deep	  underground	  repositories	  is	  the	  
safest	   option	   to	   separate	  highly	  hazardous	   radionuclides	   from	   the	   environment.	   In	  order	   to	  predict	   the	  
long-­‐term	  performance	  of	  a	  repository	  for	  different	  evolution	  scenarios,	   the	  potentially	  relevant	  specific	  
(geo)chemical	  systems	  are	  analyzed.	  This	  requires	  a	  detailed	  understanding	  of	  solubility,	  speciation	  and	  
thermodynamics	   for	   all	   relevant	   components	   including	   radionuclides,	   and	   the	   availability	   of	   reliable	  
thermodynamic	  data	  and	  databases	  as	  fundamental	  input	  for	  integral	  geochemical	  model	  calculations	  and	  
hence	  PA.	  	  
	  
Radionuclide	  solubility	  and	  speciation	  strongly	  depend	  on	  chemical	  conditions	  (pH,	  Eh,	  matrix	  electrolyte	  
system	  and	  ionic	  strength)	  with	  additional	  factors	  like	  the	  presence	  of	  complexing	  ligands	  or	  temperature	  
further	   impacting	   solution	   chemistry.	   As	   the	   fundamental	   chemical	   key	   processes	   are	   known	   and	  
convincingly	  described	  by	  general	  laws	  of	  nature	  (→	  solution	  thermodynamics),	  the	  long-­‐term	  behavior	  of	  
a	  repository	  system	  can	  be	  analyzed	  over	  geological	  timescales	  using	  geochemical	  tools.	  A	  key	  application	  
of	  fundamental	  aquatic	  chemistry	  in	  the	  Safety	  Case	  is	  the	  determination	  of	  solubility	  limits	  (radionuclide	  
source	   terms).	  Based	  upon	   fundamental	   chemical	   information	   (on	  solid	  phases,	   complexation	   reactions,	  
activity	  coefficients,	  etc.),	  the	  maximum	  amount	  of	  radionuclides	  potentially	  dissolved	  in	  a	  given	  volume	  of	  
solution	   and	   transported	   away	   from	   the	   repository,	   are	   quantified.	   A	   detailed	   understanding	   of	  
radionuclide	   chemistry	   is	   also	   crucial	   for	   neighboring	   fields.	   For	   example,	   advanced	   mechanistic	  
understanding	   and	   modeling	   of	   sorption	   processes	   at	   the	   solid	   liquid	   interphase,	   waste	   dissolution	  
processes,	  secondary	  phase	  and	  solid	  solution	  formation,	  must	  use	  qualitatively	  and	  quantitatively	  correct	  
radionuclide	  speciation	  schemes.	  
	  
The	   high	   relevance	   of	   correct,	   complete	   and	   consistent	   thermodynamic	   data	   and	   supplying	   databases	  
which	  allow	  a	   robust	  prediction	  of	   solution	  chemistry	  has	  been	  recognized	  by	   the	   international	  nuclear	  
waste	  disposal	  community	  since	  decades.	  Over	  the	  last	  20	  years,	  the	  Thermodynamic	  Database	  Project	  of	  	  
OECD-­‐NEA	   (http://www.oecd-­‐nea.org/dbtdb)	   has	   significantly	   contributed	   to	   the	   present,	   largely	  
positive,	   situation.	   The	   NEA-­‐TDB	   project	   publishes	   a	   series	   of	   critically	   reviewed	   and	   evaluated	  
compilations	  of	  consistent	  thermodynamic	  data,	  widely	  accepted	  as	  reference	  values	  for	  key	  elements	  at	  
low	  or	  intermediate	  ionic	  strengths	  conditions.	  With	  regard	  to	  modeling	  systems	  at	  extremely	  high	  ionic	  
strength,	   activities	   are	   currently	   initiated	   to	   (i)	   prepare	   a	   state-­‐of-­‐art-­‐report	   on	   Pitzer	  modeling	  within	  
NEA-­‐TDB	  and	  (ii)	  set	  up	  a	  working	  group	  within	  the	  NEA	  Salt	  Club	  to	  work	  towards	  a	  Joint	  International	  
Pitzer	  Database.	   In	   Germany,	   the	   THEREDA	  project	   is	   developing	   a	   German	  Thermodynamic	   Reference	  




Database,	   aiming	   at	   providing	   a	   comprehensive	   and	   internally	   consistent	   thermodynamic	   reference	  
database	  for	  the	  geochemical	  modeling	  of	  all	  near-­‐field	  and	  far-­‐field	  processes	  relevant	  in	  Germany.	  
	  
In	   this	  presentation,	   the	   important	   contributions	   from	   fundamental	   aquatic	   chemistry	   in	   support	  of	   the	  
Nuclear	   Waste	   Disposal	   Safety	   Case	   are	   highlighted.	   Thermodynamic	   reference	   databases	   and	   their	  
relevance	   for	   the	   Safety	  Case	   are	   analyzed.	  Based	  upon	  a	   critical	   assessment	  of	   the	   status	  quo,	   positive	  
directions	  for	  future	  research	  activities	  and	  international	  cooperation	  are	  discussed	  and	  prioritized.	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During	  operation	  and	  decommissioning	  of	   the	  Swedish	  nuclear	   facilities,	   radioactive	  waste	   is	  generated	  
that	   must	   be	   disposed	   of.	   Besides	   waste	   from	   the	   nuclear	   facilities,	   some	   waste	   derives	   from	   other	  
activities	  such	  as	  industry,	  research,	  medical	  care,	  etc..	  Short-­‐lived	  low-­‐	  and	  intermediate-­‐level	  waste	  from	  
these	  activities	   is	  disposed	  of	   in	   the	   final	  repository	   for	  short-­‐lived	  radioactive	  waste,	  SFR,	   in	  Forsmark.	  
The	   facility,	   which	   has	   been	   in	   operation	   since	   1988,	   is	   owned	   and	   operated	   by	   Svensk	  
Kärnbränslehantering	  AB,	   SKB.	  The	  existing	   facility	  has	  neither	   sufficient	   space	  nor	   a	   license	   to	   receive	  
decommissioning	  waste.	  SFR	  must	   therefore	  be	  extended	  so	   that	  shortlived	   low-­‐	  and	   intermediate-­‐level	  
decommissioning	  waste	  from	  the	  nuclear	  facilities	  can	  also	  be	  received.	  The	  need	  for	  additional	  capacity	  
has	  been	  accentuated	  by	  the	  closure	  of	   two	  reactors	   in	  Barsebäck.	  These	  reactors	  cannot	  be	  dismantled	  
until	  the	  SFR	  facility	  has	  been	  extended.	  
	  
The	   exsiting	   repository	   is	   built	   to	   receive,	   and	   after	   closure	   serve	   as	   a	   passive	   repository	   for,	   low-­‐	   and	  
intermediate-­‐level	   radioactive	   waste.	   The	   disposal	   rooms	   are	   situated	   in	   the	   bedrock	   beneath	   the	   sea	  
floor,	  covered	  by	  about	  60	  metres	  of	  rock.	  The	  repository	  has	  been	  designed	  so	  that	  it	  can	  be	  abandoned	  
after	  closure	  without	  requiring	  further	  measures	  to	  maintain	  its	  function.	  
	  
The	   extension	   of	   SFR,	   is	   done	   at	   the	   -­‐120	  m	   level	   immediately	   adjacent	   to,	   and	  within	   the	   same	   depth	  
range	  as,	   the	  existing	   facility.	  The	  basic	   function	  of	   the	  existing	  SFR	  and	  of	   the	  extended	  one	  will	  be	   the	  
same.	  However,	  a	  clear	  difference	  is	  the	  design	  of	  the	  tunnel	  and	  the	  rock	  vault	  that	  are	  required	  to	  permit	  
transport	  and	  storage	  of	  whole	  reactore	  pressure	  vessels.	  
	  
The	  application	  for	  a	  license	  to	  build	  this	  extension	  includes	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  long-­‐term	  safety	  (post-­‐
closure	  safety)	  of	  the	  facility.	  The	  safety	  assessment	  also	  contains	  an	  updated	  assessment	  of	  the	  long-­‐term	  
safety	  of	  the	  existing	  facility.	  
	  
The	   safety	   assessment	   for	   SFR	  has	   two	   clear	   roles.	   The	   first	   one	   is	   a	   normative	   and	   controlling	   role	   to	  
propose	  a	  repository	  design	  that	  meets	   the	  requirements	  made	  on	   long-­‐term	  function,	   for	  example	  best	  
available	   technology.	   The	   second	   one	   is	   an	   analyzing	   and	   reporting	   role	   where	   the	   chosen	   design	   is	  
analyzed	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  requirements	  made	  on	  long-­‐term	  function	  are	  met.	  The	  methodology	  
used	   in	   the	   assessment	   is	   similar	   to	   that	   used	   by	   SKB	   to	   produce	   the	   documents	   included	   in	   the	  
application	  for	  the	  Spent	  Fuel	  Repository.	  
	  
The	  repository	  system	  –	  broadly	  defined	  as	  the	  waste,	  the	  waste	  containers,	  the	  engineered	  barriers,	  the	  
host	  rock	  and	  the	  biosphere	  surrounding	  the	  repository	  –	  will	  change	  with	  time.	  The	   future	  state	  of	   the	  
system	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  following:	  
• the	  initial	  state	  of	  the	  system,	  
• a	  number	  of	  thermal,	  hydraulic,	  mechanical	  and	  chemical	  processes	  that	  act	  internally	  in	  the	  
repository	  system	  over	  time	  (internal	  processes),	  
• outside	  forces	  acting	  on	  the	  system	  (external	  processes).	  
Based	  on	   this,	   the	  evolution	  of	   the	  repository	   is	  estimated.	  By	  combining	   this	  with	  an	  analysis	  of	   future	  
exposure,	  radiological	  risk	  can	  be	  estimated.	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Abstract:	  Spent	  nuclear	  fuel	  from	  nuclear	  power	  plants,	  owned	  by	  TVO	  (Teollisuuden	  Voima	  Oy)	  and	  Fortum,	  
is	   planned	   to	   be	   disposed	   to	   a	   repository	   at	   a	   depth	   of	  more	   than	   400	  meters	   in	   the	   bedrock	   of	   Olkiluoto	  
(Eurajoki,	  Finland).	  The	  repository	  system	  of	  multiple	  release	  barriers	  consists	  of	  both	  manmade	  and	  natural	  
barriers.	  The	  surrounding	  rock	  acts	  as	  the	  last	  barrier	  if	  other	  barriers	  fail	  during	  passage	  of	  the	  millennia.	  
Therefore,	   safe	   disposal	   of	   spent	   nuclear	   fuel	   requires	   information	   on	   the	   radionuclide	   transport	   and	  
retention	  properties	  within	   the	  porous	  and	  water-­‐containing	  rock	  matrix	  along	   the	  water	  conducting	   flow	  
paths.	   To	   this	   end,	   various	   types	   of	   experiments	   are	   being	   performed	   and	   planned	   within	   ONKALO,	   the	  
underground	   rock	   characterization	   facility	   in	   Olkiluoto,	   as	   part	   of	   the	   project	   “rock	   matrix	   REtention	  
PROperties”	  (REPRO).	  The	  research	  site	   is	   located	  at	  a	  depth	  of	  420	  meters	  close	  to	  the	  repository	  site.	  The	  
aim	  is	  to	  study	  the	  diffusion	  and	  sorption	  properties	  of	  nuclear	  compounds	  in	  the	  rock	  matrix	  under	  real	  in-­‐
situ	  conditions.	  The	  first	  in-­‐situ	  experiment	  was	  performed	  during	  2012	  using	  HTO,	  Na-­‐22,	  Cl-­‐36	  and	  I-­‐125	  as	  
tracer	   nuclides.	   Breakthrough	   curves	   show	   retention	   and	   asymptotic	   behavior	   that	   are	   in-­‐line	   with	   those	  
caused	  by	  matrix	  diffusion	  and	  sorption	  were	  observed	  in	  their	  breakthrough	  curves.	  Weak	  sorption	  was	  also	  





It	  is	  known	  that	  elements	  migrating	  in	  water	  that	  flows	  in	  a	  fracture	  are	  transported	  at	  a	  lower	  speed	  than	  
that	  of	  the	  water	  (Neretnieks,	  1980).	  The	  retention	  is	  caused	  by	  diffusion	  of	  these	  elements	  away	  from	  the	  
flowing	   water	   to	   stagnant	   water	   in	   the	   pores	   of	   the	   surrounding	   rock	   matrix,	   and	   by	   their	   chemical	  
sorption	   on	   mineral	   surfaces	   of	   the	   rock	   matrix,	   fracture	   walls	   and	   fillings	   (Voutilainen	   et	   al.,	   2010,	  
Kekäläinen	   et	   al.,	   2011).	   However,	   the	   relevance	   of	   retention	   in	   repository	   conditions	   has	   remained	  
unclear,	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  retention	  varies	  from	  one	  nuclide	  to	  another.	  
	  
In	   general,	   it	   is	   believed	   that	   conditions	  might	   be	   different	   in	   laboratory	   than	   in-­‐situ	   due	   to,	   e.g.	   stress	  
relaxation	  caused	  by	  sampling.	  Sawing	  artifacts	  and	  stress	  relaxation	  might	  change	  the	  characteristics	  of	  
rock	   sample	   and	   increase	   porosity	   and	   in	   that	   way	   enhance	   migration	   of	   elements	   by	   diffusion.	  
Furthermore,	   these	   changes	   may	   increase	   specific	   surface	   area	   available	   for	   sorption,	   which	   would	  
increase	   the	   value	   of	   distribution	   coefficients.	   The	   same	   effect	   is	   seen	   in	   laboratory	   batch	   sorption	  
experiments	  when	  using	  crushed	  rock	  samples.	  In-­‐situ	  experiments	  avoid	  some	  of	  the	  problems	  caused	  by	  
sampling	  and	  stress	  relaxation.	  To	  this	  end,	   it	   is	   important	  to	  measure	  diffusion	  and	  sorption	  properties	  
with	  in-­‐situ	  experiments	  and	  compare	  their	  results	  with	  those	  from	  laboratory	  experiments.	  In	  addition,	  
in	   the	   performance	   assessment	   conditions	   most	   of	   the	   retention	   takes	   place	   in	   the	   vicinity	   of	   the	  
deposition	  holes.	  This	  emphasizes	  the	  significance	  of	  careful	  quantification	  of	  the	  retention	  properties	  of	  
the	  bedrock	  in	  the	  conditions	  present	  in	  the	  repository	  near-­‐field.	  




The	  objective	  of	  the	  REPRO	  project	  is	  to	  perform	  experiments	  so	  as	  to	  investigate	  the	  retention	  properties	  
of	   the	   rock	   matrix	   under	   realistic	   in-­‐situ	   conditions.	   In	   first	   in-­‐situ	   experiment,	   Water	   Phase	   matrix	  
Diffusion	   Experiment	   (WPDE),	   a	   short	   concentrated	   pulse	   of	   selected	   radionuclides	  was	   injected	   into	   a	  
water	  flow	  through	  an	  artificial	  fracture.	  This	  artificial	  fracture	  was	  formed	  on	  the	  circumference	  of	  a	  2	  m	  
long	   packed-­‐off	   section	   of	   drillhole	   by	   placing	   a	   cylindrical	   flow	   guide	   on	   center	   of	   the	   drillhole.	  
Performing	  the	  tracer	  experiment	  along	  artificial	  fracture	  in	  packed-­‐off	  drillhole	  section	  enables	  a	  better	  
control	  of	  the	  flow	  field	  and	  a	  better	  recovery	  of	  tracers,	  and	  thus	  this	  experimental	  set-­‐up	  allows	  a	  more	  
precise	  characterization	  of	  the	  rock	  matrix	  properties.	  Similar	  in-­‐situ	  experiments	  like	  here	  have	  recently	  
been	   performed	   at	   the	   Äspö	   Hard	   Rock	   Laboratory,	   Sweden,	   and	   at	   Grimsel	   test	   site,	   Switzerland	  





2.1	  Site	  description	  
	  
The	   in-­‐situ	   experiments	   are	   performed	   in	   ONKALO,	   the	   underground	   rock	   characterization	   facility	   in	  
Olkiluoto,	  Finland.	  Preliminary	  plan	  of	  site	  selection	  and	  experiments	  were	  done	  by	  Aalto	  et	  al.,	  2009.	  The	  
REPRO	  research	  niche	  was	  excavated	  at	  a	  depth	  of	  420	  m	  (see	  Fig.	  1)	  and	  experimental	  drillholes	  were	  
done	  away	   from	   the	   large	  water	   conducting	   fractures.	   Special	   attention	  was	  paid	   to	  drilling	   in	  order	   to	  
keep	  the	  drillholes	  as	  straight	  as	  possible	  and	  to	  avoid	  mechanical	  damage	  in	  the	  drillhole	  walls.	  
	  
	  
Fig.	  1.	  REPRO	  research	  niche	  locates	  at	  a	  depth	  of	  420	  m	  in	  the	  underground	  rock	  characterization	  facility	  (ONKALO)	  
in	  Olkiluoto,	  Finland.	  
	  
In	  general,	   the	  bedrock	  around	  the	  REPRO	  niche	   is	  pegmatitic	  granite	  and	  migmatitic	  gneiss	  (subgroup:	  
veined	  gneiss).	  Pegmatitic	  granite	  is	  from	  light	  gray	  to	  pale	  colored	  with	  coarse	  K-­‐feldspar	  and	  commonly	  
also	  cordierite	  and	  garnet.	  Migmatitic	  gneiss	   is	  a	  metamorphic,	  heterogeneous	  mixture	  of	   small	  grained	  
mica	   gneiss	   and	   coarser	   leucosome	   veins	   of	   thickness	   that	   varies	   from	   several	   millimeters	   up	   to	   ten	  
centimeters.	   Experiments	  were	  planned	   to	  be	  performed	   in	  unfractured	   veined	   gneiss	   and	   at	   least	   7	  m	  
away	  from	  the	  tunnel	  wall.	  Foliation	  of	  veined	  gneiss	  in	  the	  experimental	  area	  is	  mainly	  weak	  to	  moderate	  
banded	  foliation.	  Fracturing,	  fracture	  fillings	  and	  rock	  quality	  were	  also	  investigated	  from	  the	  drillcores.	  A	  
more	  detailed	  geological	  description	  of	  the	  site	  is	  given	  by	  Toropainen,	  2012.	  	  
	  




2.2	  Water	  phase	  matrix	  diffusion	  experiments	  (WPDE)	  
	  
A	   special	   double-­‐packer	   system	  was	   constructed	   for	   the	  WPDE	   (see	  Fig.	   2).	  The	  packer	   system	   forms	  a	  
two-­‐meter	  artificial	  flow	  channel	  along	  the	  perimeter	  of	  the	  drillhole.	  The	  volume	  and	  aperture	  of	  the	  flow	  
channel	  are	  minimized	  by	  an	  impermeable	  cylindrical	  flow	  guide	  inside	  the	  packer	  system.	  The	  inlet	  and	  
outlet	  positions	  of	  water	  are	  located	  at	  the	  opposite	  ends	  of	  the	  packed-­‐off	  section.	  	  WPDE	  tracer	  tests	  are	  
performed	   using	   slow	   flow	   rates	   that	   are	   generated	   using	   a	   piston	   pump.	   The	   experiment	   is	   executed	  
using	   synthetic	   groundwater	   to	   carry	   to	   tracer	   solution.	  Composition	  of	   the	   synthetic	   groundwater	  was	  
prepared	   based	   on	   a	   careful	   analysis	   of	   real	   fracture	  water	   in	   the	   REPRO	   site.	   A	   sharp	   pulse	   of	   tracer	  
solution	  was	  injected	  into	  water	  flow	  which	  was	  then	  conducted	  to	  the	  inlet	  of	  the	  experimental	  drillhole	  
section.	  Tracer	  molecules	  were	  diffused	   into	   the	   rock	  matrix	  and	  sorbed	  at	   the	  mineral	   surfaces	  during	  
migration	  through	  flow	  channel.	  The	  early	  part	  of	  the	  breakthrough	  curve	  is	  dominated	  by	  the	  advection,	  
diffusion	   and	   dispersion	   in	   the	   flow	   channel.	   However,	   matrix	   diffusion	   and	   sorption	   were	   expected	  
govern	  the	  late	  part	  of	  the	  breakthrough	  curve.	  
	  
Fig.	  2.	  WPDE	  experiment	  studied	  retention	  of	  HTO,	  Na-­‐22,	  Cl-­‐36	  and	  I-­‐125	  by	  matrix	  diffusion	  for	  flow	  through	  an	  
artificial	  fracture	  that	  is	  formed	  along	  a	  packed-­‐off	  drillhole	  section	  with	  the	  help	  of	  an	  impermeable	  cylindrical	  flow	  
guide	  
	  
The	  measurements	  need	  to	  be	  carried	  out	  using	  low	  enough	  flow	  rates	  in	  order	  to	  see	  a	  measurable	  effect	  
of	  the	  matrix	  diffusion,	  but	  also	  high	  enough	  so	  that	  the	  experiment	  time	  remains	  tolerable.	  Based	  on	  the	  
predictive	  modeling,	   flow	   rates	   of	   20,	   10,	   and	   5	   µl/min	  were	   chosen	   since	  multiple	   flow	   rates	   support	  
interpretation	  of	   the	   experimental	   results.	  The	   first	  WPDE	  experiment	  has	  been	  performed	  with	   a	   flow	  
rate	  of	  20	  µl/min	  and	  the	  second	  one	  with	  10	  µl/min	  is	  currently	  running.	  
	  
In	  the	  first	  experiment	  HTO,	  Na-­‐22,	  Cl-­‐36,	  and	  I-­‐125	  were	  used	  as	  tracers.	  Tracers	  were	  selected	  such	  that	  
the	  tracer	  cocktail	  contains	  a	  conservative	  (HTO),	  an	  anionic	  (Cl-­‐36),	  and	  a	  weakly	  sorbing	  (Na-­‐22).	  I-­‐125,	  
emitting	  low	  energy	  gammas,	  was	  included	  in	  the	  cocktail	  for	  online	  detection	  of	  the	  breakthrough	  by	  an	  
gamma	   detector.	   In	   laboratory,	   the	   concentrations	   of	   Na-­‐22	   and	   I-­‐125	  were	   first	  measured	   by	   gamma	  
spectroscopy	  (GS)	   from	  collected	  water	  samples.	  After	  GS,	  chloride	  and	  part	  of	   iodide	  were	  precipitated	  
from	  the	  solution	  using	  AgNO3	  and	  Cl-­‐36	  was	  then	  measured	  by	   liquid	  scintillation	  counting	  (LSC)	   from	  
dissolved	   precipitate.	   Both	   Na-­‐22	  and	  I-­‐125	   interfere	   with	   measurement	   of	   HTO	   which	   was	   measured	  
from	  the	  supernatant	  by	  LSC.	  Na-­‐22	  and	  I-­‐125	  were	  measured	  after	  LSC	  counting	  once	  again	  with	  GS	  and	  





The	   first	  WPDE	   experiment	   using	   radionuclides	  was	   performed	   during	   2012.	   In	   this	   experiment	  water	  
was	  pumped	  through	  the	  artificial	   flow	  channel	  with	  a	  constant	   flow	  rate	  of	  20	  µl/min	  and	  a	  mixture	  of	  




HTO,	  Na-­‐22,	  Cl-­‐36,	  and	  I-­‐125	  was	  injected	  as	  a	  sharp	  pulse	  (1	  ml)	  into	  the	  flowing	  water.	  Concentrations	  of	  
these	  radionuclides	  as	  a	  function	  of	  time,	  i.e.	  their	  breakthrough	  curves,	  were	  measured	  by	  taking	  water	  
samples	  from	  the	  outflowing	  water	  (see	  Fig.	  3).	  A	  clear	  power-­‐law	  behavior	  was	  observed	  in	  the	  late	  part	  
of	   breakthrough	   curve	  which	   is	   typical	   for	  matrix	   diffusion	   and	   sorption.	   The	  measured	   breakthrough	  
curves	   were	   analyzed	   using	   a	   numerical	   model	   that	   takes	   into	   account	   advection,	   (Taylor)	   dispersion,	  
molecular	  diffusion	  and	  some	  heterogeneities	  in	  the	  flow	  channel,	  and	  matrix	  diffusion,	  sorption	  and	  some	  
heterogeneities	   in	   the	   rock	   matrix.	   Values	   of	   related	   parameters,	   found	   by	   fitting	   the	   measured	  
breakthrough	  curve	  by	  the	  model	  solution,	  are	  shown	  in	  Table	  1.	  As	  a	  result,	  a	  pore	  diffusion	  coefficient	  of	  
3×10-­‐12	  m2/s	  was	  determined	  for	  Cl-­‐36,	  and	  1.2×10-­‐11	  m2/s	  for	  HTO,	  Na-­‐22	  and	  I-­‐125.	  Furthermore,	  for	  Na-­‐
22	   and	   I-­‐125	   distribution	   coefficients	   of	   1.3×10-­‐5	   m3/kg	   and	   1.0×10-­‐5	   m3/kg	   were	   determined	   which	  
indicates	  weak	  sorption	  of	  them.	  The	  Kd	  of	  Na-­‐22	  given	  by	  the	  model	  was	  about	  one	  order	  of	  magnitude	  
lower	  than	  the	  one	  from	  batch	  sorption	  experiments.	  
	  
Table	  1.	  The	  Injected	  activities,	  porosities,	  pore	  diffusion	  and	  distribution	  coefficients	  (A0,	  ε,	  Dp	  and	  Kd)	  as	  determined	  
from	  the	  experiment	  for	  HTO,	  Na-­‐22,	  Cl-­‐36	  and	  I-­‐125	  
Nuclide	   ɛ	  [%]	   Dp	  [m2/s]	   Kd	  [m3/kg]	  
HTO	   0.7	   1.2×10-­‐11	   -­‐	  
Na-­‐22	   0.7	   1.2×10-­‐11	   1.3×10-­‐5	  
Cl-­‐36	   0.15	   <	  3×10-­‐12	   -­‐	  




Fig.	  3.	  Late	  time	  behavior	  of	  the	  breakthrough	  curves	  of	  HTO,	  Na-­‐22,	  Cl-­‐36,	  and	  I-­‐125	  show	  typical	  power-­‐law	  
behavior	  by	  the	  matrix	  diffusion	  and	  sorption	  in	  rock	  matrix.	  
	  
The	  analysis	  of	  breakthrough	  curves	  is	  not	  straightforward.	  Here	  the	  analysis	  was	  done	  by	  first	  assuming	  
that	  Kd	  for	  HTO	  is	  equal	  to	  zero	  and	  the	  average	  porosity	  of	  laboratory	  measurements	  (0.7%)	  was	  used	  in	  
the	  model	  (Sammaljärvi	  et	  al.	  2014).	  After	  fixing	  Kd	  and	  ɛ,	  Dp	  was	  adjusted	  so	  that	  good	  agreement	  with	  
the	  experimental	  curve	  was	  found.	  In	  case	  of	  Na-­‐22	  and	  I-­‐125,	  the	  same	  values	  for	  Dp	  and	  ɛ	  were	  used,	  and	  
Kd	  was	  adjusted	  to	  find	  good	  agreement	  with	  experiment.	  It	  was	  impossible	  to	  explain	  the	  breakthrough	  
curve	  of	  Cl-­‐36	  using	  the	  same	  values	  of	  Dp	  and	  ɛ	  as	  for	  HTO.	  Since	  it	  is	  unrealistic	  to	  decrease	  only	  Dp	  or	  ɛ,	  
both	  were	  decreased	  so	  as	  to	  find	  good	  agreement	  with	  the	  experiment.	  It	  is	  possible	  that,	  as	  chloride	  is	  an	  
anion,	  it	  is	  repelled	  by	  the	  negatively	  charged	  mineral	  surfaces	  and	  thus	  it	  can	  diffuse	  only	  in	  part	  of	  the	  




pore	   space.	  This	  will	   cause	   also	  decrease	  of	   the	  diffusion	   coefficient.	   Similar	   results	   for	  Cl-­‐36	  have	   also	  
been	  obtained	  in	  laboratory	  studies.	  
	  
	  
4	  Conclusions	  and	  discussion	  
	  
In-­‐situ	  experiment	  serie	  for	   investigating	  the	  diffusion	  and	  sorption	  properties	  of	  selected	  radionuclides	  
was	   introduced.	   The	   experiments	   will	   provide	   data	   on	   matrix	   diffusion	   and	   sorption	   of	   radionuclides	  
relevant	  under	  in-­‐situ	  conditions	  in	  the	  repository	  depth	  and	  valuable	  information	  for	  the	  safety	  analysis	  
of	   the	   repository.	   In	   the	   first	   WPDE	   tracer	   test,	   the	   retarding	   effect	   caused	   by	   matrix	   diffusion	   and	  
sorption	  were	  evident	   and	  analysis	  of	   the	  measured	  breakthrough	   curves	  were	   successfully	  performed.	  
Model	   including	   some	   effects	   of	   heterogeneous	   flow	   field	   and	   rock	   was	   able	   to	   explain	   both	   the	   early	  
(advection	  dominated)	  and	  late	  (diffusion	  and	  sorption	  dominated)	  parts	  of	  the	  breakthrough	  curves.	  The	  
physical	  parameters	  linked	  to	  properties	  of	  intact	  rock	  were	  successfully	  determined	  from	  late	  part	  of	  the	  
curve	   and	   the	   results	   are	   similar	   to	   the	   ones	   from	   laboratory	   experiments	   (Sammaljärvi	   et	   al.	   2014).	  
However,	  some	  questions	  remained	  still	  unanswered	  for	  which	   following	  experiments	  are	  trying	  to	   find	  
answers.	  
	  
The	  second	  WPDE	  tracer	  test	  with	  a	  lower	  flow	  rate	  (10	  µl/min)	  and	  HTO,	  Na-­‐22,	  Cl-­‐36,	  Ba-­‐133,	  and	  Sr-­‐85	  
as	  the	  tracers	  is	  now	  running.	  The	  aim	  is	  to	  get	  information	  about	  diffusion	  and	  sorption	  for	  a	  wider	  range	  
of	   radionuclides	   and	   at	   multiple	   time	   scales.	   Since	   in	   the	   first	   WPDE	   the	   late	   part	   of	   the	   Cl-­‐36	  
breakthrough	   curve	  was	  near	   to	  detection	   limit,	   its	   initial	   activity	  was	   increased	   in	   second	   experiment.	  
This	  will	  raise	  the	  tailing	  of	   the	  breakthrough	  curve	  and	  enable	  more	  reliable	  determination	  of	   the	  rock	  
matrix	   retention	   properties	   for	   Cl-­‐36.	   Parallel	   to	   these	   in-­‐situ	   experiments,	   a	   number	   of	   laboratory	  
experiments	   are	   being	   performed,	   some	   of	   which	   were	   referred	   to	   already	   here.	   Samples	   for	   the	  
laboratory	  studies	  were	  taken	  from	  the	  drillcores	  of	  in-­‐situ	  measurement	  interval.	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Initially	  conceived	  to	  last	  only	  a	  few	  decades	  (40	  years	  in	  Germany),	  extended	  storage	  periods	  have	  now	  
to	   be	   considered	   for	   spent	   nuclear	   fuel	   due	   to	   the	   expanding	   timeline	   for	   the	   definition	   and	  
implementation	   of	   the	   disposal	   in	   geologic	   repository.	   In	   some	   countries,	   extended	   storage	   may	  
encompass	   a	   timeframe	   of	   the	   order	   of	   centuries.	   The	   safety	   assessment	   of	   extended	   storage	   requires	  
predicting	  the	  behavior	  of	  the	  spent	  fuel	  assemblies	  and	  the	  package	  systems	  over	  a	  correspondingly	  long	  
timescale,	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  mechanical	  integrity	  and	  the	  required	  level	  of	  functionality	  of	  all	  components	  
of	  the	  containment	  system	  are	  retained.	  Since	  no	  measurement	  of	  "old"	  fuel	  can	  cover	  the	  ageing	  time	  of	  
interest,	  spent	  fuel	  characterization	  must	  be	  complemented	  by	  studies	  targeting	  specific	  mechanisms	  that	  
may	   affect	   properties	   and	   behavior	   of	   spent	   fuel	   during	   extended	   storage.	   Tests	   conducted	   under	  
accelerated	  ageing	  conditions	  and	  other	  relevant	  simulations	  are	  useful	  for	  this	  purpose.	  
	  
During	  storage,	  radioactive	  decay	  determines	  the	  overall	  conditions	  of	  spent	  fuel	  and	  generates	  heat	  that	  
must	   be	   dissipated.	   Alpha-­‐decay	   damage	   and	   helium	   accumulation	   are	   key	   processes	   affecting	   the	  
evolution	  of	  properties	  and	  behavior	  of	  spent	  fuel.	  The	  radiation	  damage	  induced	  by	  a	  decay	  event	  during	  
storage	  is	  significantly	  lower	  than	  that	  caused	  by	  a	  fission	  during	  in-­‐pile	  operation:	  however,	  the	  duration	  
of	  the	  storage	  is	  much	  longer	  and	  the	  temperature	  levels	  are	  different.	  Another	  factor	  potentially	  affecting	  
the	  mechanical	  integrity	  of	  spent	  fuel	  rods	  during	  storage	  and	  handling	  /	  transportation	  is	  the	  behavior	  of	  
hydrogen	  present	  in	  the	  cladding.	  	  
	  
At	   the	   Institute	   for	   Transuranium	   Elements,	   part	   of	   the	   Joint	   Research	   Centre	   of	   the	   European	  
Commission,	   spent	   fuel	   alterations	   as	   a	   function	   of	   time	   and	   activity	   are	  monitored	   at	   different	   scales,	  
from	  the	  microstructural	  level	  (defects	  and	  lattice	  parameter	  swelling)	  up	  to	  macroscopic	  properties	  such	  
as	   hardness	   and	   thermal	   conductivity.	   In	   order	   to	   reproduce	   cumulative	   damage	   effects	   expected	   after	  
very	   long	  storage	   time	  within	  acceptable	   laboratory	   timescales,	  accelerated	  damage	  build-­‐up	  conditions	  
are	   applied,	   e.g.	   by	  using	  unirradiated	   (U,Pu)	  oxide	  with	  high	   specific	   alpha-­‐activity	   (alpha-­‐doped	  UO2).	  
The	   measurements	   performed	   so	   far	   show	   that	   saturation	   of	   macroscopic	   hardness	   and	   thermal	  
conductivity	   occurs	   for	   a	   simulated	   timescale	   corresponding	   to	   spent	   fuel	   after	   decades	   or	   centuries	   of	  
storage	  (the	  exact	  time	  scale	  depends	  on	  parameters	  like	  fuel	  composition	  and	  burnup).	  The	  outcome	  of	  
the	  studies	  also	  show	  a	  non-­‐negligible	  extent	  of	  lattice	  swelling,	  peaking	  at	  an	  accumulated	  damage	  level	  
of	  ~1	  dpa.	  The	  behavior	  observed	   in	   tailor-­‐made	  samples	   is	   compared	   to	  actual	  high	  burnup	   fuel	   (UO2,	  
MOX),	  to	  verify	  extent	  and	  significance	  of	  eventual	  macroscopic	  alterations	  of	  spent	  fuel	  during	  long-­‐term	  
storage.	  	  
	  
This	  paper	  will	  present	  the	  main	  outcome	  of	  the	  extended	  storage	  studies	  performed	  on	  alpha-­‐doped	  UO2	  
and	   on	   spent	   fuel.	   The	   experimental	   approach	   to	   investigate	   the	   possible	   impact	   of	   spent	   fuel	   rods	  
alterations	  on	  their	  retrieval	  after	  extended	  storage,	  and	  the	  expected	  behavior	  under	  accident	  conditions	  
will	   be	   described.	   Extrapolations	   to	   very	   long	   timeframes	   corresponding	   to	   spent	   fuel	   evolution	   after	  
emplacement	  in	  the	  geologic	  repository	  will	  be	  illustrated.	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Abstract:	  The	  reference	  inventory	  of	  high-­‐level	  nuclear	  wastes	  designated	  for	  geological	  disposal	  in	  Germany	  
as	   used	   within	   the	   preliminary	   safety	   assessment	   for	   a	   geological	   repository	   in	   the	   Gorleben	   salt	   dome	  
(“vorläufige	   Sicherheitsanalyse	  Gorleben”,	   vSG)	   includes	   various	   types	  of	   spent	  nuclear	   fuels	   from	   research	  
and	  prototype	  reactors,	  besides	  LWR	  spent	   fuels	  and	  vitrified	  high-­‐level	  wastes.	  This	  paper	  will	  discuss	   the	  
results	   of	   and	   conclusions	   from	   corrosion	   experiments	   on	   spent	   fuels	   from	   prototype	   high-­‐temperature	  
reactors	  (HTR)	  and	  research	  reactors	  that	  were	  performed	  under	  conditions	  relevant	  for	  a	  deep	  geological	  
repository	  and	  provided	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  derivation	  of	  respective	  source	  terms	  in	  the	  vSG.	  
	  
	  
1	  Introduction	  	  
	  
The	  direct	  deep	  geological	  disposal	  of	  spent	  nuclear	  fuels	  using	  a	  multiple	  barrier	  concept	  is	  considered	  as	  
management	   option	   for	   high-­‐level	   nuclear	   wastes	   in	   many	   countries,	   such	   as	   Sweden,	   Finland,	   and	  
Germany.	   The	   outermost	   barrier	   within	   the	   multi	   barrier	   concept	   is	   a	   suitable	   geological	   formation	  
comprising	  either	  crystalline	  rocks	  (e.g.	  granites),	  clay	  rocks	  or	  unindurated	  clay	  formations,	  or	  evaporites	  
as	   repository	  host	   rocks.	  The	   innermost	  barrier	   is	  provided	  by	   the	   limited	  dissolution	   rate	  of	   the	   spent	  
fuel	  itself	  and	  the	  limited	  solubility	  of	  radionuclides	  embedded	  in	  the	  fuel	  matrix.	  The	  corrosion	  behavior	  
of	  uranium-­‐oxide	  based	  spent	  nuclear	   fuels	   from	  nuclear	  power	  plants,	  simulated	  spent	   fuel	  (SIMFUEL),	  
and	  UO2	  under	  repository	  relevant	  conditions	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  instant	  release	  of	  radionuclides	  (instant	  
release	  fraction)	  and	  the	  long-­‐term	  matrix	  dissolution	  has	  been	  investigated	  and	  reviewed	  in	  great	  detail	  
during	   the	   last	   decades	   (e.g.	   within	   EURATOM	   framework	   projects	   SFS,	   NF-­‐PRO,	   MICADO,	   and	   First	  
Nuclides),	   leading	   to	   a	   comprehensive	   understanding	   of	   the	   behavior	   of	   spent	   fuel	   under	   conditions	  
relevant	  to	  geological	  disposal	  for	  a	  range	  of	  geochemical	  conditions	  and	  disposal	  concepts.	  In	  the	  course	  
of	  these	  investigations,	  for	  example,	  effects	  of	  solution	  chemistry,	  radiation	  fields,	  H2-­‐(over)pressures	  and	  
redox	  conditions	  on	  the	  corrosion	  rates	  have	  been	  addressed,	  indicating	  a	  very	  slow	  corrosion	  rate	  for	  the	  
UO2	  fuel	  matrix	  under	  repository	  conditions	  in	  the	  long-­‐term.	  An	  extensive	  review	  of	  the	  properties	  and	  
performance	   of	   spent	   nuclear	   fuel	   as	   a	   suitable	   waste	   form	   for	   geological	   disposal	   is	   provided,	   for	  
example,	  by	  Carbol	  et	  al.	  (2012).	  	  
	  
Besides	  commercial	  spent	  fuels	  from	  power	  reactors,	  also	  a	  variety	  of	  non-­‐conventional	  spent	  fuels	  from	  
research	   reactors	   and	   prototype/test	   reactors	   are	   at	   present	   under	   consideration	   for	   direct	   geological	  
disposal,	   for	   example	   in	   the	   USA	   (Sandia	   National	   Laboratories,	   2014),	   the	   UK	   (DECC,	   2014),	   or	   the	  
Netherlands	   (Verhoef	   et	   al.,	   2011).	   The	   reference	   inventory	   of	   high-­‐level	   nuclear	  wastes	   designated	   for	  
geological	   disposal	   in	   Germany	   as	   used	   within	   the	   preliminary	   safety	   assessment	   for	   a	   geological	  
repository	  in	  the	  Gorleben	  salt	  dome	  (“vorläufige	  Sicherheitsanalyse	  Gorleben”,	  vSG)	  also	  includes	  various	  
types	  of	  spent	  nuclear	  fuels	  from	  research	  and	  prototype	  reactors,	  besides	  LWR	  spent	  fuels	  and	  vitrified	  
high-­‐level	  wastes	  (Peiffer	  et	  al.	  2011,	  Table	  1).	  
	  




Table	   1.	   Reference	   inventory	  of	   spent	  nuclear	   fuels	   from	  prototype	   and	   research	   reactors	  used	   in	   the	  preliminary	  
safety	  assessment	  Gorleben	  (vSG)	  (Peiffer	  et	  al.,	  2011)	  
Reactor	   Waste	  type	   Waste	  containers	   Volume	  
AVR	   288,161	  fuel	  element	  spheres	   152	  Castor®	  THTR/AVR	   656	  m³	  
THTR	   617,606	  fuel	  element	  spheres	   305	  Castor®	  THTR/AVR	   1,312	  m³	  
FRM-­‐II	   c.	  120	  …	  150	  MTR	  fuel	  elements	   30	  Castor®	  MTR	   75	  m³	  
BER-­‐II	   c.	  120	  MTR	  fuel	  elements	   20	  Castor®	  MTR	   50	  m³	  
KNK	   2,484	  fuel	  rods	  
4	  Castor®	  KNK	   15.4	  m³	  
NS	  Otto	  Hahn	   52	  fuel	  rods	  
	  
One	   important	   component	   of	   a	   safety	   case	   for	   a	   geological	   repository	   for	   radioactive	   waste	   is	   to	  
demonstrate	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  corrosion	  behavior	  of	  and	  the	  consequent	  radionuclide	  release	  from	  
the	  disposed	  wastes.	  Although	  the	  expected	  quantities	  of	  spent	  fuels	  from	  research	  and	  prototype	  reactors	  
potentially	  designated	  for	  geological	  disposal	   in	  Germany	  are	  rather	   low	  compared	  to	  commercial	  spent	  
fuels	   and	   vitrified	   wastes,	   a	   mechanistic	   understanding	   of	   the	   relevant	   processes	   that	   govern	   fuel	  
corrosion	   and	   subsequent	   radionuclide	   release	   in	   the	   repository	   environment	   is	   a	   prerequisite	   for	   the	  
derivation	   of	   reliable	   radionuclide	   source	   terms	   for	   safety	   assessments.	   However,	   in	   contrast	   to	   LWR	  
oxide	  fuels,	  information	  on	  the	  behavior	  of	  research	  and	  prototype	  reactor	  fuels	  under	  disposal	  conditions	  
is	   generally	   rather	   sparse.	   This	   paper	   will	   discuss	   the	   results	   of	   and	   conclusions	   from	   corrosion	  
experiments	  on	  spent	  fuels	  from	  prototype	  high-­‐temperature	  reactors	  (HTR)	  and	  research	  reactors	  (MTR)	  
that	   were	   performed	   under	   repository	   relevant	   conditions.	   The	   results	   of	   some	   of	   these	   experiments	  
provided	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  derivation	  of	  respective	  source	  terms	  in	  the	  vSG	  (cf.	  Kienzler	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  Open	  
questions	   and	   knowledge	   gaps	   regarding	   the	   corrosion	   behavior	   and	   radionuclide	   release	  mechanisms	  
under	  repository	  conditions	  will	  be	  discussed,	   taking	   into	  account	  the	  potential	   large	  variety	  of	  possible	  
environmental	   conditions	   in	   a	   repository	   for	   heat-­‐generating	   nuclear	   wastes	   in	   Germany	   that	   will	   be	  
selected	  within	  the	  frame	  of	  the	  new	  German	  law	  for	  repository	  siting	  (StandAG,	  2013).	  
	  
	  
2	  Characteristics	  of	  spent	  fuels	  from	  research	  and	  prototype	  reactors	  
	  
Compared	   to	  UO2-­‐based	  LWR	  fuels,	  nuclear	   fuel	   types	  employed	   in	  research	  and	  prototype	  reactors	  are	  
generally	   very	   different	   in	   design	   (e.g.	   regarding	   fuel	   composition,	   enrichment,	   cladding	  materials)	   and	  
irradiation	  history	   (i.e.	   irradiation	   temperatures,	   burn-­‐up)	   resulting	   in	  distinct	  differences	   regarding	   (i)	  
the	  microstructure	  development	  and	   (ii)	   concentration,	  distribution	  and	   speciation	  of	   fission/activation	  
products	   after	   irradiation.	   These	   structural	   and	   compositional	   differences	   lead	   also	   to	   significant	  
differences	  in	  their	  long-­‐term	  behavior	  in	  the	  repository	  environment.	  
	  
Current	   research	   reactor	   fuels	   as,	   for	   example,	   used	   in	   the	   German	   BER-­‐II	   and	   FRM-­‐II	   reactors,	   are	  
predominantly	  plate-­‐shaped	  dispersion	  type	  fuels	  composed	  of	  fuel	  particles	  dispersed	  in	  an	  inert	  matrix	  
and	   sandwiched	   between	   metal	   cladding	   (Kim,	   2012).	   The	   fuelled	   zone	   in	   a	   dispersion	   fuel	   plate	   -­‐	  
sometimes	   called	   the	   ‘fuel	   meat’	   or	   ‘fuel	   core’	   -­‐	   frequently	   consists	   of	   uranium-­‐aluminide	   (UAlx)	   or	  
uranium-­‐silicide	   (e.g.	   U3Si,	   U3Si2,	   or	   USi)	   fuel	   particles	   dispersed	   in	   an	   aluminum	   matrix	   that	   is	  
metallurgicaly	  bonded	  to	  aluminum	  cladding.	  Unlike	  moderately	  enriched	  conventional	  LWR	  fuel	  (4	  to	  5	  
wt.%	  235U),	  research	  reactor	  fuels	  used	  in	  material	  test	  reactors	  can	  employ	  either	  high-­‐enriched	  uranium	  
(HEU,	  up	  to	  80	  to	  90	  wt.%	  235U)	  or	  low-­‐enriched	  uranium	  (LEU,	  up	  to	  20	  wt.%	  235U).	  
	  




Fuel	   elements	   developed	   for	   the	   prototype	   HTR	   reactor	   in	   Jülich	   (AVR)	   and	   the	   Thorium-­‐
Hochtemperaturreaktor	   (THTR)	   at	   Hamm-­‐Uentrop	   consist	   of	   up	   to	   15,000	   small	   fuel	   kernels	   (UO2,	  
(U,Th)O2,	  or	  (U,Th)C2,)	  with	  diameters	  between	  200	  and	  500	  µm,	  embedded	  in	  a	  moulded	  graphite	  sphere	  
with	  a	  diameter	  of	  about	  60	  mm.	  The	  fuel	  kernels	  are	  coated	  with	  several	  pyrocarbon	  (PyC)	  layers	  (BISO)	  
or	  PyC	  and	  SiC	  layers	  (TRISO)	  (Fig.	  1).	  The	  outer	  shell	  (thickness	  about	  5	  mm)	  of	  the	  fuel	  element	  spheres	  
contains	   no	   fuel	   kernels.	   The	   average	   burn	   up	   of	   the	   THTR	   reactor	   (fuel	   enrichment	   ~93	  %	   235U)	  
amounted	  to	  about	  85	  GWd/tHM.	   Initial	  enrichment	  of	  AVR	  fuels	  varied	  between	  5	  and	  93	  %	  235U	  with	  a	  




Fig.	  1.	  Spherical	  HTR	  fuel	  element	  with	  TRISO	  kernels	  (modified	  after	  Fachinger	  et	  al.,	  2006)	  
	  
	  
3	  Behavior	  of	  spent	  fuels	  from	  research	  and	  prototype	  reactors	  under	  
repository	  conditions	  
	  
Migration	   of	   radionuclides	   from	   a	   geological	   repository	   into	   the	   geo-­‐/biosphere	   occurs	   mainly	   via	   the	  
water	  pathway	  after	  the	  waste	  comes	  into	  contact	  with	  groundwater.	  Investigations	  into	  the	  behavior	  of	  
aluminum-­‐clad	   intermetallic	   MTR	   fuels	   (UAlx-­‐Al	   and	   U3Si2-­‐Al)	   under	   conditions	   relevant	   to	   geological	  
disposal	  have	  been	  performed	  since	  the	  1990s	  in	  particular	  at	  Research	  Centre	  Jülich	  (e.g.	  Fachinger	  and	  
Curtius,	   2000;	  Mazeina	   et	   al.,	   2003;	   Brücher	   and	   Curtius,	   2007;	   Klinkenberg	   et	   al.,	   2010;	   Curtius	   et	   al.,	  
2011).	   Corrosion	   experiments	   of	   non-­‐irradiated	   and	   irradiated	   fuel	   elements	   in	   salt	   brines,	   clay	  waters	  
and	  granite	  waters	  revealed	  complete	  dissolution	  of	  these	  fuel	  types	  within	  a	  time	  frame	  of	  a	  few	  years,	  
indicating	  a	  very	  low	  corrosion	  resistance	  under	  repository	  conditions	  after	  the	  fuel	  comes	  in	  contact	  with	  
water	  (i.e.	  after	  failure	  of	  the	  waste	  container	  due	  to	  corrosion).	  The	  measured	  corrosion	  rates	  are	  up	  to	  4	  
orders	  of	  magnitude	  larger	  than	  matrix	  corrosion	  rates	  of	  UO2-­‐based	  LWR	  fuels	  under	  similar	  conditions,	  
with	  the	  highest	  corrosion	  rates	  in	  MgCl2-­‐rich	  brines	  and	  lower	  rates	  (about	  a	  factor	  3)	  in	  clay	  and	  granite	  
waters.	   The	   crystalline	   (e.g.	   layered	   double	   hydroxides,	   lesukite)	   and	   amorphous	   corrosion	   products	  
effectively	  retain	  many	  radionuclides	  (e.g.	  Am,	  Eu),	  whereas	  more	  mobile	  radionuclides	  such	  as	  Cs	  and	  Sr	  
are	  completely	  released	  into	  solution.	  The	  low	  concentrations	  of	  U	  (10-­‐8	  to	  10-­‐7	  M)	  and	  Pu	  (10-­‐7	  to	  10-­‐6	  M)	  
indicate	   solubility	   control	   by	   U(OH)4(am)	   and	   Pu-­‐(IV)-­‐polymer	   species	   under	   reducing	   conditions,	  
respectively.	  Ongoing	  research	  on	  the	  mechanistic	  understanding	  of	  the	  radionuclide	  retention	  processes	  
(sorption	  and/or	  structural	  uptake)	  on	  a	  molecular	  level	  indicate	  also	  efficient	  retention	  of	  anionic	  species	  
(e.g.	  of	  I,	  C,	  and	  Se)	  in	  the	  corrosion	  products,	  in	  particular	  by	  layered	  double	  hydroxides.	  




The	   corrosion	  behavior	  of	   and	   the	   radionuclide	   release	   from	  spent	  HTR	   fuels	  under	  geological	  disposal	  
conditions	  has	  been	  investigated	  throughout	  the	  last	  decades,	  focusing	  initially	  in	  particular	  on	  repository	  
conditions	  in	  evaporites	  (e.g.	  Zhang,	  1993;	  Fachinger	  et	  al.,	  1997;	  Rainer	  and	  Fachinger,	  1998;	  Fachinger	  
et	   al.,	   2006).	   Integral	   leaching	   experiments	   employing	   complete	   spent	  HTR	   fuel	   elements	   in	   salt	   brines	  
indicated	   extremely	   low	   radionuclide	   release	   rates	   under	   repository	   conditions,	   originating	   from	   U	  
impurities	  in	  the	  graphite	  and	  not	  from	  diffusion	  controlled	  leaching	  of	  radionuclides	  from	  the	  coated	  fuel	  
particles.	  Ongoing	   investigations	  of	   isolated	   irradiated	  high-­‐burn	  up	  UO2-­‐TRISO	  coated	  particles	   show	  a	  
fast	  release	  of	  some	  fission	  and	  activation	  products	  into	  the	  gas	  phase	  (e.g.	  14CO2,	  85Kr)	  and	  the	  aqueous	  
phase	  (e.g.	  137Cs)	  after	  cracking	  of	  the	  TRISO	  coating.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  aqueous	  corrosion	  of	  the	  fuel	  matrix	  
obtained	   under	   reducing	   conditions	   was	   found	   to	   be	   similar	   to	   UO2-­‐based	   LWR	   fuels.	   The	   results	  
demonstrate	  that	   the	  HTR	  fuel	  elements	  represent	  a	  very	  stable	  waste	  matrix	  as	   long	  as	  the	   integrity	  of	  
the	   SiC	   coatings	   of	   the	   kernels	   is	   not	   impaired.	   Corrosion	   experiments	   of	   Fachinger	   et	   al.	   (2006)	   on	  
pyrocarbon	  and	  SiC	   coating	  materials	   employing	   salt	  brines,	   clay	  waters,	   and	  granitic	  waters	   indicate	   a	  
life-­‐time	  of	  the	  coatings	  of	  (at	  least)	  about	  104	  to	  105	  years.	  
	  
	  
4	  Concluding	  remarks	  
	  
Compared	  to	  the	  amounts	  of	  spent	  LWR	  fuel	  elements	  from	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  and	  vitrified	  high-­‐level	  
wastes	  (in	  total	  c.	  26,000	  m³),	  the	  volumes	  of	  spent	  fuels	  from	  research	  and	  prototype	  reactors	  potentially	  
designated	   for	   geological	   disposal	   in	   Germany	   are	   rather	   low.	   However,	   their	   design/composition	   and	  
irradiation	  histories,	   as	  well	   as	   in	   their	   behavior	   under	   repository	   conditions	   show	   large	  differences	   to	  
UO2-­‐based	  LWR	  fuels.	  A	  mechanistic	  understanding	  of	  the	  relevant	  processes	  that	  govern	  corrosion	  of	  and	  
subsequent	  radionuclide	  release	  from	  spent	  research	  reactor	  and	  prototype	  reactor	  fuels	  in	  the	  repository	  
environment	  after	  contact	  with	  groundwater	   is	  a	  prerequisite	   for	   the	  derivation	  of	  reliable	  radionuclide	  
source	   terms	   for	   safety	   assessments,	   taking	   into	  account	   in	  particular	   also	   the	  potential	   of	  post-­‐closure	  
criticality	  events,	  due	  to	  the	  usage	  of	  highly	  enriched	  uranium	  in	  these	  fuels.	  
	  
With	   respect	   to	   the	   time	   scales	   relevant	   for	   geological	   disposal,	   spent	   MTR	   fuels	   will	   corrode	  
instantaneously	   after	   coming	   into	   contact	   with	   groundwater.	   Thus	   after	   failure	   of	   the	   canisters,	   the	  
radionuclide	  inventory	  can	  be	  instantly	  released	  from	  these	  materials.	  However,	  parts	  of	  the	  radionuclide	  
inventory	   can	   be	   retained	   in	   secondary	   phases	   formed	   during	   the	   fuel	   corrosion	   process,	   for	   example,	  
hydrotalcite-­‐like	   layered	  double	  hydroxide	  phases,	  or	  are	  solubility	   limited	  under	  repository	  conditions.	  
Ongoing	   research	   on	   the	   mechanistic	   understanding	   of	   the	   radionuclide	   retention	   processes	   (sorption	  
and/or	  structural	  uptake)	  on	  a	  molecular	  level	  indicate	  also	  efficient	  retention	  of	  anionic	  species	  (e.g.	  of	  I,	  
C,	   and	   Se)	   and	   will	   provide	   additional	   knowledge	   for	   the	   safety	   case	   for	   nuclear	   waste	   disposal.	   The	  
amount,	   nature,	   and	   stability	   of	   the	   corrosion	   products	   depend	   on	   the	   near	   field	   conditions	   (e.g.	  
groundwater	  composition,	  pH,	  Eh,	  etc.,	  and	  thus	  also	  on	  the	  host	  rocks	  and	  disposal	  concepts)	  and	  are	  in	  
the	   focus	  of	  ongoing	   research,	   since	  not	   for	   all	   involved	   secondary	  phases	   thermodynamic	  data	  exist	   at	  
present.	  
	  
The	  HTR	  fuel	  elements	   form	  a	  complex	  multi-­‐barrier	  system	  with	  respect	   to	   the	   long-­‐term	  radionuclide	  
mobilization	  under	  final	  disposal	  conditions,	  where	  each	  barrier	  contributes	  to	  the	  radionuclide	  retention.	  
HTR	   fuel	   elements	   represent	   a	   very	   stable	   waste	   matrix	   with	   a	   high	   resistance	   against	   radionuclide	  
leaching	   as	   long	   as	   the	   integrity	   of	   the	   coatings	   of	   the	   kernels	   is	   not	   impaired.	  Due	   to	   their	   irradiation	  
history,	   the	   release	   of	   fission	   gases	   and	   mobile	   radionuclides	   (such	   as	   Cs)	   from	   the	   fuel	   kernels	   after	  
failure	  of	  the	  coatings	  can	  be	  much	  higher	  compared	  to	  LWR	  fuels.	  However,	  matrix	  corrosion	  rates	  of	  the	  




UO2	  fuel	  kernels	  have	  been	  found	  to	  be	  comparable	  to	  conventional	  spent	  LWR	  fuels.	  Future	  work	  should	  
be	   focused	  on	   the	  development	  of	   integral	  models	   to	  describe	   the	   radionuclide	   release	   from	  spent	  HTR	  
fuels,	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  different	  "barriers",	  radiolytic	  effects	  and	  potential	  irradiation	  
damage,	  as	  well	  as	  hydrodynamic	  constraints,	  and	  should	  address	  also	  disposal	  conditions	  representative	  
for	  clay	  host	  rocks	  and	  crystalline	  rocks.	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The	  Waste	  Isolation	  Pilot	  Plant	  is	  located	  about	  42	  kilometers	  from	  the	  city	  of	  Carlsbad,	  New	  Mexico.	  It	  is	  
an	   operating	   deep	   geologic	   repository	   in	   bedded	   salt	   657	  meters	   below	   the	   surface	   of	   the	   Chihuahuan	  
desert.	  Since	  its	  opening	  in	  March	  of	  1999,	  it	  has	  received	  about	  12,000	  shipments	  totaling	  about	  91,000	  
cubic	  meters	  of	  defense	  related	  transuranic	  (TRU)	  wastes.	  Twenty-­‐two	  sites	  have	  been	  cleaned	  up	  of	  their	  
defense-­‐legacy	  TRU	  waste.	  The	  WIPP’s	  shipping	  program	  has	  an	  untarnished	  safety	  record	  and	  its	  trucks	  
and	  trailers	  have	  safely	  traveled	  the	  equivalent	  of	  about	  60	  round-­‐trips	  to	  the	  Moon.	  WIPP	  received,	  and	  
deserved,	  a	  variety	  of	  safety	  accolades	  over	  its	  nearly	  15	  year	  working	  life.	  In	  February	  of	  2014,	  however,	  
two	  incidents	  resulted	  in	  a	  major	  operational	  suspension	  and	  reevaluation	  of	  its	  safety	  systems,	  processes	  
and	  equipment.	  The	  first	   incident	  was	  an	  underground	  mining	  truck	  fire,	   followed	  nine	  days	   later	  by	  an	  
airborne	  radiation	  release	  incident.	  Accident	  Investigation	  Board	  (AIB)	  reports	  on	  both	  incidents	  point	  to	  
failures	   of	   plans,	   procedures	   and	   persons.	   The	   AIB	   recommendations	   for	   recovery	   from	   both	   these	  
incidents	  are	  numerous	  and	  are	  being	  carefully	  implemented.	  One	  major	  recommendation	  is	  to	  no	  longer	  
have	   different	   maintenance	   and	   safety	   requirements	   for	   nuclear	   handling	   equipment	   and	   mining	  
equipment.	  Maintenance	   and	   cleanliness	   of	  mining	   equipment	  was	   cited	   as	   a	   contributing	   cause	   to	   the	  
underground	  fire,	  and	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  can	  be	  lesser	  rigor	  in	  taking	  care	  of	  mining	  equipment,	  when	  it	  is	  
being	  operated	  in	  the	  same	  underground	  space	  as	  the	  waste	  handling	  equipment,	  is	  not	  tenable.	  At	  some	  
point	  in	  the	  future,	  the	  changes	  made	  in	  response	  to	  these	  two	  incidents	  will	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  valuable	  lesson	  
learned	  on	  behalf	  of	  future	  repository	  programs.	  WIPP	  will	  once	  again	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  “pilot”	  in	  the	  nautical	  
sense,	   in	   terms	   of	   ‘showing	   the	   way’	   –the	   way	   to	   a	   national	   and	   international	   radioactive	   waste	  
management	   solution.	  The	  operational	   lessons	   learned	   from	   these	   two	   incidents	  will	   be	   available	   to	  be	  
shared	   with	   other	   geologic	   repository	   programs.	   Neither	   of	   these	   two	   operational	   incidents	   call	   into	  
question	  the	  suitability	  of	  rock	  salt	  as	  a	  repository	  host	  rock.	  Both	  incidents	  point	  to	  a	  need	  to	  take	  care	  to	  
evaluate	  all	  potential	  consequences	  in	  making	  decisions	  about	  underground	  equipment	  maintenance	  and	  
housekeeping,	  and	  to	  make	  a	  greater	  effort	  to	  assure	  that	  measures	  are	  taken	  to	  mitigate	  lower	  likelihood	  
events	  and	  to	  practice	  emergency	  egress	  procedures	  until	  they	  are	  second	  nature	  to	  the	  workforce.	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A	   deep	   geological	   repository	   is	   the	   reference	   solution	   enshrined	   in	   the	   French	   law	   for	   the	   long-­‐term	  
management	  of	  high-­‐level	  radioactive	  waste.	  The	  current	  project	   is	   led	  by	  Andra,	  the	  French	  radioactive	  
waste	  management	  organization.	  As	  a	  technical	  support	  organization,	  IRSN’s	  mission	  is,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  
safety	  case	  produced	  by	  Andra,	  to	  assess	  the	  safety	  of	  such	  a	  facility	  at	  its	  various	  stages	  of	  development,	  
that	  is	  to	  say	  the	  design,	  construction,	  operation	  and	  post-­‐closure	  phases	  of	  the	  facility.	  	  
	  
Such	  a	  facility	  will	  have	  to	  meet	  specific	  requirements,	  within	  different	  time	  frames	  as	  stated	  above.	  One	  of	  
the	  requirements	   is	   “reversibility”:	   in	   fact,	  French	   law	  poses	   that	   the	  geological	  disposal	  will	  have	   to	  be	  
“reversible”	   for	  a	  certain	  time,	  yet	  not	   fully	  defined.	  Reversibility	   is	  nevertheless	  believed	  encompassing	  
both	  the	  decision	  making	  process	  related	  to	  the	  waste	  emplacement	  process	  during	  operational	  phase	  and	  
the	  ability	  to	  retrieve	  waste,	  should	  such	  a	  decision	  be	  made.	  	  
	  
Thus,	  underground	  structures	  have	   to	  be	  designed	  and	  operated	   to	  allow	  both	  waste	  emplacement	  and	  
removal.	   Moreover,	   future	   decision	   making	   about	   the	   disposal	   process	   will	   have	   to	   rely	   on	   a	   sound	  
technical	  basis.	  This	  implies	  a	  data	  collection	  scheme	  and	  a	  monitoring	  program	  of	  the	  facility	  to	  check	  if	  
the	  disposal	  process	  is	  bound	  by	  limits,	  controls	  and	  conditions	  compatible	  with	  (i)	  a	  safe	  operation	  of	  the	  
facility	  and	  (ii)	  the	  state	  of	  the	  facility	  that	  the	  operator	  wants	  to	  achieve	  at	  the	  time	  of	  its	  closure,	  so	  that	  
long-­‐term	  safety	  is	  guaranteed.	  	  
	  
Therefore,	   technical	  criteria	  and	  key	  parameters	  have	  to	  be	  selected	  and	  monitored	  during	  construction	  
and	   operation,	   that	   is	   to	   say	   for	   decades.	   Then,	   reversibility	   have	   to	  make	   room	   for	   corrective	   actions,	  
including	  the	  retrieval	  of	  waste,	   if	  something	  goes	  wrong	  and	  especially	   if	   the	  facility	   is	  not	  seen	  as	  safe	  
anymore,	  especially	  in	  the	  perspective	  of	  long-­‐term	  safety.	  To	  perform	  such	  corrective	  actions,	  a	  complete	  
set	  of	  tools	  and	  procedures	  should	  be	  designed	  from	  early	  on.	  	  
	  
In	  this	  view,	  reversiblity	  is	  not	  just	  a	  constraint	  imposed	  by	  Law,	  but	  should	  rather	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  key	  factor	  
for	   ensuring	   a	   cautious,	   stepwise	   and	   consistent	   governance	   of	   the	   disposal	   facility.	   Its	   cornerstones	  
reside	   (i)	   in	   the	   definition	   of	   a	  monitoring	   program	  bound	   to	   gathering	   accurate	   data	   for	   the	   decision-­‐
making	   process	   (ii)	   and	   means	   to	   openly	   react	   if	   such	   data	   proves	   that	   the	   disposal	   system	   shows	  
weaknesses	  in	  achieving	  its	  goals	  for	  all	  the	  considered	  time	  frames.	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Since	  2003,	  Andra	  (the	  French	  public	  body	  in	  charge	  of	  radioactive	  waste	  management)	  has	  been	  working	  
on	  the	  progressive	  technological	  development	  of	  waste	  storage	  containers,	  package	  handling	  mechanical	  
prototypes,	  excavation	  techniques	  and	  support	  lining	  of	  underground	  openings	  at	  the	  Bure	  Underground	  
Laboratory	  (URL)	  site,	  in	  order	  to	  evaluate	  the	  feasibility	  of	  constructing	  and	  operating	  a	  Deep	  Geological	  
Repository	   (DGR	   aka	   Cigéo),	   in	   the	   Callovian-­‐Oxfordian	   clayish	   formation	   (the	   “Argillites”),	   likely	   to	  
receive	  as	  of	  2025-­‐2030	  the	  first	  of	  many	  intermediate	  and	  high-­‐level	  long	  lived	  wastes,	  at	  a	  500m	  depth.	  	  
	  
The	  Cigéo	  Project,	  which	  has	  now	  entered	  into	  an	  intense	  engineering	  development	  phase,	  must	  take	  into	  
account	  all	  the	  data,	  knowledge	  and	  experience	  gathered	  over	  more	  than	  10	  years	  of	  technical	  research.	  
The	   spectrum	   of	   activities	   concerned	   encompasses	   a	   wide	   array	   of	   subjects	   such	   as	   the	   return	   of	  
experience	  gathered	  from	  the	  shaft	  sinking	  operations,	  the	  drift	  excavation	  operations	  (via	  means	  of	  rock	  
hammer,	   road	   header	   and	   tunnel	   boring	  machine)	   and	   the	   subsequent	   lining	   support	   of	   the	   horizontal	  
drifts	   (via	   metal	   arches,	   mesh,	   rock	   bolts,	   shotcrete,	   cast	   concrete	   and	   wedges).	   The	   story	   of	   coring,	  
drilling	   and	   casing	   vertical,	   slanted	   or	   horizontal	   boreholes	   is	   also	   of	   interest.	   The	   implementation	   and	  
evaluation	  of	  sealing	  technologies	  or	  hydraulic	  cut-­‐offs	  must	  be	  integrated	  in	  the	  design.	  The	  construction	  
and	   qualification	   in	   3	   campaigns	   of	   9	   families	   of	   concrete	   containers	   and	   3	   categories	   of	   carbon	   steel	  
overpacks	   also	   come	   as	   input	   data.	   The	   design,	   construction	   and	   testing	   of	   3	   package	   emplacement	  
systems,	   the	   implementation	   of	   2	   waste	   retrievability	   tests	   are	   accounted	   for	   in	   the	   studies	   ongoing.	  
Finally	   the	   collation	  of	   environmental	   and	   geotechnical	   data	   on	   the	   excavated	  material	   (likely	   to	   be	   re-­‐
used	  for	  opening	  backfilling	  at	  time	  of	  repository	  closure)	  will	  help	  to	  minimize	  the	  acreage,	  volume	  and	  
visual	  impact	  of	  the	  muck	  dumps.	  
	  
The	   purpose	   of	   this	   presentation	   is	   to	   provide	   an	   overall	   view	   of	   the	   Cigéo	   Project	   development	   plan	  
(structure,	   administrative	   calendar,	  work	   schedule,	   organizational	   set-­‐up	  prevailing	   for	   the	   engineering	  
phase)	  and	  then	  to	  explicit	  the	  link	  between	  this	  design	  phase	  and	  the	  Andra	  experience	  gained	  during	  the	  
past	  10	  years	  of	  technological	  tests.	  The	  presentation	  is	  also	  providing	  a	  prospective	  analysis	  to	  show	  how	  
on-­‐going	  engineering	  activities	  and	  anterior	  practice	  will	  be	  adapted	  and	  merged	  to	  found	  the	  credibility	  
of	  Cigéo.	  
	  
These	   technological	   verifications	   on	   key	   elements	   of	   concepts	   are	   practical	   tools	   used	   to	   gain	   the	  
confidence	   of	   stakeholders	   and	   the	   public	   in	   particular.	   Their	   results	   will	   facilitate	   the	   evaluators’	  
assessment	  during	  the	  Cigéo	  license	  application	  instruction	  process.	  
	  
Finally,	  the	  presentation	  also	  elaborates	  how	  on-­‐going	  activities	  at	  the	  URL	  will	  also	  help	  in	  the	  knowledge	  
and	  monitoring	  basis	  needed	  to	  start	  the	  construction	  and	  operation	  of	  the	  disposal	  facility.	  
	   	  




Lessons	  Learned	  in	  Demonstration	  Projects	  Regarding	  Operational	  
Safety	  during	  Final	  Disposal	  of	  Vitrified	  Waste	  and	  Spent	  Fuel	  
	  
WOLFGANG	  FILBERT1,2,	  PHILIPP	  HEROLD1	  
1DBE	   TECHNOLOGY	  GmbH,	   Eschenstraße	   55,	   31224	   Peine,	   Germany,	   2email:	   filbert@dbe.de,	   phone:	   +49	   (0)	  
5171	  43	  1522	  
	  
Abstract:	  The	  paper	  summarizes	  the	  lessons	  learned	  in	  demonstration	  projects	  regarding	  operational	  safety	  
during	   the	   final	   disposal	   of	   vitrified	  waste	   and	   spent	   fuel.	   The	   three	   demonstration	   projects	   for	   the	   direct	  
disposal	   of	   vitrified	  waste	   and	   spent	   fuel	   are	   described.	   The	   first	   two	   demonstration	   projects	   concern	   the	  
shaft	   transport	   of	   heavy	   payloads	   of	   up	   to	   85	  t	   and	   the	   emplacement	   operations	   in	   the	   mine.	   The	   third	  
demonstration	  project	  concerns	  the	  borehole	  emplacement	  operation.	  Finally,	  open	  issues	  for	  the	  next	  steps	  





Up	  until	  2013	  (StandAG),	  the	  German	  concept	  for	  the	  disposal	  of	  high-­‐level	  radioactive	  waste	  (HLW)	  and	  
spent	   fuel	   (SF)	   (GRS	  2012)	   proposed	   geological	   disposal	   in	   a	   rock	   salt	   formation.	  While	  HLW	  canisters	  
(mainly	  canisters	  with	  vitrified	  waste	  from	  reprocessing)	  were	  to	  be	  disposed	  of	  in	  vertical	  boreholes,	  SF	  
was	  to	  be	  placed	  in	  heavy,	  self-­‐shielding	  containers	  (POLLUX®,	  weight	  65	  t)	  that	  were	  to	  be	  emplaced	  in	  
horizontal	  disposal	  drifts.	  For	  the	  disposal	  of	  SF,	  an	  alternative	  concept	  –	  the	  so-­‐called	  “BSK	  3	  concept”	  –	  
was	  developed,	  which	  relies	  on	  a	  vertical	  borehole	  emplacement	  technology.	  (Note:	  BSK	  3	  is	  the	  German	  
acronym	  for	  fuel	  rod	  canister	  with	  the	  rods	  of	  3	  PWR	  reactor	  fuel	  elements.)	  
	  
To	  obtain	  a	  license	  to	  construct	  a	  repository	  in	  Germany,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  demonstrate	  to	  the	  competent	  
authorities	  with	  a	  high	  level	  of	  confidence	  that	  the	  level	  of	  protection	  (dose	  or	  risk)	  can	  be	  met.	  
	  
For	  all	  concepts,	  the	  different	  technical	  systems	  for	  transport	  and	  disposal	  were	  designed,	  and	  operative	  




2	  Demonstration	  Tests	  
	  
2.1	  Demonstration	  test	  shaft	  transport	  
	  
The	  first	  test	  was	  carried	  out	  in	  1992/1993	  for	  the	  vertical	  transport	  of	  POLLUX®	  casks	  in	  a	  shaft	  (Filbert	  
1994).	  
	  
The	  steps	  to	  the	  full-­‐scale	  test	  were:	  
	  
• designing	   a	   shaft	   hoisting	   system	   based	   on	   the	   payload	   of	   85	  t	   (transport	   system	   plus	   waste	  
package)	  and	  designing	  the	  emplacement	  level	  
• selecting	  the	  Koepe	  system	  with	  cage	  and	  counter	  weight	  
• designing	  the	  loading	  and	  unloading	  devices	  




• performing	  probabilistic	  safety	  analyses	  and	  reliability	  study	  
• full-­‐scale	  tests	  
	  
All	  devices	  were	  designed,	  fabricated,	  and	  tested	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  applicable	  specific	  requirements,	  
taking	   into	  account	   the	  payload	  of	  85	   t.	  Figure	  1	  shows	   the	  demonstration	   facility	   for	   the	  shaft	  hoisting	  
system	  for	  a	  payload	  of	  85	  t.	  
	  
	  
Fig.	  1.	  Demonstration	  facility	  with	  cage	  and	  transport	  cart	  
	  
2000	   loading	   and	   unloading	   operations	   were	   performed	   and	   showed	   the	   reliability	   of	   the	   system.	  
Operational	  disturbances	  were	  simulated,	  and	  the	  implication	  on	  radiological	  protection	  was	  assessed.	  A	  
probabilistic	   safety	   analysis	  based	  on	   the	   reliability	  data	  derived	   from	   the	   full-­‐scale	   tests	   estimated	   the	  
probability	   of	   occurrence	   of	   catastrophic	   events	   in	   the	   order	   of	   <10-­‐6	   per	   year.	   With	   this	   value,	   these	  
incidents	  are	  in	  the	  range	  of	  residual	  risks.	  
	  
2.2	  Demonstration	  test	  drift	  emplacement	  
	  
A	  second	  test	  series	  in	  1994/1995	  (Filbert	  1995)	  was	  aimed	  at	  demonstrating	  the	  feasibility	  of	  rail-­‐bound	  
handling	  system,	  horizontal	  transportation,	  and	  drift	  emplacement	  of	  self-­‐shielded	  containers	  loaded	  with	  
spent	  fuel,	  see	  Figure	  2.	  Here,	  emphasis	  was	  placed	  on	  the	  development	  and	  construction	  of	  components,	  
such	  as	  an	  emplacement	  device,	  a	  transport	  cart,	  and	  a	  mining	  locomotive.	  Their	  capabilities	  of	  working	  
under	  normal	  operating	  conditions	  and	  under	  conditions	  of	  operational	  disturbances	  were	  demonstrated	  
in	  a	  full-­‐scale	  surface	  test	  facility	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  the	  safe	  handling	  of	  waste	  packages.	  
	  
Again,	  2000	  disposal	  and	  retrieval	  operations	  to	  simulate	  the	  next	  disposal	  operation	  were	  performed	  and	  
showed	   the	   reliability	   of	   the	   system.	   Operational	   disturbances	   were	   simulated,	   and	   the	   implication	   on	  
radiological	  protection	  was	  assessed.	  





Fig.	  2.	  Demonstration	  facility	  with	  emplacement	  device	  and	  transport	  cart	  
	  
2.3	  Demonstration	  test	  borehole	  emplacement	  
	  
A	  third	  test	  series	  in	  2008/2009	  (Filbert	  2009)	  was	  aimed	  at	  demonstrating	  the	  feasibility	  of	  a	  rail-­‐bound	  
handling	  system,	  horizontal	  transportation,	  and	  vertical	  borehole	  emplacement	  of	  BSK	  3,	  see	  Figure	  3.	  	  
	  
	  
Fig.	  3.	  Demonstration	  facility	  for	  borehole	  disposal	  




All	   full-­‐scale	  demonstration	   tests	  were	  carried	  out	   in	  a	   surface	   facility	  using	  canister	  dummies	  with	   the	  
same	  dimensions	  and	  masses	  as	  real	  BSK	  3	  canisters.	  
	  
The	  demonstration	  tests	  comprised	  all	  process	  steps,	  beginning	  with	  the	  acceptance	  of	  the	  BSK	  3	  canister	  
and	  concluding	  with	  the	  emplacement	  of	  the	  canister	  into	  the	  vertical	  borehole.	  In	  total,	  more	  than	  1000	  
complete	  emplacement	  operations	  had	  been	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  test	  program.	  The	  entire	  system	  
and	  each	  component	  proved	  to	  be	  safe,	  reliable,	  and	  robust.	  The	  masses	  involved	  in	  the	  BSK	  3	  concept	  are	  
slightly	   lower	   than	   those	   in	   the	   POLLUX®	  concept.	   It	   can	   thus	   be	   assumed	   that	   all	   shaft	   transport	   and	  
hoisting	  devices	  developed	  for	  the	  POLLUX®	  concept	  are	  applicable	  for	  the	  BSK	  3	  concept	  as	  well.	  
	  
	  
3	  Results	  and	  lessons	  learned	  
	  
The	   basic	   reliability	   of	   all	   technologies	   involved	   in	   the	   transport,	   handling,	   and	   disposal	   of	   radioactive	  
waste	  has	  been	  confirmed	  for	  all	  concepts	  in	  surface	  "cold"	  full-­‐scale	  demonstration	  tests.	  All	  components	  
were	  successfully	  tested.	  
	  
The	  design	  was	  assessed	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  radioactive,	  mechanical,	  and	  thermal	  conditions,	   taking	   into	  
account	  the	  design	  requirements	  defined	  for	  normal	  operation	  and	  for	  hypothetical	  accident	  conditions	  of	  
transport	  and	  disposal.	  The	  tight	  enclosure	  of	  the	  radioactive	  inventory	  has	  to	  be	  ensured	  by	  the	  POLLUX®	  
casks	  and	  the	  BSK	  3	  canisters	  themselves.	  
	  
Taking	   into	  account	   the	  current	   state	  of	  development,	   six	  main	  priorities	  were	   identified	   for	  R&D	  work	  
within	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  radiological	  and	  operational	  safety	  investigation	  (Filbert	  2008):	  
	  
• possible	  rock	  mechanics	  effects	  
• consequences	  of	  inflow	  of	  solutions	  and	  natural	  gases	  
• analysis	  of	  radionuclides	  that	  fall	  out	  in	  the	  mine	  after	  a	  release	  incident	  
• acquisition	  of	  failure	  rate	  data	  for	  equipment	  and	  systems	  
• update	  of	  the	  probabilistic	  safety	  analysis	  based	  on	  new	  developments	  
• mitigation	  of	  the	  residual	  risk	  
	  
Independent	  experts	  confirmed	   that	  all	  design	  requirements	   imposed	  are	  met	   for	   the	   transport	  and	   the	  
emplacement	  systems.	  
	  
From	  a	   technical	  point	  of	  view,	   the	  concepts	  are	  now	  ready	   for	   testing	  underground	   to	  simulate	   typical	  
“mining	   conditions”	   in	   a	   dustier	   environment	   with	   higher	   temperatures.	   The	   further	   optimization	   and	  
evaluation	  of	  the	  concepts,	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  lessons	  learned	  with	  regard	  to	  operational	  safety	  that	  
have	  not	  yet	  been	  implemented,	  remains	  a	  task	  for	  the	  years	  to	  come	  and	  requires	  a	  stable	  set	  of	  safety	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International	   intercomparison	  and	  harmonization	  projects	  are	  one	  of	   the	  mechanisms	  developed	  by	   the	  
IAEA	  for	  examining	  the	  application	  and	  use	  of	  safety	  standards,	  with	  a	  view	  to	  ensuring	  their	  effectiveness	  
and	  working	  towards	  harmonization	  of	  approaches	  to	  the	  safety	  of	  radioactive	  waste	  management.	  
	  
The	   IAEA	   has	   organized	   a	   number	   of	   international	   projects	   on	   the	   safety	   of	   radioactive	   waste	  
management;	   in	   particular	   on	   the	   issues	   related	   to	   safety	   demonstration	   for	   radioactive	   waste	  
management	   facilities.	   In	   2008,	   GEOSAF,	   Demonstration	   of	   The	   Operational	   and	   Long-­‐Term	   Safety	   of	  
Geological	  Disposal	  Facilities	  for	  Radioactive	  Waste,	  project	  was	  initiated.	  This	  project	  was	  completed	  in	  
2011	  by	  delivering	  a	  project	  report	  focusing	  on	  the	  safety	  case	  for	  geological	  disposal	  facilities,	  a	  concept	  
that	  has	  gained	  in	  recent	  years	  considerable	  prominence	  in	  the	  waste	  management	  area	  and	  is	  addressed	  
in	  several	  international	  safety	  standards.	  	  
	  
During	   the	   course	   of	   the	   project,	   it	   was	   recognized	   that	   little	   work	   was	   undertaken	   internationally	   to	  
develop	  a	  common	  view	  on	  the	  safety	  approach	  related	  to	  the	  operational	  phase	  of	  a	  geological	  disposal	  
although	  long-­‐term	  safety	  of	  disposal	  facility	  has	  been	  discussed	  for	  several	  decades.	  	  
	  
Upon	  completion	  of	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  GEOSAF	  project,	  it	  was	  decided	  to	  commence	  a	  follow-­‐up	  project	  
aiming	   at	   harmonizing	   approaches	   on	   the	   safety	   of	   geological	   disposal	   facilities	   for	   radioactive	   waste	  
through	  the	  development	  of	  an	  integrated	  safety	  case	  covering	  both	  operational	  and	  long-­‐term	  safety.	  The	  
new	   project	   was	   named	   as	   GEOSAF	   Part	   II,	   which	   was	   initiated	   in	   2012	   initially	   as	   2-­‐year	   project,	  
involving	  regulators	  and	  operators.	  	  
	  
GEOSAF	  Part	  II	  provides	  a	  forum	  to	  exchange	  ideas	  and	  experience	  on	  the	  development	  and	  review	  of	  an	  
integrated	   operational	   and	   post-­‐closure	   safety	   case	   for	   geological	   disposal	   facilities.	   It	   also	   aims	   at	  
providing	  a	  platform	  for	  knowledge	  transfer.	  	  
	  
The	   project	   is	   of	   particular	   interest	   to	   regulatory	   authorities,	   technical	   safety	   organizations	   and	  waste	  
management	  organizations	  responsible	  for	  the	  development	  and	  operation	  of	  geological	  disposal	  facilities.	  
The	  project	  is	  planned	  to	  be	  completed	  in	  2015.	  The	  outcome	  of	  the	  project	  will	  be	  compiled	  as	  a	  technical	  
report,	   which	   provides	   views	   and	   expectations	   regarding	   how	   the	   safety	   during	   operational	   phase	   of	  
radioactive	  waste	  geological	  disposal	  faicility	  can	  potentially	  impact	  on	  post-­‐closure	  safety.	  
	  
In	   this	  presentation,	  overview	  of	  GEOSAF	  project	  and	  ongoing	   topics	  being	  discussed	   in	  GEOSAF	  Part	   II	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